diff --git a/doc/OpenPGP b/doc/OpenPGP
index 96223d71d..794f6694e 100644
--- a/doc/OpenPGP
+++ b/doc/OpenPGP
@@ -9,6 +9,15 @@
   ===================
    GnuPG (>=1.0.3) is in compliance with RFC2440 despite these exceptions:
 
+    * With GnuPG >= 2.1.0 all support for version 3 keys has been
+      removed.  Thus there is no more compatibility with PGP-2.  Users
+      who need to be able to decrypt old PGP 2 messages should use
+      GnuPG 1.4.x along with the option --allow-weak-digest-algos.
+
+    * With GnuPG >= 2.1.0 all signatures (on messages and keys) are
+      created using version 4 signatures.  Support for verifying
+      version 3 signature is still available.
+
     * (9.2) states that IDEA SHOULD be implemented.  This is not done
       due to patent problems.
       UPDATE: Since version 1.4.13 (or GnuPG 2.x with Libgcrypt 1.6)
diff --git a/doc/gpg.texi b/doc/gpg.texi
index 2997b6436..cddf46238 100644
--- a/doc/gpg.texi
+++ b/doc/gpg.texi
@@ -2129,6 +2129,7 @@ platforms that have different line ending conventions (UNIX-like to Mac,
 Mac to Windows, etc). @option{--no-textmode} disables this option, and
 is the default.
 
+@ifclear gpgtwoone
 @item --force-v3-sigs
 @itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
 @opindex force-v3-sigs
@@ -2147,6 +2148,15 @@ Defaults to no.
 Always use v4 key signatures even on v3 keys. This option also
 changes the default hash algorithm for v3 RSA keys from MD5 to SHA-1.
 @option{--no-force-v4-certs} disables this option.
+@end ifclear
+
+@ifset gpgtwoone
+@item --force-v3-sigs
+@itemx --no-force-v3-sigs
+@item --force-v4-certs
+@itemx --no-force-v4-certs
+These options are obsolete and have no effect since GnuPG 2.1.
+@end ifset
 
 @item --force-mdc
 @opindex force-mdc
@@ -2301,8 +2311,12 @@ compression algorithms none and ZIP. This also disables
 --throw-keyids, and making signatures with signing subkeys as PGP 6
 does not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.
 
-This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines
---force-v3-sigs}.
+@ifclear gpgtwoone
+This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines --force-v3-sigs}.
+@end ifclear
+@ifset gpgtwoone
+This option implies @option{--disable-mdc --escape-from-lines}.
+@end ifset
 
 @item --pgp7
 @opindex pgp7
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index af0de3b41..c04abab54 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -291,24 +291,13 @@ do_key (iobuf_t out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk)
   int i, nskey, npkey;
   iobuf_t a = iobuf_temp(); /* Build in a self-enlarging buffer.  */
 
-  /* Write the version number - if none is specified, use 3 */
+  /* Write the version number - if none is specified, use 4 */
   if ( !pk->version )
-    iobuf_put ( a, 3 );
+    iobuf_put ( a, 4 );
   else
     iobuf_put ( a, pk->version );
   write_32 (a, pk->timestamp );
 
-  /* v3 needs the expiration time. */
-  if ( pk->version < 4 )
-    {
-      u16 ndays;
-      if ( pk->expiredate )
-        ndays = (u16)((pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp) / 86400L);
-      else
-        ndays = 0;
-      write_16(a, ndays);
-    }
-
   iobuf_put (a, pk->pubkey_algo );
 
   /* Get number of secret and public parameters.  They are held in one
@@ -347,45 +336,37 @@ do_key (iobuf_t out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk)
       /* Build the header for protected (encrypted) secret parameters.  */
       if (ski->is_protected)
         {
-          if ( is_RSA (pk->pubkey_algo) && pk->version < 4 && !ski->s2k.mode )
+          /* OpenPGP protection according to rfc2440. */
+          iobuf_put (a, ski->sha1chk? 0xfe : 0xff);
+          iobuf_put (a, ski->algo);
+          if (ski->s2k.mode >= 1000)
             {
-              /* The simple rfc1991 (v3) way. */
-              iobuf_put (a, ski->algo );
-              iobuf_write (a, ski->iv, ski->ivlen);
+              /* These modes are not possible in OpenPGP, we use them
+                 to implement our extensions, 101 can be viewed as a
+                 private/experimental extension (this is not specified
+                 in rfc2440 but the same scheme is used for all other
+                 algorithm identifiers). */
+              iobuf_put (a, 101);
+              iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
+              iobuf_write (a, "GNU", 3 );
+              iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.mode - 1000);
             }
           else
             {
-              /* OpenPGP protection according to rfc2440. */
-              iobuf_put (a, ski->sha1chk? 0xfe : 0xff);
-              iobuf_put (a, ski->algo);
-              if (ski->s2k.mode >= 1000)
-                {
-                  /* These modes are not possible in OpenPGP, we use
-                     them to implement our extensions, 101 can be
-                     viewed as a private/experimental extension (this
-                     is not specified in rfc2440 but the same scheme
-                     is used for all other algorithm identifiers). */
-                  iobuf_put (a, 101);
-                  iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
-                  iobuf_write (a, "GNU", 3 );
-                  iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.mode - 1000);
-                }
-              else
-                {
-                  iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.mode);
-                  iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
-                }
-
-              if (ski->s2k.mode == 1 || ski->s2k.mode == 3)
-                iobuf_write (a, ski->s2k.salt, 8);
-
-              if (ski->s2k.mode == 3)
-                iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.count);
-
-              /* For our special modes 1001, 1002 we do not need an IV. */
-              if (ski->s2k.mode != 1001 && ski->s2k.mode != 1002)
-                iobuf_write (a, ski->iv, ski->ivlen);
+              iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.mode);
+              iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.hash_algo);
             }
+
+          if (ski->s2k.mode == 1 || ski->s2k.mode == 3)
+            iobuf_write (a, ski->s2k.salt, 8);
+
+          if (ski->s2k.mode == 3)
+            iobuf_put (a, ski->s2k.count);
+
+          /* For our special modes 1001, 1002 we do not need an IV. */
+          if (ski->s2k.mode != 1001 && ski->s2k.mode != 1002)
+            iobuf_write (a, ski->iv, ski->ivlen);
+
         }
       else /* Not protected. */
         iobuf_put (a, 0 );
@@ -400,7 +381,7 @@ do_key (iobuf_t out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk)
           /* The serial number gets stored in the IV field.  */
           iobuf_write (a, ski->iv, ski->ivlen);
         }
-      else if (ski->is_protected && pk->version >= 4)
+      else if (ski->is_protected)
         {
           /* The secret key is protected - write it out as it is.  */
           byte *p;
@@ -410,20 +391,6 @@ do_key (iobuf_t out, int ctb, PKT_public_key *pk)
           p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[npkey], &ndatabits);
           iobuf_write (a, p, (ndatabits+7)/8 );
         }
-      else if (ski->is_protected)
-        {
-          /* The secret key is protected the old v4 way. */
-          for ( ; i < nskey; i++ )
-            {
-              byte *p;
-              unsigned int ndatabits;
-
-              assert (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
-              p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &ndatabits);
-              iobuf_write (a, p, (ndatabits+7)/8);
-            }
-          write_16 (a, ski->csum );
-        }
       else
         {
           /* Non-protected key. */
diff --git a/g10/filter.h b/g10/filter.h
index 40c51343d..731ad0fba 100644
--- a/g10/filter.h
+++ b/g10/filter.h
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control,
 int text_filter( void *opaque, int control,
 		 iobuf_t chain, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len);
 int copy_clearsig_text (iobuf_t out, iobuf_t inp, gcry_md_hd_t md,
-                        int escape_dash, int escape_from, int pgp2mode);
+                        int escape_dash, int escape_from);
 
 /*-- progress.c --*/
 progress_filter_context_t *new_progress_context (void);
diff --git a/g10/gpg.c b/g10/gpg.c
index 57deb8d60..1df44fe7c 100644
--- a/g10/gpg.c
+++ b/g10/gpg.c
@@ -272,10 +272,6 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values
     oShowPhotos,
     oNoShowPhotos,
     oPhotoViewer,
-    oForceV3Sigs,
-    oNoForceV3Sigs,
-    oForceV4Certs,
-    oNoForceV4Certs,
     oForceMDC,
     oNoForceMDC,
     oDisableMDC,
@@ -525,10 +521,6 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oQuiet,	  "quiet",   "@"),
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoTTY,   "no-tty",  "@"),
 
-  ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceV3Sigs,      "force-v3-sigs", "@"),
-  ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceV3Sigs, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"),
-  ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceV4Certs,     "force-v4-certs", "@"),
-  ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceV4Certs, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"),
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oForceMDC, "force-mdc", "@"),
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoForceMDC, "no-force-mdc", "@"),
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oDisableMDC, "disable-mdc", "@"),
@@ -810,6 +802,10 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-sk-comments", "@"),
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-keys", "@"),
   ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "compress-sigs", "@"),
+  ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v3-sigs", "@"),
+  ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v3-sigs", "@"),
+  ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "force-v4-certs", "@"),
+  ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoop, "no-force-v4-certs", "@"),
 
   ARGPARSE_end ()
 };
@@ -2535,7 +2531,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
 	    opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
 	    opt.pgp2_workarounds = 0;
 	    opt.escape_from = 1;
-	    opt.force_v3_sigs = 0;
 	    opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
 	    opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
 	    opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
@@ -2553,7 +2548,6 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
 	    opt.allow_freeform_uid = 1;
 	    opt.pgp2_workarounds = 0;
 	    opt.escape_from = 0;
-	    opt.force_v3_sigs = 0;
 	    opt.not_dash_escaped = 0;
 	    opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
 	    opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
@@ -2637,10 +2631,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
 	    opt.verify_options&=~VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS;
 	    break;
 	  case oPhotoViewer: opt.photo_viewer = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
-	  case oForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 1; break;
-	  case oNoForceV3Sigs: opt.force_v3_sigs = 0; break;
-          case oForceV4Certs: opt.force_v4_certs = 1; break;
-          case oNoForceV4Certs: opt.force_v4_certs = 0; break;
+
 	  case oForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 1; break;
 	  case oNoForceMDC: opt.force_mdc = 0; break;
 	  case oDisableMDC: opt.disable_mdc = 1; break;
@@ -3288,15 +3279,17 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
     /* Do these after the switch(), so they can override settings. */
     if(PGP6)
       {
+        /* That does not anymore work becuase we have no more support
+           for v3 signatures.  */
 	opt.disable_mdc=1;
 	opt.escape_from=1;
-	opt.force_v3_sigs=1;
 	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
       }
     else if(PGP7)
       {
+        /* That does not anymore work because we have no more support
+           for v3 signatures.  */
 	opt.escape_from=1;
-	opt.force_v3_sigs=1;
 	opt.ask_sig_expire=0;
       }
     else if(PGP8)
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 308576da0..a8e6f5d18 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -536,14 +536,10 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
     {
       u32 sk_keyid[2], pk_keyid[2];
       char *p, *trust_regexp = NULL;
-      int force_v4 = 0, class = 0, selfsig = 0;
+      int class = 0, selfsig = 0;
       u32 duration = 0, timestamp = 0;
       byte trust_depth = 0, trust_value = 0;
 
-      if (local || nonrevocable || trust
-          || opt.cert_policy_url || opt.cert_notations)
-	force_v4 = 1;
-
       pk = sk_rover->pk;
       keyid_from_pk (pk, sk_keyid);
 
@@ -567,14 +563,7 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
 
 	      /* Is this a self-sig? */
 	      if (pk_keyid[0] == sk_keyid[0] && pk_keyid[1] == sk_keyid[1])
-		{
-		  selfsig = 1;
-		  /* Do not force a v4 sig here, otherwise it would
-		     be difficult to remake a v3 selfsig.  If this
-		     is a v3->v4 promotion case, then we set
-		     force_v4 later anyway. */
-		  force_v4 = 0;
-		}
+                selfsig = 1;
 	    }
 	  else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
 	    {
@@ -716,7 +705,6 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
 						     "it to an OpenPGP self-"
 						     "signature? (y/N) ")))
 			  {
-			    force_v4 = 1;
 			    node->flag |= NODFLG_DELSIG;
 			    xfree (user);
 			    continue;
@@ -860,7 +848,6 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
 		         passphrase, etc). */
 		      timestamp = now;
 		      duration = primary_pk->expiredate - now;
-		      force_v4 = 1;
 		    }
 
 		  cpr_kill_prompt ();
@@ -879,9 +866,6 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
 	    duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_cert_expire);
 	}
 
-      if (duration)
-	force_v4 = 1;
-
       if (selfsig)
 	;
       else
@@ -1041,7 +1025,7 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
 					 node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
 					 NULL,
 					 pk,
-					 0x13, 0, force_v4 ? 4 : 0, 0, 0,
+					 0x13, 0, 0, 0,
 					 keygen_add_std_prefs, primary_pk,
                                          NULL);
 	      else
@@ -1049,7 +1033,7 @@ sign_uids (estream_t fp,
 					 node->pkt->pkt.user_id,
 					 NULL,
 					 pk,
-					 class, 0, force_v4 ? 4 : 0,
+					 class, 0,
 					 timestamp, duration,
 					 sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
                                          NULL);
@@ -3290,7 +3274,7 @@ menu_adduid (KBNODE pub_keyblock, int photo, const char *photo_name)
   if (!uid)
     return 0;
 
-  err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+  err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x13, 0, 0, 0,
                             keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, NULL);
   if (err)
     {
@@ -3674,9 +3658,7 @@ menu_addrevoker (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t pub_keyblock, int sensitive)
       break;
     }
 
-  /* The 1F signature must be at least v4 to carry the revocation key
-     subpacket. */
-  rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 4, 0, 0,
+  rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk, 0x1F, 0, 0, 0,
 			   keygen_add_revkey, &revkey, NULL);
   if (rc)
     {
@@ -4966,7 +4948,7 @@ reloop:			/* (must use this, because we are modifing the list) */
 	}
       rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, primary_pk,
 			       unode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
-			       NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+			       NULL, signerkey, 0x30, 0, 0, 0,
                                sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
       free_public_key (signerkey);
       if (rc)
@@ -5058,7 +5040,7 @@ menu_revuid (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
 	    node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELUID;
 
 	    rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, pk, 0x30, 0,
-				     (reason == NULL) ? 3 : 0, timestamp, 0,
+				     timestamp, 0,
 				     sign_mk_attrib, &attrib, NULL);
 	    if (rc)
 	      {
@@ -5122,7 +5104,7 @@ menu_revkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
     return 0;
 
   rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk,
-			   0x20, 0, opt.force_v4_certs ? 4 : 0, 0, 0,
+			   0x20, 0, 0, 0,
 			   revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL);
   if (rc)
     {
@@ -5183,7 +5165,7 @@ menu_revsubkey (KBNODE pub_keyblock)
 
 	  node->flag &= ~NODFLG_SELKEY;
 	  rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, mainpk, NULL, subpk, mainpk,
-				   0x28, 0, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
+				   0x28, 0, 0, 0, sign_mk_attrib, &attrib,
                                    NULL);
 	  if (rc)
 	    {
diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
index 6079ff0b7..80954527c 100644
--- a/g10/keygen.c
+++ b/g10/keygen.c
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ make_backsig (PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
   cache_public_key (sub_pk);
 
   err = make_keysig_packet (&backsig, pk, NULL, sub_pk, sub_psk, 0x19,
-                            0, 0, timestamp, 0, NULL, NULL, cache_nonce);
+                            0, timestamp, 0, NULL, NULL, cache_nonce);
   if (err)
     log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed for backsig: %s\n", g10_errstr(err));
   else
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ write_direct_sig (KBNODE root, PKT_public_key *psk,
 
   /* Make the signature.  */
   err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, NULL,NULL, psk, 0x1F,
-                            0, 0, timestamp, 0,
+                            0, timestamp, 0,
                             keygen_add_revkey, revkey, cache_nonce);
   if (err)
     {
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ write_selfsigs (KBNODE root, PKT_public_key *psk,
 
   /* Make the signature.  */
   err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pk, uid, NULL, psk, 0x13,
-                            0, 0, timestamp, 0,
+                            0, timestamp, 0,
                             keygen_add_std_prefs, pk, cache_nonce);
   if (err)
     {
@@ -1036,12 +1036,12 @@ write_keybinding (KBNODE root, PKT_public_key *pri_psk, PKT_public_key *sub_psk,
   oduap.usage = use;
   oduap.pk = sub_pk;
   err = make_keysig_packet (&sig, pri_pk, NULL, sub_pk, pri_psk, 0x18,
-                            0, 0, timestamp, 0,
+                            0, timestamp, 0,
                             keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire, &oduap,
                             cache_nonce);
   if (err)
     {
-      log_error ("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr (err));
+      log_error ("make_keysig_packeto failed: %s\n", g10_errstr (err));
       return err;
     }
 
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
index 8b4eeb1f2..662806b3e 100644
--- a/g10/keyid.c
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -147,10 +147,6 @@ hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk)
   size_t nbytes;
   int npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo);
 
-  /* Two extra bytes for the expiration date in v3 */
-  if(pk->version<4)
-    n+=2;
-
   /* FIXME: We can avoid the extra malloc by calling only the first
      mpi_print here which computes the required length and calling the
      real mpi_print only at the end.  The speed advantage would only be
@@ -211,16 +207,6 @@ hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk)
   gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->timestamp >>  8 );
   gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->timestamp       );
 
-  if(pk->version<4)
-    {
-      u16 days=0;
-      if(pk->expiredate)
-	days=(u16)((pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp) / 86400L);
-
-      gcry_md_putc ( md, days >> 8 );
-      gcry_md_putc ( md, days );
-    }
-
   gcry_md_putc ( md, pk->pubkey_algo );
 
   if(npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0]
@@ -432,18 +418,6 @@ keyid_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid)
       keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1];
       lowbits = keyid[1];
     }
-  else if( pk->version < 4 )
-    {
-      if( is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) )
-	{
-	  lowbits = (pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo) ?
-                     v3_keyid ( pk->pkey[0], keyid ) : 0); /* From n. */
-	  pk->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
-	  pk->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
-	}
-      else
-	pk->keyid[0]=pk->keyid[1]=keyid[0]=keyid[1]=lowbits=0xFFFFFFFF;
-    }
   else
     {
       const byte *dp;
@@ -706,66 +680,20 @@ colon_expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
 byte *
 fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len)
 {
-  byte *buf;
   const byte *dp;
-  size_t len, nbytes;
-  int i;
+  size_t len;
+  gcry_md_hd_t md;
 
-  if ( pk->version < 4 )
-    {
-      if ( is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) )
-        {
-          /* RSA in version 3 packets is special. */
-          gcry_md_hd_t md;
-
-          if (gcry_md_open (&md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0))
-            BUG ();
-          if ( pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo) > 1 )
-            {
-              for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
-                {
-                  if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0,
-                                      &nbytes, pk->pkey[i]))
-                    BUG ();
-                  /* fixme: Better allocate BUF on the stack */
-                  buf = xmalloc (nbytes);
-                  if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, buf, nbytes,
-                                      NULL, pk->pkey[i]))
-                    BUG ();
-                  gcry_md_write (md, buf, nbytes);
-                  xfree (buf);
-                }
-            }
-          gcry_md_final (md);
-          if (!array)
-            array = xmalloc (16);
-          len = 16;
-          memcpy (array, gcry_md_read (md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5), 16);
-          gcry_md_close(md);
-        }
-      else
-        {
-          if (!array)
-            array = xmalloc(16);
-          len = 16;
-          memset (array,0,16);
-        }
-    }
-  else
-    {
-      gcry_md_hd_t md;
-
-      md = do_fingerprint_md(pk);
-      dp = gcry_md_read( md, 0 );
-      len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (gcry_md_get_algo (md));
-      assert( len <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN );
-      if (!array)
-        array = xmalloc ( len );
-      memcpy (array, dp, len );
-      pk->keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
-      pk->keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
-      gcry_md_close( md);
-    }
+  md = do_fingerprint_md(pk);
+  dp = gcry_md_read( md, 0 );
+  len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (gcry_md_get_algo (md));
+  assert( len <= MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN );
+  if (!array)
+    array = xmalloc ( len );
+  memcpy (array, dp, len );
+  pk->keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
+  pk->keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
+  gcry_md_close( md);
 
   if (ret_len)
     *ret_len = len;
diff --git a/g10/options.h b/g10/options.h
index edd31a9c2..0875eb529 100644
--- a/g10/options.h
+++ b/g10/options.h
@@ -74,8 +74,6 @@ struct
   int no_armor;
   int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/
   int def_cipher_algo;
-  int force_v3_sigs;
-  int force_v4_certs;
   int force_mdc;
   int disable_mdc;
   int def_digest_algo;
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
index b1b82d75b..ba43638fa 100644
--- a/g10/packet.h
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ int ask_for_detached_datafile( gcry_md_hd_t md, gcry_md_hd_t md2,
 int make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
 			PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk,
 			PKT_public_key *pksk, int sigclass, int digest_algo,
-			int sigversion, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+			u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
 			int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *),
 			void *opaque,
                         const char *cache_nonce);
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index f7b2079b0..50da17cb9 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -1901,53 +1901,6 @@ parse_onepass_sig (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 }
 
 
-static gcry_mpi_t
-read_protected_v3_mpi (IOBUF inp, unsigned long *length)
-{
-  int c;
-  unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
-  unsigned char *buf, *p;
-  gcry_mpi_t val;
-
-  if (*length < 2)
-    {
-      log_error ("mpi too small\n");
-      return NULL;
-    }
-
-  if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
-    return NULL;
-  --*length;
-  nbits = c << 8;
-  if ((c = iobuf_get (inp)) == -1)
-    return NULL;
-  --*length;
-  nbits |= c;
-
-  if (nbits > 16384)
-    {
-      log_error ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
-      return NULL;
-    }
-  nbytes = (nbits + 7) / 8;
-  buf = p = xmalloc (2 + nbytes);
-  *p++ = nbits >> 8;
-  *p++ = nbits;
-  for (; nbytes && *length; nbytes--, --*length)
-    *p++ = iobuf_get (inp);
-  if (nbytes)
-    {
-      log_error ("packet shorter than mpi\n");
-      xfree (buf);
-      return NULL;
-    }
-
-  /* Convert buffer into an opaque MPI.  */
-  val = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, buf, (p - buf) * 8);
-  return val;
-}
-
-
 static int
 parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	   byte * hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET * pkt)
@@ -1956,7 +1909,6 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
   int i, version, algorithm;
   unsigned long timestamp, expiredate, max_expiredate;
   int npkey, nskey;
-  int is_v4 = 0;
   int rc = 0;
   u32 keyid[2];
   PKT_public_key *pk;
@@ -1991,8 +1943,19 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
       return 0;
     }
   else if (version == 4)
-    is_v4 = 1;
-  else if (version != 2 && version != 3)
+    {
+      /* The only supported version.  Use an older gpg
+         versions (i.e. gpg 1.4 to parse v3 packets).  */
+    }
+  else if (version == 2 || version == 3)
+    {
+      log_info ("packet(%d) with obsolete version %d\n", pkttype, version);
+      if (list_mode)
+        es_fprintf (listfp, ":key packet: [obsolete version %d]\n", version);
+      err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
+      goto leave;
+    }
+  else
     {
       log_error ("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
       if (list_mode)
@@ -2012,23 +1975,8 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 
   timestamp = read_32 (inp);
   pktlen -= 4;
-  if (is_v4)
-    {
-      expiredate = 0;		/* have to get it from the selfsignature */
-      max_expiredate = 0;
-    }
-  else
-    {
-      unsigned short ndays;
-      ndays = read_16 (inp);
-      pktlen -= 2;
-      if (ndays)
-	expiredate = timestamp + ndays * 86400L;
-      else
-	expiredate = 0;
-
-      max_expiredate = expiredate;
-    }
+  expiredate = 0;		/* have to get it from the selfsignature */
+  max_expiredate = 0;
   algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
   pktlen--;
   if (list_mode)
@@ -2145,7 +2093,7 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	      ski->s2k.hash_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
 	      pktlen--;
 	      /* Check for the special GNU extension.  */
-	      if (is_v4 && ski->s2k.mode == 101)
+	      if (ski->s2k.mode == 101)
 		{
 		  for (i = 0; i < 4 && pktlen; i++, pktlen--)
 		    temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
@@ -2312,7 +2260,7 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 						 10 * 8);
 	  pktlen = 0;
 	}
-      else if (is_v4 && ski->is_protected)
+      else if (ski->is_protected)
 	{
 	  /* Ugly: The length is encrypted too, so we read all stuff
 	   * up to the end of the packet into the first SKEY
@@ -2331,29 +2279,18 @@ parse_key (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	}
       else
 	{
-          /* The v3 method: The mpi length is not encrypted.  */
+          /* Not encrypted.  */
 	  for (i = npkey; i < nskey; i++)
 	    {
-	      if (ski->is_protected)
-		{
-		  pk->pkey[i] = read_protected_v3_mpi (inp, &pktlen);
-                  if (pk->pkey[i])
-                    gcry_mpi_set_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
-		  if (list_mode)
-		    es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: [v3 protected]\n", i);
-		}
-	      else
-		{
-		  unsigned int n = pktlen;
-		  pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
-		  pktlen -= n;
-		  if (list_mode)
-		    {
-		      es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
-		      mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode);
-		      es_putc ('\n', listfp);
-		    }
-		}
+              unsigned int n = pktlen;
+              pk->pkey[i] = mpi_read (inp, &n, 0);
+              pktlen -= n;
+              if (list_mode)
+                {
+                  es_fprintf (listfp, "\tskey[%d]: ", i);
+                  mpi_print (listfp, pk->pkey[i], mpi_print_mode);
+                  es_putc ('\n', listfp);
+                }
 
 	      if (!pk->pkey[i])
 		err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
diff --git a/g10/revoke.c b/g10/revoke.c
index 81b5d6de5..6b9e709fe 100644
--- a/g10/revoke.c
+++ b/g10/revoke.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ gen_desig_revoke( const char *uname, strlist_t locusr )
 
 	    /* create it */
 	    rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, NULL, pk2, 0x20, 0,
-				     0, 0, 0,
+				     0, 0,
 				     revocation_reason_build_cb, reason,
                                      NULL);
 	    if( rc ) {
@@ -465,7 +465,6 @@ create_revocation (const char *filename,
   push_armor_filter (afx, out);
 
   rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, psk, NULL, NULL, psk, 0x20, 0,
-                           opt.force_v4_certs? 4:0,
                            0, 0,
                            revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, cache_nonce);
   if (rc)
@@ -649,16 +648,13 @@ gen_revoke (const char *uname)
       goto leave;
     }
 
-  if (psk->version >= 4 || opt.force_v4_certs)
+  /* Get the reason for the revocation.  */
+  reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 1);
+  if (!reason)
     {
-      /* Get the reason for the revocation.  */
-      reason = ask_revocation_reason (1, 0, 1);
-      if (!reason)
-        {
-          /* user decided to cancel */
-          rc = 0;
-          goto leave;
-        }
+      /* User decided to cancel.  */
+      rc = 0;
+      goto leave;
     }
 
   if (!opt.armor)
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index bd78c1750..e7d4a6888 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -155,30 +155,32 @@ mk_notation_policy_etc (PKT_signature *sig,
 static void
 hash_uid (gcry_md_hd_t md, int sigversion, const PKT_user_id *uid)
 {
-    if ( sigversion >= 4 ) {
-        byte buf[5];
+  byte buf[5];
 
-	if(uid->attrib_data) {
-	  buf[0] = 0xd1;	           /* indicates an attribute packet */
-	  buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24;  /* always use 4 length bytes */
-	  buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16;
-	  buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >>  8;
-	  buf[4] = uid->attrib_len;
-	}
-	else {
-	  buf[0] = 0xb4;	    /* indicates a userid packet */
-	  buf[1] = uid->len >> 24;  /* always use 4 length bytes */
-	  buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
-	  buf[3] = uid->len >>  8;
-	  buf[4] = uid->len;
-	}
-        gcry_md_write( md, buf, 5 );
+  (void)sigversion;
+
+  if (uid->attrib_data)
+    {
+      buf[0] = 0xd1;	               /* Indicates an attribute packet.  */
+      buf[1] = uid->attrib_len >> 24;  /* Always use 4 length bytes.  */
+      buf[2] = uid->attrib_len >> 16;
+      buf[3] = uid->attrib_len >>  8;
+      buf[4] = uid->attrib_len;
     }
+  else
+    {
+      buf[0] = 0xb4;	               /* Indicates a userid packet.  */
+      buf[1] = uid->len >> 24;         /* Always use 4 length bytes.  */
+      buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
+      buf[3] = uid->len >>  8;
+      buf[4] = uid->len;
+    }
+  gcry_md_write( md, buf, 5 );
 
-    if(uid->attrib_data)
-      gcry_md_write (md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len );
-    else
-      gcry_md_write (md, uid->name, uid->len );
+  if (uid->attrib_data)
+    gcry_md_write (md, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len );
+  else
+    gcry_md_write (md, uid->name, uid->len );
 }
 
 
@@ -188,45 +190,38 @@ hash_uid (gcry_md_hd_t md, int sigversion, const PKT_user_id *uid)
 static void
 hash_sigversion_to_magic (gcry_md_hd_t md, const PKT_signature *sig)
 {
-    if (sig->version >= 4)
-        gcry_md_putc (md, sig->version);
-    gcry_md_putc (md, sig->sig_class);
-    if (sig->version < 4) {
-        u32 a = sig->timestamp;
-        gcry_md_putc (md, (a >> 24) & 0xff );
-        gcry_md_putc (md, (a >> 16) & 0xff );
-        gcry_md_putc (md, (a >>  8) & 0xff );
-        gcry_md_putc (md,  a	       & 0xff );
-    }
-    else {
-        byte buf[6];
-        size_t n;
+  byte buf[6];
+  size_t n;
 
-        gcry_md_putc (md, sig->pubkey_algo);
-        gcry_md_putc (md, sig->digest_algo);
-        if (sig->hashed) {
-            n = sig->hashed->len;
-            gcry_md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
-            gcry_md_putc (md,  n       );
-            gcry_md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
-            n += 6;
-        }
-        else {
-            gcry_md_putc (md, 0);  /* always hash the length of the subpacket*/
-            gcry_md_putc (md, 0);
-            n = 6;
-        }
-        /* add some magic */
-        buf[0] = sig->version;
-        buf[1] = 0xff;
-        buf[2] = n >> 24; /* hmmm, n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0 */
-        buf[3] = n >> 16;
-        buf[4] = n >>  8;
-        buf[5] = n;
-        gcry_md_write (md, buf, 6);
+  gcry_md_putc (md, sig->version);
+  gcry_md_putc (md, sig->sig_class);
+  gcry_md_putc (md, sig->pubkey_algo);
+  gcry_md_putc (md, sig->digest_algo);
+  if (sig->hashed)
+    {
+      n = sig->hashed->len;
+      gcry_md_putc (md, (n >> 8) );
+      gcry_md_putc (md,  n       );
+      gcry_md_write (md, sig->hashed->data, n );
+      n += 6;
     }
+  else
+    {
+      gcry_md_putc (md, 0);  /* Always hash the length of the subpacket.  */
+      gcry_md_putc (md, 0);
+      n = 6;
+    }
+  /* Add some magic.  */
+  buf[0] = sig->version;
+  buf[1] = 0xff;
+  buf[2] = n >> 24;         /* (n is only 16 bit, so this is always 0) */
+  buf[3] = n >> 16;
+  buf[4] = n >>  8;
+  buf[5] = n;
+  gcry_md_write (md, buf, 6);
 }
 
+
 /* Perform the sign operation.  If CACHE_NONCE is given the agent is
    advised to use that cached passphrase fro the key.  */
 static int
@@ -520,26 +515,6 @@ hash_for (PKT_public_key *pk)
 }
 
 
-/* Return true iff all keys in SK_LIST are old style (v3 RSA).  */
-static int
-only_old_style (SK_LIST sk_list)
-{
-  SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
-  int old_style = 0;
-
-  for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
-    {
-      PKT_public_key *pk = sk_rover->pk;
-
-      if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA && pk->version < 4)
-        old_style = 1;
-      else
-        return 0;
-    }
-  return old_style;
-}
-
-
 static void
 print_status_sig_created (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, int what)
 {
@@ -705,10 +680,8 @@ write_signature_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, gcry_md_hd_t hash,
 
       /* Build the signature packet.  */
       sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sig);
-      if (opt.force_v3_sigs)
-        sig->version = 3;
-      else if (duration || opt.sig_policy_url
-               || opt.sig_notations || opt.sig_keyserver_url)
+      if (duration || opt.sig_policy_url
+          || opt.sig_notations || opt.sig_keyserver_url)
         sig->version = 4;
       else
         sig->version = pk->version;
@@ -727,11 +700,8 @@ write_signature_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, gcry_md_hd_t hash,
       if (gcry_md_copy (&md, hash))
         BUG ();
 
-      if (sig->version >= 4)
-        {
-          build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig);
-          mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, pk, NULL);
-        }
+      build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig);
+      mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, pk, NULL);
 
       hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
       gcry_md_final (md);
@@ -814,13 +784,10 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
        && (rc=setup_symkey(&efx.symkey_s2k,&efx.symkey_dek)))
       goto leave;
 
-    if(!opt.force_v3_sigs)
-      {
-	if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
-	  duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
-	else
-	  duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
-      }
+    if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
+      duration = ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
+    else
+      duration = parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
 
     /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
        unprotect the secret key.  This is now done on demand by the agent.  */
@@ -1123,30 +1090,22 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, strlist_t locusr, const char *outfile )
     int rc = 0;
     SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
     SK_LIST sk_rover = NULL;
-    int old_style = 0;
-    int only_md5 = 0;
     u32 duration=0;
 
     pfx = new_progress_context ();
     afx = new_armor_context ();
     init_packet( &pkt );
 
-    if(!opt.force_v3_sigs)
-      {
-	if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
-	  duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
-	else
-	  duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
-      }
+    if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
+      duration = ask_expire_interval (1,opt.def_sig_expire);
+    else
+      duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire);
 
     /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
        unprotect the secret key.  This is now done on demand by the agent.  */
     if( (rc=build_sk_list( locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )) )
 	goto leave;
 
-    if(!duration )
-	old_style = only_old_style( sk_list );
-
     /* prepare iobufs */
     inp = iobuf_open(fname);
     if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
@@ -1184,18 +1143,7 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, strlist_t locusr, const char *outfile )
 
     iobuf_writestr(out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" LF );
 
-    for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
-      {
-	if (hash_for (sk_rover->pk) == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
-          only_md5 = 1;
-	else
-          {
-	    only_md5 = 0;
-	    break;
-          }
-      }
-
-    if( !(old_style && only_md5) ) {
+    {
 	const char *s;
 	int any = 0;
 	byte hashs_seen[256];
@@ -1234,8 +1182,8 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, strlist_t locusr, const char *outfile )
     if ( DBG_HASHING )
       gcry_md_debug ( textmd, "clearsign" );
 
-    copy_clearsig_text( out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped,
-			opt.escape_from, (old_style && only_md5) );
+    copy_clearsig_text (out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped,
+                        opt.escape_from);
     /* fixme: check for read errors */
 
     /* now write the armor */
@@ -1292,13 +1240,10 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
     memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx);
     init_packet( &pkt );
 
-    if(!opt.force_v3_sigs)
-      {
-	if(opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
-	  duration=ask_expire_interval(1,opt.def_sig_expire);
-	else
-	  duration=parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
-      }
+    if (opt.ask_sig_expire && !opt.batch)
+      duration = ask_expire_interval (1, opt.def_sig_expire);
+    else
+      duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire);
 
     /* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
        unprotect the secret key.  This is now done on demand by the agent.  */
@@ -1441,52 +1386,39 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
  * applied (actually: dropped) when a v3 key is used.  TIMESTAMP is
  * the timestamp to use for the signature. 0 means "now" */
 int
-make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+make_keysig_packet (PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
 		    PKT_user_id *uid, PKT_public_key *subpk,
 		    PKT_public_key *pksk,
 		    int sigclass, int digest_algo,
-                    int sigversion, u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
+                    u32 timestamp, u32 duration,
 		    int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *), void *opaque,
                     const char *cache_nonce)
 {
     PKT_signature *sig;
     int rc=0;
+    int sigversion;
     gcry_md_hd_t md;
 
     assert( (sigclass >= 0x10 && sigclass <= 0x13) || sigclass == 0x1F
 	    || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19
 	    || sigclass == 0x30 || sigclass == 0x28 );
 
-    if (opt.force_v4_certs)
-        sigversion = 4;
-
+    sigversion = 4;
     if (sigversion < pksk->version)
         sigversion = pksk->version;
 
-    /* If you are making a signature on a v4 key using your v3 key, it
-       doesn't make sense to generate a v3 sig.  After all, no v3-only
-       PGP implementation could understand the v4 key in the first
-       place.  Note that this implies that a signature on an attribute
-       uid is usually going to be v4 as well, since they are not
-       generally found on v3 keys. */
-    if (sigversion < pk->version)
-        sigversion = pk->version;
-
     if( !digest_algo )
       {
-	/* Basically, this means use SHA1 always unless it's a v3 RSA
-	   key making a v3 cert (use MD5), or the user specified
-	   something (use whatever they said), or it's DSA (use the
-	   best match).  They still can't pick an inappropriate hash
-	   for DSA or the signature will fail.  Note that this still
-	   allows the caller of make_keysig_packet to override the
-	   user setting if it must. */
+	/* Basically, this means use SHA1 always unless the user
+	   specified something (use whatever they said), or it's DSA
+	   (use the best match).  They still can't pick an
+	   inappropriate hash for DSA or the signature will fail.
+	   Note that this still allows the caller of
+	   make_keysig_packet to override the user setting if it
+	   must. */
 
 	if(opt.cert_digest_algo)
 	  digest_algo=opt.cert_digest_algo;
-	else if(pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
-		&& pk->version<4 && sigversion<4)
-	  digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
 	else if(pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA)
 	  digest_algo = match_dsa_hash (gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pksk->pkey[1])/8);
         else if (pksk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
@@ -1533,16 +1465,14 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
     if(duration)
       sig->expiredate=sig->timestamp+duration;
     sig->sig_class = sigclass;
-    if( sig->version >= 4 )
-      {
-	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
-	mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, pk, pksk);
-      }
+
+    build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+    mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, pk, pksk);
 
     /* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
        to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
        function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
-    if( sig->version >= 4 && mksubpkt )
+    if (mksubpkt)
 	rc = (*mksubpkt)( sig, opaque );
 
     if( !rc ) {
@@ -1627,17 +1557,14 @@ update_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig,
        duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
        detects this case. */
 
-    if( sig->version >= 4 )
-      {
-	/* Put the updated timestamp into the sig.  Note that this
-	   will automagically lower any sig expiration dates to
-	   correctly correspond to the differences in the timestamps
-	   (i.e. the duration will shrink). */
-	build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
+    /* Put the updated timestamp into the sig.  Note that this will
+       automagically lower any sig expiration dates to correctly
+       correspond to the differences in the timestamps (i.e. the
+       duration will shrink).  */
+    build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
 
-	if (mksubpkt)
-	  rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);
-      }
+    if (mksubpkt)
+      rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);
 
     if (!rc) {
         hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
diff --git a/g10/textfilter.c b/g10/textfilter.c
index 14bf69962..394d9c3bb 100644
--- a/g10/textfilter.c
+++ b/g10/textfilter.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ text_filter( void *opaque, int control,
  */
 int
 copy_clearsig_text( IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, gcry_md_hd_t md,
-		    int escape_dash, int escape_from, int pgp2mode )
+		    int escape_dash, int escape_from)
 {
     unsigned int maxlen;
     byte *buffer = NULL;    /* malloced buffer */
@@ -170,10 +170,7 @@ copy_clearsig_text( IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, gcry_md_hd_t md,
     int truncated = 0;
     int pending_lf = 0;
 
-    if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
-	pgp2mode = 0;
-
-    if( !escape_dash )
+   if( !escape_dash )
 	escape_from = 0;
 
     write_status_begin_signing (md);
@@ -194,9 +191,7 @@ copy_clearsig_text( IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, gcry_md_hd_t md,
 		gcry_md_putc ( md, '\n' );
 	    }
 	    gcry_md_write ( md, buffer,
-                            len_without_trailing_chars (buffer, n,
-                                                        pgp2mode?
-                                                        " \r\n":" \t\r\n"));
+                            len_without_trailing_chars (buffer, n, " \t\r\n"));
 	}
 	else
             gcry_md_write ( md, buffer, n );
diff --git a/tests/openpgp/defs.inc b/tests/openpgp/defs.inc
index 2faa4c25a..b7320d562 100755
--- a/tests/openpgp/defs.inc
+++ b/tests/openpgp/defs.inc
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ dsa_usrname1="pgp5"
 # we use the sub key because we do not yet have the logic to to derive
 # the first encryption key from a keyblock (I guess) (Well of course
 # we have this by now and the notation below will lookup the primary
-# first and the search for the encryption subkey.)
+# first and then search for the encryption subkey.)
 dsa_usrname2="0xCB879DE9"