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See ChangeLog: Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000 Werner Koch

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2000-09-13 16:11:24 +00:00
parent 3c3ad064b6
commit 8f6b40ff1c
6 changed files with 122 additions and 9 deletions
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6
cipher/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* rsa.c (secret): Speed up by using the CRT. For a 2k keys this
is about 3 times faster.
(stronger_key_check): New but unused code to check the secret key.
Wed Sep 6 17:55:47 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* rsa.c: Changed the comment about the patent.

93
cipher/rsa.c
View File

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ generate( RSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
MPI t1, t2;
MPI n; /* the public key */
MPI e; /* the exponent */
MPI phi; /* helper: (p-a)(q-1) */
MPI phi; /* helper: (p-1)(q-1) */
MPI g;
MPI f;
@ -201,19 +201,106 @@ public(MPI output, MPI input, RSA_public_key *pkey )
mpi_powm( output, input, pkey->e, pkey->n );
}
#if 0
static void
stronger_key_check ( RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
MPI t = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
MPI t2 = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
MPI phi = mpi_alloc_secure ( 0 );
/* check that n == p * q */
mpi_mul( t, skey->p, skey->q);
if (mpi_cmp( t, skey->n) )
log_info ( "RSA Oops: n != p * q\n" );
/* check that p is less than q */
if( mpi_cmp( skey->p, skey->q ) > 0 )
log_info ("RSA Oops: p >= q\n");
/* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */
mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->p, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides p-1\n" );
mpi_sub_ui(t, skey->q, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r(t, t, skey->e );
if ( !mpi_cmp_ui( t, 0) )
log_info ( "RSA Oops: e divides q-1\n" );
/* check that d is correct */
mpi_sub_ui( t1, skey->p, 1 );
mpi_sub_ui( t2, skey->q, 1 );
mpi_mul( phi, t1, t2 );
mpi_gcd(t, t1, t2);
mpi_fdiv_q(t, phi, t);
mpi_invm(t, skey->e, t );
if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->d ) )
log_info ( "RSA Oops: d is wrong\n");
/* check for crrectness of u */
mpi_invm(t, skey->p, skey->q );
if ( mpi_cmp(t, skey->u ) )
log_info ( "RSA Oops: u is wrong\n");
log_info ( "RSA secret key check finished\n");
mpi_free (t);
mpi_free (t1);
mpi_free (t2);
mpi_free (phi);
}
#endif
/****************
* Secret key operation. Encrypt INPUT with SKEY and put result into OUTPUT.
*
* m = c^d mod n
*
* Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n are elements of PKEY.
* Or faster:
*
* FIXME: We should better use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p
* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q
* h = u * (m2 - m1) mod q
* m = m1 + h * p
*
* Where m is OUTPUT, c is INPUT and d,n,p,q,u are elements of SKEY.
*/
static void
secret(MPI output, MPI input, RSA_secret_key *skey )
{
#if 0
mpi_powm( output, input, skey->d, skey->n );
#else
MPI m1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
MPI m2 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
MPI h = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->n)+1 );
/* m1 = c ^ (d mod (p-1)) mod p */
mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->p, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
mpi_powm( m1, input, h, skey->p );
/* m2 = c ^ (d mod (q-1)) mod q */
mpi_sub_ui( h, skey->q, 1 );
mpi_fdiv_r( h, skey->d, h );
mpi_powm( m2, input, h, skey->q );
/* h = u * ( m2 - m1 ) mod q */
mpi_sub( h, m2, m1 );
if ( mpi_is_neg( h ) )
mpi_add ( h, h, skey->q );
mpi_mulm( h, skey->u, h, skey->q );
/* m = m2 + h * p */
mpi_mul ( h, h, skey->p );
mpi_add ( output, m1, h );
/* ready */
mpi_free ( h );
mpi_free ( m1 );
mpi_free ( m2 );
#endif
}

7
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow to use "debug" on the secret key.
* ringedit.c (cmp_seckey): Fix for v4 RSA keys.
* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Workaround for PGP 7 bug.
Wed Sep 6 17:55:47 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* misc.c (print_pubkey_algo_note): Do not print the RSA notice.

2
g10/keyedit.c
View File

@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr, STRLIST commands,
{ N_("sign") , cmdSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key") },
{ N_("s") , cmdSIGN , 0,1,1, NULL },
{ N_("lsign") , cmdLSIGN , 0,1,1, N_("sign the key locally") },
{ N_("debug") , cmdDEBUG , 0,1,0, NULL },
{ N_("debug") , cmdDEBUG , 0,0,0, NULL },
{ N_("adduid") , cmdADDUID , 1,1,0, N_("add a user ID") },
{ N_("deluid") , cmdDELUID , 0,1,0, N_("delete user ID") },
{ N_("addkey") , cmdADDKEY , 1,1,0, N_("add a secondary key") },

8
g10/ringedit.c
View File

@ -1070,7 +1070,13 @@ cmp_seckey( PKT_secret_key *req_sk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
n = pubkey_get_nskey( req_sk->pubkey_algo );
for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
if( mpi_cmp( req_sk->skey[i], sk->skey[i] ) )
/* Note: becuase v4 protected keys have nothing in the
* mpis except for the first one, we skip all NULL MPIs.
* This might not be always correct in cases where the both
* keys do not match in their secret parts but we can ignore that
* because the need for this function is quite ugly. */
if( req_sk->skey[1] && sk->skey[i]
&& mpi_cmp( req_sk->skey[i], sk->skey[i] ) )
return -1;
}
return 0;

15
g10/seckey-cert.c
View File

@ -80,10 +80,13 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
int ndata;
byte *p, *data;
u16 csumc = 0;
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
if ( ndata > 1 )
csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata );
mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
@ -96,9 +99,14 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
else {
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
}
}
/* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
* because the length das an abritary value */
* because the length may have an arbitrary value */
if( sk->csum == csum ) {
for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
nbytes = ndata;
@ -106,6 +114,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
ndata -= nbytes;
p += nbytes;
}
/* at this point ndata should be equal to 2 (the checksum) */
}
m_free(data);
}
@ -237,9 +246,7 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
/* FIXME: There is a bug in this function for all algorithms
* where the secret MPIs are more than 1 */
byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
int ndata=0;