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Fix ECDSA 521 bit signing. 

This fix also allows the creation and use of an 521 bit ECDH key which
used to fail while creating the binding signature.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-02-07 14:38:39 +01:00
parent b008274afd
commit 8a7336e0bf
4 changed files with 27 additions and 16 deletions
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4
agent/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
2011-02-07 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* pksign.c (do_encode_dsa): Enforce multipe of 8 bits only for DSA.
2011-02-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* protect.c (protect_info): Support ECC algos.

4
agent/pksign.c
View File

@ -132,8 +132,10 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte *md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO);
if ((qbits%8))
if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA && (qbits%8))
{
/* FIXME: We check the QBITS but print a message about the hash
length. */
log_error (_("DSA requires the hash length to be a"
" multiple of 8 bits\n"));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);

6
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
2011-02-07 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Truncate to MDLEN and not to QBYTES
which makes a difference with 521 bit ECC keys. For clarity
rename QBYTES to QBITS and adjust accordingly.
2011-02-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* sig-check.c (do_check_messages): Remove the long deprecated

29
g10/seskey.c
View File

@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
{
gcry_mpi_t frame;
int pkalgo;
size_t mdlen;
assert (hash_algo);
assert (pk);
@ -267,16 +268,16 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
{
/* It's a DSA signature, so find out the size of q. */
size_t qbytes = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[1]);
size_t qbits = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (pk->pkey[1]);
/* pkey[1] is Q for ECDSA, which is an uncompressed point,
i.e. 04 <x> <y> */
if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
qbytes = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (qbytes);
qbits = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (qbits);
/* Make sure it is a multiple of 8 bits. */
if (qbytes%8)
if ((qbits%8))
{
log_error(_("DSA requires the hash length to be a"
" multiple of 8 bits\n"));
@ -289,15 +290,13 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
or something like that, which would look correct but allow
trivial forgeries. Yes, I know this rules out using MD5 with
DSA. ;) */
if (qbytes < 160)
if (qbits < 160)
{
log_error (_("%s key %s uses an unsafe (%zu bit) hash\n"),
gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo), keystr_from_pk (pk), qbytes);
gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo), keystr_from_pk (pk), qbits);
return NULL;
}
qbytes /= 8;
/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
automatically left-truncate.
@ -308,24 +307,24 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, gcry_md_hd_t md, int hash_algo)
adjust it later for general case. (Note that the check will
never pass for ECDSA 521 anyway as the only hash that
intended to match it is SHA 512, but 512 < 521). */
if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo)
< ((pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbytes > (521)/8) ? 512/8 : qbytes))
mdlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo);
if (mdlen < ((pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits > 521) ? 512: qbits)/8)
{
log_error (_("%s key %s requires a %zu bit or larger hash "
"(hash is %s\n"),
gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo),
keystr_from_pk(pk), qbytes*8,
keystr_from_pk(pk), qbits,
gcry_md_algo_name (hash_algo));
return NULL;
}
/* By passing QBYTES as length to mpi_scan, we do the truncation
of the hash.
/* By passing MDLEN as length to mpi_scan, we do the truncation
of the hash.
Note that in case of ECDSA 521 the hash is always smaller
than the key size. */
Note that in case of ECDSA 521 the hash is always smaller
than the key size. */
if (gcry_mpi_scan (&frame, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), qbytes, &qbytes))
gcry_md_read (md, hash_algo), mdlen, NULL))
BUG();
}
else