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agent: Changes to the new KEM code in pkdecrypt.c
* agent/pkdecrypt.c (agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt): Replace fixed-info by an s-exp parameter. Do not expect the algo and extra length octet. -- This code needs more work, for example extracting the curve from the s-expression and mapping it to a KEM algo. It might even be better top move parts of the code to common/.
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52c4b09080
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863fc3b2c5
@ -177,12 +177,13 @@ reverse_buffer (unsigned char *buffer, unsigned int length)
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First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT
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First keygrip is for ECC, second keygrip is for PQC. CIPHERTEXT
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should follow the format of:
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should follow the format of:
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(enc-val(pqc(s%m)(e%m)(k%m))))
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(enc-val(pqc(e%m)(k%m)(s%m)(fixed-info&)))
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s: encrypted session key
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e: ECDH ciphertext
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e: ECDH ciphertext
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k: ML-KEM ciphertext
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k: ML-KEM ciphertext
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s: encrypted session key
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fixed-info: A buffer with the fixed info.
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FIXME: For now, possibile keys on smartcard are not supported.
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FIXME: For now, possible keys on smartcards are not supported.
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*/
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*/
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static gpg_error_t
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static gpg_error_t
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agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
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agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
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@ -226,7 +227,9 @@ agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
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gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
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gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
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unsigned char sessionkey[256];
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unsigned char sessionkey[256];
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size_t sessionkey_len;
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size_t sessionkey_len;
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const unsigned char fixedinfo[1] = { 105 };
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memset (iov, 0, sizeof iov);
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err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
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err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
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ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info,
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ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info,
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@ -248,33 +251,44 @@ agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
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/* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */
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/* Here assumes no smartcard, but private keys */
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gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "/e/k/s",
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/* Note that we put the fixed-info already here into IOV[5]. Take
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&ecc_ct_mpi,
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* care not to clear anymore. */
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&mlkem_ct_mpi,
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err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_cipher, NULL, "/eks&'fixed-info'",
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&encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, NULL);
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&ecc_ct_mpi,
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&mlkem_ct_mpi,
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&encrypted_sessionkey_mpi,
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iov+5, NULL);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
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encrypted_sessionkey = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (encrypted_sessionkey_mpi, &nbits);
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encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
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encrypted_sessionkey_len = (nbits+7)/8;
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if (encrypted_sessionkey_len < 1+1+8)
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{
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/* Fixme: This is a basic check but we should better test
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* against the expected length and something which
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* is required to avoid an underflow. */
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
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goto leave;
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}
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encrypted_sessionkey_len--;
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encrypted_sessionkey_len--;
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if (encrypted_sessionkey[0] != encrypted_sessionkey_len)
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if (encrypted_sessionkey[0] != encrypted_sessionkey_len)
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{
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{
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err = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
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err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_DATA);
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goto leave;
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goto leave;
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}
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}
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encrypted_sessionkey++; /* Skip the length. */
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encrypted_sessionkey++; /* Skip the length. */
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if (encrypted_sessionkey[0] != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256)
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{
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err = GPG_ERR_INV_DATA;
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goto leave;
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}
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encrypted_sessionkey_len--;
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encrypted_sessionkey++; /* Skip the sym algo */
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/* Fistly, ECC part. FIXME: For now, we assume X25519. */
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/* Fistly, ECC part. FIXME: For now, we assume X25519. We need to
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gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey0, NULL, "/q/d",
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* take that info from s_key0 */
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&ecc_pk_mpi, &ecc_sk_mpi, NULL);
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err = gcry_sexp_extract_param (s_skey0, NULL, "/q/d",
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&ecc_pk_mpi, &ecc_sk_mpi, NULL);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_pk_mpi, &nbits);
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p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (ecc_pk_mpi, &nbits);
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len = (nbits+7)/8;
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len = (nbits+7)/8;
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memcpy (ecc_pk, p+1, 32); /* Remove the 0x40 prefix */
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memcpy (ecc_pk, p+1, 32); /* Remove the 0x40 prefix */
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@ -359,9 +373,7 @@ agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
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iov[4].off = 0;
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iov[4].off = 0;
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iov[4].len = GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_ENCAPS_LEN;
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iov[4].len = GCRY_KEM_MLKEM768_ENCAPS_LEN;
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iov[5].data = (unsigned char *)fixedinfo;
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/* Note: iov[5] has already been filled. */
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iov[5].off = 0;
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iov[5].len = 1;
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err = compute_kmac256 (kekkey, kekkeylen,
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err = compute_kmac256 (kekkey, kekkeylen,
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"OpenPGPCompositeKeyDerivationFunction", 37,
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"OpenPGPCompositeKeyDerivationFunction", 37,
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@ -406,6 +418,7 @@ agent_hybrid_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
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put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
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put_membuf (outbuf, ")", 2);
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leave:
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leave:
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gcry_free (iov[5].data); /* The fixed-info. */
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gcry_sexp_release (s_skey0);
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gcry_sexp_release (s_skey0);
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gcry_sexp_release (s_skey1);
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gcry_sexp_release (s_skey1);
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return err;
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return err;
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