security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2024-12-22 10:19:57 +01:00
Code Activity

scd:nks: Minor additions to the basic IDLM application support.

Browse Source 
* scd/app-nks.c (filelist): Use special value -1 for IDLM pubkeys.
(keygripstr_from_pk_file): Handle special value.
(do_readcert): Ditto.
(do_writecert): Ditto.
--

This allows to get information about the keys from the card.  However
the do_readkey still requires a fallback to readcert.  This does not
work because there are no certificates yet on the card.  The fix is to
fully implement do_readkey.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2020-11-30 09:57:35 +01:00
parent ad469609b1
commit 806547d9d2
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
1 changed files with 25 additions and 15 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

40
scd/app-nks.c
View File

@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ static struct
int fid; /* File ID. */
int nks_ver; /* 0 for NKS version 2, 3 for version 3, etc. */
int certtype; /* Type of certificate or 0 if it is not a certificate. */
int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the corresponding certificate. */
int iskeypair; /* If true has the FID of the corresponding certificate.
* If no certificate is known a value of -1 is used. */
int isauthkey; /* True if file is a key usable for authentication. */
int issignkey; /* True if file is a key usable for signing. */
int isencrkey; /* True if file is a key usable for decryption. */
@ -161,12 +162,12 @@ static struct
{ 2, 0xC001, 15,100 }, /* EF.C.ICC.QES (Cert) */
{ 2, 0xC00E, 15,111 }, /* EF.C.RCA.QES (RootCA */
{ 3, 0x4E03, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_03 */
{ 3, 0x4E04, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_04 */
{ 3, 0x4E05, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_05 */
{ 3, 0x4E06, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_06 */
{ 3, 0x4E07, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_07 */
{ 3, 0x4E08, 3, 100 }, /* EK_PK_08 */
{ 3, 0x4E03, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_03 */
{ 3, 0x4E04, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_04 */
{ 3, 0x4E05, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_05 */
{ 3, 0x4E06, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_06 */
{ 3, 0x4E07, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_07 */
{ 3, 0x4E08, 3, 0, -1 }, /* EK_PK_08 */
{ 0, 0 }
};
@ -272,7 +273,8 @@ get_dispserialno (app_t app)
* used and Read Record needs to be replaced by read binary. Given
* all the ECC parameters required, we don't do that but rely that the
* corresponding certificate at CFID is already available and get the
* public key from there. If R_ALGO is not NULL the public key
* public key from there. Note that a CFID of 1 is indicates that a
* certificate is not known. If R_ALGO is not NULL the public key
* algorithm for the returned KEYGRIP is stored there. If R_ALGOSTR
* is not NULL the public key algo string (e.g. "rsa2048") is stored
* there. */
@ -292,7 +294,8 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr,
struct fid_cache_s *ci;
for (ci = app->app_local->fid_cache; ci; ci = ci->next)
if (ci->fid && ((cfid && ci->fid == cfid) || (!cfid && ci->fid == pkfid)))
if (ci->fid && ((cfid > 0 && ci->fid == cfid)
|| (!(cfid > 0) && ci->fid == pkfid)))
{
if (!ci->got_keygrip)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
@ -316,6 +319,12 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr,
unsigned char *cert, *pk;
size_t certlen, pklen;
if (cfid == -1)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto leave;
}
/* Fall back to certificate reading. */
err = readcert_from_ef (app, cfid, &cert, &certlen);
if (err)
@ -456,7 +465,8 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr,
/* FIXME: We need to implement not_found caching. */
for (ci = app->app_local->fid_cache; ci; ci = ci->next)
if (ci->fid
&& ((cfid && ci->fid == cfid) || (!cfid && ci->fid == pkfid)))
&& ((cfid > 0 && ci->fid == cfid)
|| (!(cfid > 0) && ci->fid == pkfid)))
{
/* Update the keygrip. */
memcpy (ci->keygripstr, r_gripstr, 2*KEYGRIP_LEN+1);
@ -477,7 +487,7 @@ keygripstr_from_pk_file (app_t app, int pkfid, int cfid, char *r_gripstr,
; /* Out of memory - it is a cache, so we ignore it. */
else
{
ci->fid = cfid? cfid : pkfid;
ci->fid = (cfid > 0)? cfid : pkfid;
memcpy (ci->keygripstr, r_gripstr, 2*KEYGRIP_LEN+1);
ci->algo = algo;
ci->got_keygrip = 1;
@ -1049,7 +1059,7 @@ do_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid,
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
fid = xtoi_4 (certid);
for (i=0; filelist[i].fid; i++)
if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair)
if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair > 0)
&& filelist[i].nks_app_id == nks_app_id
&& filelist[i].fid == fid)
break;
@ -1061,7 +1071,7 @@ do_readcert (app_t app, const char *certid,
because we sometime use the key directly or let the caller
retrieve the key from the certificate. The rationale for
that is to support not-yet stored certificates. */
if (filelist[i].iskeypair)
if (filelist[i].iskeypair > 0)
fid = filelist[i].iskeypair;
return readcert_from_ef (app, fid, cert, certlen);
@ -1178,7 +1188,7 @@ do_writecert (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
fid = xtoi_4 (certid);
for (i=0; filelist[i].fid; i++)
if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair)
if ((filelist[i].certtype || filelist[i].iskeypair > 0)
&& filelist[i].nks_app_id == nks_app_id
&& filelist[i].fid == fid)
break;
@ -1189,7 +1199,7 @@ do_writecert (app_t app, ctrl_t ctrl,
* the corresponding certificate. This makes it easier for the user
* to figure out which CERTID to use. For example gpg-card shows
* the id of the key and not of the certificate. */
if (filelist[i].iskeypair)
if (filelist[i].iskeypair > 0)
fid = filelist[i].iskeypair;
/* We have no selective flush mechanism and given the rare use of