See ChangeLog: Thu May 6 14:18:17 CEST 1999 Werner Koch

BUGS

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ and after about half a day in the rsync snapshots.
        5. key has expiration date from 1. and gpg reports that pubkey
 	  and seckey differ.
      The for loop the exp.date is set before v3 detection?
-     [is this bug still there?]
+     [is this bug still alive?]
 
 [  *] #5
     /home/jam/.gnupg/pubring.gpg: can't open gdbm file: Can't be writer
@@ -48,22 +48,5 @@ and after about half a day in the rsync snapshots.
     --> IRIX bug still there
 
 
-[  *] #13 1999-04-05
+Next #17
-    Trying to generate very large keys fails with a BUG in read_pool()
-    FIX: 1999-04-06
-
-
-[  *] #14 1999-04-05 <anonymous>
-    If you use --s2k-cipher-algo twofish, the the program crashes with
-    a BUG at line 226 of passphrase.c.
-    FIX: 1999-04-06
-
-
-[ **] #15 1999-04-05
-    Hash calculation for subkey bindings is not according to rfc2440 if
-    a 4 byte length header is used for the subkey.
-    FIX: 1999-04-06
-
-
-Next #16
 

ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+Thu May  6 14:18:17 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* README: Minor updates
+
+	* VERSION: Now 0.9.6
+
 Thu Apr  8 09:35:53 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_CHECK_RDYNAMIC): Fix for

OBUGS

@@ -44,4 +44,24 @@
     gpg --list-secret-keys --with-colon SEGVs
     FIX: 1999-03-10
 
+[  *] #13 1999-04-05
+    Trying to generate very large keys fails with a BUG in read_pool()
+    FIX: 1999-04-06
+
+
+[  *] #14 1999-04-05 <anonymous>
+    If you use --s2k-cipher-algo twofish, the the program crashes with
+    a BUG at line 226 of passphrase.c.
+    FIX: 1999-04-06
+
+
+[ **] #15 1999-04-05
+    Hash calculation for subkey bindings is not according to rfc2440 if
+    a 4 byte length header is used for the subkey.
+    FIX: 1999-04-06
+
+[***] #16 1999-03-23 <jafo@tummy.com>
+    Verifying detached signatures with an empty file yields a rc of 0.
+    FIX: 1999-05-06
+
 

README

@@ -1,13 +1,8 @@
-Please note that this is only a bug fix release and some things
-do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
-
-
-
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
 		    GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
 		   -------------------------------
-			    Version 0.9
+			   Version 0.9.6
 
     GnuPG is now in Beta test and you should report all bugs to the
     mailing list (see below).  The 0.9.x versions are released mainly
@@ -17,29 +12,28 @@ do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
 
     GnuPG works best on GNU/Linux or *BSD.  Other Unices are
     also supported but are not as well tested as the Free Unices.
-    Please verify the tar file with the PGP2 or GnuPG/PGP5
+    Please verify the tar file with the PGP2 or OpenPGP
     signatures provided.  My PGP2 key is well known and published in
     the "Global Trust Register for 1998", ISBN 0-9532397-0-5.
 
     I have included my pubring as "g10/pubring.asc", which contains
     the key used to make GnuPG signatures:
+
     "pub  1024D/57548DCD 1998-07-07 Werner Koch (gnupg sig) <dd9jn@gnu.org>"
     "Key fingerprint = 6BD9 050F D8FC 941B 4341  2DCC 68B7 AB89 5754 8DCD"
 
-    My new DSA key is:
+    You may want to add this DSA key to your GnuPG pubring and use it in
-    "pub  1024D/621CC013 1998-07-07 Werner Koch <werner.koch@guug.de>"
-    "Key fingerprint = ECAF 7590 EB34 43B5 C7CF  3ACB 6C7E E1B8 621C C013"
-
-    You may want add my new DSA key to your GnuPG pubring and use it in
     the future to verify new releases.	Because you verified this README
     file and _checked_that_it_is_really_my PGP2 key 0C9857A5, you can be
-    sure that the above fingerprints are correct.
+    quite sure that the above fingerprint is correct.
 
-    Please subscribe to g10@net.lut.ac.uk by sending a mail with
+    Please subscribe to announce@gnupg.org by sending a mail with
-    the word "subscribe" in the body to "g10-request@net.lut.ac.uk".
+    a subject of "subscribe" to "announce-request@gnupg.org".  If you
-    This mailing list is closed (only subscribers are allowed to post)
+    have problems, please subscribe to "gnupg-users@gnupg.org" by sending
-    to avoid misuse by folks who don't know the Netiquette and trash
+    mail with the subject "subscribe" to "gnupg-users-request@gnupg.org"
-    your mailspool with commercial junk.
+    and ask there.  The gnupg.org domain is hosted in Germany to avoid
+    possible legal problems with gnu.org (technical advices may count
+    as a violation of ITAR).
 
     See the file COPYING for copyright and warranty information.
 
@@ -72,9 +66,11 @@ do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
 
     3) "make install"
 
-    4) You end up with the binaries "gpg" and "gpgm" in /usr/local/bin.
+    4) You end up with a "gpg" binray in /usr/local/bin.
 
-    5) Optional, but suggested, install the binary "gpg" as suid root.
+    5) To avoid swapping out of sensitive data, you can install "gpg" as
+       suid root.  If you don't do so, you may want to add the option
+       "no-secmem-warning" to ~/.gnupg/options
 
 
 
@@ -230,7 +226,8 @@ do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
     key - different keys will always have different fingerprints.
     It is easy to compare fingerprints by phone and I suggest
     that you print your fingerprint on the back of your business
-    card.
+    card.  To see the fingerprints of the secondary keys, you can
+    give the command twice; but this is normally not needed.
 
     If you don't know the owner of the public key you are in trouble.
     Suppose however that friend of yours knows someone who knows someone
@@ -442,11 +439,11 @@ do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
     Have fun and remember: Echelon is looking at you kid.
 
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-Version: GnuPG v0.9.2 (GNU/Linux)
+Version: GnuPG v0.9.5 (GNU/Linux)
 Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
 
-iQB1AwUBNr2fPh0Z9MEMmFelAQHqNAL/e7pApR0CGUJ/zuIsjaVhNGPEgKAglcEd
+iQB1AwUBNzFgoB0Z9MEMmFelAQG1EgL/UlmBc7X9UoSh0ge1FNSNncHQGIX8wHkG
-YuVdB+RCN0wq7ZfI0AHU2FdVISRACmSN3xituTTgeiOUsczM40EZ4l1XNfyRF768
+0BHOkcHS9XNxZokgkxoUTSRDFlXxW9auWpYKYeNkkck8S9ExtOJK6FABme6Daof0
-fglui6XxEeYHFY7mSQMgzzFWDG0Squx0
+Hfe4E7TA82T73gvsMMlN6wyys3k5gTRt
-=enRo
+=FP1e
 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

THANKS

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ errors.
 
 Anand Kumria		wildfire@progsoc.uts.edu.au
 Ariel T Glenn		ariel@columbia.edu
+Bodo Moeller		Bodo_Moeller@public.uni-hamburg.de
 Bryan Fullerton 	bryanf@samurai.com
 Brian Moore		bem@cmc.net
 Brian Warner		warner@lothar.com

TODO

@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
   * add some status output put for signing and encryption.
     replace the putc in primegen with some kind of status-fd outputs.
 
-  * Fix revocation and expire stuff.  Subkey revocations are not detected.
-
   * Speed up calculation of key validity.
 
   * See why we always get this "Hmmm, public key not anymore available"
@@ -19,7 +17,6 @@
     encrypt package was found.	Extension: display a list of all recipients.
 
   * Add NO_PUBKEY and NO_SECKEY status lines.
-  * Add more NODATA status lines
 
   * Solaris make has problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a
     gettext bug.

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.9.5b
+0.9.6

checks/defs.inc

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ chdir () {
 
 
 have_hash_algo () {
-  if  ../g10/gpgm --homedir .  --version | grep "Hash:.*$1" >/dev/null
+  if  ../g10/gpg --homedir .  --version | grep "Hash:.*$1" >/dev/null
   then
 	true
   else

cipher/Makefile.am

@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ libcipher_a_SOURCES = cipher.c	\
 		 des.c		\
 		 des.h		\
 		 twofish.c	\
-		 twofish.h	\
 		 blowfish.c	\
 		 blowfish.h	\
 		 cast5.c	\

doc/DETAILS

@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ more arguments in future versions.
     NODATA  <what>
 	No data has been found. Codes for what are:
 	    1 - No armored data.
+	    2 - Expected a packet but did not found one.
+	    3 - Invalid packet found, this may indicate a non OpenPGP message.
+	You may see more than one of these status lines.
 
     TRUST_UNDEFINED
     TRUST_NEVER

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+Thu May  6 14:18:17 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* trustdb.c (check_trust): Check for revoked subkeys.
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust): Handled revoked subkeys.
+	(do_we_trust_pre): Ditto.
+	(check_signatures_trust): Ditto.
+
+	* build-packet.c (hash_public_key): Fix for ancient g10 keys.
+
+	* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Return EOF if no data has been read.
+	* g10.c (main): Catch errors for default operation.
+
 Thu Apr 29 12:29:22 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* sign.c (sign_file): Fixed hashing in case of no subpackets.

g10/build-packet.c

@@ -258,38 +258,42 @@ hash_public_key( MD_HANDLE md, PKT_public_key *pk )
     pkt.pkt.public_key = pk;
     if( (rc = build_packet( a, &pkt )) )
 	log_fatal("build public_key for hashing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
-    /* skip the constructed header */
+
-    ctb = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
+    if( !(pk->version == 3 && pk->pubkey_algo == 16) ) {
-    pktlen = 0;
+	/* skip the constructed header but don't do this for our very old
-    if( (ctb & 0x40) ) {
+	 * v3 ElG keys */
-	c = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
+	ctb = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
-	if( c < 192 )
+	pktlen = 0;
-	    pktlen = c;
+	if( (ctb & 0x40) ) {
-	else if( c < 224 ) {
-	    pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
 	    c = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
-	    pktlen += c + 192;
+	    if( c < 192 )
+		pktlen = c;
+	    else if( c < 224 ) {
+		pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
+		c = iobuf_get_noeof(a);
+		pktlen += c + 192;
+	    }
+	    else if( c == 255 ) {
+		pktlen	= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 24;
+		pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 16;
+		pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 8;
+		pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a);
+	    }
 	}
-	else if( c == 255 ) {
+	else {
-	    pktlen  = iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 24;
+	    int lenbytes = ((ctb&3)==3)? 0 : (1<<(ctb & 3));
-	    pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 16;
+	    for( ; lenbytes; lenbytes-- ) {
-	    pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a) << 8;
+		pktlen <<= 8;
-	    pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a);
+		pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a);
+	    }
 	}
+	/* hash a header */
+	md_putc( md, 0x99 );
+	pktlen &= 0xffff; /* can't handle longer packets */
+	md_putc( md, pktlen >> 8 );
+	md_putc( md, pktlen & 0xff );
     }
-    else {
+    /* hash the packet body */
-	int lenbytes = ((ctb&3)==3)? 0 : (1<<(ctb & 3));
-	for( ; lenbytes; lenbytes-- ) {
-	    pktlen <<= 8;
-	    pktlen |= iobuf_get_noeof(a);
-	}
-    }
-    /* hash a header */
-    md_putc( md, 0x99 );
-    pktlen &= 0xffff; /* can't handle longer packets */
-    md_putc( md, pktlen >> 8 );
-    md_putc( md, pktlen & 0xff );
-    /* hash the packet body (don't use pktlen here!) */
     while( (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 ) {
       #if 0
 	fprintf( fp," %02x", c );

g10/g10.c

@@ -1243,7 +1243,9 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 		set_packet_list_mode(1);
 		opt.list_packets=1;
 	    }
-	    proc_packets(NULL, a );
+	    rc = proc_packets(NULL, a );
+	    if( rc )
+		log_error("processing message failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
 	    iobuf_close(a);
 	}
 	break;

g10/getkey.c

@@ -1438,7 +1438,8 @@ find_by_fpr( KBNODE keyblock, PKT_public_key *pk, const char *name, int mode )
 		keyid_from_pk( k->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki );
 		log_debug("         aki=%08lx%08lx algo=%d mode=%d an=%u\n",
 				(ulong)aki[0], (ulong)aki[1],
-			k->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_algo, mode, an );
+			k->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_algo, mode,
+							    (unsigned)an );
 	    }
 
 	    if( an == mode
@@ -1470,7 +1471,8 @@ find_by_fpr_sk( KBNODE keyblock, PKT_secret_key *sk,
 		keyid_from_sk( k->pkt->pkt.secret_key, aki );
 		log_debug("         aki=%08lx%08lx algo=%d mode=%d an=%u\n",
 				(ulong)aki[0], (ulong)aki[1],
-			k->pkt->pkt.secret_key->pubkey_algo, mode, an );
+			k->pkt->pkt.secret_key->pubkey_algo, mode,
+							(unsigned)an );
 	    }
 
 	    if( an == mode

g10/kbnode.c

@@ -302,7 +302,8 @@ dump_kbnode( KBNODE node )
 	    fputs("\"\n", stderr);
 	}
 	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
-	    fprintf(stderr, "  keyid=%08lX\n",
+	    fprintf(stderr, "  class=%02x keyid=%08lX\n",
+		   node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class,
 		   (ulong)node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] );
 	}
 	else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY

g10/keyedit.c

@@ -122,8 +122,6 @@ check_all_keysigs( KBNODE keyblock, int only_selected )
     int anyuid = 0;
 
     for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
-	int is_rev = 0;
-
 	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
 	    PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
 
@@ -140,10 +138,11 @@ check_all_keysigs( KBNODE keyblock, int only_selected )
 	    }
 	}
 	else if( selected && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
-		 && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+		 && ( (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
-		 && (is_rev = node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x30) ) {
+		     || node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x30 )  ) {
 	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
 	    int sigrc, selfsig;
+	    int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30;
 
 	    switch( (rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, &selfsig)) ) {
 	      case 0:
@@ -956,7 +955,7 @@ show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
 			 int with_fpr, int with_subkeys, int with_prefs )
 {
     KBNODE node;
-    int i;
+    int i, rc;
 
     /* the keys */
     for( node = keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
@@ -1001,6 +1000,20 @@ show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked,
 			  datestr_from_sk(sk),
 			  expirestr_from_sk(sk) );
 	}
+	else if( with_subkeys && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28       ) {
+	    PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+	    rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
+	    if( !rc )
+		tty_printf( "rev! subkey has been revoked: %s\n",
+			    datestr_from_sig( sig ) );
+	    else if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN )
+		tty_printf( "rev- faked revocation found\n" );
+	    else if( rc )
+		tty_printf( "rev? problem checking revocation: %s\n",
+							 g10_errstr(rc) );
+	}
     }
     /* the user ids */
     i = 0;
@@ -1677,7 +1690,7 @@ menu_revsig( KBNODE keyblock )
 	pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
 	pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
 	pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
-	insert_kbnode( unode, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
+	insert_kbnode( unode, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
 	goto reloop;
     }
 
@@ -1701,7 +1714,7 @@ menu_revkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
     int upd_trust = 0;
     int rc;
 
-  reloop: /* (better this way becuase we are modifing the keyring) */
+  reloop: /* (better this way because we are modifing the keyring) */
     mainpk = pub_keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
     for( node = pub_keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
 	if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
@@ -1726,7 +1739,7 @@ menu_revkey( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
 	    pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
 	    pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
 	    pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
-	    insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), PKT_SIGNATURE );
+	    insert_kbnode( node, new_kbnode(pkt), 0 );
 	    goto reloop;
 	}
     }

g10/mainproc.c

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     else {
 	/* fixme: defer this message until we have parsed all packets of
 	 * this type - do this by building a list of keys with their stati
-	 * and store it with the conetxt.  do_proc_packets can then use
+	 * and store it with the context.  do_proc_packets can then use
 	 * this list to display some information */
 	log_error(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
     }
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
 	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
     }
-  #if 1
+  #if 0
     #warning md_start_debug is enabled
     md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
   #endif
@@ -753,12 +753,13 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
 {
     PACKET *pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
     int rc=0;
+    int any_data=0;
     int newpkt;
 
     c->iobuf = a;
     init_packet(pkt);
     while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
-
+	any_data = 1;
 	if( rc ) {
 	    free_packet(pkt);
 	    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
@@ -844,7 +845,13 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
 	else
 	    free_packet(pkt);
     }
-    rc = 0;
+    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
+	write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
+    if( any_data )
+	rc = 0;
+    else if( rc == -1 )
+	write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" );
+
 
   leave:
     release_list( c );

g10/pkclist.c

@@ -287,6 +287,16 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
 				    _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
 	    return 0;
     }
+    else if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
+	log_info(_("key %08lX: subkey has been revoked!\n"),
+					(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
+	if( opt.batch )
+	    return 0;
+
+	if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
+				    _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
+	    return 0;
+    }
 
 
     switch( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
@@ -368,6 +378,8 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
 
     if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) && !rc )
 	return 0;
+    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) && !rc )
+	return 0;
     else if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
 	char *p;
 	u32 keyid[2];
@@ -435,6 +447,10 @@ check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
 	log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
 	log_info(_("         This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
     }
+    else if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
+	write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
+	log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
+    }
 
 
     switch( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {

g10/trustdb.c

@@ -2780,6 +2780,36 @@ check_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned *r_trustlevel,
 	}
     }
 
+    /* is a subkey has been requested, we have to check its keyflags */
+    if( !rc ) {
+	TRUSTREC krec;
+	byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN] = {0}; /* to avoid compiler warnings */
+	size_t fprlen = 0;
+	ulong recno;
+	int kcount=0;
+
+	for( recno = rec.r.dir.keylist; recno; recno = krec.r.key.next ) {
+	    read_record( recno, &krec, RECTYPE_KEY );
+	    if( ++kcount == 1 )
+		continue; /* skip the primary key */
+	    if( kcount == 2 ) /* now we need the fingerprint */
+		fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &fprlen );
+
+	    if( krec.r.key.fingerprint_len == fprlen
+		&& !memcmp( krec.r.key.fingerprint, fpr, fprlen ) ) {
+		/* found the subkey */
+		if( (krec.r.key.keyflags & KEYF_REVOKED) )
+		    trustlevel |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
+		/* should we check for keybinding here??? */
+		/* Hmmm: Maybe this whole checking stuff should not go
+		 * into the trustdb, but be done direct from the keyblock.
+		 * Chnage this all when we add an abstarction layer around
+		 * the way certificates are handled by different standards */
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
 
   leave:
     if( DBG_TRUST )

g10/trustdb.h

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #define TRUST_ULTIMATE	  6  /* u: ultimately trusted */
 /* trust values not covered by the mask */
 #define TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED 32 /* r: revoked */
+#define TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED 64
 
 
 #define PREFTYPE_SYM	  1