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gpg: Fix actual leak and possible leaks in the packet parser.

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* g10/packet.h (struct parse_packet_ctx_s): Change LAST_PKT deom a
pointer to its struct.
(init_parse_packet): Adjust for LAST_PKT not being a pointer.
* g10/parse-packet.c (parse): Ditto. Free the last packet before
storing a new one in case of a deep link.
(parse_ring_trust): Adjust for LAST_PKT not being a pointer.
* g10/free-packet.c (free_packet): Ditto.
* g10/t-keydb-get-keyblock.c (do_test): Release keyblock.
--

Fixes-commit: afa86809087909a8ba2f9356588bf90cc923529c
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2017-03-30 16:01:52 +02:00
parent 64665404e4
commit 7bf24e8146
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
5 changed files with 26 additions and 19 deletions
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2
g10/build-packet.c
View File

@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ do_user_id( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_user_id *uid )
log_assert (ctb_pkttype (ctb) == PKT_USER_ID
|| ctb_pkttype (ctb) == PKT_ATTRIBUTE);
/* We need to take special care that doe user ID with a length of 0:
/* We need to take special care of a user ID with a length of 0:
* Without forcing HDRLEN to 2 in this case an indeterminate length
* packet would be written which is not allowed. Note that we are
* always called with a CTB indicating an old packet header format,

12
g10/free-packet.c
View File

@ -409,14 +409,15 @@ free_packet (PACKET *pkt, parse_packet_ctx_t parsectx)
{
if (!pkt || !pkt->pkt.generic)
{
if (parsectx && parsectx->last_pkt)
if (parsectx && parsectx->last_pkt.pkt.generic)
{
if (parsectx->free_last_pkt)
{
free_packet (parsectx->last_pkt, NULL);
free_packet (&parsectx->last_pkt, NULL);
parsectx->free_last_pkt = 0;
}
parsectx->last_pkt = NULL;
parsectx->last_pkt.pkttype = 0;
parsectx->last_pkt.pkt.generic = NULL;
}
return;
}
@ -427,8 +428,11 @@ free_packet (PACKET *pkt, parse_packet_ctx_t parsectx)
/* If we have a parser context holding PKT then do not free the
* packet but set a flag that the packet in the parser context is
* now a deep copy. */
if (parsectx && parsectx->last_pkt == pkt && !parsectx->free_last_pkt)
if (parsectx && !parsectx->free_last_pkt
&& parsectx->last_pkt.pkttype == pkt->pkttype
&& parsectx->last_pkt.pkt.generic == pkt->pkt.generic)
{
parsectx->last_pkt = *pkt;
parsectx->free_last_pkt = 1;
pkt->pkt.generic = NULL;
return;

5
g10/packet.h
View File

@ -621,7 +621,7 @@ int set_packet_list_mode( int mode );
struct parse_packet_ctx_s
{
iobuf_t inp; /* The input stream with the packets. */
PACKET *last_pkt; /* The last parsed packet. */
struct packet_struct last_pkt; /* The last parsed packet. */
int free_last_pkt; /* Indicates that LAST_PKT must be freed. */
int skip_meta; /* Skip right trust packets. */
};
@ -629,7 +629,8 @@ typedef struct parse_packet_ctx_s *parse_packet_ctx_t;
#define init_parse_packet(a,i) do { \
(a)->inp = (i); \
(a)->last_pkt = NULL; \
(a)->last_pkt.pkttype = 0; \
(a)->last_pkt.pkt.generic= NULL;\
(a)->free_last_pkt = 0; \
(a)->skip_meta = 0; \
} while (0)

25
g10/parse-packet.c
View File

@ -833,14 +833,15 @@ parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t * retpos,
}
/* Store a shallow copy of certain packets in the context. */
free_packet (NULL, ctx);
if (!rc && (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE
|| pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE))
ctx->last_pkt = pkt;
else
ctx->last_pkt = NULL;
{
ctx->last_pkt = *pkt;
}
leave:
/* FIXME: We leak in case of an error (see the xmalloc's above). */
@ -2992,12 +2993,12 @@ parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, unsigned long pktlen)
/* Now transfer the data to the respective packet. Do not do this
* if SKIP_META is set. */
if (!ctx->last_pkt || ctx->skip_meta)
if (!ctx->last_pkt.pkt.generic || ctx->skip_meta)
;
else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_SIG
&& ctx->last_pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
&& ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
PKT_signature *sig = ctx->last_pkt->pkt.signature;
PKT_signature *sig = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.signature;
if ((rt.sigcache & 1))
{
@ -3006,10 +3007,10 @@ parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, unsigned long pktlen)
}
}
else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_UID
&& (ctx->last_pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| ctx->last_pkt->pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE))
&& (ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_ATTRIBUTE))
{
PKT_user_id *uid = ctx->last_pkt->pkt.user_id;
PKT_user_id *uid = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.user_id;
uid->keysrc = rt.keysrc;
uid->keyupdate = rt.keyupdate;
@ -3017,10 +3018,10 @@ parse_ring_trust (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, unsigned long pktlen)
rt.url = NULL;
}
else if (rt.subtype == RING_TRUST_KEY
&& (ctx->last_pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| ctx->last_pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY))
&& (ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| ctx->last_pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY))
{
PKT_public_key *pk = ctx->last_pkt->pkt.public_key;
PKT_public_key *pk = ctx->last_pkt.pkt.public_key;
pk->keysrc = rt.keysrc;
pk->keyupdate = rt.keyupdate;

1
g10/t-keydb-get-keyblock.c
View File

@ -61,4 +61,5 @@ do_test (int argc, char *argv[])
TEST_P ("", ! rc);
keydb_release (hd1);
release_kbnode (kb1);
}