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Code Activity

2006-04-09 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com>

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* command-ssh.c (ssh_request_process): Removed FIXME mentioning a
	possible DoS attack.
This commit is contained in:
Moritz Schulte 2006-04-09 11:31:37 +00:00
parent f3c5360ca1
commit 76cb368202
2 changed files with 13 additions and 5 deletions
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5
agent/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
2006-04-09 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com>
* command-ssh.c (ssh_request_process): Removed FIXME mentioning a
possible DoS attack.
2006-04-01 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com>
* command-ssh.c (ssh_identity_register): Make KEY_GRIP_RAW be 20

11
agent/command-ssh.c
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* command-ssh.c - gpg-agent's ssh-agent emulation layer
* Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -2677,9 +2677,12 @@ ssh_request_process (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t stream_sock)
secret key material. The response does not have to be stored in
secure memory, since we never give out secret keys.
FIXME: This is a pretty good DoS. We only have a limited amount
of secure memory, we can't throw in everything we get from a
client -wk */
Note: we only have little secure memory, but there is NO
possibility of DoS here; only trusted clients are allowed to
connect to the agent. What could happen is that the agent
returns out-of-secure-memory errors on requests in case the
agent's owner floods his own agent with many large messages.
-moritz */
/* Retrieve request. */
err = stream_read_string (stream_sock, 1, &request_data, &request_data_size);