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applied Mathews typo and grammar fixes

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1998-04-14 17:51:16 +00:00
parent 3c7368a33d
commit 700c438def
62 changed files with 386 additions and 314 deletions
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4
ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
Tue Apr 14 19:08:05 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* [all files]: Applied Matthew Skala's typo and grammar fixes.
Wed Mar 4 10:32:40 1998 Werner Koch (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
* configure.in (getrusage,gettimeofday): New tests.

6
INSTALL
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Configure options for GNUPG
--with-included-zlib Forces usage of the local zlib sources. Default is
to use the (shared) library of the system.
--with-included-gettext Forces usage of the local gettext sources instead of.
--with-included-gettext Forces usage of the local gettext sources instead of
the one provided by your system.
--disable-nls Disable NLS support (See ABOUT-NLS)
@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ Problems
If you have compile problems, try the configure options "--with-included-zlib"
or "--disable-nls" (See ABOUT-NLS).
I cant check all assembler files; so if you have problems assembling them
I can't check all assembler files, so if you have problems assembling them
(or the program crashes), simply delete the files in the mpi/<cpu> directory.
The configure scripts may consider several subdirectories to get all
available assembler files; be sure to delete the correct ones. The
assembler replacements are in C and in mpi/generic; never delete udiv-qrnnd.S
in any CPU directory, because there maybe no C substitute.
in any CPU directory, because there may be no C substitute.
Don't forget to delete "config.cache" and run "./config.status --recheck".

52
README
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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
THIS IS ALPHA SOFTWARE, YOU MAY ENCOUNTER SOOME BUGS.
On a Linux box (version 2.x.x, alpha or x86 CPU) it should
work reliable. You may create your key on such a machine and
work reliably. You may create your key on such a machine and
use it. Please verify the tar file; there is a PGP and a GNUPG
signature available. My PGP key is well known and published in
the "Global Trust Register for 1998", ISBN 0-9532397-0-5.
@ -25,14 +25,14 @@
See the file COPYING for copyright and warranty information.
Due to the fact that GNUPG does not use use any patented algorithm,
it cannot be compatible to old PGP versions, because those use
IDEA (which is worldwide patented) and RSA (which is patented in
it cannot be compatible with old PGP versions, because those use
IDEA (which is patented worldwide) and RSA (which is patented in
the United States until Sep 20, 2000). I'm sorry about this, but
this is the world we have created (e.g. by using proprietary software).
Because the OpenPGP standard is still a draft, GNUPG is not yet
compatible to it (or PGP 5) - but it will. The data structures
used are compatible with PGP 2.x, so it can parse an list such files
compatible with it (or PGP 5) - but it will be. The data structures
used are compatible with PGP 2.x, so it can parse and list such files
and PGP should be able to parse data created by GNUPG and complain
about unsupported algorithms.
@ -40,9 +40,9 @@
encryption and signing; Blowfish with a 160 bit key for protecting
the secret-key components, conventional and session encryption;
RIPE MD-160 to create message digest. DSA, SHA-1 and CAST are
also implemented, but not used on default. I decided not
to use DSA as default signing algorithm, because it allows only for
1024 bit keys and this may be not enough in a couple of years.
also implemented, but not used by default. I decided not
to use DSA as the default signing algorithm, because it allows only
for 1024 bit keys and this may not be enough in a couple of years.
@ -70,16 +70,16 @@
This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create
good random numbers for prime number generation, it uses a /dev/random
which will emit only bytes if the kernel can gather enough entropy.
which will only emit bytes if the kernel can gather enough entropy.
If you see no progress, you should start some other activities such
as mouse moves, "find /" or using the keyboard (on another window).
Because we have no hardware device to generate random we have to use
this method.
as mouse moves, "find /" or using the keyboard (in another window).
Because we have no hardware device to generate randomness we have to
use this method.
Key generation shows progress by printing different characters to
stderr:
"." Last 10 Miller-Rabin tests failed.
"+" Miller-Rabin test succeeded.
"." Last 10 Miller-Rabin tests failed
"+" Miller-Rabin test succeeded
"!" Reloading the pool with fresh prime numbers
"^" Checking a new value for the generator
"<" Size of one factor decreased
@ -87,10 +87,10 @@
The prime number for ElGamal is generated this way:
1) Make a prime number q of 160, 200, 240 bits (depending on the keysize).
1) Make a prime number q of 160, 200, 240 bits (depending on the keysize)
2) Select the length of the other prime factors to be at least the size
of q and calculate the number of prime factors needed
3) Make a pool of prime number, each of the length determined in step 2
3) Make a pool of prime numbers, each of the length determined in step 2
4) Get a new permutation out of the pool or continue with step 3
if we have tested all permutations.
5) Calculate a candidate prime p = 2 * q * p[1] * ... * p[n] + 1
@ -121,12 +121,12 @@
This let you sign the key of of "Donald" with the userids of "Karl"
and "Joe".
All existing signatures are checked, if some are invalid, a menu is
offered to delete some of them, and the you are asked for every user
wether you want to sign this key.
All existing signatures are checked; if some are invalid, a menu is
offered to delete some of them, and then you are asked for every user
whether you want to sign this key.
You may remove a signature at any time using the option "--edit-sig",
which asks for the sigs to remove. Self-signatures are not removable.
which asks for the sigs to remove. Self-signatures are not removable.
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@
Batch mode
----------
If you use the option "--batch", GNUPG runs in non-interactive mode and
never prompts for input data. This even does not allow to enter
never prompts for input data. This does not even allow entering the
passphrase; until we have a better solution (something like ssh-agent),
you can use the option "--passhrase-fd n", which works like PGPs
PGPPASSFD.
@ -267,7 +267,7 @@
GNUPG returns with an exit status of 1 if in batch mode and a bad signature
has been detected or 2 or higher for all other errors. You should parse
stderr or the output of the fd specified with --status-fd to get detailed
informations about the errors.
information about the errors.
Esoteric commands
@ -291,7 +291,7 @@
List the possible trust paths for the given username, up to the specified
depth. If depth is negative, duplicate introducers are not listed,
because those would increase the trust probabilty only minimal.
because those would increase the trust probability only minimally.
(you must use the special option "--" to stop option parsing when
using a negative number). This option may create new entries in the
trustdb.
@ -307,7 +307,7 @@
gpgm --gen-prime n q
Generate a prime number suitable for ElGamal signatures of size n with
a q as largest primefactor of n-1.
a q as largest prime factor of n-1.
gpgm --gen-prime n q 1
@ -319,7 +319,7 @@
Debug Flags
-----------
Use the option "--debug n" to output debug informations. This option
Use the option "--debug n" to output debug information. This option
can be used multiple times, all values are ORed; n maybe prefixed with
0x to use hex-values.
@ -339,7 +339,7 @@
Other Notes
-----------
This is work in progress, so you may find duplicated code fragments,
ugly data structures, weird usage of filenames and other thinks.
ugly data structures, weird usage of filenames and other things.
I will run "indent" over the source when making a real distribution,
but for now I stick to my own formatting rules.

11
THANKS
View File

@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
GNUPG has originally been written by Werner Koch. Other people contributed
by reporting problems, suggesting various improvements or submitting actual
code. Here is a list of these people. Help me keeping it complete and
exempt of errors.
GNUPG was originally written by Werner Koch. Other people contributed by
reporting problems, suggesting various improvements or submitting actual
code. Here is a list of those people. Help me keep it complete and free of
errors.
Anand Kumria wildfire@progsoc.uts.edu.au
Daniel Eisenbud eisenbud@cs.swarthmore.edu
@ -16,6 +15,7 @@ Jens Bachem bachem@rrz.uni-koeln.de
Marco d'Itri md@linux.it
Mark Adler madler@alumni.caltech.edu
Martin Schulte schulte@thp.uni-koeln.de
Matthew Skala mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca
Peter Gutmann pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
Ralph Gillen gillen@theochem.uni-duesseldorf.de
Thomas Roessler roessler@guug.de
@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ Walter Koch walterk@ddorf.rhein-ruhr.de
Werner Koch werner.koch@guug.de
Wim Vandeputte bunbun@reptile.rug.ac.be
Thanks to the German Unix User Group for providing FTP space and
Martin Hamilton for hosting the mailing list.

2
VERSION
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@ -1 +1 @@
0.2.15
0.2.15a

2
acinclude.m4
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ define(WK_MSG_PRINT,
dnl WK_CHECK_TYPEDEF(TYPE, HAVE_NAME)
dnl Check wether a typedef exists and create a #define $2 if it exists
dnl Check whether a typedef exists and create a #define $2 if it exists
dnl
AC_DEFUN(WK_CHECK_TYPEDEF,
[ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 typedef)

2
checks/clearsig.test
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
. defs.inc || exit 3
#info Checking cleartext signatures
# There is a minor glitch, which appends a lf to the cleartext.
# There is a minor glitch, which appends an lf to the cleartext.
# I do not consider that a bug, but I have to use the head .. mimic.
# It is not clear what should happen to leading LFs, we must
# change the defintion of cleartext, so that only 1 empty line

2
cipher/cipher.c
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@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ cipher_decrypt( CIPHER_HANDLE c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf, unsigned nbytes )
/****************
* Used for PGP's somewhat strange CFB mode. Does only work if
* Used for PGP's somewhat strange CFB mode. Only works if
* the handle is in PHILS_CFB mode
*/
void

2
cipher/dsa.c
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@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ dsa_free_secret_key( DSA_secret_key *sk )
/****************
* Test wether the secret key is valid.
* Test whether the secret key is valid.
* Returns: if this is a valid key.
*/
int

4
cipher/elgamal.c
View File

@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ elg_generate( ELG_public_key *pk, ELG_secret_key *sk,
/****************
* Test wether the secret key is valid.
* Test whether the secret key is valid.
* Returns: if this is a valid key.
*/
int
@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ elg_sign(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
/****************
* Returns true if the signature composed from A and B is valid.
* Returns true if the signature composed of A and B is valid.
*/
int
elg_verify(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey )

8
cipher/md5.c
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@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )
u32 D_save = D;
/* First round: using the given function, the context and a constant
the next context is computed. Because the algorithms processing
unit is a 32-bit word and it is determined to work on words in
little endian byte order we perhaps have to change the byte order
the next context is computed. Because the algorithm's processing
unit is a 32-bit word, and it is determined to work on words in
little endian byte order, we perhaps have to change the byte order
before the computation. To reduce the work for the next steps
we store the swapped words in the array CORRECT_WORDS. */
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )
cyclic rotation. Hope the C compiler is smart enough. */
#define CYCLIC(w, s) (w = (w << s) | (w >> (32 - s)))
/* Before we start, one word to the strange constants.
/* Before we start, one word about the strange constants.
They are defined in RFC 1321 as
T[i] = (int) (4294967296.0 * fabs (sin (i))), i=1..64

4
cipher/primegen.c
View File

@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ gen_prime( unsigned nbits, int secret, int randomlevel )
}
/****************
* Returns: true if this is may me a prime
* Returns: true if this may be a prime
*/
static int
check_prime( MPI prime )
@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ check_prime( MPI prime )
/****************
* Return true if n is propably a prime
* Return true if n is probably a prime
*/
static int
is_prime( MPI n, int steps, int *count )

2
cipher/random.c
View File

@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ quick_random_gen( int onoff )
/****************
* Fill the buffer with LENGTH bytes of cryptologic strong
* Fill the buffer with LENGTH bytes of cryptographically strong
* random bytes. level 0 is not very strong, 1 is strong enough
* for most usage, 2 is good for key generation stuff but may be very slow.
*/

2
cipher/sha1.c
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* sha1.c - SHA1 hash function
* Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* Please see below for more legal informations!
* Please see below for more legal information!
*
* This file is part of GNUPG.
*

2
cipher/smallprime.c
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include "util.h"
#include "types.h"
/* Note: 2 is not included because it can be testest more easily
/* Note: 2 is not included because it can be tested more easily
* by looking at bit 0. The last entry in this list is marked by a zero
*/
ushort

2
configure.in
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@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gettimeofday getrusage)
dnl check wether we have a random device
dnl check whether we have a random device
AC_CACHE_CHECK(for random device, ac_cv_have_dev_random,
[if test -c /dev/random && test -c /dev/urandom ; then
ac_cv_have_dev_random=yes; else ac_cv_have_dev_random=no; fi])

32
doc/DETAILS
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@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
a rmd160 hash value from it. This is used as the
fingerprint and the low 64 bits are the keyid.
* Revocation certificates consists only of the signature packet;
* Revocation certificates consist only of the signature packet;
"import" knows how to handle this. The rationale behind it is
to keep them small.
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Layout of the TrustDB
=====================
FIXME: use a directory record as top node instead of the pubkey record
The TrustDB is build from fixed length records, where the first bytes
The TrustDB is built from fixed length records, where the first byte
describes the record type. All numeric values are stored in network
byte order. The length of each record is 40 bytes. The first record of
the DB is always of type 1 and this is the only record of this type.
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Record type 0:
Record type 1:
--------------
Version information for this TrustDB. This is always the first
record of the DB and the onyl one with type 1.
record of the DB and the only one with type 1.
1 byte value 1
3 bytes 'gpg' magic value
1 byte Version of the TrustDB
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Record type 3:
1 byte reserved
1 u32 owner This is used to bind all records for
a given certificate together. It is valid only in this TrustDB
and usefull if we have duplicate keyids
and useful if we have duplicate keyids
It points back to the directory node.
1 byte pubkey algorithm
1 byte reserved
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Record type 3:
Record type 4: (cache record)
--------------
Used to bind the trustDB to the concrete instance of keyblock in
a pubring. This is used to cache informations.
a pubring. This is used to cache information.
1 byte value 4
1 byte reserved
@ -132,14 +132,14 @@ Record Type 6 (hash table)
-------------
Due to the fact that we use the keyid to lookup keys, we can
implement quick access by some simple hash methods, and avoid
the overhead gdbm. A property of keyids is that they can be
used directly as hash value (They can be considered as strong
random numbers.
the overhead of gdbm. A property of keyids is that they can be
used directly as hash values. (They can be considered as strong
random numbers.)
What we use is a dynamic multilevel architecture, which combines
Hashtables, record lists, and linked list.
Hashtables, record lists, and linked lists.
This record is a hashtable of 256 entries; a special property
is, that all these records are adjacent stored to make up one
is that all these records are stored consecutively to make one
big table. The hash value is simple the 1st, 2nd, ... byte of
the keyid (depending on the indirection level).
@ -154,15 +154,15 @@ Record Type 6 (hash table)
which is 29 for a record length of 40.
To look up a key we use its lsb to get the recnum from this
hashtable and look up this addressed record:
hashtable and look up the addressed record:
- If this record is another hashtable, we use 2nd lsb
to index this hast table and so on.
- if this record is of hashlist, we lwalk thru these
reclist record until we found one whos hash fields
- if this record is a hashlist, we walk thru the
reclist records until we found one whose hash field
matches the MSB of our keyid, and lookup this record
- if this record is a dir record, we compare the
keyid and if this is correct, we get the keyrecod and compare
the fingerprint to decide wether it is the requested key;
the fingerprint to decide whether it is the requested key;
if this is not the correct dir record, we look at the next
dir record which is linked by the link field.
@ -185,8 +185,8 @@ Record type 7 (hash list)
Packet Headers
===============
GNUPG uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understand OpenPGP packet header.
There is one enhavement used ith the old style packet headers:
GNUPG uses PGP 2 packet headers and also understands OpenPGP packet header.
There is one enhancement used with the old style packet headers:
CTB bits 10, the "packet-length length bits", have values listed in
the following table:

50
doc/gpg.1pod
View File

@ -8,14 +8,14 @@ B<gpg> [--homedir name] [--options file] [options] command [args]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
This is the main program from the GNUPG system.
This is the main program for the GNUPG system.
=head1 COMMANDS
B<gpg> recognizes these commands:
B<-s>, B<--sign>
Make a signature. This option maybe combined
Make a signature. This option may be combined
with B<--encrypt>.
B<--clearsign>
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ B<-e>, B<--encrypt>
Encrypt data. This option may be combined with B<--sign>.
B<-c>, B<--symmetric>
Encrypt only with symmetric cipher
Encrypt with symmetric cipher only
This command asks for a passphrase.
B<--store>
@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ B<--decrypt> [I<file>]
write it to stdout (or the file specified with
B<--output>). If the decrypted file is signed, the
signature is also verified. This command differs
from the default operation, as it never write to the
filename which is included in the file and that it
from the default operation, as it never writes to the
filename which is included in the file and it
rejects files which don't begin with an encrypted
message.
@ -49,27 +49,27 @@ B<--verify> [[I<sigfile>] {I<signed-files>}]
without generating any output. With no arguments,
the signature packet is read from stdin (it may be a
detached signature when not used in batch mode). If
only a sigfile is given, is maybe a complete signature
or a detached signature in which case the signed stuff
only a sigfile is given, it may be a complete signature
or a detached signature, in which case the signed stuff
is expected from stdin. With more than 1 argument, the
first should be a detached signature and the remaining
files are the signed stuff.
B<-k> [I<username>] [I<keyring>]
Kludge to be somewhat compatibe to PGP.
Without arguments, all public key-rings are listed,
with one argument, only I<keyring> is listed.
Kludge to be somewhat compatible with PGP.
Without arguments, all public key-rings are listed.
With one argument, only I<keyring> is listed.
Special combinations are also allowed, but it may
give starnge results when combined with more options.
give strange results when combined with more options.
B<-kv> Same as B<-k>
B<-kvv> List the signatures with every key.
B<-kvvv> Additional check all signatures.
B<-kvvv> Additionally check all signatures.
B<-kvc> List fingerprints
B<-kvvc> List fingerprints and signatures
B<--list-keys> [I<names>]
List all keys from the default public keyring or just the ones
given on the commandline.
List all keys from the default public keyring, or just the ones
given on the command line.
B<--list-sigs> [I<names>]
Same as B<--list-keys>, but the signatures are listed too.
@ -97,8 +97,8 @@ B<--sign-key> I<name>
all existing signatures of this key. If the key is
not yet signed by the default user (or the users given
with B<-u>), the program displays the information of
the key again, together with it's fingerprint and
asked whether it should be signed. This question
the key again, together with its fingerprint and
asks whether it should be signed. This question
is repeated for all users specified with B<-u>.
The key is then signed and the keyring which
contains the key is updated.
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ B<--gen-revoke>
B<--export> [I<names>]
Either export all keys from all key-rings (default
key-rings and those registered via option B<--keyring>,
key-rings and those registered via option B<--keyring>),
or if at least one name is given, those of the given
name. The new keyring is written to F<stdout> or to
the file given with option "output". Use together
@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ B<--import>
Long options can be put in an options file (default F<~/.gnupg/options>);
do not write the 2 dashes, but simply the name of the option and any
arguments if required, lines with a hash as the first non-white-space
character are ignored. Commands maybe put in this file too, but that
arguments if required. Lines with a hash as the first non-white-space
character are ignored. Commands may be put in this file too, but that
does not make sense.
B<gpg> recognizes these options:
@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ B<-r> I<name>, B<--remote-user> I<name>
so that it can be used in an options file.
B<-v>, B<--verbose>
Give more informations during processing. If used
2 times, the input data is listed in detail.
Give more information during processing. If used
twice, the input data is listed in detail.
B<-z> I<n>
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ B<--no-comment>
Do not write comment packets.
B<--completes-needed> I<n>
Number of completey trusted users to introduce a new
Number of completely trusted users to introduce a new
key signator (defaults to 1).
B<--marginals-needed> I<n>
@ -238,17 +238,17 @@ B<--marginals-needed> I<n>
B<--cipher-algo> I<name>
Use I<name> as cipher algorithm. Running the program
with the option B<--verbose> yields a list off supported
with the option B<--verbose> yields a list of supported
algorithms.
B<--pubkey-algo> I<name>
Use I<name> as puplic key algorithm. Running the program
with the option B<--verbose> yields a list off supported
with the option B<--verbose> yields a list of supported
algorithms.
B<--digest-algo> I<name>
Use I<name> as message digest algorithm. Running the
program with the option B<--verbose> yields a list off
program with the option B<--verbose> yields a list of
supported algorithms.
B<--passphrase-fd> I<n>

6
g10/OPTIONS
View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
# This is a sample option file
#
# Unless you you specify which option file to use with the
# commandline option "--options filename", gpg uses per
# default the file ~/.gnupg/options.
# commandline option "--options filename", gpg uses the
# file ~/.gnupg/options by default.
#
# An option file can contain all long options which are
# available in GNUPG. If the first non white space character of
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
#-----------------------------------------------
#------------------- Commands ------------------
#-----------------------------------------------
# With some expections, those cannot be combined
# With some expections, these cannot be combined
gen-prime
# Generate a prime.

34
g10/armor.c
View File

@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ typedef enum {
/* if we encounter this armor string with this index, go
* into a mode, which fakes packets and wait for the next armor */
* into a mode which fakes packets and wait for the next armor */
#define BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX 3
static char *head_strings[] = {
"BEGIN PGP MESSAGE",
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ initialize(void)
}
/****************
* Check wether this is a armored file or not
* Check whether this is an armored file or not
* See also parse-packet.c for details on this code
* Returns: True if it seems to be armored
*/
@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ is_armored( byte *buf )
/****************
* Try to check wether the iobuf is armored
* Try to check whether the iobuf is armored
* Returns true if this may be the case; the caller should use the
* filter to do further processing.
*/
@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ use_armor_filter( IOBUF a )
n = iobuf_peek(a, buf, 1 );
if( n == -1 )
return 0; /* EOF, doesn't matter wether armored or not */
return 0; /* EOF, doesn't matter whether armored or not */
if( !n )
return 1; /* can't check it: try armored */
return is_armored(buf);
@ -197,11 +197,11 @@ invalid_armor(void)
/****************
* check wether the armor header is valid on a signed message.
* check whether the armor header is valid on a signed message.
* this is for security reasons: the header lines are not included in the
* hash and by using some creative formatting rules, Mallory could fake
* any text at the beginning of a document; assuming it is read with
* a simple viewer. We do only allow the Hash Header.
* a simple viewer. We only allow the Hash Header.
*/
static int
parse_hash_header( const char *line )
@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen,
do {
switch( state ) {
case fhdrHASArmor:
/* read at least the first byte to check wether it is armored
/* read at least the first byte to check whether it is armored
* or not */
c = 0;
for(n=0; n < 28 && (c=iobuf_get2(a)) != -1 && c != '\n'; )
@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen,
state = fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3;
}
else {
/* fixme: we should check wether this line continues
* it is poosible that we have only read ws until here
/* fixme: we should check whether this line continues
* it is possible that we have only read ws until here
* and more stuff is to come */
state = fhdrEOF;
}
@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen,
case fhdrEMPTYClearsig:
case fhdrREADClearsig:
/* we are at the start of a line: read a clearsig into the buffer
* we have to look for a the header line or dashed escaped text*/
* we have to look for a header line or dashed escaped text*/
n = 0;
c = 0;
while( n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get2(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' )
@ -508,11 +508,11 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen,
break;
case fhdrTESTSpaces: {
/* but must check wether the rest of the line
* does only contain white spaces; this is problematic
* since we may have to restore the stuffs. simply
/* but must check whether the rest of the line
* only contains white spaces; this is problematic
* since we may have to restore the stuff. simply
* counting spaces is not enough, because it may be a
* mix of different white space chacters */
* mix of different white space characters */
IOBUF b = iobuf_temp();
while( (c=iobuf_get2(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' ) {
iobuf_put(b,c);
@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen,
}
/* figure out wether the data is armored or not */
/* figure out whether the data is armored or not */
static int
check_input( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a )
{
@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ radix64_read( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a, size_t *retn,
/****************
* The filter is used to handle the armor stuff
* This filter is used to handle the armor stuff
*/
int
armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
* is easy to construct the packets */
/* first a onepass signature packet */
buf[0] = 0x90; /* old packet forma, type 4, 1 length byte */
buf[0] = 0x90; /* old packet format, type 4, 1 length byte */
buf[1] = 13; /* length */
buf[2] = 3; /* version */
buf[3] = 0x01; /* sigclass 0x01 (data in canonical text mode)*/

2
g10/build-packet.c
View File

@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ write_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len )
/****************
* if HDRLEN is > 0, try to build a header of this length.
* we need this, so hat we can hash packets without reading them again.
* we need this, so that we can hash packets without reading them again.
*/
static int
write_header2( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen, int blkmode )

2
g10/cipher.c
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
/****************
* This filter is used to en/de-cipher data with a conventinal algorithm
* This filter is used to en/de-cipher data with a conventional algorithm
*/
int
cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control,

2
g10/compress.c
View File

@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ init_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs )
/****************
* PGP uses a windowsize of 13 bits. Using a negative value for
* it forces zlib not to expect a zlib header. This is a
* undocumented feature, Peter Gutmann told me about.
* undocumented feature Peter Gutmann told me about.
*/
if( (rc = zfx->pgpmode? inflateInit2( zs, -13)
: inflateInit( zs )) != Z_OK ) {

4
g10/decrypt.c
View File

@ -39,9 +39,9 @@
/****************
* Assume that the input is an encrypted message and decrypt
* (and if signed, verify the signature) it.
* (and if signed, verify the signature on) it.
* This command differs from the default operation, as it never
* write to the filename which is included in the file and that it
* writes to the filename which is included in the file and it
* rejects files which don't begin with an encrypted message.
*/

4
g10/encode.c
View File

@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PKC_LIST pkc_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out );
/****************
* Encode FILENAME only with the symmetric cipher. Take input from
* Encode FILENAME with only the symmetric cipher. Take input from
* stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
*/
int
@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ encode_symmetric( const char *filename )
}
/****************
* Encode FILENAME as literal data packet only. Take input from
* Encode FILENAME as a literal data packet only. Take input from
* stdin if FILENAME is NULL.
*/
int

6
g10/export.c
View File

@ -35,9 +35,9 @@
/****************
* Export the public keys (to standard out or --outout).
* Export the public keys (to standard out or --output).
* Depending on opt.armor the output is armored.
* If USERS is NULL, the complete ring wil. be exported.
* If USERS is NULL, the complete ring will be exported.
*/
int
export_pubkeys( STRLIST users )
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export_pubkeys( STRLIST users )
all = 2;
}
/* use the correct sequence. strlist_last,prev do work correct with
/* use the correct sequence. strlist_last,prev do work correctly with
* NULL pointers :-) */
for( sl=strlist_last(users); sl || all ; sl=strlist_prev( users, sl )) {
if( all ) { /* get the next user */

4
g10/free-packet.c
View File

@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *sig )
/****************
* Return the digest algorithm from the signature packet.
* We need this function because the digeste algo depends on the
* We need this function because the digest algo depends on the
* used pubkey algorithm.
*/
int
@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ void
free_compressed( PKT_compressed *zd )
{
if( zd->buf ) { /* have to skip some bytes */
/* don't have any informations about the length, so
/* don't have any information about the length, so
* we assume this is the last packet */
while( iobuf_get(zd->buf) != -1 )
;

23
g10/g10.c
View File

@ -116,8 +116,12 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
{ 536, "marginals-needed", 1, N_("(default is 3)")},
#ifdef IS_G10
{ 527, "cipher-algo", 2 , N_("select default cipher algorithm")},
{ 528, "pubkey-algo", 2 , N_("select default puplic key algorithm")},
{ 528, "pubkey-algo", 2 , N_("select default public key algorithm")},
{ 529, "digest-algo", 2 , N_("select default message digest algorithm")},
#else /* some dummies */
{ 527, "cipher-algo", 2 , "\r"},
{ 528, "pubkey-algo", 2 , "\r"},
{ 529, "digest-algo", 2 , "\r"},
#endif
#ifdef IS_G10
@ -412,7 +416,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
#endif
}
/* check wether we have a config file on the commandline */
/* check whether we have a config file on the commandline */
orig_argc = argc;
orig_argv = argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
@ -509,7 +513,12 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
case 540: secmem_set_flags( secmem_get_flags() | 1 ); break;
case 542: set_cmd( &cmd, aGenRevoke); break;
case 550: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break;
#endif /* IS_G10 */
#else
case 527:
case 528:
case 529:
break;
#endif /* !IS_G10 */
#ifdef IS_G10MAINT
case 513: set_cmd( &cmd, aPrimegen); break;
@ -632,9 +641,9 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
else {
fname = NULL;
if( get_passphrase_fd() == 0 ) {
/* reading data and passphrase form stdin:
/* reading data and passphrase from stdin:
* we assume the first line is the passphrase, so
* we better should read it now.
* we should read it now.
*
* We should do it here, but for now it is not needed.
* Anyway, this password scheme is not quite good
@ -804,7 +813,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
#ifdef IS_G10
case aKeygen: /* generate a key (interactive) */
if( argc )
wrong_args(_("--gen-key"));
wrong_args("--gen-key");
generate_keypair();
break;
#endif
@ -932,7 +941,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
case aListPackets:
opt.list_packets=1;
default:
/* fixme: g10maint should to regular maintenace tasks here */
/* fixme: g10maint should do regular maintenace tasks here */
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("[filename]"));
if( !(a = iobuf_open(fname)) )

8
g10/getkey.c
View File

@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ add_secret_keyring( const char *name )
sl->next = secret_keyrings;
secret_keyrings = sl;
/* fixme: We should remove much out of this mpdule and
/* fixme: We should remove much out of this module and
* combine it with the keyblock stuff from ringedit.c
* For now we will simple add the filename as keyblock resource
*/
@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
int rc = 0;
pkc_cache_entry_t ce;
/* lets see wether we checked the keyid already */
/* let's see whether we checked the keyid already */
for( kl = unknown_keyids; kl; kl = kl->next )
if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY; /* already checked and not found */
@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ hextobyte( const byte *s )
/****************
* Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This functions looks for the
* Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This function looks for the
* first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id.
* if pkc has the pubkey algo set, the function will only return
* a pubkey with that algo.
@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ get_seckey( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
}
/****************
* Check wether the secret key is available
* Check whether the secret key is available
* Returns: 0 := key is available
* G10ERR_NO_SECKEY := not availabe
*/

4
g10/gpgd.c
View File

@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
opt.compress = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
opt.batch = 1;
/* check wether we have a config file on the commandline */
/* check whether we have a config file on the commandline */
orig_argc = argc;
orig_argv = argv;
pargs.argc = &argc;
@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ become_daemon()
log_fatal("chdir to root failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) );
umask(0);
/* do not let possible childs become zombies */
/* do not let possible children become zombies */
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
if( opt.verbose )
log_info("now running as daemon\n");

44
g10/import.c
View File

@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
/****************
* Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
* This function rejects alls keys which are not valid self signed on at
* This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
* least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
* Other signatures are not not checked.
* Other signatures are not checked.
*
* Actually this functtion does a merge. It works like this:
*
@ -62,23 +62,23 @@ static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
* - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
* without/invalid self-signatures.
* - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
* - See wether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
* - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
* If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
* - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
* our keyring. If they are differen something weird is going on;
* our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on;
* ask what to do.
* - See wether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
* - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
* ask the user what to do.
* - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
* (consider to look at the timestamp and use the newest?)
* (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
* - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signatures public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
* is used.
* - Proceed with next signature.
*
* Key revocation certificates have a special handling.
* Key revocation certificates have special handling.
*
*/
int
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock )
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
/* get the key and print some infos about it */
/* get the key and print some info about it */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_CERT );
if( !node ) {
log_error("%s: Oops; public key not found anymore!\n", fname);
@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock )
goto leave;
}
/* See wether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
/* See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
* ask the user what to do. <--- fixme */
/* now read the original keyblock */
@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock )
/****************
* Import a revocation certificate, this is a single signature packet.
* Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet.
*/
static int
import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node )
@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node )
}
/* check wether we already have this */
/* check whether we already have this */
for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node )
/****************
* loop over the keyblock an check all self signatures.
* loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures.
* Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0.
* Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1.
*/
@ -515,8 +515,8 @@ chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
}
/****************
* delete all parts which are invalidand those signatures whos
* public key algorithm is not availabe in this implemenation;
* delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
* public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation;
* but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows
* about it.
* returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over.
@ -583,10 +583,10 @@ delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid )
*
* o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
* FIXME: add the check, that we don't have duplicate signatures and the
* warning in cases that the old/new signatures don't match.
* FIXME: add the check that we don't have duplicate signatures and the
* warning in cases where the old/new signatures don't match.
* o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signatures public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
* into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
* is used.
* Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0
@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
break;
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
/* check wether we already have this */
/* check whether we already have this */
found = 0;
for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
@ -742,9 +742,9 @@ merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs,
if( found ) { /* we already have this signature */
/* Hmmm: should we compare the timestamp etc?
* but then we have first to see wether this signature is valid
* - or - simply add it in such a case and let trustdb logic
* decide wether to remove the old one
* but then we have first to see whether this signature is valid
* - or simply add it in such a case and let trustdb logic
* decide whether to remove the old one
*/
continue;
}

12
g10/kbnode.c
View File

@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ release_kbnode( KBNODE n )
/****************
* Delete NODE from ROOT, ROOT must exist!
* Note: This does only work with walk_kbnode!!
* Delete NODE from ROOT. ROOT must exist!
* Note: This only works with walk_kbnode!!
*/
void
delete_kbnode( KBNODE node )
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ delete_kbnode( KBNODE node )
/****************
* Append NODE to ROOT, ROOT must exist!
* Append NODE to ROOT. ROOT must exist!
*/
void
add_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node )
@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ find_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype )
/****************
* Walk through a list of kbnodes. This functions returns
* Walk through a list of kbnodes. This function returns
* the next kbnode for each call; before using the function the first
* time, the caller must set CONTEXT to NULL (This has simply the effect
* to start with ROOT).
@ -213,9 +213,9 @@ clear_kbnode_flags( KBNODE n )
/****************
* Commit changes made to the kblist at ROOT. Note that ROOT my change,
* and it is therefor passed by reference.
* and it is therefore passed by reference.
* The function has the effect of removing all nodes marked as deleted.
* returns true, if any node has been changed
* returns true if any node has been changed
*/
int
commit_kbnode( KBNODE *root )

6
g10/keydb.h
View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
/****************
* A Keyblock are all packets which form an entire certificate;
* A Keyblock is all packets which form an entire certificate;
* i.e. the public key, certificate, trust packets, user ids,
* signatures, and subkey.
*
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct kbnode_struct {
};
/****************
* A data structre to hold informations about the external position
* A data structre to hold information about the external position
* of a keyblock.
*/
struct keyblock_pos_struct {
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct skc_list {
int mark;
};
/* structure to collect all informations which can be used to
/* structure to collect all information which can be used to
* identify a public key */
typedef struct pubkey_find_info *PUBKEY_FIND_INFO;
struct pubkey_find_info {

14
g10/keygen.c
View File

@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ gen_elg(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
pkt->pkt.public_cert = pkc;
add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
/* don't know wether it make sense to have the factors, so for now
* we store them in the secret keyring (but they are of secret) */
/* don't know whether it makes sense to have the factors, so for now
* we store them in the secret keyring (but they are secret) */
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_CERT;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert = skc;
@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ generate_keypair()
nbits = *answer? atoi(answer): 1024;
m_free(answer);
if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && (nbits < 512 || nbits > 1024) )
tty_printf(_("DSA does only allow keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"));
tty_printf(_("DSA only allows keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"));
else if( nbits < 768 )
tty_printf(_("keysize too small; 768 is smallest value allowed.\n"));
else if( nbits > 2048 ) {
@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ generate_keypair()
tty_printf(_("You selected this USER-ID:\n \"%s\"\n\n"), uid);
/* fixme: add a warning if this the user-id already exists */
/* fixme: add a warning if this user-id already exists */
for(;;) {
answer = tty_get(_("Edit (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay? "));
tty_kill_prompt();
@ -539,8 +539,8 @@ generate_keypair()
if( rc == -1 ) {
m_free(dek); dek = NULL;
tty_printf(_(
"You don't what a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
"I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at anytime,\n"
"You don't want a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
"I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at any time,\n"
"using this program with the option \"--change-passphrase\"\n\n"));
break;
}
@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ generate_keypair()
}
/* now check wether we a are allowed to write to the keyrings */
/* now check whether we are allowed to write to the keyrings */
pub_fname = make_filename(opt.homedir, "pubring.gpg", NULL );
sec_fname = make_filename(opt.homedir, "secring.gpg", NULL );
if( opt.verbose ) {

12
g10/mainproc.c
View File

@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ typedef struct {
PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
md_filter_context_t mfx;
int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */
int encrypt_only; /* process onyl encrytion messages */
int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */
STRLIST signed_data;
DEK *dek;
int last_was_pubkey_enc;
@ -123,12 +123,12 @@ add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
KBNODE node;
if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
/* This is the first signature for a following datafile.
* G10 does not write such packets, instead it always uses
/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
* G10 does not write such packets; instead it always uses
* onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
* of prepending the signtaure to the data is,
* of prepending the signature to the data is
* that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
* from stdin. (Anyway, G10 is able to read these stuff) */
* from stdin. (G10 is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
node = new_kbnode( pkt );
c->list = node;
return 1;
@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
/* fixme: take the digest algo(s) to use from the
* onepass_sig packet (if we have these)
* And look at the sigclass to check wether we should use the
* And look at the sigclass to check whether we should use the
* textmode filter (sigclass 0x01)
*/
c->mfx.md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);

2
g10/mdfilter.c
View File

@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
/****************
* The filter is used to collect a message digest
* This filter is used to collect a message digest
*/
int
md_filter( void *opaque, int control,

2
g10/openfile.c
View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
/****************
* Check wether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an
* Check whether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an
* existing one.
* Returns: -1 : Do not overwrite
* 0 : it's okay to overwrite or the file does not exist

6
g10/packet.h
View File

@ -124,12 +124,12 @@ typedef struct {
byte hdrbytes; /* number of header bytes */
byte version;
byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
byte is_protected; /* The secret infos are protected and must */
/* be decrypteded before use, the protected */
byte is_protected; /* The secret info is protected and must */
/* be decrypted before use, the protected */
/* MPIs are simply (void*) pointers to memory */
/* and should never be passed to a mpi_xxx() */
struct {
byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret informations*/
byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret information*/
byte s2k;
byte hash;
byte salt[8];

17
g10/parse-packet.c
View File

@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
#include "filter.h"
#include "options.h"
static mpi_print_mode = 0;
static list_mode = 0;
static int mpi_print_mode = 0;
static int list_mode = 0;
static int parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int reqtype,
ulong *retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip );
@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt )
}
/****************
* Like parse packet, but do only return packets of the given type.
* Like parse packet, but only return packets of the given type.
*/
int
search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int pkttype, ulong *retpos )
@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out )
/****************
* Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces.
* Stop after at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy the packet at this offset)
* Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later offsets)
*/
int
copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, ulong stopoff )
@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( is_v4 ) { /*extract required informations */
if( is_v4 ) { /*extract required information */
const byte *p;
p = parse_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, 2 );
if( !p )
@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
n = pktlen; cert->d.elg.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */
n = pktlen; cert->d.dsa.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
@ -1288,11 +1288,12 @@ parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *pkt )
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode )
if( list_mode ) {
if( pktlen )
printf(":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n", pktlen-10);
else
printf(":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n");
}
ed->buf = inp;
pktlen = 0;

22
g10/pkclist.c
View File

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
#include "i18n.h"
/****************
* Returns true if a ownertrust has changed.
* Returns true if an ownertrust has changed.
*/
static int
query_ownertrust( ulong lid )
@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ query_ownertrust( ulong lid )
tty_print_string( p, n ),
m_free(p);
tty_printf(_("\"\n\n"
"Please decide in how far do you trust this user to\n"
"correctly sign other users keys (looking at his passport,\n"
"checking the fingerprints from different sources ...)?\n\n"
"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"
" 1 = Don't know\n"
" 2 = I do NOT trust\n"
" 3 = I trust marginally\n"
" 4 = I trust fully\n"
" s = please show me more informations\n\n") );
" s = please show me more information\n\n") );
for(;;) {
p = tty_get(_("Your decision? "));
@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ add_ownertrust( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
int any=0;
tty_printf(
_("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Lets see, wether we\n"
_("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Let's see whether we\n"
"can assign some missing owner trust values.\n\n"));
rc = query_trust_record( pkc );
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ _("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Lets see, wether we\n"
}
/****************
* Check wether we can trust this pkc which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
* Check whether we can trust this pkc which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
* Returns: true if we trust.
*/
static int
@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel )
if( rc )
log_fatal("trust check after add_ownertrust failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc) );
/* fixme: this is recursive; we better should unroll it */
/* fixme: this is recursive; we should unroll it */
return do_we_trust( pkc, trustlevel );
}
}
@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel )
return 0; /* no */
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
log_info("I'm not sure wether this keys really belongs to the owner\n"
log_info("I'm not sure whether this key really belongs to the owner\n"
"but I proceed anyway\n");
return 1; /* yes */
@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel )
/****************
* wrapper arounf do_we_trust, so we can ask wether to use the
* wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the
* key anyway.
*/
static int
@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel )
char *answer;
tty_printf(_(
"It is NOT certain, that the key belongs to his owner.\n"
"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n"
"If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n"
"the next question with yes\n\n") );

8
g10/revoke.c
View File

@ -176,11 +176,11 @@ gen_revoke( const char *uname )
/* and issue a usage notice */
tty_printf("Revocation certificate created.\n\n"
"Please move it to a media, which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n"
"Please move it to a medium which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n"
"access to this certificate he can use it to make your key unusable.\n"
"It is clever to print this certificate and store it away, just in the case\n"
"your media gets unreadable. But have some caution: The printer system of\n"
"your machine might store the data and make it availabe to others!\n");
"It is smart to print this certificate and store it away, just in case\n"
"your media become unreadable. But have some caution: The print system of\n"
"your machine might store the data and make it available to others!\n");

18
g10/ringedit.c
View File

@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ check_pos( KBPOS *kbpos )
****************************************************************/
/****************
* Register a resource (which currently may ionly be a keyring file).
* Register a resource (which currently may only be a keyring file).
*/
int
add_keyblock_resource( const char *filename, int force, int secret )
@ -165,12 +165,12 @@ get_keyblock_handle( const char *filename, int secret, KBPOS *kbpos )
/****************
* Search a keyblock which starts with the given packet and put all
* informations into KBPOS, which can be used later to access this key block.
* Search a keyblock which starts with the given packet and puts all
* information into KBPOS, which can be used later to access this key block.
* This function looks into all registered keyblock sources.
* PACKET must be a packet with either a secret_cert or a public_cert
*
* This function is intended to check wether a given certificate
* This function is intended to check whether a given certificate
* is already in a keyring or to prepare it for editing.
*
* Returns: 0 if found, -1 if not found or an errorcode.
@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ find_secret_keyblock_byname( KBPOS *kbpos, const char *username )
/****************
* Lock the keyblock; wait until it's available
* This function may change the internal data in kbpos, in cases
* when the to be locked keyblock has been modified.
* when the keyblock to be locked has been modified.
* fixme: remove this function and add an option to search()?
*/
int
@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ read_keyblock( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
/****************
* This functions can be used to read trough a complete keyring.
* This functions can be used to read through a complete keyring.
* Mode is: 0 = open
* 1 = read
* 2 = close
@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ insert_keyblock( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE root )
/****************
* Delete the keyblock described by KBPOS.
* The current code simply changes the keyblock in the keyring
* to packet of type 0 with the correct length. To help detecting errors,
* to packet of type 0 with the correct length. To help detect errors,
* zero bytes are written.
*/
int
@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs )
break;
default:
/* skip pakets at the begin of a keyring, until we find
/* skip pakets at the beginning of a keyring, until we find
* a start packet; issue a warning if it is not a comment */
if( !root && pkt->pkttype != PKT_COMMENT )
log_info("keyring_enum: skipped packet of type %d\n",
@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs )
/****************
* Peromf insert/delete/update operation.
* Perform insert/delete/update operation.
* mode 1 = insert
* 2 = delete
* 3 = update

6
g10/seckey-cert.c
View File

@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
default: BUG();
}
cipher_close( cipher_hd );
/* now let's see wether we have used the right passphrase */
/* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
if( csum != cert->csum ) {
if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
/* very bad kludge to work around an early bug */
@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
/****************
* Check the secret key certificate
* Ask up to 3 time for a correct passphrase
* Ask up to 3 times for a correct passphrase
*/
int
check_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
}
/****************
* check wether the secret key is protected.
* check whether the secret key is protected.
* Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm
*/
int

6
g10/seskey.c
View File

@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
u16 csum;
MPI a;
/* the current limitation is, that we can only use a session key
* which length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB
/* the current limitation is that we can only use a session key
* whose length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB
* I think we can live with that.
*/
if( dek->keylen + 7 > nframe || !nframe )
@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
* 0 2 RND(n bytes) 0 A DEK(k bytes) CSUM(2 bytes)
*
* (But how can we store the leading 0 - the external representaion
* of MPIs don't allow leading zeroes =:-)
* of MPIs doesn't allow leading zeroes =:-)
*
* RND are non-zero random bytes.
* A is the cipher algorithm

4
g10/sig-check.c
View File

@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
/****************
* check the signature pointed to by NODE. This is a key signatures.
* check the signature pointed to by NODE. This is a key signature.
* If the function detects a self-signature, it uses the PKC from
* NODE and does not read the any public key.
* NODE and does not read any public key.
*/
int
check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )

2
g10/sign.c
View File

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_cert *skc, MD_HANDLE md )
else
BUG();
/* fixme: should we check wether the signature is okay?
/* fixme: should we check whether the signature is okay?
* maybe by using an option */
return rc;

42
g10/trustdb.c
View File

@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ release_lid_table( LOCAL_ID_INFO *tbl )
/****************
* Add a new item to the table or return 1 if we already have this item
* fixme: maybe its a good idea to take items from an unused item list.
* fixme: maybe it's a good idea to take items from an unused item list.
*/
static int
ins_lid_table_item( LOCAL_ID_INFO *tbl, ulong lid, unsigned flag )
@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ search_record( PKT_public_cert *pkc, TRUSTREC *rec )
/****************
* If we do not have a local_id in a signature packet, find the owner of
* the signature packet in our trustdb or insert him into the trustdb
* the signature packet in our trustdb or insert them into the trustdb
*/
static int
set_signature_packets_local_id( PKT_signature *sig )
@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ keyid_from_local_id( ulong lid, u32 *keyid )
}
/****************
* Walk throug the signatures of a public key.
* Walk through the signatures of a public key.
* The caller must provide a context structure, with all fields set
* to zero, but the local_id field set to the requested key;
* This function does not change this field. On return the context
@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ walk_sigrecs( SIGREC_CONTEXT *c, int create )
/****************
* Verify, that all our public keys are in the trustDB.
* Verify that all our public keys are in the trustDB.
*/
static int
verify_own_certs()
@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ verify_own_certs()
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_debug("checking secret key %08lX\n", (ulong)keyid[1] );
/* look wether we can access the public key of this secret key */
/* see whether we can access the public key of this secret key */
memset( pkc, 0, sizeof *pkc );
rc = get_pubkey( pkc, keyid );
if( rc ) {
@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ do_list_sigs( ulong root, ulong pubkey, int depth,
else {
printf("%6u: %*s%08lX(%lu:%02x) ", *lineno, depth*4, "",
(ulong)keyid[1], sx.sig_id, sx.sig_flag );
/* check wether we already checked this pubkey */
/* check whether we already checked this pubkey */
if( !qry_lid_table_flag( ultikey_table, sx.sig_id, NULL ) ) {
print_user_id("[ultimately trusted]", keyid);
++*lineno;
@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ do_list_path( TRUST_INFO *stack, int depth, int max_depth,
/*printf("%2lu/%d: scrutinizig\n", stack[depth-1], depth);*/
if( depth >= max_depth || depth >= MAX_LIST_SIGS_DEPTH-1 ) {
/*printf("%2lu/%d: to deeply nested\n", stack[depth-1], depth);*/
/*printf("%2lu/%d: too deeply nested\n", stack[depth-1], depth);*/
return 0;
}
memset( &sx, 0, sizeof sx );
@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ do_list_path( TRUST_INFO *stack, int depth, int max_depth,
* Check all the sigs of the given keyblock and mark them
* as checked. Valid signatures which are duplicates are
* also marked [shall we check them at all?]
* FIXME: what shall we do if we have duplicate signatures were only
* FIXME: what shall we do if we have duplicate signatures where only
* some of them are bad?
*/
static int
@ -1204,9 +1204,9 @@ build_sigrecs( ulong pubkeyid )
/* the next function should always succeed, because
* we have already checked the signature, and for this
* it was necessary to have the pubkey. The only reason
* this can fail are I/o errors of the trustdb or a
* this can fail are I/O errors of the trustdb or a
* remove operation on the pubkey database - which should
* not disturb us, because we have to chace them anyway. */
* not disturb us, because we have to chance them anyway. */
rc = set_signature_packets_local_id( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
if( rc )
log_fatal("set_signature_packets_local_id failed: %s\n",
@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ make_tsl( ulong pubkey_id, TRUST_SEG_LIST *ret_tslist )
* to assign a trustvalue to the first segment (which is the requested key)
* of each path.
*
* FIXME: We have to do more thinks here. e.g. we should never increase
* FIXME: We have to do more thinking here. e.g. we should never increase
* the trust value.
*
* Do not do it for duplicates.
@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ propagate_trust( TRUST_SEG_LIST tslist )
if( tsl->dup )
continue;
assert( tsl->nseg );
/* the last segment is always a ultimately trusted one, so we can
/* the last segment is always an ultimately trusted one, so we can
* assign a fully trust to the next one */
i = tsl->nseg-1;
tsl->seg[i].trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE;
@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel )
tflags |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
if( !rc && !dr->r.dir.sigrec ) {
/* See wether this is our own key */
/* See whether this is our own key */
if( !qry_lid_table_flag( ultikey_table, pubkeyid, NULL ) )
*trustlevel = tflags | TRUST_ULTIMATE;
return 0;
@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel )
}
}
/* and look wether there is a trusted path.
/* and see whether there is a trusted path.
* We only have to look at the first segment, because
* propagate_trust has investigated all other segments */
marginal = fully = 0;
@ -1478,9 +1478,9 @@ do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel )
}
/*********************************************************
**************** API Interface ************************
*********************************************************/
/***********************************************
**************** API ************************
***********************************************/
/****************
* Perform some checks over the trustdb
@ -1536,11 +1536,11 @@ init_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname )
* in ~/.gnupg/ here */
rc = verify_private_data();
if( !rc ) {
/* verify, that our own certificates are in the trustDB
/* verify that our own certificates are in the trustDB
* or move them to the trustdb. */
rc = verify_own_certs();
/* should we check wether there is no other ultimately trusted
/* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted
* key in the database? */
}
@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ check_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, unsigned *r_trustlevel )
* 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
* to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web
* 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL,
* so that it can free it's context.
* so that it can free its context.
*/
int
enum_trust_web( void **context, ulong *lid )
@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ query_trust_record( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
/****************
* Insert a trust record into the TrustDB
* This function failes if this record already exists.
* This function fails if this record already exists.
*/
int
insert_trust_record( PKT_public_cert *pkc )

2
g10/trustdb.h
View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
#define TRUST_MASK 15
#define TRUST_UNKNOWN 0 /* not yet calculated */
#define TRUST_EXPIRED 1 /* calculation may be invalid */
#define TRUST_UNDEFINED 2 /* not enough informations for calculation */
#define TRUST_UNDEFINED 2 /* not enough information for calculation */
#define TRUST_NEVER 3 /* never trust this pubkey */
#define TRUST_MARGINAL 4 /* marginally trusted */
#define TRUST_FULLY 5 /* fully trusted */

4
g10/verify.c
View File

@ -41,9 +41,9 @@
/****************
* Assume that the input is a signature and verify it without
* generating any output. With no arguments, the sigature packet
* generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet
* is read from stdin (it may be a detached signature when not
* used in batch mode). If only a sigfile is given, is maybe a complete
* used in batch mode). If only a sigfile is given, it may be a complete
* signature or a detached signature in which case the signed stuff
* is expected from stdin. With more than 1 argument, the first should
* be a detached signature and the remaining files are the signed stuff.

2
mpi/mpi-bit.c
View File

@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ mpi_get_nbits( MPI a )
/****************
* Test wether bit N is set.
* Test whether bit N is set.
*/
int
mpi_test_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )

2
mpi/mpi-div.c
View File

@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ mpi_tdiv_q_2exp( MPI w, MPI u, unsigned count )
}
/****************
* Check wether dividend is divisible by divisor
* Check whether dividend is divisible by divisor
* (note: divisor must fit into a limb)
*/
int

12
mpi/mpicoder.c
View File

@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ mpi_read(IOBUF inp, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
/****************
* Make a mpi from a character string.
* Make an mpi from a character string.
*/
int
mpi_fromstr(MPI val, const char *str)
@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ mpi_fromstr(MPI val, const char *str)
/****************
* print an MPI to the give stream and return the number of characters
* print an MPI to the given stream and return the number of characters
* printed.
*/
int
@ -236,9 +236,9 @@ mpi_print( FILE *fp, MPI a, int mode )
/****************
* Special function to get the low 8 bytes from a mpi,
* this can be used as a keyid, KEYID is an 2 element array.
* Does return the low 4 bytes.
* Special function to get the low 8 bytes from an mpi.
* This can be used as a keyid; KEYID is an 2 element array.
* Return the low 4 bytes.
*/
u32
mpi_get_keyid( MPI a, u32 *keyid )
@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ mpi_get_keyid( MPI a, u32 *keyid )
/****************
* Return a m_alloced buffer with the MPI (msb first).
* Return an m_alloced buffer with the MPI (msb first).
* NBYTES receives the length of this buffer. Caller must free the
* return string (This function does return a 0 byte buffer with NBYTES
* set to zero if the value of A is zero. If sign is not NULL, it will

4
mpi/mpih-mul.c
View File

@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ mul_n( mpi_ptr_t prodp, mpi_ptr_t up, mpi_ptr_t vp,
mpi_size_t size, mpi_ptr_t tspace )
{
if( size & 1 ) {
/* The size is odd, the code code below doesn't handle that.
/* The size is odd, and the code below doesn't handle that.
* Multiply the least significant (size - 1) limbs with a recursive
* call, and handle the most significant limb of S1 and S2
* separately.
@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ void
mpih_sqr_n( mpi_ptr_t prodp, mpi_ptr_t up, mpi_size_t size, mpi_ptr_t tspace)
{
if( size & 1 ) {
/* The size is odd, the code code below doesn't handle that.
/* The size is odd, and the code below doesn't handle that.
* Multiply the least significant (size - 1) limbs with a recursive
* call, and handle the most significant limb of S1 and S2
* separately.

2
po/Makefile.in.in
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Makefile for program source directory in GNU NLS utilities package.
# Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997 by Ulrich Drepper <drepper@gnu.ai.mit.edu>
#
# This file file be copied and used freely without restrictions. It can
# This file may be copied and used freely without restrictions. It can
# be used in projects which are not available under the GNU Public License
# but which still want to provide support for the GNU gettext functionality.
# Please note that the actual code is *not* freely available.

82
po/de.po
View File

@ -78,6 +78,14 @@ msgstr "Aufruf: gpgm [Optionen] [Dateien] (-h f
msgid "Usage: gpg [options] [files] (-h for help)"
msgstr "Aufruf: gpg [Optionen] [Dateien] (-h für Hilfe)"
#: g10/g10.c:298
msgid "usage: gpgm [options] "
msgstr "Aufruf: gpgm [Optionen] "
#: g10/g10.c:300
msgid "usage: gpg [options] "
msgstr "Aufruf: gpg [Optionen] "
#: g10/g10.c:152
msgid "conflicting commands\n"
@ -262,7 +270,7 @@ msgid "select default cipher algorithm"
msgstr "Den Cipher Algorithmus auswählen"
#: g10/g10.c:206
msgid "select default puplic key algorithm"
msgid "select default public key algorithm"
msgstr "Den Public-Key Algorithmus auswählen"
#: g10/g10.c:207
@ -339,6 +347,9 @@ msgstr "Die Trust-DB kann nicht initialisiert werden: %s\n"
msgid "can't open '%s'\n"
msgstr "Datei '%s' kann nicht geöffnet werden\n"
#: g10/g10.c:799
msgid "can't open %s: %s\n"
msgstr "Datei '%s' kann nicht geöffnet werden: %s\n"
#: g10/g10.c:113
msgid "write status info to this fd"
@ -417,6 +428,31 @@ msgstr "--delete-key Benutzername"
msgid "--change-passphrase [username]"
msgstr "--change-passphrase [Benutzername]"
#: g10/g10.c:810
msgid "-k[v][v][v][c] [userid] [keyring]"
msgstr "-h[v][v][v][c] [Benutzername] [Keyring]"
#: g10/g10.c:857
msgid "dearmoring failed: %s\n"
msgstr "De-Armor fehlgeschlagen: %s\n"
#: g10/g10.c:865
msgid "enarmoring failed: %s\n"
msgstr "En-Armor fehlgeschlagen: %s\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:157
msgid ""
"No ownertrust values changed.\n"
"\n"
msgstr "Keine \"Ownertrust\" Werte geändert.\n"
@ -432,15 +468,15 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"\"\n"
"\n"
"Please decide in how far do you trust this user to\n"
"correctly sign other users keys (looking at his passport,\n"
"checking the fingerprints from different sources ...)?\n"
"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n"
"\n"
" 1 = Don't know\n"
" 2 = I do NOT trust\n"
" 3 = I trust marginally\n"
" 4 = I trust fully\n"
" s = please show me more informations\n"
" s = please show me more information\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
"\"\n"
@ -473,7 +509,7 @@ msgstr "Sie sollten hier eigentlich eine Liste der Signierer sehen.\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:132
msgid ""
"Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Lets see, wether we\n"
"Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Let's see whether we\n"
"can assign some missing owner trust values.\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
@ -481,6 +517,34 @@ msgstr ""
"Mal sehen ob wir now weitere Ownertrust Werte zuordnen können.\n"
"\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:267
msgid ""
"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n"
"If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n"
"the next question with yes\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
"Es ist NICHT sicher, daß der Key dem vorgeblichen Besitzer gehört.\n"
"Wenn Sie *wirklich* wissen, was Sie tun, können Sie die nächste\n"
"Frage mit ja beantworten\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:304
msgid ""
"You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
"Sie gaben keine User-ID angegeben. (benutzen Sie die Option \"-r\")\n"
"\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:308
msgid "Enter the user ID: "
msgstr "Geben Sie die User-ID ein: "
#: g10/keygen.c:109
msgid "writing self signature\n"
msgstr "Die Selbst-Signatur wird geschrieben\n"
@ -532,7 +596,7 @@ msgid "What keysize do you want? (1024) "
msgstr "Welche Schlüssellänge wünschen Sie? (1024)"
#: g10/keygen.c:357
msgid "DSA does only allow keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"
msgid "DSA only allows keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"
msgstr ""
#: g10/keygen.c:359
@ -636,8 +700,8 @@ msgstr ""
#: g10/keygen.c:508
msgid ""
"You don't what a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
"I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at anytime,\n"
"You don't want a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
"I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at any time,\n"
"using this program with the option \"--change-passphrase\"\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""

33
po/it.po
View File

@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ msgid "select default cipher algorithm"
msgstr "seleziona l'algoritmo di cifratura predefinito"
#: g10/g10.c:119
msgid "select default puplic key algorithm"
msgid "select default public key algorithm"
msgstr "seleziona l'algoritmo a chiave pubblica predefinito"
#: g10/g10.c:120
@ -410,10 +410,6 @@ msgstr "impossibile aprire '%s': %s\n"
msgid "-k[v][v][v][c] [userid] [keyring]"
msgstr "-k[v][v][v][c] [userid] [portachiavi]"
#: g10/g10.c:804
msgid "--gen-key"
msgstr ""
#: g10/g10.c:845
#, c-format
msgid "dearmoring failed: %s\n"
@ -447,15 +443,15 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"\"\n"
"\n"
"Please decide in how far do you trust this user to\n"
"correctly sign other users keys (looking at his passport,\n"
"checking the fingerprints from different sources ...)?\n"
"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n"
"\n"
" 1 = Don't know\n"
" 2 = I do NOT trust\n"
" 3 = I trust marginally\n"
" 4 = I trust fully\n"
" s = please show me more informations\n"
" s = please show me more information\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
"\"\n"
@ -493,7 +489,7 @@ msgstr "Qui vedrai una lista di firmatari, ecc.\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:132
msgid ""
"Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Lets see, wether we\n"
"Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Let's see whether we\n"
"can assign some missing owner trust values.\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
@ -511,7 +507,7 @@ msgstr ""
#: g10/pkclist.c:267
msgid ""
"It is NOT certain, that the key belongs to his owner.\n"
"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n"
"If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n"
"the next question with yes\n"
"\n"
@ -564,7 +560,7 @@ msgid "Your selection? (1,2) "
msgstr "Cosa scegli? (1,2) "
#: g10/keygen.c:336
msgid "Sorry; DSA is not yet supported.\n"
msgid "Sorry; DSA key generation is not yet supported.\n"
msgstr "Mi spiace, DSA non è gestito.\n"
#: g10/keygen.c:349
@ -585,7 +581,7 @@ msgid "What keysize do you want? (1024) "
msgstr "Di che dimensioni vuoi la chiave? (1024) "
#: g10/keygen.c:363
msgid "DSA does only allow keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"
msgid "DSA only allows keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"
msgstr "DSA permette solo chiavi di dimensioni da 512 a 1024\n"
#: g10/keygen.c:365
@ -625,17 +621,16 @@ msgstr "arrotondate a %u bit"
#: g10/keygen.c:397
msgid ""
"\n"
"You need a User-ID to identify your key; the software constructs the user "
"id\n"
"You need a User-ID to identify your key; the software constructs the user id\n"
"from Real Name, Comment and Email Address in this form:\n"
" \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>\"\n"
" \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <heinrichh@duesseldorf.de>\"\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
"\n"
"Ti serve un User ID per identificare la tua chiave; il software costruisce "
"l'user id a partire da Nome e Cognome, Commento e Indirizzo di Email "
"indicati in questa forma:\n"
" \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>\"\n"
" \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <heinrichh@duesseldorf.de>\"\n"
"\n"
#: g10/keygen.c:409
@ -695,8 +690,8 @@ msgstr ""
#: g10/keygen.c:516
msgid ""
"You don't what a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
"I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at anytime,\n"
"You don't want a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n"
"I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at any time,\n"
"using this program with the option \"--change-passphrase\"\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""

6
tools/mpicalc.c
View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
/* mpitest.c - test the mpi functions
* Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This is a RPN calculator; values must be given in hex.
* Operaion is like dc(1) except that the input/output radix is
* This is an RPN calculator; values must be given in hex.
* Operation is like dc(1) except that the input/output radix is
* always 16 and you can use a '-' to prefix a negative number.
* Addition operators: ++ and --. All operators must be delimeted by a blank
* Addition operators: ++ and --. All operators must be delimited by a blank
*
*
* This file is part of GNUPG.

2
util/argparse.c
View File

@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ usage( int level )
* 18: Optional thanks list (with LFs)
* 19: Bug report info
*20..29: Additional lib version strings.
*30..39: Additional program infos (with LFs)
*30..39: Additional program info (with LFs)
* 40: short usage note (with LF)
* 41: long usage note (with LF)
*/

4
util/fileutil.c
View File

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
/****************
* Construct a filename form the NULL terminated list of parts.
* Construct a filename from the NULL terminated list of parts.
* Tilde expansion is done here.
*/
char *
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ make_filename( const char *first_part, ... )
/****************
* A simple function to decide, wether the filename ist stdout
* A simple function to decide whether the filename is stdout
* or a real filename.
*/
const char *

20
util/iobuf.c
View File

@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int underflow(IOBUF a);
* Read data from a file into buf which has an allocated length of *LEN.
* return the number of read bytes in *LEN. OPAQUE is the FILE * of
* the stream. A is not used.
* control maybe:
* control may be:
* IOBUFCTRL_INIT: called just before the function is linked into the
* list of function. This can be used to prepare internal
* data structures of the function.
@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ iobuf_open( const char *fname )
}
/****************
* create a iobuf for writing to a file; the file will be created.
* create an iobuf for writing to a file; the file will be created.
*/
IOBUF
iobuf_create( const char *fname )
@ -423,8 +423,8 @@ iobuf_create( const char *fname )
}
/****************
* append to a iobuf if the file does not exits; create it.
* cannont be used for stdout.
* append to an iobuf; if the file does not exist, create it.
* cannot be used for stdout.
*/
IOBUF
iobuf_append( const char *fname )
@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ iobuf_pop_filter( IOBUF a, int (*f)(void *opaque, int control,
return rc;
}
/* and look how to remove it */
/* and see how to remove it */
if( a == b && !b->chain )
log_bug("can't remove the last filter from the chain\n");
else if( a == b ) { /* remove the first iobuf from the chain */
@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ iobuf_read(IOBUF a, byte *buf, unsigned buflen )
/****************
* Have a look at the iobuf.
* NOTE: This does only work in special cases.
* NOTE: This only works in special cases.
*/
int
iobuf_peek(IOBUF a, byte *buf, unsigned buflen )
@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ iobuf_unget_and_close_temp( IOBUF a, IOBUF temp )
/****************
* Set a limit, how much bytes may be read from the input stream A.
* Set a limit on how many bytes may be read from the input stream A.
* Setting the limit to 0 disables this feature.
*/
void
@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ iobuf_tell( IOBUF a )
/****************
* This is a very limited implementation. It simply discards all internal
* buffering and remove all filters but the first one.
* buffering and removes all filters but the first one.
*/
int
iobuf_seek( IOBUF a, ulong newpos )
@ -968,7 +968,7 @@ iobuf_set_block_mode( IOBUF a, size_t n )
}
/****************
* enable patial block mode as descriped in the OpenPGP draft.
* enable partial block mode as described in the OpenPGP draft.
* LEN is the first length
*/
void
@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ iobuf_set_partial_block_mode( IOBUF a, size_t len )
/****************
* Checks wether the stream is in block mode
* Checks whether the stream is in block mode
* Note: This does not work if other filters are pushed on the stream.
*/
int

12
util/memory.c
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* We use our own memory allocation functions instead of plain malloc(),
* so that we can provide some special enhancements:
* a) functions to provide memory from a secure memory.
* b) By looking at the requested allocation size we
* b) by looking at the requested allocation size we
* can reuse memory very quickly (e.g. MPI storage)
* (really needed?)
* c) memory usage reporting if compiled with M_DEBUG
@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ struct memtbl_entry {
#define info_hash(p) ( *(u32*)((p)) % INFO_BUCKETS )
static struct info_entry *info_strings[INFO_BUCKETS]; /* hash table */
static struct memtbl_entry *memtbl; /* the table with the memory infos */
static struct memtbl_entry *memtbl; /* the table with the memory info */
static unsigned memtbl_size; /* number of allocated entries */
static unsigned memtbl_len; /* number of used entries */
static struct memtbl_entry *memtbl_unused;/* to keep track of unused entries */
@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
index = memtbl_len++;
else {
struct memtbl_entry *e;
/* look for an used entry in the table. We take the first one,
/* look for a used entry in the table. We take the first one,
* so that freed entries remain as long as possible in the table
* (free appends a new one)
*/
@ -193,9 +193,9 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
/****************
* Check that the memory block is correct. The magic byte has already been
* checked. Checks which are done here:
* - see wether the index points into our memory table
* - see wether P is the same as the one stored in the table
* - see wether we have already freed this block.
* - see whether the index points into our memory table
* - see whether P is the same as the one stored in the table
* - see whether we have already freed this block.
*/
struct memtbl_entry *
check_mem( const byte *p, const char *info )

2
util/strgutil.c
View File

@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ strlist_last( STRLIST node )
/****************
* look for the substring SUB in buffer and return a pointer to that
* substring in BUF or NULL if not found.
* Comparison is case-in-sensitive.
* Comparison is case-insensitive.
*/
const char *
memistr( const char *buf, size_t buflen, const char *sub )