See ChangeLog: Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999 Werner Koch

BUGS

@@ -42,29 +42,27 @@ an "info standards" to find out why a disclaimer is needed for GNU.)
     Buserror on IRIX 6.4: Crash while doing a keygen. I think while creating
     the prime.	Other buserrors are reported when doing a "gpg README"
     on sparc-solaris2.6.
-    --> I hope I've fixed this: Please, can someone it. I can't reproduce it
+    --> I hope I've fixed this: Please, can check someone it.
-	on the alpha I have access to.
+	I can't reproduce it on the alpha I have access to.
 
-[ **] #7 1999-02-22 <dwpalmer@dwpalm.jf.intel.com> 0.9.3
+[  *] #7 1999-02-22 <dwpalmer@dwpalm.jf.intel.com> 0.9.3
     Conventional encrytion incompatibilty:
      $ gpg -c --cipher-algo cast5 --compress-algo 1 --no-comment secrets.txt
     Creates a file that gpg can decrypt, but PGP 5.5 has problems with it.
     PGP decrypts 6416k out of 6424k, then complains with "PGP Warning",
     "The keyring contains a bad (corrupted) PGP packet".  The resulting
     file is missing information from the front.
+    [26.02.99: temporary fix in encrypt_simple()
 
-[  *] #8 1999-02-25 <kazu@iijlab.net>
+[   ] #8 1999-02-25 <kazu@iijlab.net> 0.9.3
     %gpg --encrypt -r kazu@iijlab.net --batch foo
     gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!
     gpg: 11C23F61: no info to calculate a trust probability
-
     This creates a symmetrically encrypted message WITHOUT a session key
     encrypted with public cryptographic(i.e. foo.gpg). This is probably
-    because GNUPG encrypted a message with a random session key first then
+    [26.02.99 fixed]
-    tries to find public keys specified with the -r option. I don't like
-    this.
 
-[ **] #9 1999-02-25
+[   ] #9 1999-02-25
     Misalignment in md5.c#md5_write.
-
+    [26.02.99 fixed]
 

ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* encode.c (encode_simple): temporary fix.
+
 Wed Feb 24 11:07:27 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* configure.in: New option --enable-static-rnd.

THANKS

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ QingLong		qinglong@bolizm.ihep.su
 Ralph Gillen		gillen@theochem.uni-duesseldorf.de
 Rat			ratinox@peorth.gweep.net
 Reinhard Wobst		R.Wobst@ifw-dresden.de
+Rémi Guyomarch		rguyomarch@ifn.fr
 Reuben Sumner		rasumner@wisdom.weizmann.ac.il
 Roddy Strachan		roddy@satlink.com.au
 Roland Rosenfeld	roland@spinnaker.rhein.de

TODO

@@ -18,17 +18,7 @@
     What about 2.2 or should we use the system calls directly?
 
   * when decryptiong multiple key: print a warning only if no usable pubkey
-    encrypte package was found.  Extension: display a list of all recipients.
+    encrypt package was found.	Extension: display a list of all recipients.
-
-  * in pkclist.c : display info about the key before saying that
-    we have (no) trust info.
-
-  * for new key: the last keyring specified is used.  Order is: default
-    keyrings, keyrings from options, keyrings from the command line.
-
-  * display a kind of message-id from a signature (the timestamp may not
-    be suffiecient but DSA signatures are always different).  This can
-    be used to prevent replay attacks.	(something is mentioned in rfc2440).
 
 
 Nice to have

checks/Makefile.am

@@ -64,5 +64,7 @@ data-32000:
 data-80000:
 	../tools/mk-tdata 80000  >data-80000
 plain-large:
-	cat ../doc/HACKING ../doc/DETAILS ../doc/FAQ >plain-large
+	cat $(srcdir)/../doc/HACKING \
+	    $(srcdir)/../doc/DETAILS \
+	    $(srcdir)/../doc/FAQ	 >plain-large
 

checks/defs.inc

@@ -74,12 +74,11 @@ pgmname=`basename $0`
 
 [ -z "$srcdir" ] && fatal "not called from make"
 
-# Note don't use lock-once here because we call gpg in a pipe
 cat <<EOF  >./options
 no-greeting
 no-secmem-warning
 load-extension ../cipher/tiger
+load-extension ../cipher/rndlinux
 batch
-lock-once
 EOF
 

cipher/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* md.c: Nearly a total rewrote.
+
 Wed Feb 24 11:07:27 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* cipher.c (context): Fixed alignment

cipher/md5.c

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* md5.c - MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
- *	Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * according to the definition of MD5 in RFC 1321 from April 1992.
  * NOTE: This is *not* the same file as the one from glibc.
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  * Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
  */
 /* Written by Ulrich Drepper <drepper@gnu.ai.mit.edu>, 1995.  */
-/* modified for GnuPG by <werner.koch@guug.de> */
+/* heavily modified for GnuPG by <werner.koch@guug.de> */
 
 /* Test values:
  * ""                  D4 1D 8C D9 8F 00 B2 04  E9 80 09 98 EC F8 42 7E
@@ -40,24 +40,12 @@
 
 typedef struct {
     u32 A,B,C,D;	  /* chaining variables */
-    u32 total[2];
+    u32  nblocks;
-    u32  buflen;
+    byte buf[64];
-    char buffer[128];
+    int  count;
 } MD5_CONTEXT;
 
 
-
-#ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
-  #define SWAP(n) \
-    (((n) << 24) | (((n) & 0xff00) << 8) | (((n) >> 8) & 0xff00) | ((n) >> 24))
-#else
-  #define SWAP(n) (n)
-#endif
-
-/* This array contains the bytes used to pad the buffer to the next
-   64-byte boundary.  (RFC 1321, 3.1: Step 1)  */
-static const unsigned char fillbuf[64] = { 0x80, 0 /* , 0, 0, ...  */ };
-
 static void
 md5_init( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx )
 {
@@ -66,8 +54,8 @@ md5_init( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx )
     ctx->C = 0x98badcfe;
     ctx->D = 0x10325476;
 
-    ctx->total[0] = ctx->total[1] = 0;
+    ctx->nblocks = 0;
-    ctx->buflen = 0;
+    ctx->count = 0;
 }
 
 
@@ -87,46 +75,35 @@ md5_init( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx )
  * transform n*64 bytes
  */
 static void
-transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )
+/*transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )*/
+transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, byte *data )
 {
     u32 correct_words[16];
-    const u32 *words = buffer;
-    size_t nwords = len / sizeof(u32);
-    const u32 *endp = words + nwords;
     u32 A = ctx->A;
     u32 B = ctx->B;
     u32 C = ctx->C;
     u32 D = ctx->D;
-
-    /* First increment the byte count.	RFC 1321 specifies the possible
-       length of the file up to 2^64 bits.  Here we only compute the
-       number of bytes.  Do a double word increment.  */
-    ctx->total[0] += len;
-    if( ctx->total[0] < len )
-	++ctx->total[1];
-
-
-    /* Process all bytes in the buffer with 64 bytes in each round of
-       the loop.  */
-    while(words < endp) {
     u32 *cwp = correct_words;
-	u32 A_save = A;
-	u32 B_save = B;
-	u32 C_save = C;
-	u32 D_save = D;
 
-      /* First round: using the given function, the context and a constant
+  #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
-	 the next context is computed.	Because the algorithm's processing
+    { int i;
-	 unit is a 32-bit word, and it is determined to work on words in
+      byte *p2, *p1;
-	 little endian byte order, we perhaps have to change the byte order
+      for(i=0, p1=data, p2=(byte*)correct_words; i < 16; i++, p2 += 4 ) {
-	 before the computation.  To reduce the work for the next steps
+	p2[3] = *p1++;
-	 we store the swapped words in the array CORRECT_WORDS.  */
+	p2[2] = *p1++;
+	p2[1] = *p1++;
+	p2[0] = *p1++;
+      }
+    }
+  #else
+    memcpy( correct_words, data, 64 );
+  #endif
+
 
 #define OP(a, b, c, d, s, T)					    \
   do								    \
     {								    \
-	  a += FF (b, c, d) + (*cwp++ = SWAP (*words)) + T;		\
+      a += FF (b, c, d) + (*cwp++) + T; 	    \
-	  ++words;							\
       CYCLIC (a, s);						    \
       a += b;							    \
     }								    \
@@ -160,9 +137,6 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )
     OP (C, D, A, B, 17, 0xa679438e);
     OP (B, C, D, A, 22, 0x49b40821);
 
-	/* For the second to fourth round we have the possibly swapped words
-	   in CORRECT_WORDS.  Redefine the macro to take an additional first
-	   argument specifying the function to use.  */
 #undef OP
 #define OP(f, a, b, c, d, k, s, T)  \
     do								      \
@@ -226,18 +200,12 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )
     OP (FI, D, A, B, C, 11, 10, 0xbd3af235);
     OP (FI, C, D, A, B,  2, 15, 0x2ad7d2bb);
     OP (FI, B, C, D, A,  9, 21, 0xeb86d391);
-	/* Add the starting values of the context.  */
-	A += A_save;
-	B += B_save;
-	C += C_save;
-	D += D_save;
-    }
 
     /* Put checksum in context given as argument.  */
-    ctx->A = A;
+    ctx->A += A;
-    ctx->B = B;
+    ctx->B += B;
-    ctx->C = C;
+    ctx->C += C;
-    ctx->D = D;
+    ctx->D += D;
 }
 
 
@@ -247,46 +215,33 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len )
  * in the message whose digest is being computed.
  */
 static void
-md5_write( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len)
+md5_write( MD5_CONTEXT *hd, byte *inbuf, size_t inlen)
 {
-    /* When we already have some bits in our internal buffer concatenate
+    if( hd->count == 64 ) { /* flush the buffer */
-       both inputs first.  */
+	transform( hd, hd->buf );
-    if (ctx->buflen != 0)
+	hd->count = 0;
-      {
+	hd->nblocks++;
-	size_t left_over = ctx->buflen;
+    }
-	size_t add = 128 - left_over > len ? len : 128 - left_over;
+    if( !inbuf )
-
+	return;
-	memcpy (&ctx->buffer[left_over], buffer, add);
+    if( hd->count ) {
-	ctx->buflen += add;
+	for( ; inlen && hd->count < 64; inlen-- )
-
+	    hd->buf[hd->count++] = *inbuf++;
-	if (left_over + add > 64)
+	md5_write( hd, NULL, 0 );
-	  {
+	if( !inlen )
-	    transform(ctx, ctx->buffer, (left_over + add) & ~63);
+	    return;
-	    /* The regions in the following copy operation cannot overlap.  */
-	    memcpy (ctx->buffer, &ctx->buffer[(left_over + add) & ~63],
-		    (left_over + add) & 63);
-	    ctx->buflen = (left_over + add) & 63;
     }
 
-	buffer = (const char *) buffer + add;
+    while( inlen >= 64 ) {
-	len -= add;
+	transform( hd, inbuf );
-	/* FIXME: misalignment occurs ... tsssss */
+	hd->count = 0;
+	hd->nblocks++;
+	inlen -= 64;
+	inbuf += 64;
     }
+    for( ; inlen && hd->count < 64; inlen-- )
+	hd->buf[hd->count++] = *inbuf++;
 
-    /* Process available complete blocks.  */
-    if (len > 64)
-      {
-	transform( ctx, buffer, len & ~63);
-	buffer = (const char *) buffer + (len & ~63);
-	len &= 63;
-      }
-
-    /* Move remaining bytes in internal buffer.  */
-    if (len > 0)
-      {
-	memcpy (ctx->buffer, buffer, len);
-	ctx->buflen = len;
-      }
 }
 
 
@@ -298,39 +253,68 @@ md5_write( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, const void *buffer, size_t len)
  */
 
 static void
-md5_final( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx )
+md5_final( MD5_CONTEXT *hd )
 {
-    /* Take yet unprocessed bytes into account.  */
+    u32 t, msb, lsb;
-    u32 bytes = ctx->buflen;
+    byte *p;
-    size_t pad;
 
-    /* Now count remaining bytes.  */
+    md5_write(hd, NULL, 0); /* flush */;
-    ctx->total[0] += bytes;
-    if( ctx->total[0] < bytes )
-	++ctx->total[1];
 
-    pad = bytes >= 56 ? 64 + 56 - bytes : 56 - bytes;
+    msb = 0;
-    memcpy (&ctx->buffer[bytes], fillbuf, pad);
+    t = hd->nblocks;
+    if( (lsb = t << 6) < t ) /* multiply by 64 to make a byte count */
+	msb++;
+    msb += t >> 26;
+    t = lsb;
+    if( (lsb = t + hd->count) < t ) /* add the count */
+	msb++;
+    t = lsb;
+    if( (lsb = t << 3) < t ) /* multiply by 8 to make a bit count */
+	msb++;
+    msb += t >> 29;
 
-    /* Put the 64-bit file length in *bits* at the end of the buffer.  */
+    if( hd->count < 56 ) { /* enough room */
-    *(u32 *) &ctx->buffer[bytes + pad] = SWAP (ctx->total[0] << 3);
+	hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0x80; /* pad */
-    *(u32 *) &ctx->buffer[bytes + pad + 4] = SWAP ((ctx->total[1] << 3) |
+	while( hd->count < 56 )
-						    (ctx->total[0] >> 29));
+	    hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0;  /* pad */
+    }
+    else { /* need one extra block */
+	hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0x80; /* pad character */
+	while( hd->count < 64 )
+	    hd->buf[hd->count++] = 0;
+	md5_write(hd, NULL, 0);  /* flush */;
+	memset(hd->buf, 0, 56 ); /* fill next block with zeroes */
+    }
+    /* append the 64 bit count */
+    hd->buf[56] = lsb	   ;
+    hd->buf[57] = lsb >>  8;
+    hd->buf[58] = lsb >> 16;
+    hd->buf[59] = lsb >> 24;
+    hd->buf[60] = msb	   ;
+    hd->buf[61] = msb >>  8;
+    hd->buf[62] = msb >> 16;
+    hd->buf[63] = msb >> 24;
+    transform( hd, hd->buf );
 
-    /* Process last bytes.  */
+    p = hd->buf;
-    transform( ctx, ctx->buffer, bytes + pad + 8);
+  #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
+    #define X(a) do { *p++ = hd->##a	  ; *p++ = hd->##a >> 8;      \
+		      *p++ = hd->##a >> 16; *p++ = hd->##a >> 24; } while(0)
+  #else /* little endian */
+    #define X(a) do { *(u32*)p = hd->##a ; p += 4; } while(0)
+  #endif
+    X(A);
+    X(B);
+    X(C);
+    X(D);
+  #undef X
 
-    /* Store the result in buffer */
-    ((u32 *)ctx->buffer)[0] = SWAP (ctx->A);
-    ((u32 *)ctx->buffer)[1] = SWAP (ctx->B);
-    ((u32 *)ctx->buffer)[2] = SWAP (ctx->C);
-    ((u32 *)ctx->buffer)[3] = SWAP (ctx->D);
 }
 
 static byte *
 md5_read( MD5_CONTEXT *hd )
 {
-    return hd->buffer;
+    return hd->buf;
 }
 
 /****************

cipher/rmd160.c

@@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ rol(int n, u32 x)
 static void
 transform( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd, byte *data )
 {
-
-
     u32 a,b,c,d,e,aa,bb,cc,dd,ee,t;
   #ifdef BIG_ENDIAN_HOST
     u32 x[16];

cipher/rndegd.c

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ gather_random( void (*add)(const void*, size_t, int), int requester,
 "\n"
 "Not enough random bytes available.  Please do some other work to give\n"
 "the OS a chance to collect more entropy! (Need %d more bytes)\n"), length );
-	    warn = 0; /*  <--- set to 1 to display the message only once */
+	    warn = 1;
 	    continue;
 	}
 	else if( rc == -1 ) {
@@ -140,17 +140,23 @@ gather_random( void (*add)(const void*, size_t, int), int requester,
 	/* process reply */
 	if( n == -1 )
 	    g10_log_error("read error on EGD: %s\n", strerror(errno));
-	else if( n < 2 )
+	else if( cmd == 2 && n != nbytes  ) {
+	    g10_log_error("bad EGD reply: too short %d/%d\n", nbytes, n );
+	}
+	else if( cmd == 2 ) {
+	    (*add)( buffer, n, requester );
+	    length -= n;
+	}
+	else if( !n )
 	    g10_log_error("bad EGD reply: too short\n");
-	else if( buffer[0] != cmd )
+	else if( buffer[0] != n-1 )
-	    g10_log_error("bad EGD reply: cmd mismatch %d/%d\n",
-							cmd, *buffer );
-	else if( buffer[1] != nbytes )
 	    g10_log_error("bad EGD reply: count mismatch %d/%d\n",
-						      nbytes, buffer[1] );
+						      n-1, buffer[0] );
+	else if( n==1 )
+	    g10_log_info("no data from EGD\n");
 	else {
-	    n -= 2;
+	    n -= 1;
-	    (*add)( buffer+2, n, requester );
+	    (*add)( buffer+1, n, requester );
 	    length -= n;
 	}
     }

doc/DETAILS

@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ more arguments in future versions.
 	as GOODSIG but has the fingerprint as the argument. Both
 	status lines ere emitted for a good signature.
 
+    SIG_ID  <radix64_string>
+	This is emitted only for DSA or ElGamal signatures which
+	have been verified okay.  The strings is a signature id
+	and maybe used in applications to detect replay attacks
+	of signed messages.
+
     TRUST_UNDEFINED
     TRUST_NEVER
     TRUST_MARGINAL

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Return error if there are no recipients.
+
+	* sig-check.c (signature_check): New signature id feature.
+	* armor.c (make_radic64_string): New.
+
+	* mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): early check for seckey availability.
+
+	* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): print user id before asking.
+
+	* ringedit.c (add_keyblock_resource,get_keyblock_handle): Cleaner
+	handling of default resource.
+
+
 Thu Feb 25 18:47:39 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* pkclist.c (algo_available): New.

g10/armor.c

@@ -1007,4 +1007,31 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
 }
 
 
+/****************
+ * create a radix64 encoded string.
+ */
+char *
+make_radix64_string( const byte *data, size_t len )
+{
+    char *buffer, *p;
+
+    buffer = p = m_alloc( (len+2)/3*4 + 1 );
+    for( ; len >= 3 ; len -= 3, data += 3 ) {
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[0] <<4)&060)|((data[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[1]<<2)&074)|((data[2]>>6)&03))&077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[data[2]&077];
+    }
+    if( len == 2 ) {
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(((data[0] <<4)&060)|((data[1] >> 4)&017))&077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[((data[1]<<2)&074)];
+    }
+    else if( len == 1 ) {
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] >> 2) & 077];
+	*p++ = bintoasc[(data[0] <<4)&060];
+    }
+    *p = 0;
+    return buffer;
+}
 

g10/encode.c

@@ -150,7 +150,13 @@ encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode )
 	pt = m_alloc( sizeof *pt - 1 );
 	pt->namelen = 0;
     }
-    if( filename ) {
+    /* pgp5 has problems to decrypt symmetrically encrypted data from
+     * GnuPOG if the filelength is in the inner packet.  It works
+     * when only partial length headers are use.  Until we have
+     * tracked this problem down. We use this temporary fix
+     * (fixme: remove the && !mode )
+     */
+    if( filename && !mode ) {
 	if( !(filesize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
 	    log_info(_("%s: WARNING: empty file\n"), filename );
     }

g10/main.h

@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ void print_pubkey_algo_note( int algo );
 void print_cipher_algo_note( int algo );
 void print_digest_algo_note( int algo );
 
+/*-- armor.c --*/
+char *make_radix64_string( const byte *data, size_t len );
+
 /*-- misc.c --*/
 void trap_unaligned(void);
 void disable_core_dumps(void);

g10/mainproc.c

@@ -178,10 +178,13 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     c->last_was_session_key = 1;
     enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
     /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
+    /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
+     * function to check it. */
     if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
 	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
 	|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)  ) {
-	if ( !c->dek ) {
+	if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+			  || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
 	    c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
 	    if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
 		/* error: delete the DEK */

g10/pkclist.c

@@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ _("Could not find a valid trust path to the key.  Let's see whether we\n"
     }
 
     lid = pk->local_id;
+  #if 0  /* FIXME: enable this when trustdb stuff works again */
     while( enum_cert_paths( &context, &lid, &otrust, &validity ) != -1 ) {
 	if( lid == pk->local_id )
 	    continue;
@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ _("Could not find a valid trust path to the key.  Let's see whether we\n"
 	}
     }
     enum_cert_paths( &context, NULL, NULL, NULL ); /* release context */
+  #endif
 
     if( !any )
 	tty_printf(_("No path leading to one of our keys found.\n\n") );
@@ -374,6 +376,19 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
     if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) && !rc )
 	return 0;
     else if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
+	char *p;
+	u32 keyid[2];
+	size_t n;
+
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
+	tty_printf( "%4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
+		  nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+		  (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
+	p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
+	tty_print_string( p, n ),
+	m_free(p);
+	tty_printf("\"\n\n");
+
 	tty_printf(_(
 "It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n"
 "If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n"
@@ -382,6 +397,10 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
 	if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
 				  _("Use this key anyway? "))  )
 	    rc = 1;
+
+	/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user the user about
+	 *	 his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
+	 */
     }
     else if( opt.always_trust && !rc ) {
 	log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
@@ -598,6 +617,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST remusr, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
 	}
     }
     else {
+	any_recipients = 0;
 	for(; remusr; remusr = remusr->next ) {
 	    if( (remusr->flags & 1) )
 		continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled */

g10/ringedit.c

@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ typedef struct resource_table_struct RESTBL;
 
 #define MAX_RESOURCES 10
 static RESTBL resource_table[MAX_RESOURCES];
+static int default_public_resource;
+static int default_secret_resource;
 
 static int search( PACKET *pkt, KBPOS *kbpos, int secret );
 
@@ -348,11 +350,17 @@ add_keyblock_resource( const char *url, int force, int secret )
 	goto leave;
     }
 
+    /* fixme: avoid duplicate resources */
     resource_table[i].used = 1;
     resource_table[i].secret = !!secret;
     resource_table[i].fname = m_strdup(filename);
     resource_table[i].iobuf = iobuf;
     resource_table[i].rt    = rt;
+    if( secret )
+	default_secret_resource = i;
+    else
+	default_public_resource = i;
+
   leave:
     if( rc )
 	log_error("keyblock resource `%s': %s\n", filename, g10_errstr(rc) );
@@ -386,9 +394,12 @@ keyblock_resource_name( KBPOS *kbpos )
 int
 get_keyblock_handle( const char *filename, int secret, KBPOS *kbpos )
 {
-    int i;
+    int i = 0;
 
-    for(i=0; i < MAX_RESOURCES; i++ )
+    if( !filename )
+	i = secret? default_secret_resource : default_public_resource;
+
+    for(; i < MAX_RESOURCES; i++ ) {
 	if( resource_table[i].used && !resource_table[i].secret == !secret ) {
 	    /* fixme: dos needs case insensitive file compare */
 	    if( !filename || !strcmp( resource_table[i].fname, filename ) ) {
@@ -398,6 +409,7 @@ get_keyblock_handle( const char *filename, int secret, KBPOS *kbpos )
 		return 0;
 	    }
 	}
+    }
     return -1; /* not found */
 }
 

g10/sig-check.c

@@ -64,6 +64,34 @@ signature_check( PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
 	rc = do_check( pk, sig, digest );
 
     free_public_key( pk );
+
+    if( !rc && is_status_enabled()
+	&& (   sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+	    || sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL	) ) {
+	/* If we are using these public key algorithms we can
+	 * calculate an unique signature id, which may be useful
+	 * in an application to prevent replac attacks */
+	MD_HANDLE md;
+	int i, nsig = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo );
+	byte *p;
+
+	md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
+	for(i=0; i < nsig; i++ ) {
+	    unsigned n = mpi_get_nbits( sig->data[i]);
+
+	    md_putc( md, n>>8);
+	    md_putc( md, n );
+	    p = mpi_get_buffer( sig->data[i], &n, NULL );
+	    md_write( md, p, n );
+	    m_free(p);
+	}
+	md_final( md );
+	p = make_radix64_string( md_read( md, 0 ), 20 );
+	write_status_text( STATUS_SIG_ID, p );
+	m_free(p);
+	md_close(md);
+    }
+
     return rc;
 }
 

g10/status.c

@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ write_status_text ( int no, const char *text)
       case STATUS_SHM_GET_HIDDEN : s = "SHM_GET_HIDDEN\n"; break;
       case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
       case STATUS_VALIDSIG	 : s = "VALIDSIG\n"; break;
+      case STATUS_SIG_ID	 : s = "SIG_ID\n"; break;
       default: s = "?\n"; break;
     }
 

g10/status.h

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 
 #define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE 20
 #define STATUS_VALIDSIG        21
+#define STATUS_SIG_ID	       22
 
 /*-- status.c --*/
 void set_status_fd ( int fd );

util/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Fri Feb 26 17:55:41 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
+
+	* secmem.c (memblock_struct): Force align (Rémi Guyomarch)
+
 Wed Feb 24 11:07:27 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
 
 	* iobuf.c (block_filter): Fixed the oscillating partial packet chunks.

util/secmem.c

@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ struct memblock_struct {
     unsigned size;
     union {
 	MEMBLOCK *next;
-	long align_dummy;
+	PROPERLY_ALIGNED_TYPE aligned;
-	char d[1];
     } u;
 };
 
@@ -291,7 +290,7 @@ secmem_malloc( size_t size )
 	max_alloced = cur_alloced;
     if( cur_blocks > max_blocks )
 	max_blocks = cur_blocks;
-    return &mb->u.d;
+    return &mb->u.aligned.c;
 }
 
 
@@ -302,7 +301,7 @@ secmem_realloc( void *p, size_t newsize )
     size_t size;
     void *a;
 
-    mb = (MEMBLOCK*)((char*)p - ((size_t) &((MEMBLOCK*)0)->u.d));
+    mb = (MEMBLOCK*)((char*)p - ((size_t) &((MEMBLOCK*)0)->u.aligned.c));
     size = mb->size;
     if( newsize < size )
 	return p; /* it is easier not to shrink the memory */
@@ -323,7 +322,7 @@ secmem_free( void *a )
     if( !a )
 	return;
 
-    mb = (MEMBLOCK*)((char*)a - ((size_t) &((MEMBLOCK*)0)->u.d));
+    mb = (MEMBLOCK*)((char*)a - ((size_t) &((MEMBLOCK*)0)->u.aligned.c));
     size = mb->size;
     memset(mb, 0xff, size );
     memset(mb, 0xaa, size );