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Editorial cleanups of keygen.c

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Also fixed a regression introduced by me in pubkey_enc.c.
Added extra checks.  Removed unused code.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-01-25 16:54:18 +01:00
parent b9958bba10
commit 638dca5dbc
6 changed files with 167 additions and 258 deletions
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29
g10/pubkey-enc.c
View file

@ -145,18 +145,17 @@ get_it (PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
gcry_sexp_t s_data;
char *desc;
char *keygrip;
byte fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
byte fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t fpn;
const int gcry_pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry( sk->pubkey_algo );
const int pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (sk->pubkey_algo);
/* Get the keygrip. */
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (sk, &keygrip);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Convert the data to an S-expression. */
if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ELG ||gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E)
if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ELG || pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E)
{
if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
@ -164,7 +163,7 @@ get_it (PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(elg(a%m)(b%m)))",
enc->data[0], enc->data[1]);
}
else if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_RSA || gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_RSA_E)
else if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_RSA || pkalgo == GCRY_PK_RSA_E)
{
if (!enc->data[0])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
@ -172,12 +171,12 @@ get_it (PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(rsa(a%m)))",
enc->data[0]);
}
else if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDH )
else if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDH)
{
if (!enc->data[0] || !enc->data[1])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_MPI);
else
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(ecdh(a%m)(b%m)))",
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_data, NULL, "(enc-val(ecdh(a%m)(b%m)))",
enc->data[0], enc->data[1]);
}
else
@ -186,8 +185,9 @@ get_it (PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
if (err)
goto leave;
fingerprint_from_pk( sk, fp, &fpn );
assert( fpn == 20 );
/* fixme: only needed for ECDH. Don't compute always. */
fingerprint_from_pk (sk, fp, &fpn);
assert (fpn == 20);
/* Decrypt. */
desc = gpg_format_keydesc (sk, 0, 1);
@ -222,12 +222,12 @@ get_it (PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
{
gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi;
gcry_mpi_t decoded;
/* At the beginning the frame are the bytes of shared point MPI. */
err = gcry_mpi_scan (&shared_mpi, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, frame, nframe, NULL);
if (err)
{
log_fatal ("mpi_scan failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
goto leave;
}
@ -247,13 +247,14 @@ get_it (PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_public_key *sk, u32 *keyid)
/* Allow double padding for the benefit of DEK size concealment.
Higher than this is wasteful. */
if (frame[nframe-1] > 8*2 || nframe <= 8)
if (!nframe || frame[nframe-1] > 8*2 || nframe <= 8
|| frame[nframe-1] > nframe)
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_SECKEY);
goto leave;
goto leave;
}
nframe -= frame[nframe-1]; /* Remove padding. */
assert (n); /* (used just below) */
assert (!n); /* (used just below) */
}
else
{