mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
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dirmngr: Add support for hkps keyservers.
* dirmngr/dirmngr.c: Include gnutls.h. (opts): Add --gnutls-debug and --hkp-cacert. (opt_gnutls_debug, my_gnutls_log): New. (set_debug): Set gnutls log level. (parse_rereadable_options): Register a CA file. (main): Init GNUTLS. * dirmngr/ks-engine-hkp.c (ks_hkp_help): Support hkps. (send_request): Ditto.
This commit is contained in:
parent
ea0f5481f0
commit
60e2fc7d38
@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
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# include <signal.h>
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#endif
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#include <npth.h>
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#ifdef HTTP_USE_GNUTLS
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# include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
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#endif /*HTTP_USE_GNUTLS*/
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#define JNLIB_NEED_LOG_LOGV
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@ -92,6 +95,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values {
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oDebugAll,
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oDebugWait,
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oDebugLevel,
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oGnutlsDebug,
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oNoGreeting,
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oNoOptions,
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oHomedir,
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@ -116,6 +120,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values {
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oOCSPMaxPeriod,
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oOCSPCurrentPeriod,
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oMaxReplies,
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oHkpCaCert,
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oFakedSystemTime,
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oForce,
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oAllowOCSP,
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@ -195,11 +200,16 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
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ARGPARSE_s_i (oMaxReplies, "max-replies",
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N_("|N|do not return more than N items in one query")),
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ARGPARSE_s_s (oHkpCaCert, "hkp-cacert",
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N_("|FILE|use the CA certifciates in FILE for HKP over TLS")),
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ARGPARSE_s_s (oSocketName, "socket-name", "@"), /* Only for debugging. */
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ARGPARSE_s_u (oFakedSystemTime, "faked-system-time", "@"), /*(epoch time)*/
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ARGPARSE_p_u (oDebug, "debug", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oDebugAll, "debug-all", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_i (oGnutlsDebug, "gnutls-debug", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_i (oDebugWait, "debug-wait", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_n (oNoGreeting, "no-greeting", "@"),
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ARGPARSE_s_s (oHomedir, "homedir", "@"),
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@ -234,6 +244,9 @@ static char *current_logfile;
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/* Helper to implement --debug-level. */
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static const char *debug_level;
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/* Helper to set the GNUTLS log level. */
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static int opt_gnutls_debug = -1;
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/* Flag indicating that a shutdown has been requested. */
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static volatile int shutdown_pending;
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@ -331,6 +344,20 @@ my_ksba_hash_buffer (void *arg, const char *oid,
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}
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/* GNUTLS log function callback. */
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static void
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my_gnutls_log (int level, const char *text)
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{
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int n;
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n = strlen (text);
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while (n && text[n-1] == '\n')
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n--;
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log_debug ("gnutls:L%d: %.*s\n", level, n, text);
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}
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/* Setup the debugging. With a LEVEL of NULL only the active debug
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flags are propagated to the subsystems. With LEVEL set, a specific
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set of debug flags is set; thus overriding all flags already
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@ -382,6 +409,14 @@ set_debug (void)
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if (opt.debug & DBG_CRYPTO_VALUE )
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gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SET_DEBUG_FLAGS, 1);
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#ifdef HTTP_USE_GNUTLS
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if (opt_gnutls_debug >= 0)
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{
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gnutls_global_set_log_function (my_gnutls_log);
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gnutls_global_set_log_level (opt_gnutls_debug);
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}
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#endif /*HTTP_USE_GNUTLS*/
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}
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@ -439,6 +474,7 @@ parse_rereadable_options (ARGPARSE_ARGS *pargs, int reread)
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opt.ocsp_signer = tmp;
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}
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FREE_STRLIST (opt.ignored_cert_extensions);
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http_register_tls_ca (NULL);
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return 1;
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}
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@ -449,6 +485,7 @@ parse_rereadable_options (ARGPARSE_ARGS *pargs, int reread)
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case oDebug: opt.debug |= pargs->r.ret_ulong; break;
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case oDebugAll: opt.debug = ~0; break;
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case oDebugLevel: debug_level = pargs->r.ret_str; break;
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case oGnutlsDebug: opt_gnutls_debug = pargs->r.ret_int; break;
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case oLogFile:
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if (!reread)
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@ -490,6 +527,10 @@ parse_rereadable_options (ARGPARSE_ARGS *pargs, int reread)
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case oMaxReplies: opt.max_replies = pargs->r.ret_int; break;
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case oHkpCaCert:
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http_register_tls_ca (pargs->r.ret_str);
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break;
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case oIgnoreCertExtension:
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add_to_strlist (&opt.ignored_cert_extensions, pargs->r.ret_str);
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break;
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@ -628,6 +669,12 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
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ksba_set_malloc_hooks (gcry_malloc, gcry_realloc, gcry_free );
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ksba_set_hash_buffer_function (my_ksba_hash_buffer, NULL);
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/* Init GNUTLS. */
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#ifdef HTTP_USE_GNUTLS
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rc = gnutls_global_init ();
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if (rc)
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log_fatal ("gnutls_global_init failed: %s\n", gnutls_strerror (rc));
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#endif /*HTTP_USE_GNUTLS*/
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/* Init Assuan. */
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malloc_hooks.malloc = gcry_malloc;
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@ -628,12 +628,14 @@ ks_hkp_help (ctrl_t ctrl, parsed_uri_t uri)
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const char const data[] =
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"Handler for HKP URLs:\n"
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" hkp://\n"
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" hkps://\n"
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"Supported methods: search, get, put\n";
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gpg_error_t err;
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if (!uri)
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err = ks_print_help (ctrl, " hkp");
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else if (uri->is_http && !strcmp (uri->scheme, "hkp"))
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err = ks_print_help (ctrl, " hkp\n hkps");
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else if (uri->is_http && (!strcmp (uri->scheme, "hkp")
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|| !strcmp (uri->scheme, "hkps")))
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err = ks_print_help (ctrl, data);
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else
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err = 0;
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@ -747,6 +749,7 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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estream_t *r_fp)
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{
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gpg_error_t err;
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http_session_t session = NULL;
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http_t http = NULL;
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int redirects_left = MAX_REDIRECTS;
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estream_t fp = NULL;
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@ -754,6 +757,10 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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*r_fp = NULL;
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err = http_session_new (&session, NULL);
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if (err)
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goto leave;
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once_more:
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err = http_open (&http,
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post_cb? HTTP_REQ_POST : HTTP_REQ_GET,
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@ -761,7 +768,8 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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/* fixme: AUTH */ NULL,
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httpflags,
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/* fixme: proxy*/ NULL,
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NULL, NULL,
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session,
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NULL,
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/*FIXME curl->srvtag*/NULL);
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if (!err)
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{
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@ -798,6 +806,13 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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goto leave;
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}
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if (http_get_tls_info (http, NULL))
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{
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/* Update the httpflags so that a redirect won't fallback to an
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unencrypted connection. */
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httpflags |= HTTP_FLAG_FORCE_TLS;
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}
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switch (http_get_status_code (http))
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{
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case 200:
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@ -806,6 +821,7 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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case 301:
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case 302:
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case 307:
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{
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const char *s = http_get_header (http, "Location");
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@ -837,6 +853,10 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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goto leave;
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}
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/* FIXME: We should register a permanent redirection and whether a
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host has ever used TLS so that future calls will always use
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TLS. */
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fp = http_get_read_ptr (http);
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if (!fp)
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{
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@ -851,6 +871,7 @@ send_request (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *request, const char *hostportstr,
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leave:
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http_close (http, 0);
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http_session_release (session);
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xfree (request_buffer);
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return err;
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}
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32
dirmngr/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem
Normal file
32
dirmngr/sks-keyservers.netCA.pem
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIFizCCA3OgAwIBAgIJAK9zyLTPn4CPMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAMFwxCzAJBgNV
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BAYTAk5PMQ0wCwYDVQQIDARPc2xvMR4wHAYDVQQKDBVza3Mta2V5c2VydmVycy5u
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ZXQgQ0ExHjAcBgNVBAMMFXNrcy1rZXlzZXJ2ZXJzLm5ldCBDQTAeFw0xMjEwMDkw
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MDMzMzdaFw0yMjEwMDcwMDMzMzdaMFwxCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5PMQ0wCwYDVQQIDARP
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c2xvMR4wHAYDVQQKDBVza3Mta2V5c2VydmVycy5uZXQgQ0ExHjAcBgNVBAMMFXNr
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cy1rZXlzZXJ2ZXJzLm5ldCBDQTCCAiIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggIPADCCAgoC
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ggIBANdsWy4PXWNUCkS3L//nrd0GqN3dVwoBGZ6w94Tw2jPDPifegwxQozFXkG6I
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6A4TK1CJLXPvfz0UP0aBYyPmTNadDinaB9T4jIwd4rnxl+59GiEmqkN3IfPsv5Jj
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MkKUmJnvOT0DEVlEaO1UZIwx5WpfprB3mR81/qm4XkAgmYrmgnLXd/pJDAMk7y1F
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45b5zWofiD5l677lplcIPRbFhpJ6kDTODXh/XEdtF71EAeaOdEGOvyGDmCO0GWqS
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FDkMMPTlieLA/0rgFTcz4xwUYj/cD5e0ZBuSkYsYFAU3hd1cGfBue0cPZaQH2HYx
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Qk4zXD8S3F4690fRhr+tki5gyG6JDR67aKp3BIGLqm7f45WkX1hYp+YXywmEziM4
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aSbGYhx8hoFGfq9UcfPEvp2aoc8u5sdqjDslhyUzM1v3m3ZGbhwEOnVjljY6JJLx
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MxagxnZZSAY424ZZ3t71E/Mn27dm2w+xFRuoy8JEjv1d+BT3eChM5KaNwrj0IO/y
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u8kFIgWYA1vZ/15qMT+tyJTfyrNVV/7Df7TNeWyNqjJ5rBmt0M6NpHG7CrUSkBy9
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p8JhimgjP5r0FlEkgg+lyD+V79H98gQfVgP3pbJICz0SpBQf2F/2tyS4rLm+49rP
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fcOajiXEuyhpcmzgusAj/1FjrtlynH1r9mnNaX4e+rLWzvU5AgMBAAGjUDBOMB0G
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A1UdDgQWBBTkwyoJFGfYTVISTpM8E+igjdq28zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBTkwyoJFGfY
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TVISTpM8E+igjdq28zAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBBQUAA4ICAQAR
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OXnYwu3g1ZjHyley3fZI5aLPsaE17cOImVTehC8DcIphm2HOMR/hYTTL+V0G4P+u
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gH+6xeRLKSHMHZTtSBIa6GDL03434y9CBuwGvAFCMU2GV8w92/Z7apkAhdLToZA/
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X/iWP2jeaVJhxgEcH8uPrnSlqoPBcKC9PrgUzQYfSZJkLmB+3jEa3HKruy1abJP5
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gAdQvwvcPpvYRnIzUc9fZODsVmlHVFBCl2dlu/iHh2h4GmL4Da2rRkUMlbVTdioB
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UYIvMycdOkpH5wJftzw7cpjsudGas0PARDXCFfGyKhwBRFY7Xp7lbjtU5Rz0Gc04
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lPrhDf0pFE98Aw4jJRpFeWMjpXUEaG1cq7D641RpgcMfPFvOHY47rvDTS7XJOaUT
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BwRjmDt896s6vMDcaG/uXJbQjuzmmx3W2Idyh3s5SI0GTHb0IwMKYb4eBUIpQOnB
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cE77VnCYqKvN1NVYAqhWjXbY7XasZvszCRcOG+W3FqNaHOK/n/0ueb0uijdLan+U
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f4p1bjbAox8eAOQS/8a3bzkJzdyBNUKGx1BIK2IBL9bn/HravSDOiNRSnZ/R3l9G
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ZauX0tu7IIDlRCILXSyeazu0aj/vdT3YFQXPcvt5Fkf5wiNTo53f72/jYEJd6qph
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WrpoKqrwGwTpRUCMhYIUt65hsTxCiJJ5nKe39h46sg==
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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145
doc/dirmngr.texi
145
doc/dirmngr.texi
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
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@mansect synopsis
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@ifset manverb
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.B dirmngr
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.RI [ options ]
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.RI [ options ]
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.I command
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.RI [ args ]
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@end ifset
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@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ system daemon through the @command{dirmngr-client} tool.
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If @command{dirmngr} is started in system daemon mode, it uses a
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directory layout as common for system daemons and does not make use of
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the default @file{~/.gnupg} directory.
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the default @file{~/.gnupg} directory.
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@manpause
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@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ numeric value or by a keyword:
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@item none
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No debugging at all. A value of less than 1 may be used instead of
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the keyword.
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@item basic
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@item basic
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Some basic debug messages. A value between 1 and 2 may be used
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instead of the keyword.
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@item advanced
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@ -204,6 +204,10 @@ usual C-Syntax.
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@opindex debug-all
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Same as @code{--debug=0xffffffff}
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@item --gnutls-debug @var{level}
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@opindex gnutls-debug
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Enable debugging of GNUTLS at @var{level}.
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@item --debug-wait @var{n}
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@opindex debug-wait
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When running in server mode, wait @var{n} seconds before entering the
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@ -247,12 +251,12 @@ scheme are ignored when looking for a suitable DP.
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@item --ignore-ldap-dp
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@opindex ignore-ldap-dp
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This is similar to @option{--ignore-http-dp} but ignores entries using
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the @acronym{LDAP} scheme. Both options may be combined resulting in
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the @acronym{LDAP} scheme. Both options may be combined resulting in
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ignoring DPs entirely.
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@item --ignore-ocsp-service-url
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@opindex ignore-ocsp-service-url
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Ignore all OCSP URLs contained in the certificate. The effect is to
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Ignore all OCSP URLs contained in the certificate. The effect is to
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force the use of the default responder.
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@item --honor-http-proxy
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@ -284,7 +288,7 @@ configured LDAP server if the connection using the "proxy" failed.
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@item --ldapserverlist-file @var{file}
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@opindex ldapserverlist-file
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Read the list of LDAP servers to consult for CRLs and certificates from
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file instead of the default per-user ldap server list file. The default
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file instead of the default per-user ldap server list file. The default
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value for @var{file} is @file{dirmngr_ldapservers.conf} or
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@file{ldapservers.conf} when running in @option{--daemon} mode.
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@ -328,7 +332,7 @@ Note: The current version of dirmngr has this option disabled by default.
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@item --allow-ocsp
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@opindex allow-ocsp
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This option enables OCSP support if requested by the client.
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This option enables OCSP support if requested by the client.
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OCSP requests are rejected by default because they may violate the
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privacy of the user; for example it is possible to track the time when
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@ -395,10 +399,17 @@ won't be rejected due to an unknown critical extension. Use this
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option with care because extensions are usually flagged as critical
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for a reason.
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@item --hkp-cacert @var{file}
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Use the root certificates in @var{file} for verification of the TLS
|
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certificates used with @code{hkps} (keyserver access over TLS). If
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the file is in PEM format a suffix of @code{.pem} is expected for
|
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@var{file}. This option may be given multiple times to add more
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root certificates.
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@end table
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@c
|
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@c
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@c Dirmngr Configuration
|
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@c
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@mansect files
|
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@ -472,7 +483,7 @@ Please ignore the output; it is not needed anymore. Check the log file
|
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to see whether all trusted root certificates have been loaded correctly.
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|
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|
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@c
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||||
@c
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@c Dirmngr Signals
|
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@c
|
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@mansect signals
|
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@ -480,7 +491,7 @@ to see whether all trusted root certificates have been loaded correctly.
|
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@section Use of signals.
|
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|
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A running @command{dirmngr} may be controlled by signals, i.e. using
|
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the @command{kill} command to send a signal to the process.
|
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the @command{kill} command to send a signal to the process.
|
||||
|
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Here is a list of supported signals:
|
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|
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@ -522,7 +533,7 @@ This prints some caching statistics to the log file.
|
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Dirmngr is supposed to be used as a system wide daemon, it should be
|
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started like:
|
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|
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@example
|
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@example
|
||||
dirmngr --daemon
|
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@end example
|
||||
|
||||
@ -613,7 +624,7 @@ local lookup will be done in this case.
|
||||
|
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Check whether the certificate described by the @var{certid} has been
|
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revoked. Due to caching, the Dirmngr is able to answer immediately in
|
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most cases.
|
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most cases.
|
||||
|
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The @var{certid} is a hex encoded string consisting of two parts,
|
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delimited by a single dot. The first part is the SHA-1 hash of the
|
||||
@ -642,7 +653,7 @@ us that it has been revoked.
|
||||
|
||||
@item GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN
|
||||
No CRL is known for this certificate or the CRL is not valid or out of
|
||||
date.
|
||||
date.
|
||||
|
||||
@item GPG_ERR_NO_DATA
|
||||
The OCSP responder returned an ``unknown'' status. This means that it
|
||||
@ -690,7 +701,7 @@ given or the certificate is not know, the function inquires the
|
||||
certificate using:
|
||||
|
||||
@example
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
|
||||
C: END
|
||||
@end example
|
||||
@ -720,7 +731,7 @@ certificate is not known by Dirmngr, the function inquires the
|
||||
certificate using:
|
||||
|
||||
@example
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
|
||||
C: END
|
||||
@end example
|
||||
@ -751,13 +762,13 @@ helpful for debugging. To get the actual certificate, this command
|
||||
immediately inquires it using
|
||||
|
||||
@example
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
|
||||
C: END
|
||||
@end example
|
||||
|
||||
Thus the caller is expected to return the certificate for the request
|
||||
as a binary blob.
|
||||
as a binary blob.
|
||||
|
||||
@noindent
|
||||
The return code is 0 for success; i.e. the certificate has not been
|
||||
@ -771,45 +782,45 @@ internally by dirmngr. This command is only useful for debugging. To
|
||||
get the actual certificate, this command immediately inquires it using
|
||||
|
||||
@example
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
S: INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
C: D <DER encoded certificate>
|
||||
C: END
|
||||
@end example
|
||||
|
||||
Thus the caller is expected to return the certificate for the request
|
||||
as a binary blob.
|
||||
as a binary blob.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@mansect see also
|
||||
@ifset isman
|
||||
@command{gpgsm}(1),
|
||||
@command{gpgsm}(1),
|
||||
@command{dirmngr-client}(1)
|
||||
@end ifset
|
||||
@include see-also-note.texi
|
||||
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c !!! UNDER CONSTRUCTION !!!
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @section Verifying a Certificate
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c There are several ways to request services from Dirmngr. Almost all of
|
||||
@c them are done using the Assuan protocol. What we describe here is the
|
||||
@c Assuan command CHECKCRL as used for example by the dirmnr-client tool if
|
||||
@c invoked as
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @example
|
||||
@c dirmngr-client foo.crt
|
||||
@c @end example
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c This command will send an Assuan request to an already running Dirmngr
|
||||
@c instance. foo.crt is expected to be a standard X.509 certificate and
|
||||
@c dirmngr will receive the Assuan command
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @example
|
||||
@c CHECKCRL @var [{fingerprint}]
|
||||
@c @end example
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @var{fingerprint} is optional and expected to be the SHA-1 has of the
|
||||
@c DER encoding of the certificate under question. It is to be HEX
|
||||
@c encoded. The rationale for sending the fingerprint is that it allows
|
||||
@ -817,15 +828,15 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c this is not the case and no certificate has been found in dirmngr's
|
||||
@c internal certificate storage, dirmngr will request the certificate using
|
||||
@c the Assuan inquiry
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @example
|
||||
@c INQUIRE TARGETCERT
|
||||
@c @end example
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c The caller (in our example dirmngr-client) is then expected to return
|
||||
@c the certificate for the request (which should match @var{fingerprint})
|
||||
@c as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c Dirmngr now passes control to @code{crl_cache_cert_isvalid}. This
|
||||
@c function checks whether a CRL item exists for target certificate. These
|
||||
@c CRL items are kept in a database of already loaded and verified CRLs.
|
||||
@ -837,25 +848,25 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c listed in the CRL or @code{GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN} in cases where no CRL or no
|
||||
@c information is available. The first two codes are immediatly returned to
|
||||
@c the caller and the processing of this request has been done.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c Only the @code{GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN} needs more attention: Dirmngr now
|
||||
@c calls @code{clr_cache_reload_crl} and if this succeeds calls
|
||||
@c @code{crl_cache_cert_isvald) once more. All further errors are
|
||||
@c immediately returned to the caller.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @code{crl_cache_reload_crl} is the actual heart of the CRL management.
|
||||
@c It locates the corresponding CRL for the target certificate, reads and
|
||||
@c verifies this CRL and stores it in the CRL cache. It works like this:
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c * Loop over all crlDPs in the target certificate.
|
||||
@c * If the crlDP is invalid immediately terminate the loop.
|
||||
@c * Loop over all names in the current crlDP.
|
||||
@c * If the URL scheme is unknown or not enabled
|
||||
@c * If the URL scheme is unknown or not enabled
|
||||
@c (--ignore-http-dp, --ignore-ldap-dp) continues with
|
||||
@c the next name.
|
||||
@c * @code{crl_fetch} is called to actually retrieve the CRL.
|
||||
@c In case of problems this name is ignore and we continue with
|
||||
@c the next name. Note that @code{crl_fetch} does only return
|
||||
@c the next name. Note that @code{crl_fetch} does only return
|
||||
@c a descriptor for the CRL for further reading so does the CRL
|
||||
@c does not yet end up in memory.
|
||||
@c * @code{crl_cache_insert} is called with that descriptor to
|
||||
@ -873,16 +884,16 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c * @code(crl_cache_insert) is then used to actually insert the CRL
|
||||
@c into the cache. If this failed we give up immediatley without
|
||||
@c checking the rest of the servers from the first step.
|
||||
@c * Ready.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c * Ready.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c The @code{crl_cache_insert} function takes care of reading the bulk of
|
||||
@c the CRL, parsing it and checking the signature. It works like this: A
|
||||
@c new database file is created using a temporary file name. The CRL
|
||||
@c parsing machinery is started and all items of the CRL are put into
|
||||
@c this database file. At the end the issuer certificate of the CRL
|
||||
@c needs to be retrieved. Three cases are to be distinguished:
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c a) An authorityKeyIdentifier with an issuer and serialno exits: The
|
||||
@c certificate is retrieved using @code{find_cert_bysn}. If
|
||||
@c the certificate is in the certificate cache, it is directly
|
||||
@ -899,7 +910,7 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c certificate to match the requested issuer and seriano (This is
|
||||
@c needed because the LDAP layer may return several certificates as
|
||||
@c LDAP as no standard way to retrieve by serial number).
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c b) An authorityKeyIdentifier with a key ID exists: The certificate is
|
||||
@c retrieved using @code{find_cert_bysubject}. If the certificate is
|
||||
@c in the certificate cache, it is directly returned. Then the
|
||||
@ -913,7 +924,7 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c external resources. This is done using the @code{ca_cert_fetch}
|
||||
@c and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} and comparing the returned
|
||||
@c certificate to match the requested subject and key ID.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c c) No authorityKeyIdentifier exits: The certificate is retrieved
|
||||
@c using @code{find_cert_bysubject} without the key ID argument. If
|
||||
@c the certificate is in the certificate cache the first one with a
|
||||
@ -930,12 +941,12 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} and comparing the returned
|
||||
@c certificate to match the requested subject; the first certificate
|
||||
@c with a matching subject is then returned.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c If no certificate was found, the function returns with the error
|
||||
@c GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT. Now the signature is verified. If this fails,
|
||||
@c the erro is returned. On success the @code{validate_cert_chain} is
|
||||
@c used to verify that the certificate is actually valid.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c used to verify that the certificate is actually valid.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c Here we may encounter a recursive situation:
|
||||
@c @code{validate_cert_chain} needs to look at other certificates and
|
||||
@c also at CRLs to check whether tehse other certificates and well, the
|
||||
@ -944,7 +955,7 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c are currently processing. This would be a catch-22 and may indicate a
|
||||
@c broken PKI. However, due to overlapping expiring times and imprecise
|
||||
@c clocks thsi may actually happen.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c For historical reasons the Assuan command ISVALID is a bit different
|
||||
@c to CHECKCRL but this is mainly due to different calling conventions.
|
||||
@c In the end the same fucntionality is used, albeit hidden by a couple
|
||||
@ -952,44 +963,44 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c ingetrages OCSP checking depending on options are the way it is
|
||||
@c called. GPGSM still uses this command but might eventuall switch over
|
||||
@c to CHECKCRL and CHECKOCSP so that ISVALID can be retired.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @section Validating a certificate
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c We describe here how the internal function @code{validate_cert_chain}
|
||||
@c works. Note that mainly testing purposes this functionality may be
|
||||
@c called directly using @cmd{dirmngr-client --validate @file{foo.crt}}.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c For backward compatibility this function returns success if Dirmngr is
|
||||
@c not used as a system daemon. Thus not validating the certicates at
|
||||
@c all. FIXME: This is definitely not correct and should be fixed ASAP.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c The function takes the target certificate and a mode argument as
|
||||
@c parameters and returns an error code and optionally the closes
|
||||
@c expiration time of all certificates in the chain.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c We first check that the certificate may be used for the requested
|
||||
@c purpose (i.e. OCSP or CRL signing). If this is not the case
|
||||
@c GPG_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE is returned.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c The next step is to find the trust anchor (root certificate) and to
|
||||
@c assemble the chain in memory: Starting with the target certificate,
|
||||
@c the expiration time is checked against the current date, unknown
|
||||
@c critical extensions are detected and certificate policies are matched
|
||||
@c (We only allow 2.289.9.9 but I have no clue about that OID and from
|
||||
@c where I got it - it does not even seem to be assigned - debug cruft?).
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c Now if this certificate is a self-signed one, we have reached the
|
||||
@c trust anchor. In this case we check that the signature is good, the
|
||||
@c certificate is allowed to act as a CA, that it is a trusted one (by
|
||||
@c checking whether it is has been put into the trusted-certs
|
||||
@c configuration directory) and finally prepend into to our list
|
||||
@c representing the certificate chain. This steps ends then.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c If it is not a self-signed certificate, we check that the chain won't
|
||||
@c get too long (current limit is 100), if this is the case we terminate
|
||||
@c with the error GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c Now the issuer's certificate is looked up: If an
|
||||
@c authorityKeyIdentifier is available, this one is used to locate the
|
||||
@c certificate either using issuer and serialnumber or subject DN
|
||||
@ -1002,7 +1013,7 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c that a matching certificate has explicitly been put into the
|
||||
@c certificate cache. If the issuer's certificate could not be found,
|
||||
@c the validation terminates with the error code @code{GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT}.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c If the issuer's certificate has been found, the signature of the
|
||||
@c actual certificate is checked and in case this fails the error
|
||||
@c #code{GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN} is returned. If the signature checks out, the
|
||||
@ -1011,13 +1022,13 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c certificate signing). Then the certificate is prepended to our list
|
||||
@c representing the certificate chain. Finally the loop is continued now
|
||||
@c with the issuer's certificate as the current certificate.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c After the end of the loop and if no error as been encountered
|
||||
@c (i.e. the certificate chain has been assempled correctly), a check is
|
||||
@c done whether any certificate expired or a critical policy has not been
|
||||
@c met. In any of these cases the validation terminates with an
|
||||
@c appropriate error.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c appropriate error.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c Finally the function @code{check_revocations} is called to verify no
|
||||
@c certificate in the assempled chain has been revoked: This is an
|
||||
@c recursive process because a CRL has to be checked for each certificate
|
||||
@ -1025,16 +1036,16 @@ as a binary blob.
|
||||
@c that it is trusted and we avoid checking a CRL here due to common
|
||||
@c setup problems and the assumption that a revoked root certifcate has
|
||||
@c been removed from the list of trusted certificates.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c @section Looking up certificates through LDAP.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c This describes the LDAP layer to retrieve certificates.
|
||||
@c the functions @code{ca_cert_fetch} and @code{fetch_next_ksba_cert} are
|
||||
@c used for this. The first one starts a search and the second one is
|
||||
@c used to retrieve certificate after certificate.
|
||||
@c
|
||||
@c
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
13
doc/gpg.texi
13
doc/gpg.texi
@ -1630,16 +1630,29 @@ are available for all keyserver types, some common options are:
|
||||
program uses internally (libcurl, openldap, etc).
|
||||
|
||||
@item check-cert
|
||||
@ifset gpgtwoone
|
||||
This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
|
||||
@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
|
||||
@end ifset
|
||||
@ifclear gpgtwoone
|
||||
Enable certificate checking if the keyserver presents one (for hkps or
|
||||
ldaps). Defaults to on.
|
||||
@end ifclear
|
||||
|
||||
@item ca-cert-file
|
||||
@ifset gpgtwoone
|
||||
This option has no more function since GnuPG 2.1. Use the
|
||||
@code{dirmngr} configuration options instead.
|
||||
@end ifset
|
||||
@ifclear gpgtwoone
|
||||
Provide a certificate store to override the system default. Only
|
||||
necessary if check-cert is enabled, and the keyserver is using a
|
||||
certificate that is not present in a system default certificate list.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that depending on the SSL library that the keyserver helper is
|
||||
built with, this may actually be a directory or a file.
|
||||
@end ifclear
|
||||
|
||||
@end table
|
||||
|
||||
@item --completes-needed @code{n}
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user