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worked on solving some bugs

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2001-03-12 20:21:50 +00:00
parent be06120679
commit 5e79cb47e0
32 changed files with 766 additions and 482 deletions
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45
g10/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,8 +1,53 @@
2001-03-12 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* armor.c (parse_header_line): Removed double empty line check.
(parse_header_line): Replaced trim_trailing_ws with a counting
function so that we can adjust for the next read.
* options.skel: Fixed 3 typos. By Thomas Klausner. Replaced the
keyserver example by a better working server.
* parse-packet.c (parse_symkeyenc): Return Invalid_Packet on error.
(parse_pubkeyenc): Ditto.
(parse_onepass_sig): Ditto.
(parse_plaintext): Ditto.
(parse_encrypted): Ditto.
(parse_signature): Return error at other places too.
(parse_key): Ditto.
* g10.c (main): Set opt.list_packets to another value when invoked
with the --list-packets command.
* mainproc.c (do_proc_packets): Don's stop processing when running
under --list-packets command.
* signal.c (do_sigaction): Removed.
(init_one_signal): New to replace the above. Needed to support
systems without sigactions. Suggested by Dave Dykstra.
(got_fatal_signal,init_signals): Use the above here.
(do_block): Use sigset() if sigprocmask() is not available.
* armor.c (parse_hash_header): Test on TIGER192, which is the
correct value as per rfc2440. By Edwin Woudt.
2001-03-08 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* misc.c: Include time.h. By James Troup.
* getkey.c: Re-enabled the unknown user Id and PK caches and
increased their sizes.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Set expire date and continue
processing even if we found a revoked key.
(merge_selfsigs_subkeys): Ditto.
* packet.h: Add an is_revoked flag to the user_id packet.
* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Set that flag here.
(merge_selfsigs_main): Fix so that the latest signature is used to
find the self-signature for an UID.
* parse-packet.c (parse_user_id): Zero out all fields.
* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print the primary user ID
according the the node flag and then all other non-revoked user IDs.
(is_uid_revoked): Removed; it is now handled by the key selection code.
Changed the year list of all copyright notices.
2001-03-07 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>

22
g10/armor.c
View file

@ -245,7 +245,9 @@ parse_hash_header( const char *line )
found |= 2;
else if( !strncmp( s, "MD5", s2-s ) )
found |= 4;
else if( !strncmp( s, "TIGER", s2-s ) )
else if( !strncmp( s, "TIGER192", s2-s ) )
found |= 8;
else if( !strncmp( s, "TIGER", s2-s ) ) /* used by old versions */
found |= 8;
else
return 0;
@ -312,19 +314,19 @@ is_armor_header( byte *line, unsigned len )
* >0: Good header line
*/
static int
parse_header_line( armor_filter_context_t *afx, byte *line, unsigned len )
parse_header_line( armor_filter_context_t *afx, byte *line, unsigned int len )
{
byte *p;
int hashes=0;
unsigned int len2;
/* fixme: why this double check? I think the original code w/o the
* second check for an empty line was done from an early draft of
* of OpenPGP - or simply very stupid code */
if( *line == '\n' || ( len && (*line == '\r' && line[1]=='\n') ) )
return 0; /* empty line */
len = trim_trailing_ws( line, len );
if( !len )
return 0; /* WS only same as empty line */
len2 = check_trailing_ws( line, len );
if( !len2 ) {
afx->buffer_pos = len2; /* (it is not the fine way to do it here) */
return 0; /* WS only: same as empty line */
}
len = len2;
line[len2] = 0;
p = strchr( line, ':');
if( !p || !p[1] ) {

2
g10/g10.c
View file

@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
break;
case aListPackets:
opt.list_packets=1;
opt.list_packets=2;
default:
if( argc > 1 )
wrong_args(_("[filename]"));

40
g10/getkey.c
View file

@ -1354,12 +1354,13 @@ fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode )
uid->created = 0; /* not created == invalid */
if ( !signode )
return; /* no self-signature */
if ( IS_UID_REV ( sig ) )
if ( IS_UID_REV ( sig ) ) {
uid->is_revoked = 1;
return; /* has been revoked */
}
uid->created = sig->timestamp; /* this one is okay */
/* store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing */
uid->help_key_usage = 0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
@ -1434,13 +1435,15 @@ merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
; /* signature did not verify */
else if ( IS_KEY_REV (sig) ){
/* key has been revoked - there is no way to override
* such a revocation, so we can stop now.
* we can't cope with expiration times for revocations
* here because we have to assumethat an attacker can
* generate all kinds of signatures.
* such a revocation, so we theoretically can stop now.
* We should not cope with expiration times for revocations
* here because we have to assume that an attacker can
* generate all kinds of signatures. However due to the
* fact that the key has been revoked it does not harm
* either and by continuing we gather some more info on
* that key.
*/
*r_revoked = 1;
return;
}
else if ( IS_KEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
const byte *p;
@ -1511,8 +1514,9 @@ merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) {
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
; /* signature did not verify */
else if ( IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig)) {
/* Note: we allow to invalidated cert revocations
else if ( (IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
&& sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
/* Note: we allow to invalidate cert revocations
* by a newer signature. An attacker can't use this
* because a key should be revoced with a key revocation.
* The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
@ -1583,10 +1587,9 @@ merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
}
pk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
if ( !key_expire_seen ) {
/* find the latest valid user ID with a key expiration set
* Note, that this may be a diferent one from the above because
* Note, that this may be a different one from the above because
* some user IDs may have no expiration date set */
uiddate = 0;
for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
@ -1603,8 +1606,10 @@ merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
}
pk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
/* FIXME: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields */
if ( pk->version >= 4 )
pk->expiredate = key_expire;
/* Fixme: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields but
* this needs changes at other palces too. */
/* and now find the real primary user ID and delete all others */
uiddate = uiddate2 = 0;
@ -1681,12 +1686,10 @@ merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
; /* signature did not verify */
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) ) {
/* key has been revoked - given the fact that it is easy
* to create a new subkey, it does not make sense to
* revive a revoked key. So we can stop here.
*/
subpk->is_revoked = 1;
return;
/* although we could stop now, we continue to
* figure out other information like the old expiration
* time */
}
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data,
@ -1735,6 +1738,7 @@ merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
else
key_expire = 0;
subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
subpk->expiredate = key_expire;
}

116
g10/mainproc.c
View file

@ -245,8 +245,8 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
if( enc->seskeylen )
log_error( "symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n");
if (enc->seskeylen)
log_error ("symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n");
else {
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, enc->cipher_algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
@ -1040,7 +1040,9 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
any_data = 1;
if( rc ) {
free_packet(pkt);
if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
/* stop processing hwne an invalid packet has been encountered
* but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packet. */
if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 )
break;
continue;
}
@ -1163,68 +1165,6 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
}
/* fixme: This code is a duplicate fro keylist.c and should be replaced
* by flags set in getkey.c. gpg 1.1 already does this */
static int
is_uid_revoked ( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE uidnode, u32 *mainkid )
{
KBNODE node;
PKT_signature *selfsig = NULL; /* the latest valid self signature */
assert ( uidnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
/* first find out about the latest valid self-signature */
for ( node = uidnode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
PKT_signature *sig;
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PHOTO_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
if ( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
continue; /* we only care about self-signatures for now */
if ( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 ) { /* regular self signature */
if ( !check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL ) ) {
if ( !selfsig )
selfsig = sig; /* use the first valid sig */
else if ( sig->timestamp > selfsig->timestamp
&& sig->sig_class >= selfsig->sig_class )
selfsig = sig; /* but this one is newer */
}
}
}
/* watch out for a newer revocation */
for ( node = uidnode->next; node; node = node->next ) {
PKT_signature *sig;
if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PHOTO_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
break;
if ( node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( mainkid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || mainkid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
continue; /* we only care about self-signatures */
if ( sig->sig_class == 0x30
&& (!selfsig || sig->timestamp >= selfsig->timestamp) ) {
if ( !check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL ) )
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
@ -1282,8 +1222,6 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
KBNODE un, keyblock;
char *us;
int count=0;
u32 mainkid[2];
int mainkid_ok = 0;
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
@ -1291,35 +1229,45 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
write_status_text( rc? STATUS_BADSIG : STATUS_GOODSIG, us );
m_free(us);
/* fixme: list only user ids which are valid and add information
* about the trustworthiness of each user id, sort them.
* Integrate this with check_signatures_trust(). */
/* find an print the primary user ID */
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if ( !mainkid_ok && un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
keyid_from_pk( un->pkt->pkt.public_key, mainkid );
mainkid_ok = 1;
}
if( !mainkid_ok || un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if ( is_uid_revoked (keyblock, un, mainkid ) )
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
continue;
if( !count++ )
log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
: _("Good signature from \""));
else
log_info( _(" aka \""));
if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
continue;
log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
: _("Good signature from \""));
print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
if( rc )
break; /* print only one id in this case */
count++;
}
if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no userid */
log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
: _("Good signature from \""));
fputs("[?]\"\n", log_stream() );
}
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
if ( count && !rc ) {
for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
continue;
if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
continue;
log_info( _(" aka \""));
print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
}
}
release_kbnode( keyblock );
if( !rc )
print_notation_data( sig );

1
g10/misc.c
View file

@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
#include <time.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#endif

2
g10/options.h
View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct {
int fingerprint; /* list fingerprints */
int list_sigs; /* list signatures */
int no_armor;
int list_packets; /* list-packets mode */
int list_packets; /* list-packets mode: 1=normal, 2=invoked by command*/
int def_cipher_algo;
int force_v3_sigs;
int force_mdc;

8
g10/options.skel
View file

@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ force-v3-sigs
# Because some mailers change lines starting with "From " to ">From "
# it is good to handle such lines in a special way when creating
# cleartext signatures; all other PGP versions it this way too.
# cleartext signatures; all other PGP versions do it this way too.
# To enable full OpenPGP compliance you have to remove this option.
escape-from-lines
@ -81,12 +81,12 @@ lock-once
# GnuPG can import a key from a HKP keyerver if one is missing
# for sercain operations. Is you set this option to a keyserver
# for certain operations. Is you set this option to a keyserver
# you will be asked in such a case whether GnuPG should try to
# import the key from that server (server do syncronize with each
# others and DNS Round-Robin may give you a random server each time).
# other and DNS Round-Robin may give you a random server each time).
# Use "host -l pgp.net | grep www" to figure out a keyserver.
#keyserver wwwkeys.eu.pgp.net
#keyserver wwwkeys.nl.pgp.net
# The environment variable http_proxy is only used when the
# this option is set.

1
g10/packet.h
View file

@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ typedef struct {
int help_key_usage;
u32 help_key_expire;
int is_primary;
int is_revoked;
u32 created; /* according to the self-signature */
char name[1];
} PKT_user_id;

43
g10/parse-packet.c
View file

@ -576,19 +576,23 @@ static int
parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
PKT_symkey_enc *k;
int rc = 0;
int i, version, s2kmode, cipher_algo, hash_algo, seskeylen, minlen;
if( pktlen < 4 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( version != 4 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( pktlen > 200 ) { /* (we encode the seskeylen in a byte) */
log_error("packet(%d) too large\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
@ -610,6 +614,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
}
if( minlen > pktlen ) {
log_error("packet with S2K %d too short\n", s2kmode );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
seskeylen = pktlen - minlen;
@ -646,24 +651,27 @@ parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return 0;
return rc;
}
static int
parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
unsigned n;
unsigned int n;
int rc = 0;
int i, ndata;
PKT_pubkey_enc *k;
k = packet->pkt.pubkey_enc = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *packet->pkt.pubkey_enc);
if( pktlen < 12 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
k->version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( k->version != 2 && k->version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
k->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
@ -695,7 +703,7 @@ parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return 0;
return rc;
}
@ -1088,6 +1096,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
is_v4=1;
else if( sig->version != 2 && sig->version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, sig->version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
@ -1223,14 +1232,17 @@ parse_onepass_sig( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PKT_onepass_sig *ops )
{
int version;
int rc = 0;
if( pktlen < 13 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( version != 3 ) {
log_error("onepass_sig with unknown version %d\n", version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
ops->sig_class = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
@ -1249,7 +1261,7 @@ parse_onepass_sig( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
leave:
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return 0;
return rc;
}
@ -1289,11 +1301,13 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
is_v4=1;
else if( version != 2 && version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( pktlen < 11 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
@ -1572,6 +1586,12 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
packet->pkt.user_id->len = pktlen;
packet->pkt.user_id->photo = NULL;
packet->pkt.user_id->photolen = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->is_primary = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->is_revoked = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->created = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->help_key_usage = 0;
packet->pkt.user_id->help_key_expire = 0;
p = packet->pkt.user_id->name;
for( ; pktlen; pktlen--, p++ )
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
@ -1580,7 +1600,7 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
if( list_mode ) {
int n = packet->pkt.user_id->len;
printf(":user ID packet: \"");
/* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this wioth print_string?? */
/* fixme: Hey why don't we replace this with print_string?? */
for(p=packet->pkt.user_id->name; n; p++, n-- ) {
if( *p >= ' ' && *p <= 'z' )
putchar(*p);
@ -1663,6 +1683,7 @@ static int
parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
int rc = 0;
int mode, namelen;
PKT_plaintext *pt;
byte *p;
@ -1670,6 +1691,7 @@ parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
if( pktlen && pktlen < 6 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short (%lu)\n", pkttype, (ulong)pktlen);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
mode = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); if( pktlen ) pktlen--;
@ -1709,7 +1731,7 @@ parse_plaintext( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
leave:
return 0;
return rc;
}
@ -1738,6 +1760,7 @@ static int
parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
int rc = 0;
PKT_encrypted *ed;
unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;
@ -1757,12 +1780,14 @@ parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
log_error("encrypted_mdc packet with unknown version %d\n",
version);
/*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
ed->mdc_method = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
}
if( orig_pktlen && pktlen < 10 ) { /* actually this is blocksize+2 */
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
goto leave;
}
@ -1779,7 +1804,7 @@ parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pktlen = 0;
leave:
return 0;
return rc;
}
@ -1787,6 +1812,7 @@ static int
parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *pkt, int new_ctb )
{
int rc = 0;
PKT_mdc *mdc;
byte *p;
@ -1795,6 +1821,7 @@ parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(":mdc packet: length=%lu\n", pktlen);
if( !new_ctb || pktlen != 20 ) {
log_error("mdc_packet with invalid encoding\n");
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
p = mdc->hash;
@ -1802,7 +1829,7 @@ parse_mdc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
*p = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
leave:
return 0;
return rc;
}

2
g10/sign.c
View file

@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
if( !(filesize = iobuf_get_filelength(inp)) )
log_info(_("WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"), fname );
/* we can't yet encode the length of very large files,
* so we switch to partial lengthn encoding in this case */
* so we switch to partial length encoding in this case */
if ( filesize >= IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT )
filesize = 0;

114
g10/signal.c
View file

@ -38,6 +38,36 @@
static volatile int caught_fatal_sig = 0;
static volatile int caught_sigusr1 = 0;
static void
init_one_signal (int sig, RETSIGTYPE (*handler)(int), int check_ign )
{
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
#if HAVE_SIGACTION
struct sigaction oact, nact;
if (check_ign) {
/* we don't want to change an IGN handler */
sigaction (sig, NULL, &oact );
if (oact.sa_handler == SIG_IGN )
return;
}
nact.sa_handler = handler;
sigemptyset (&nact.sa_mask);
nact.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction ( sig, &nact, NULL);
#else
RETSIGTYPE (*ohandler)(int);
ohandler = signal (sig, handler);
if (check_ign && ohandler == SIG_IGN) {
/* Change it back if it was already set to IGN */
signal (sig, SIG_IGN);
}
#endif
#endif /*!HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM*/
}
static const char *
get_signal_name( int signum )
{
@ -66,18 +96,9 @@ got_fatal_signal( int sig )
s = get_signal_name(sig); write(2, s, strlen(s) );
write(2, " caught ... exiting\n", 21 );
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
{ /* reset action to default action and raise signal again */
struct sigaction nact;
nact.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
sigemptyset( &nact.sa_mask );
nact.sa_flags = 0;
sigaction( sig, &nact, NULL);
}
#endif
/* reset action to default action and raise signal again */
init_one_signal (sig, SIG_DFL, 0);
remove_lockfiles ();
raise( sig );
}
@ -88,37 +109,18 @@ got_usr_signal( int sig )
caught_sigusr1 = 1;
}
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
static void
do_sigaction( int sig, struct sigaction *nact )
{
struct sigaction oact;
sigaction( sig, NULL, &oact );
if( oact.sa_handler != SIG_IGN )
sigaction( sig, nact, NULL);
}
#endif
void
init_signals()
{
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
struct sigaction nact;
nact.sa_handler = got_fatal_signal;
sigemptyset( &nact.sa_mask );
nact.sa_flags = 0;
do_sigaction( SIGINT, &nact );
do_sigaction( SIGHUP, &nact );
do_sigaction( SIGTERM, &nact );
do_sigaction( SIGQUIT, &nact );
do_sigaction( SIGSEGV, &nact );
nact.sa_handler = got_usr_signal;
sigaction( SIGUSR1, &nact, NULL );
nact.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
sigaction( SIGPIPE, &nact, NULL );
init_one_signal (SIGINT, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
init_one_signal (SIGHUP, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
init_one_signal (SIGTERM, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
init_one_signal (SIGQUIT, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
init_one_signal (SIGSEGV, got_fatal_signal, 1 );
init_one_signal (SIGUSR1, got_usr_signal, 0 );
init_one_signal (SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN, 0 );
#endif
}
@ -127,6 +129,7 @@ void
pause_on_sigusr( int which )
{
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
sigset_t mask, oldmask;
assert( which == 1 );
@ -138,6 +141,14 @@ pause_on_sigusr( int which )
sigsuspend( &oldmask );
caught_sigusr1 = 0;
sigprocmask( SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL );
#else
assert (which == 1);
sighold (SIGUSR1);
while (!caught_sigusr1)
sigpause(SIGUSR1);
caught_sigusr1 = 0;
sigrelse(SIGUSR1); ????
#endif /*!HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/
#endif
}
@ -145,12 +156,13 @@ pause_on_sigusr( int which )
static void
do_block( int block )
{
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
#ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
static int is_blocked;
#ifdef HAVE_SIGPROCMASK
static sigset_t oldmask;
if( block ) {
sigset_t newmask;
sigset_t newmask;
if( is_blocked )
log_bug("signals are already blocked\n");
@ -164,7 +176,28 @@ do_block( int block )
sigprocmask( SIG_SETMASK, &oldmask, NULL );
is_blocked = 0;
}
#endif /*HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM*/
#else /*!HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/
static void (*disposition[MAXSIG])();
int sig;
if( block ) {
if( is_blocked )
log_bug("signals are already blocked\n");
for (sig=1; sig < MAXSIG; sig++) {
disposition[sig] = sigset (sig, SIG_HOLD);
}
is_blocked = 1;
}
else {
if( !is_blocked )
log_bug("signals are not blocked\n");
for (sig=1; sig < MAXSIG; sig++) {
sigset (sig, disposition[sig]);
}
is_blocked = 0;
}
#endif /*!HAVE_SIGPROCMASK*/
#endif /*HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM*/
}
@ -179,4 +212,3 @@ unblock_all_signals()
{
do_block(0);
}