indent: Some typo and indentation changes for gpg.

--

doc/HACKING

@@ -182,12 +182,11 @@ Note that such a comment will be removed if the git commit option
 ** Variable names
 
   Follow the GNU standards.  Here are some conventions you may want to
-  stick to (do not rename existing "wrong" uses without a goog
-  reason).
+  stick to (do not rename existing "wrong" uses without a good reason).
 
   - err :: This conveys an error code of type =gpg_error_t= which is
            compatible to an =int=.  To compare such a variable to a
-           GPG_ERR_ constant, it is necessary to map the value like
+           GPG_ERR_ constant, it is necessary to access the value like
            this: =gpg_err_code(err)=.
   - ec  :: This is used for a gpg-error code which has no source part
            (=gpg_err_code_t=) and will eventually be used as input to
@@ -425,5 +424,3 @@ plaintext packets and so on.  The file g10/encode.c might be a good
 starting point to see how it is used - actually this is the other way:
 constructing messages using pushed filters but it may be easier to
 understand.
-
-

g10/decrypt-data.c

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ static int decode_filter ( void *opaque, int control, IOBUF a,
 /* Our context object.  */
 struct decode_filter_context_s
 {
-  /* Recounter (max value is 2).  We need it because we do not know
+  /* Redcounter (max value is 2).  We need it because we do not know
    * whether the iobuf or the outer control code frees this object
    * first.  */
   int  refcount;
@@ -57,7 +58,8 @@ struct decode_filter_context_s
   byte startiv[16];
 
   /* The holdback buffer and its used length.  For AEAD we need 32+1
-   * bytes but we use 48 byte.  For MDC we need 22 bytes.  */
+   * bytes but we use 48 byte.  For MDC we need 22 bytes; here
+   * holdbacklen will either 0 or 22.  */
   char holdback[48];
   unsigned int holdbacklen;
 
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ struct decode_filter_context_s
 
   /* EOF indicator with these true values:
    *   1 = normal EOF
-   *   2 = premature EOF (tag incomplete)
+   *   2 = premature EOF (tag or hash incomplete)
    *   3 = premature EOF (general)       */
   unsigned int eof_seen : 2;
 
@@ -118,7 +120,7 @@ release_dfx_context (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx)
 
 
 /* Set the nonce and the additional data for the current chunk.  This
- * also reset the decryption machinery * so that the handle can be
+ * also reset the decryption machinery so that the handle can be
  * used for a new chunk.  If FINAL is set the final AEAD chunk is
  * processed.  */
 static gpg_error_t
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek)
   blocksize = openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (dek->algo);
   if ( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 )
     log_fatal ("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
+
   if (ed->aead_algo)
     {
       enum gcry_cipher_modes ciphermode;
@@ -375,7 +378,7 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek)
       if ( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) )
         {
           /* An invalid message.  We can't check that during parsing
-             because we may not know the used cipher then.  */
+           * because we may not know the used cipher then.  */
           rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
           goto leave;
         }
@@ -405,19 +408,19 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek)
       rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (dfx->cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
       if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_WEAK_KEY )
         {
-          log_info(_("WARNING: message was encrypted with"
+          log_info (_("WARNING: message was encrypted with"
                       " a weak key in the symmetric cipher.\n"));
           rc=0;
         }
-      else if( rc )
+      else if (rc)
         {
-          log_error("key setup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
+          log_error ("key setup failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
           goto leave;
         }
 
       if (!ed->buf)
         {
-          log_error(_("problem handling encrypted packet\n"));
+          log_error (_("problem handling encrypted packet\n"));
           goto leave;
         }
 
@@ -535,7 +538,6 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek)
       /* log_printhex("MDC calc:", gcry_md_read (dfx->mdc_hash,0), datalen); */
     }
 
-
  leave:
   release_dfx_context (dfx);
   return rc;

g10/mainproc.c

@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 
   /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
    * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
-   * The apcket is further used to convey extra data from the
+   * The packet is further used to convey extra data from the
    * plaintext packet to the signature verification. */
   extrahash = xtrymalloc (6 + pt->namelen);
   if (!extrahash)

g10/misc.c

@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@
 #include "../common/zb32.h"
 
 
-/* FIXME: Libgcrypt 1.9 will support EAX.  Until we kame this a
+/* FIXME: Libgcrypt 1.9 will support EAX.  Until we name this a
  * requirement we hardwire the enum used for EAX.  */
 #define MY_GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_EAX 14
 

g10/parse-packet.c

@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
         {
           /* To compute the size of the session key we need to know
            * the size of the AEAD nonce which we may not know.  Thus
-           * we show only the seize of the entire encrypted session
+           * we show only the size of the entire encrypted session
            * key.  */
           if (aead_algo)
             es_fprintf (listfp, ", encrypted seskey %d bytes", seskeylen);