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mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2024-07-01 02:42:44 +02:00

Encryption should work again

This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2001-09-27 16:22:23 +00:00
parent 52be6a8aef
commit 531f3953d8
6 changed files with 250 additions and 237 deletions

View File

@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
2001-09-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Allow settin of ultimate trust.
* trustdb.c (mark_keyblock_seen): New.
(make_key_array): Use it to mark the subkeys too.
(validate_keys): Store validity for ultimatly trusted keys.
2001-09-26 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust, do_we_trust): Removed the
invocation of add_ownertrust. Minor changes to the wording.
(add_ownertrust, add_ownertrust_cb): Removed.
* trustdb.c (get_validity): Allow to lookup the validity using a
subkey.
* trustdb.c (new_key_hash_table): Increased the table size to 1024
and changed the masks accordingly.
(validate): Changed stats printing.
@ -121,7 +136,7 @@
2001-09-14 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): List key server preferences
and show the revocable flag correctly. Contributed by Davod Shaw.
and show the revocable flag correctly. Contributed by David Shaw.
2001-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
@ -653,7 +668,7 @@
* cipher.c (write_header): Set extralen.
* build-packet.c (do_encrypted): Use extralen instead of const 10.
(do_encrypted_mdc): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Set extralen to 0 becuase we
* parse-packet.c (parse_encrypted): Set extralen to 0 because we
don't know it here.
2001-03-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>

View File

@ -49,6 +49,13 @@ static struct helptexts { const char *key; const char *help; } helptexts[] = {
"to do with the (implicitly created) web-of-certificates."
)},
{ "edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay", N_(
"To build the Web-of-Trust, GnuPG needs to know which keys are\n"
"ultimately trusted - those are usually the keys for which you have\n"
"access to the secret key. Answer \"yes\" to set this key to\n"
"ultimately trusted\n"
)},
{ "revoked_key.override", N_(
"If you want to use this revoked key anyway, answer \"yes\"."
)},
@ -203,14 +210,6 @@ static struct helptexts { const char *key; const char *help; } helptexts[] = {
"self-signatures fill be advanced by one second.\n"
)},
{ "keyedit.trust.set_ultimate.okay", N_(
"To build the Web-of-Trust, GnuPG needs to know which keys are\n"
"ultimately trusted - those are usually the keys for which you have\n"
"access to the secret key. Answer \"yes\" to set this key to\n"
"ultimately trusted; if you choose not to do so, you will then be\n"
"taken to the regular ownertrust menu.\n"
)},
{ "passphrase.enter", N_(
""

View File

@ -928,19 +928,6 @@ keyedit_menu( const char *username, STRLIST locusr, STRLIST commands,
case cmdTRUST:
show_key_with_all_names( keyblock, 0, 0, 1, 0 );
tty_printf("\n");
if ( sec_keyblock
&& cpr_get_answer_is_yes(
"keyedit.trust.set_ultimate.okay",
_("Do you want to set this key to ultimately trusted? "))) {
PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
update_ownertrust (pk,
((get_ownertrust (pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
redisplay = 1;
break;
}
if( edit_ownertrust( find_kbnode( keyblock,
PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )->pkt->pkt.public_key, 1 ) )
redisplay = 1;

View File

@ -219,11 +219,12 @@ show_paths (const PKT_public_key *pk, int only_first )
/****************
* mode: 0 = standard
* 1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
* this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
* Returns:
* -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
* -1 = quit operation
* 0 = nothing changed
* 1 = new ownertrust now ion new_trust
* 1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
*/
static int
do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
@ -257,15 +258,17 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
tty_printf("\n");
}
tty_printf(_(
tty_printf (_(
"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"
" 1 = Don't know\n"
" 2 = I do NOT trust\n"
" 3 = I trust marginally\n"
" 4 = I trust fully\n"
" s = please show me more information\n") );
"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"));
tty_printf (_(" %d = Don't know\n"), 1);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
if (mode)
tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
tty_printf (_(" s = please show me more information\n") );
if( mode )
tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
else
@ -282,20 +285,29 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
did_help = 0;
else if( *p && p[1] )
;
else if( !p[1] && (*p >= '1' && *p <= '4') )
else if( !p[1] && (*p >= '1' && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) )
{
unsigned trust;
unsigned int trust;
switch( *p )
{
case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER ; break;
case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY ; break;
case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
default: BUG();
}
*new_trust = trust;
changed = 1;
break;
if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
&& !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
_("Do you really want to set this key"
" to ultimate trust? ")))
; /* no */
else
{
*new_trust = trust;
changed = 1;
break;
}
}
else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] )
{
@ -350,73 +362,37 @@ edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
}
}
static int
add_ownertrust_cb (PKT_public_key *pk )
{
unsigned int trust;
int rc = do_edit_ownertrust (pk, 0, &trust, 0 );
if( rc == 1 )
return trust & TRUST_MASK;
return rc > 0? 0 : rc;
}
/****************
* Try to add some more owner trusts (interactive)
* This function presents all the signator in a certificate
* chain who have no ownertrust value assigned.
* Returns: -1 if no ownertrust were added.
*/
static int
add_ownertrust( PKT_public_key *pk, int *quit, int *trustlevel )
{
int rc;
unsigned flags = 0;
#warning This function does not make sense anymore
*quit = 0;
*trustlevel = 0;
tty_printf(
_("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Let's see whether we\n"
"can assign some missing owner trust values.\n\n"));
*trustlevel = get_validity ( pk, NULL);
if( !(flags & 1) )
tty_printf(_("No path leading to one of our keys found.\n\n") );
else if( !(flags & 2) )
tty_printf(_("No certificates with undefined trust found.\n\n") );
else if( !(flags & 4) )
tty_printf(_("No trust values changed.\n\n") );
return (flags & 4)? 0:-1;
}
/****************
* Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
* Returns: true if we trust. Might change the trustlevel
* Returns: true if we trust.
*/
static int
do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int *trustlevel )
do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int *trustlevel )
{
int rc;
int did_add = 0;
int trustmask = 0;
unsigned int trustmask = 0;
retry:
/* FIXME: get_pubkey_byname already checks the validity and won't
* return keys which are either expired or revoked - so these
* question here won't get triggered. We have to find a solution
* for this. It might make sense to have a function in getkey.c
* which does only the basic checks and returns even revoked and
* expired keys. This fnction could then also returhn a list of
* keys if the speicified name is ambiguous
*/
if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: key has been revoked!\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
show_revocation_reason( pk );
if( opt.batch )
return 0;
return 0; /* no */
if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
_("Use this key anyway? ")) )
return 0;
return 0; /* no */
trustmask |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
}
else if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
if( (*trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
log_info(_("key %08lX: subkey has been revoked!\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
show_revocation_reason( pk );
@ -433,43 +409,25 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int *trustlevel )
if( opt.always_trust) {
if( opt.verbose )
log_info("No trust check due to --always-trust option\n");
/* The problem with this, is that EXPIRE can't be checked as
* this needs to insert a new key into the trustdb first and
* we don't want that - IS this still true? */
return 1;
}
switch( (*trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
case TRUST_UNKNOWN: /* No pubkey in trustDB: Insert and check again */
*trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
*trustlevel &= ~trustmask;
if( *trustlevel == TRUST_UNKNOWN || *trustlevel == TRUST_EXPIRED ) {
log_debug("do_we_trust: oops at %d\n", __LINE__ );
return 0;
}
return do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
log_info(_("%08lX: key has expired\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
return 0; /* no */
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
*trustlevel);
/* fall thru */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
if( opt.batch || opt.answer_no )
log_info(_("%08lX: no info to calculate a trust probability\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
else {
int quit;
rc = add_ownertrust( pk, &quit, trustlevel );
*trustlevel &= ~trustmask;
if( !rc && !did_add && !quit ) {
did_add = 1;
goto retry;
}
}
return 0;
log_info(_("%08lX: There is no indication that this key "
"really belongs to the owner\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
return 0; /* no */
case TRUST_NEVER:
log_info(_("%08lX: We do NOT trust this key\n"),
@ -491,8 +449,6 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int *trustlevel )
if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
return 1; /* yes */
default: BUG();
}
return 1; /* yes */
@ -505,7 +461,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int *trustlevel )
* key anyway.
*/
static int
do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
{
int rc;
@ -515,7 +471,8 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
return 0;
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) && !rc )
return 0;
else if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
char *p;
u32 keyid[2];
size_t n;
@ -540,7 +497,7 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
_("Use this key anyway? ")) )
rc = 1;
/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user the user about
/* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
* his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
*/
}
@ -561,117 +518,105 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
int
check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
{
PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
int trustlevel;
int did_add = 0;
int rc=0;
PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
unsigned int trustlevel;
int did_add = 0;
int rc=0;
if( opt.always_trust ) {
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
rc = 0;
goto leave;
}
rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
if( rc ) { /* this should not happen */
log_error("Ooops; the key vanished - can't check the trust\n");
rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
retry:
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
log_info(_(" This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk );
}
else if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) {
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk );
}
switch( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
case TRUST_UNKNOWN: /* No pubkey in trustDB: Insert and check again */
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
if( trustlevel == TRUST_UNKNOWN || trustlevel == TRUST_EXPIRED )
BUG();
goto retry;
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
if ( opt.always_trust)
{
if( !opt.quiet )
log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
if( did_add || opt.batch || opt.answer_no ) {
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
log_info(_(
"WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!\n"));
log_info(_(
" There is no indication that the "
"signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
}
else {
int quit;
rc = add_ownertrust( pk, &quit, &trustlevel );
if( rc || quit ) {
did_add = 1;
rc = 0;
}
goto retry;
}
break;
case TRUST_NEVER:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
log_info(_(" The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
break;
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
log_info(_(
"WARNING: This key is not certified with sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"
));
log_info(_(
" It is not certain that the signature belongs to the owner.\n"
));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_FULLY:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
default: BUG();
goto leave;
}
rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
if (rc)
{ /* this should not happen */
log_error("Ooops; the key vanished - can't check the trust\n");
rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
goto leave;
}
leave:
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) )
{
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
log_info(_(" This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk );
}
else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) )
{
write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
show_revocation_reason( pk );
}
if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));
switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) )
{
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
trustlevel);
/* fall thru */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
if( did_add || opt.batch || opt.answer_no ) {
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
" a trusted signature!\n"));
log_info(_(" There is no indication that the "
"signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
}
break;
case TRUST_NEVER:
/* currently we won't get that status */
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
log_info(_(" The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
break;
case TRUST_MARGINAL:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
" sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
log_info(_(" It is not certain that the"
" signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_FULLY:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
if (opt.with_fingerprint)
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
break;
}
leave:
free_public_key( pk );
return rc;
}

View File

@ -165,7 +165,6 @@ add_key_hash_table (KeyHashTable tbl, u32 *kid)
tbl[(kid[1] & 0x03ff)] = kk;
}
/*
* Release a key_array
*/
@ -671,6 +670,8 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
int rc;
ulong recno;
unsigned int validity;
u32 kid[2];
PKT_public_key *main_pk;
init_trustdb ();
if (!did_nextcheck)
@ -690,14 +691,33 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
}
}
rc = read_trust_record (pk, &trec);
keyid_from_pk (pk, kid);
if (pk->main_keyid[0] != kid[0] || pk->main_keyid[1] != kid[1])
{ /* this is a subkey - get the mainkey */
main_pk = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *main_pk);
rc = get_pubkey (main_pk, pk->main_keyid);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("error getting main key %08lX of subkey %08lX: %s\n",
(ulong)pk->main_keyid[1], (ulong)kid[1], g10_errstr(rc));
validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
goto leave;
}
}
else
main_pk = pk;
rc = read_trust_record (main_pk, &trec);
if (rc && rc != -1)
{
tdbio_invalid ();
return 0;
}
if (rc == -1) /* no record found */
return TRUST_UNKNOWN;
{
validity = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
goto leave;
}
/* loop over all user IDs */
recno = trec.r.trust.validlist;
@ -719,13 +739,18 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, const byte *namehash)
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
/* set some flags direct from the key */
if (pk->is_revoked)
if (main_pk->is_revoked)
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED;
if (main_pk != pk && pk->is_revoked)
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED;
/* Note: expiration is a trust value and not a flag - don't know why
* I initially designed it that way */
if (pk->has_expired)
if (main_pk->has_expired || pk->has_expired)
validity = (validity & ~TRUST_MASK) | TRUST_EXPIRED;
leave:
if (main_pk != pk)
free_public_key (main_pk);
return validity;
}
@ -825,10 +850,25 @@ ask_ownertrust (u32 *kid)
}
static void
mark_keyblock_seen (KeyHashTable tbl, KBNODE node)
{
for ( ;node; node = node->next )
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
u32 aki[2];
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, aki);
add_key_hash_table (tbl, aki);
}
}
static int
search_skipfnc (void *opaque, u32 *kid)
{
return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
return test_key_hash_table ((KeyHashTable)opaque, kid);
}
/*
@ -882,7 +922,6 @@ make_key_array (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited,
do
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
u32 kid[2];
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
if (rc)
@ -905,12 +944,10 @@ make_key_array (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited,
merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, kid); /*(cheap: should already be cached in the pk)*/
if (pk->has_expired || pk->is_revoked)
{
/* it does not make sense to look further at those keys */
add_key_hash_table (visited, kid);
mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
}
else if (cmpfnc (keyblock, cmpval))
{
@ -920,7 +957,7 @@ make_key_array (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, KeyHashTable visited,
}
keys[nkeys++].keyblock = keyblock;
/* This key is signed - don't check it again */
add_key_hash_table (visited, kid);
mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
}
else
release_kbnode (keyblock);
@ -1256,8 +1293,38 @@ validate_keys (int interactive)
goto leave;
}
/* mark all UTKs as visited and set validity to ultimate */
for (k=utk_list; k; k = k->next)
add_key_hash_table (visited, k->kid);
{
KBNODE keyblock;
keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (k->kid);
if (!keyblock)
{
log_error (_("public key of ultimately"
" trusted key %08lX not found\n"), (ulong)k->kid[1]);
continue;
}
mark_keyblock_seen (visited, keyblock);
for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
byte namehash[20];
PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
if( uid->photo )
rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->photo, uid->photolen);
else
rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->name, uid->len );
update_validity (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key,
namehash, 0, TRUST_ULTIMATE);
}
}
release_kbnode (keyblock);
do_sync ();
}
klist = utk_list;
kdb = keydb_new (0);

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
#define TRUST_ULTIMATE 6 /* u: ultimately trusted */
/* trust values not covered by the mask */
#define TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED 32 /* r: revoked */
#define TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED 64
#define TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED 64 /* r: revoked but for subkeys */
#define TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED 128 /* d: key/uid disabled */