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Code Activity

* minip12.c (parse_bag_encrypted_data): Print error if a bad

Browse source 
passphrase has been given.

* gpg-agent.texi (Invoking GPG-AGENT): Add a few words about the
expected pinentry filename.

* import.c (parse_p12): Write an error status line for bad
passphrases. Add new arg CTRL and changed caller.
* export.c (export_p12): Likewise.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2004-09-29 13:50:31 +00:00
parent 4604ae8e99
commit 530a0a91c4
9 changed files with 102 additions and 17 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

32
sm/import.c
View file

@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ struct stats_s {
};
static gpg_error_t parse_p12 (ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp,
static gpg_error_t parse_p12 (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp,
struct stats_s *stats);
@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ import_one (CTRL ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, int in_fd)
Base64Context b64p12rdr;
ksba_reader_t p12rdr;
rc = parse_p12 (reader, &certfp, stats);
rc = parse_p12 (ctrl, reader, &certfp, stats);
if (!rc)
{
any = 1;
@ -572,13 +572,14 @@ popen_protect_tool (const char *pgmname,
/* Assume that the reader is at a pkcs#12 message and try to import
certificates from that stupid format. We will alos store secret
certificates from that stupid format. We will also store secret
keys. All of the pkcs#12 parsing and key storing is handled by the
gpg-protect-tool, we merely have to take care of receiving the
certificates. On success RETFP returns a temporary file with
certificates. */
static gpg_error_t
parse_p12 (ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp, struct stats_s *stats)
parse_p12 (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_reader_t reader,
FILE **retfp, struct stats_s *stats)
{
const char *pgmname;
gpg_error_t err = 0, child_err = 0;
@ -588,6 +589,7 @@ parse_p12 (ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp, struct stats_s *stats)
char buffer[1024];
size_t nread;
pid_t pid = -1;
int bad_pass = 0;
if (!opt.protect_tool_program || !*opt.protect_tool_program)
pgmname = GNUPG_DEFAULT_PROTECT_TOOL;
@ -681,8 +683,13 @@ parse_p12 (ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp, struct stats_s *stats)
else if ( !strcmp (p, "bad-passphrase"))
;
}
else
log_info ("%s", buffer);
else
{
log_info ("%s", buffer);
if (!strncmp (buffer, "gpg-protect-tool: "
"possibly bad passphrase given",46))
bad_pass++;
}
}
pos = 0;
cont_line = (c != '\n');
@ -698,6 +705,7 @@ parse_p12 (ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp, struct stats_s *stats)
log_info ("%s\n", buffer);
}
/* If we found no error in the output of the cild, setup a suitable
error code, which will later be reset if the exit status of the
child is 0. */
@ -738,5 +746,17 @@ parse_p12 (ksba_reader_t reader, FILE **retfp, struct stats_s *stats)
}
else
*retfp = certfp;
if (bad_pass)
{
/* We only write a plain error code and not direct
BAD_PASSPHRASE because the pkcs12 parser might issue this
message multiple times, BAd_PASSPHRASE in general requires a
keyID and parts of the import might actually succeed so that
IMPORT_PROBLEM is also not appropriate. */
gpgsm_status_with_err_code (ctrl, STATUS_ERROR,
"import.parsep12", GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
}
return err;
}