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See ChangeLog: Mon Sep 13 10:55:14 CEST 1999 Werner Koch
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch
parent
d92e4db7fd
commit
52139a60cf
1
BUGS
1
BUGS
@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ and after about half a day in the rsync snapshots.
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[ *] #23 1999-09-03 <todd.brooks@yale.edu> 0.9.11
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Only the first signature of a cleartext sig seems to be verified.
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Can't fix it in 1.0 because the code is semi-frozen.
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HMMM: Can't reprodude the bug here - it just works. Check wehther
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[ *] #24 1999-09-05 <marcus@yoyo.cc.monash.edu.au> 0.9.11
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Does not link libc and libz expect when removing all "-lc -lz" except
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31
THOUGHTS
31
THOUGHTS
@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
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How often have we to do a key lookup by mailaddress?.
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can this be accomplished by an external program?
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What about using S-Exp to describe the interface to the ciphers instead
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of simply iterating over them. This way we can easy register a name which
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can be used as the "hintstr" for --load-extension.
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EGD
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====
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Oh, and on embedding egd into the gpg package: I think if you just unpack it
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@ -48,8 +55,8 @@ From: Matthew Skala <mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca>
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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Hash: SHA1
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==============================
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[ "-->" indicates a comment by me (wk) ]
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Hi Werner..
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@ -83,11 +90,16 @@ extension mechanisms in GPG should be enough to try various ways later on.
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1) pass an argument string to loadable extension modules (maybe
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gpg --load-extension foofish=arg1,arg2,arg3 ?)
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--> could also be achived by S-Exps
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2) allow multiple instances of the same extension module (presumably with
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different arguments)
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--> set an alias name when loading them
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3) allow extension modules to use stdin/stdout/stderr as normal (probably
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already in there), for giving feedback to the user, or possibly asking them
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for a password of some sort
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--> there should really be some kind of callback mechanism.
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4) have an extension to provide secret keys:
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It looks like most of the hooks for this are already in place, it just
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@ -97,6 +109,9 @@ extension mechanisms in GPG should be enough to try various ways later on.
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an argument. When the keyblock resource is asked to enumerate its keys, it
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runs the external program (first with a "0" argument, then a "1", and so on
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until the program reports that no more keys are available). The external
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--> better use a cookie: This way we are also stateless but have a more
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general interface.
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program returns one (possibly armored) secret key block each time. The
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program might have some kind of special protocol to talk to the storage
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device. One thing that comes to mind is to simply include a random number
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@ -108,6 +123,8 @@ extension mechanisms in GPG should be enough to try various ways later on.
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much processing power and IO is available on the device. But the same
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extension module should be able to handle as complex a scheme as one could
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wish.
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--> authenticate the session on startup, using DH and the mentioned
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cookie/screen/keyboard authentication.
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The current keyblock-resource interface would work fine, although it
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might be more convenient if a resource could be asked for a key by id
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@ -118,10 +135,13 @@ extension mechanisms in GPG should be enough to try various ways later on.
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to fetch by id (which would require it to fall back to the other keyblock
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resources if it failed), the user's device might be asked to release the
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key even though some other secret key was the one needed.
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--> Right.
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5) have an extension to perform a secret-key operation without the actual
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secret key material
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--> Define a clear interface to do this and in the first step write
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a daemon which does exactly this.
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basically something to indicate that any decrypt or sign operations that
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occur for a specific keyid should call the extension module instead. The
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@ -221,12 +241,17 @@ DJGPP
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Don't use symlinks but try to do the preprocessing in the config-links script.
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DJPGG has problems to distinguish betwen .s and .S becaus the FAT filesystem
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is not case sensitive (Mark Elbrecht).
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Well, it runs only on one architecture and therefor it might be possible
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to add a special case for it, completely bypassing the symlink autselection
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trick.
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Special procmail addresses
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==========================
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* foo+bar@example.net: Try to match the address without the "+bar".
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Should be done by the MUA, but maybe we can do this.
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--> Yep. Another reason to utilize a directory service or something
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else for keylookup.
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Suggested things which I will not do:
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
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Mon Sep 13 10:51:29 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
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* bithelp.h: New.
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* rmd160.h, sha1.h, md5.h: Use the rol macro from bithelp.h
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Tue Sep 7 16:23:36 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
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@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ libcipher_la_SOURCES = cipher.c \
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md.c \
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dynload.c \
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dynload.h \
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bithelp.h \
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des.c \
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des.h \
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twofish.c \
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41
cipher/bithelp.h
Normal file
41
cipher/bithelp.h
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
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/* bithelp.h - Some bit manipulation helpers
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* Copyright (C) 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
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*/
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#ifndef G10_BITHELP_H
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#define G10_BITHELP_H
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/****************
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* Rotate a 32 bit integer by n bytes
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*/
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#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__)
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static inline u32
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rol( u32 x, int n)
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{
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__asm__("roll %%cl,%0"
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:"=r" (x)
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:"0" (x),"c" (n));
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return x;
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}
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#else
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#define rol(x,n) ( ((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))) )
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#endif
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#endif /*G10_BITHELP_H*/
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10
cipher/md5.c
10
cipher/md5.c
@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
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#include "memory.h"
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#include "dynload.h"
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#include "bithelp.h"
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typedef struct {
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u32 A,B,C,D; /* chaining variables */
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@ -104,15 +106,11 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, byte *data )
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do \
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{ \
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a += FF (b, c, d) + (*cwp++) + T; \
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CYCLIC (a, s); \
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a = rol(a, s); \
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a += b; \
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} \
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while (0)
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/* It is unfortunate that C does not provide an operator for
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cyclic rotation. Hope the C compiler is smart enough. */
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#define CYCLIC(w, s) (w = (w << s) | (w >> (32 - s)))
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/* Before we start, one word about the strange constants.
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They are defined in RFC 1321 as
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@ -142,7 +140,7 @@ transform( MD5_CONTEXT *ctx, byte *data )
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do \
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{ \
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a += f (b, c, d) + correct_words[k] + T; \
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CYCLIC (a, s); \
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a = rol(a, s); \
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a += b; \
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} \
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while (0)
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@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
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#include "cipher.h" /* only used for the rmd160_hash_buffer() prototype */
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#include "dynload.h"
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#include "bithelp.h"
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/*********************************
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* RIPEMD-160 is not patented, see (as of 25.10.97)
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* http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html
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@ -153,19 +155,6 @@ rmd160_init( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd )
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}
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#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__)
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static inline u32
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rol(int n, u32 x)
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{
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__asm__("roll %%cl,%0"
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:"=r" (x)
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:"0" (x),"c" (n));
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return x;
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}
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#else
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#define rol(n,x) ( ((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))) )
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#endif
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/****************
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* Transform the message X which consists of 16 32-bit-words
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@ -218,8 +207,8 @@ transform( RMD160_CONTEXT *hd, byte *data )
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#define F3(x,y,z) ( ((x) & (z)) | ((y) & ~(z)) )
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#define F4(x,y,z) ( (x) ^ ((y) | ~(z)) )
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#define R(a,b,c,d,e,f,k,r,s) do { t = a + f(b,c,d) + k + x[r]; \
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a = rol(s,t) + e; \
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c = rol(10,c); \
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a = rol(t,s) + e; \
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c = rol(c,10); \
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} while(0)
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/* left lane */
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@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
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#include "util.h"
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#include "memory.h"
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#include "dynload.h"
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#include "bithelp.h"
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typedef struct {
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@ -49,20 +50,6 @@ typedef struct {
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} SHA1_CONTEXT;
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#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__i386__)
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static inline u32
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rol(int n, u32 x)
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{
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__asm__("roll %%cl,%0"
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:"=r" (x)
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:"0" (x),"c" (n));
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return x;
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}
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#else
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#define rol(n,x) ( ((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))) )
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#endif
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void
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@ -123,11 +110,11 @@ transform( SHA1_CONTEXT *hd, byte *data )
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^ x[(i-8)&0x0f] ^ x[(i-3)&0x0f] \
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, (x[i&0x0f] = (tm << 1) | (tm >> 31)) )
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#define R(a,b,c,d,e,f,k,m) do { e += rol( 5, a ) \
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#define R(a,b,c,d,e,f,k,m) do { e += rol( a, 5 ) \
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+ f( b, c, d ) \
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+ k \
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+ m; \
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b = rol( 30, b ); \
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b = rol( b, 30 ); \
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} while(0)
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R( a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, x[ 0] );
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R( e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, x[ 1] );
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16
doc/FAQ
16
doc/FAQ
@ -232,7 +232,7 @@
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abbreviated -o) is an option that takes a filename. The option's argument
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must follow immediately after the option itself, otherwise gpg doesn't know
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which option the argument is supposed to go with. As an option, --output and
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its filename must come before the command. The --remote-user (-r) option takes
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its filename must come before the command. The --recipient (-r) option takes
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a name or keyid to encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r
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argument. The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options followed
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by the file you wish to encrypt. So use
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@ -241,22 +241,22 @@
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If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read
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gpg --remote-user alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
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gpg --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
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If you're saving it in a file called ".txt" then you'd probably expect to see
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ASCII-armored text in there, so you need to add the --armor (-a) option,
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which doesn't take any arguments.
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gpg --armor --remote-user alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
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gpg --armor --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
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If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes a bit
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clearer:
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gpg [--armor] [--remote-user alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt
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gpg [--armor] [--recipient alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt
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The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want.
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gpg --output secret.txt --remote-user alice --armor --encrypt test.txt
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gpg --output secret.txt --recipient alice --armor --encrypt test.txt
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If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), gnupg assumes this is
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an option and may complain. To avoid this you have either to use
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@ -282,8 +282,7 @@
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other keys. "validity", or calculated trust, is a value which
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says how much GnuPG thinks a key is valid (that it really belongs
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to the one who claims to be the owner of the key).
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For more see the chapter "The Web of Trust" in the
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Manual [gpg: Oops: Internal error: manual not found - sorry]
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For more see the chapter "The Web of Trust" in the Manual
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Q: How do I interpret some of the informational outputs?
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A: While checking the validity of a key, GnuPG sometimes prints
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@ -340,5 +339,6 @@
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A: There is a script in the tools directory to help you:
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After you have imported the PGP keyring you can give this command:
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$ lspgpot pgpkeyring | gpg --import-ownertrust
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where pgpkeyring is the original keyring and not the GnuPG one you
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might have created in the first step.
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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GnuPG and OpenPGP
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=================
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See RFC2440 for a description of OpenPGP. I have an annotated version
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See RFC2440 for a description of OpenPGP. We have an annotated version
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of this RFC online: http://www.gnupg.org/rfc2440.html
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@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
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Mon Sep 13 10:51:29 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
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* signal.c (got_fatal_signal): Print message using write(2) and
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only for development versions.
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Mon Sep 6 19:59:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
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* tdbio.c (tdbio_set_dbname): Use mkdir macro
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22
g10/signal.c
22
g10/signal.c
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/* signal.c - signal handling
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* Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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@ -39,28 +39,34 @@ static volatile int caught_fatal_sig = 0;
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static volatile int caught_sigusr1 = 0;
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static const char *
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signal_name( int signum )
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get_signal_name( int signum )
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{
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#if defined(SYS_SIGLIST_DECLARED) && defined(NSIG)
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return (signum >= 0 && signum < NSIG) ? sys_siglist[signum] : "?";
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#else
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static char buf[20];
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sprintf(buf, "signal %d", signum );
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return buf;
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return "some signal";
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#endif
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}
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static RETSIGTYPE
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got_fatal_signal( int sig )
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{
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const char *s;
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if( caught_fatal_sig )
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raise( sig );
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caught_fatal_sig = 1;
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fprintf( stderr, "\n%s: %s caught ... exiting\n",
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log_get_name(), signal_name(sig) );
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secmem_term();
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exit( 8 );
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#ifdef IS_DEVELOPMENT_VERSION
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write(2, "\n", 1 );
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s = log_get_name(); if( s ) write(2, s, strlen(s) );
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write(2, ": ", 2 );
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s = get_signal_name(sig); write(2, s, strlen(s) );
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write(2, " caught ... exiting\n", 21 );
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#endif
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exit(8); /* Hmmm, for some reasons rais2e does not work */
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}
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@ -370,6 +370,16 @@ m_is_secure( const void *p )
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return p >= pool && p < (void*)((char*)pool+poolsize);
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}
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/****************
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* Warning: This code might be called by an interrupt handler
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* and frankly, thre should really be such a handler,
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* to make sure that the memory is wiped out.
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* We hope that the OS wipes out mlocked memory after
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* receiving a SIGKILL - it really should do so, otherwise
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* there is no chance to get the secure memory cleaned.
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*/
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void
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secmem_term()
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{
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