diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog index 99247bf96..6ea996178 100644 --- a/g10/ChangeLog +++ b/g10/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,20 @@ +2003-04-30 David Shaw + + * pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): If an untrusted key was chosen by a + particular user ID, use that ID as the one to ask about when + prompting whether to use the key anyway. + (build_pk_list): Similar change here when adding keys to the + recipient list. + + * trustdb.c (update_validity): Fix bug that prevented more than + one validity record per trust record. + (get_validity): When retrieving validity for a (user) supplied + user ID, return the validity for that user ID only, and do not + fall back to the general key validity. + (validate_one_keyblock): Some commentary on whether + non-self-signed user IDs belong in the web of trust (arguably, + they do). + 2003-04-29 Werner Koch * sig-check.c (check_key_signature2): Made "no subkey for subkey diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c index a80b18289..982b16774 100644 --- a/g10/pkclist.c +++ b/g10/pkclist.c @@ -525,17 +525,23 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel ) return 0; if( !opt.batch && !rc ) { - char *p; u32 keyid[2]; - size_t n; keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid); tty_printf( "%4u%c/%08lX %s \"", nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) ); - p = get_user_id( keyid, &n ); - tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ), - m_free(p); + /* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, this is the + one to ask about. */ + if(pk->user_id) + tty_print_utf8_string(pk->user_id->name,pk->user_id->len); + else + { + size_t n; + char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n ); + tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ); + m_free(p); + } tty_printf("\"\n"); print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2); tty_printf("\n"); @@ -889,8 +895,8 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use ) } else { int trustlevel; - - trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL); + + trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id); if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) { tty_printf(_("Public key is disabled.\n") ); } @@ -903,8 +909,6 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use ) } else { PK_LIST r; - char *p; - size_t n; u32 keyid[2]; keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid); @@ -913,9 +917,16 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use ) pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) ); - p = get_user_id( keyid, &n ); - tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ); - m_free(p); + if(pk->user_id) + tty_print_utf8_string(pk->user_id->name, + pk->user_id->len); + else + { + size_t n; + char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n ); + tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ); + m_free(p); + } tty_printf("\"\n"); r = m_alloc( sizeof *r ); @@ -985,7 +996,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use ) else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) { int trustlevel; - trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL); + trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id); if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) { free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL; log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"), diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c index 5f27b973c..c148cfd2d 100644 --- a/g10/trustdb.c +++ b/g10/trustdb.c @@ -692,13 +692,13 @@ update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid, vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID; memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20); vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist; + trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum; } vrec.r.valid.validity = validity; vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count; vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count; write_record (&vrec); trec.r.trust.depth = depth; - trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum; write_record (&trec); } @@ -739,7 +739,6 @@ clear_validity (PKT_public_key *pk) return any; } - /*********************************************** ********* Query trustdb values ************** ***********************************************/ @@ -804,7 +803,7 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid) else rmd160_hash_buffer (namehash, uid->name, uid->len ); } - + init_trustdb (); if (!did_nextcheck) { @@ -861,16 +860,30 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid) while (recno) { read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID); - if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) ) - validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK); - if ( uid && !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, namehash, 20) ) - break; + + if(uid) + { + /* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that + user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then there + is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't + signed). */ + if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,namehash,20)==0) + { + validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK); + break; + } + } + else + { + /* If no namehash is given, we take the maximum validity + over all user IDs */ + if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) ) + validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK); + } + recno = vrec.r.valid.next; } - if (recno) /* okay, use the user ID associated one */ - validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK); - if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED; @@ -1304,6 +1317,16 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist, keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid); for (node=kb; node; node = node->next) { + /* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust + to be built among only self-signed uids? On the one hand, a + self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely + intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a + signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort, + even if it is a statement being made by people other than the + key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm + going with the latter. -dshaw */ + + /* && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created) */ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID) { if (uidnode && issigned) @@ -1318,13 +1341,19 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist, } uidnode = node; uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id; +#if 0 + /* If the selfsig is going to expire... This is disabled as + we do count un-self-signed uids in the web of trust. */ + if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire) + *next_expire = uid->expiredate; +#endif issigned = 0; get_validity_counts(pk,uid); mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist, curtime, next_expire); } - else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE - && (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid) + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE + && (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;