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See ChangeLog: Mon Sep 6 19:59:08 CEST 1999 Werner Koch

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Fri Sep 3 13:24:45 1999 Werner Koch (wk@gnupg.org)
* Makefile.am: New

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# GPH - GNU Privacy Handbook
PARTS = manual.sgml c1.sgml c2.sgml c3.sgml c4.sgml c5.sgml c6.sgml \
signatures.fig
EXTRA_DIST = $(PARTS) index.html
BUILT_SOURCES = index.html
index.html: $(PARTS) signatures.jpg
db2html manual.sgml
cp signatures.jpg manual/signatures.jpg
echo '<html><body>' >index.html
echo '<ul>' >>index.html
echo '<li><a href="manual/book1.html">GnuPG User Manual</a>' >>index.html
echo '</ul>' >>index.html
echo '</body></html>' >>index.html
-rm -r manual.junk
(cd manual; rm -r stylesheet-images; ls | grep -v distfiles >distfiles)
%.dvi: %.sgml
db2dvi $<
%.ps: %.dvi
dvips -o $@ $<
%/%.html: %.sgml
db2html $<
%.png: %.fig
fig2dev -L png $< $@
%.jpg: %.fig
fig2dev -L jpeg $< $@
%.eps: %.fig
fig2dev -L ps $< $@

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<chapter id="intro" xreflabel="1">
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Getting Started
</title>
<para>
&Gnupg; is a tool for secure communication.
This chapter is a quick-start guide that covers the core functionality
of &gnupg;.
This includes keypair creation, exchanging and verifying keys, encrypting
and decrypting documents, and making and verifying signatures.
It does not explain in detail the concepts behind public-key cryptography,
encryption, and digital signatures.
This is covered in Chapter <xref linkend="concepts">.
It also does not explain how to use &gnupg; wisely.
This is covered in Chapters <xref linkend="management"> and
<xref linkend="wise">.
</para>
<para>
&Gnupg; uses public-key cryptography so that users may communicate securely.
In a public-key system, each user has a public/private keypair.
A user's private key is kept secret; it need never be revealed.
The public key may be given to anyone with whom the user wants to
communicate.
&Gnupg; uses a somewhat more sophisticated scheme in which a user has
a primary keypair and then zero or more additional subordinate keypairs.
The primary and subordinate keypairs are bundled to facilitate key
management and the bundle can often be considered simply as one keypair.
</para>
<sect1>
<title>
Generating a new keypair
</title>
<para>
The command-line option <link linkend="gen-key"><option>--gen-key</option></link>
is used to create a new primary keypair.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --gen-key</userinput>
gpg (GnuPG) 0.9.4; Copyright (C) 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY.
This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details.
Please select what kind of key you want:
(1) DSA and ElGamal (default)
(2) DSA (sign only)
(4) ElGamal (sign and encrypt)
Your selection?
</screen>
<!--
REWRITE
From Thomas Zander (zander@microweb.nl):
In GPG you can create 3 type of keypairs. A keypair is the combination
of a publ ic key and a private key, see chapter X. A DSA keypair can
only be used to sign a message. A ElGamal subordinate keypair can be
used for encryption as well as s igning, but is not as compatible with
former standards.
Option 1 creates 2 keypairs; a DSA (signing) and a ElGamal (Encryption).
Option 2 creates a DSA keypair (Signing)
Option 4 creates a ElGemal keypair (Signing & Encryption).
note: option 3 xxxx
This doesn't quite work, but I agree the following paragraph is rough.
-->
&Gnupg; is able to create several different types of keypairs, but a primary
key must be capable of making signatures.
There are therefore only three options.
Option 1 actually creates two keypairs.
A DSA keypair is the primary keypair usable only for making signatures.
An ElGamal subordinate keypair is also created for encryption.
Option 2 is similar but creates only a DSA keypair.
Option 4<footnote><para>Option 3 is to generate an ElGamal keypair that is
not usable for making signatures.</para></footnote> creates a single ElGamal
keypair usable for both making signatures and performing encryption.
In all cases it is possible to later add additional subkeys for encryption
and signing.
For most users the default option is fine.
</para>
<para>
You must also choose a key size.
The size of a DSA key must be between 512 and 1024 bits, and an ElGamal
key may be of any size.
&Gnupg;, however, requires that keys be no smaller than 768 bits.
Therefore, if Option 1 was chosen and you choose a keysize larger than
1024 bits, the ElGamal key will have the requested size, but the DSA
key will be 1024 bits.
<screen width="80">
About to generate a new ELG-E keypair.
minimum keysize is 768 bits
default keysize is 1024 bits
highest suggested keysize is 2048 bits
What keysize do you want? (1024)
</screen>
The longer the key the more secure it is against brute-force attacks,
but for almost all purposes the default keysize is adequate since
it would be cheaper to circumvent the encryption than try to break it.
Also, encryption and decryption will be slower as the
key size is increased, and a larger keysize may affect signature length.
Once selected, the keysize can never be changed.
</para>
<para>
Finally, you must choose an expiration date.
If Option 1 was chosen, the expiration date will be used for both the
ElGamal and DSA keypairs.
<screen width="80">
Please specify how long the key should be valid.
0 = key does not expire
&lt;n> = key expires in n days
&lt;n>w = key expires in n weeks
&lt;n>m = key expires in n months
&lt;n>y = key expires in n years
Key is valid for? (0)
</screen>
For most users a key that does not expire is adequate.
The expiration time should be chosen with care, however,
since although it is possible to change the expiration date after the key
is created, it may be difficult to communicate a change
to users who have your public key.
</para>
<para>
You must provide a user ID in addition to the key parameters.
The user ID is used to associate the key being created with a real
person.
<screen width="80">
You need a User-ID to identify your key; the software constructs the user id
from Real Name, Comment and Email Address in this form:
"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) &lt;heinrichh@duesseldorf.de>"
Real name:
</screen>
Only one user ID is created when a key is created, but it is possible
to create additional user IDs if you want to use the key in two or
more contexts, &eg;, as an employee at work and a political activist
on the side.
A user ID should be created carefully since it cannot be edited after
it is created.
</para>
<para>
&Gnupg; needs a passphrase to protect the primary and subordinate
private keys that you keep in your possession.
<screen width="80">
You need a Passphrase to protect your private key.
Enter passphrase:
</screen>
There is no limit on the length of a passphrase, and it should be
carefully chosen.
From the perspective of security, the passphrase to unlock the private
key is one of the weakest points in &gnupg; (and other public-key
encryption systems as well) since it is the only protection you
have if another individual gets your private key.
Ideally, the passphrase should not use words from a dictionary and
should mix the case of alphabetic characters as well as use
non-alphabetic characters.
A good passphrase is crucial to the secure use of &gnupg;.
</para>
<sect2 id="revocation">
<title>
Generating a revocation certificate
</title>
<para>
After your keypair is created you should immediately generate a revocation
certificate for the primary public key using the option
<link linkend="gen-revoke"><option>--gen-revoke</option></link>.
If you forget your passphrase or if your private key is compromised
or lost, this revocation certificate may be published to notify others
that the public key should no longer be used.
A revoked public key can still be used to verify signatures made
by you in the past, but it cannot be used to encrypt future messages
to you.
It also does not affect your ability to decrypt messages sent to
you in the past if you still do have access to the private key.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output revoke.asc --gen-revoke mykey</userinput>
[...]
</screen>
The argument <userinput>mykey</userinput> must be a <emphasis>key
specifier</emphasis>,
either the key ID of your primary keypair or any part of a user ID
that identifies your keypair.
The generated certificate will be left in the file
<parameter>revoke.asc</parameter>.
If the <link linkend="output"><option>--output</option></link> option is
omitted, the result will be placed on standard output.
Since the certificate is short, you may wish to print a hardcopy of
the certificate to store somewhere safe such as your safe deposit box.
The certificate should not be stored where others can access it since
anybody can publish the revocation certificate and render the
corresponding public key useless.
</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Exchanging keys
</title>
<para>
To communicate with others you must exchange public keys.
To list the keys on your public keyring use the command-line
option <link linkend="list-keys"><option>--list-keys</option></link>.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --list-keys</userinput>
/users/alice/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
---------------------------------------
pub 1024D/BB7576AC 1999-06-04 Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>
sub 1024g/78E9A8FA 1999-06-04
</screen>
<sect2>
<title>
Exporting a public key
</title>
<para>
To send your public key to a correspondent you must first export it.
The command-line option <link linkend="export"><option>--export</option></link>
is used to do this.
It takes an additional argument identifying the public key to export.
As with the <option>--gen-revoke</option> option, either the key ID or any part of
the user ID may be used to identify the key to export.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output alice.gpg --export alice@cyb.org</userinput>
</screen>
<para>
The key is exported in a binary format, but this can be inconvenient
when the key is to be sent though email or published on a web page.
&Gnupg; therefore supports a command-line option
<link linkend="armor"><option>--armor</option></link><footnote>
<para>Many
command-line options that are frequently used can also be set in a
<link linkend="optionsfile">configuration file</link>.
</para>
</footnote>
that that
causes output to be generated in an ASCII-armored format similar to
uuencoded documents.
In general, any output from &gnupg;, &eg;, keys, encrypted documents, and
signatures, can be ASCII-armored by adding the <option>--armor</option> option.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --armor --export alice@cyb.org</userinput>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v0.9.7 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
[...]
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
</screen>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Importing a public key
</title>
<para>
A public key may be added to your public keyring with the
<link linkend="import"><option>--import</option></link> option.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --import blake.gpg</userinput>
gpg: key 9E98BC16: public key imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --list-keys</userinput>
/users/alice/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
---------------------------------------
pub 1024D/BB7576AC 1999-06-04 Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>
sub 1024g/78E9A8FA 1999-06-04
pub 1024D/9E98BC16 1999-06-04 Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
sub 1024g/5C8CBD41 1999-06-04
</screen>
<para>
Once a key is imported it should be validated.
&Gnupg; uses a powerful and flexible trust model that does not require
you to personally validate each key you import.
Some keys may need to be personally validated, however.
A key is validated by verifying the key's fingerprint and then signing
the key to certify it as a valid key.
A key's fingerprint can be quickly viewed with the
<link linkend="fingerprint"><option>--fingerprint</option></link>
command-line option, but in order to certify the key you must edit it.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --edit-key blake@cyb.org</userinput>
pub 1024D/9E98BC16 created: 1999-06-04 expires: never trust: -/q
sub 1024g/5C8CBD41 created: 1999-06-04 expires: never
(1) Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>fpr</userinput>
pub 1024D/9E98BC16 1999-06-04 Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
Fingerprint: 268F 448F CCD7 AF34 183E 52D8 9BDE 1A08 9E98 BC16
</screen>
Key verification is a weak point in public-key cryptography, so you
must be sure that the fingerprint is correct.
The fingerprint displayed should be checked with the key's owner.
This may be done in person or over the phone or through any other means
as long as you can guarantee that you are communicating with the key's
true owner.
Once verified you may sign the key to validate it.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>sign</userinput>
pub 1024D/9E98BC16 created: 1999-06-04 expires: never trust: -/q
Fingerprint: 268F 448F CCD7 AF34 183E 52D8 9BDE 1A08 9E98 BC16
Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
Are you really sure that you want to sign this key
with your key: "Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>"
Really sign?
</screen>
<para>
Once signed you can check the key to list the signatures on it and
see the signature that you have added.
Every user ID on the key will have one or more self-signatures as well
as a signature for each user that has validated the key.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>check</userinput>
uid Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
sig! 9E98BC16 1999-06-04 [self-signature]
sig! BB7576AC 1999-06-04 Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>
</screen>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Encrypting and decrypting documents
</title>
<para>
To encrypt a document the option
<link linkend="encrypt"><option>--encrypt</option></link> is used.
You must have the public keys of the intended recipients.
The software expects the name of the document to encrypt as input or, if
omitted, on standard input.
The encrypted result is placed on standard output or as specified using
the option <option>--output</option>.
The document is compressed for additional security in addition to
encrypting it.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output doc.gpg --encrypt --recipient blake@cyb.org doc</userinput>
</screen>
The <link linkend="recipient"><option>--recipient</option></link> option
is used once for each recipient and takes an extra argument specifying
the public key to which the document should be encrypted.
The encrypted document can only be decrypted by someone with a private
key that complements one of the recipients' public keys.
In particular, you cannot decrypt a document encrypted by you unless
you included your own public key in the recipient list.
</para>
<para>
To decrypt a message the option
<link linkend="decrypt"><option>--decrypt</option></link> is used.
You need the private key to which the message was encrypted.
Similar to the encryption process, the document to decrypt is
input, and the decrypted result is output.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>blake%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output doc --decrypt doc.gpg</userinput>
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>"
1024-bit ELG-E key, ID 5C8CBD41, created 1999-06-04 (main key ID 9E98BC16)
Enter passphrase:
</screen>
<para>
Documents may also be encrypted without using public-key cryptography.
Instead, only a symmetric cipher is used to encrypt the document.
The key used to drive the symmetric cipher is derived from a passphrase
supplied when the document is encrypted, and for good security, it
should not be the same passphrase that you use to protect your private key.
Symmetric encryption is useful for securing documents when the
passphrase does not need to be communicated to others.
A document can be encrypted with a symmetric cipher by using the
<link linkend="symmetric"><option>--symmetric</option></link> option.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output doc.gpg --symmetric doc</userinput>
Enter passphrase:
</screen>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Making and verifying signatures
</title>
<para>
A digital signature certifies and timestamps a document.
If the document is subsequently modified in any way, a verification
of the signature will fail.
A digital signature can serve the same purpose as a hand-written signature
with the additional benefit of being tamper-resistant.
The &gnupg; source distribution, for example, is signed so that users can
verify that the source code has not been modified since it was packaged.
</para>
<para>
Creating and verifying signatures uses the public/private keypair
in an operation different from encryption and decryption.
A signature is created using the private key of the signer.
The signature is verified using the corresponding public key.
A consequence is that it is difficult to deny that you made a digital
signature since that would imply your private key had been compromised.
</para>
<para>
The command-line option <link linkend="sign"><option>--sign</option></link> is
used to make a digital signature.
The document to sign is input, and the signed document is output.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output doc.sig --sign doc</userinput>
You need a passphrase to unlock the private key for
user: "Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>"
1024-bit DSA key, ID BB7576AC, created 1999-06-04
Enter passphrase:
</screen>
The document is compressed before signed, and the output is in binary
format.
</para>
<para>
Given a signed document, you can either check the signature or
check the signature and recover the original document.
To check the signature use the
<link linkend="verify"><option>--verify</option></link> option.
To verify the signature and extract the document use the
<option>--decrypt</option>
option.
The signed document to verify and recover is input and the recovered
document is output.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>blake%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output doc --decrypt doc.sig</userinput>
gpg: Signature made Fri Jun 4 12:02:38 1999 CDT using DSA key ID BB7576AC
gpg: Good signature from "Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>"
</screen>
<sect2>
<title>
Clearsigned documents
</title>
<para>
A common use of digital signatures is to sign usenet postings or
email messages.
In such situations it is undesirable to compress the document while
signing it.
The option
<link linkend="clearsign"><option>--clearsign</option></link>
causes the document to be wrapped in an ASCII-armored signature but
otherwise does not modify the document.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --clearsign doc</userinput>
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>"
1024-bit DSA key, ID BB7576AC, created 1999-06-04
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
[...]
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v0.9.7 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
iEYEARECAAYFAjdYCQoACgkQJ9S6ULt1dqz6IwCfQ7wP6i/i8HhbcOSKF4ELyQB1
oCoAoOuqpRqEzr4kOkQqHRLE/b8/Rw2k
=y6kj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
</screen>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Detached signatures
</title>
<para>
A signed document has limited usefulness.
Other users must recover the original document from the signed
version, and even with clearsigned documents, the signed document
must be edited to recover the original.
Therefore, there is a third method for signing a document that
creates a detached signature.
A detached signature is created using the
<link linkend="detach-sig"><option>--detach-sig</option></link>
option.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --output doc.sig --detach-sig doc</userinput>
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>"
1024-bit DSA key, ID BB7576AC, created 1999-06-04
Enter passphrase:
</screen>
<para>
Both the document and detached signature are needed to verify
the signature.
The <option>--verify</option> option can be to check the
signature.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>blake%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --verify doc.sig doc</userinput>
gpg: Signature made Fri Jun 4 12:38:46 1999 CDT using DSA key ID BB7576AC
gpg: Good signature from "Alice (Judge) &lt;alice@cyb.org>"
</screen>
</sect2>
</sect1>
</chapter>
<!--
In the "Getting Started" chapter, it would be interesting to provide
a checklist of assumptions that the reader can consult to determine
whether or not she fits the "most users" profile. Perhaps put this
at the end of the chapter (perhaps w/ forward pointer?). You could
include cross references for each item on the list. For example:
23. Your use of public key encryption has property X with attribute Y.
(see Section 3.4.1 for a more detailed discussion of other
attributes of property X)
What prompted this was wondering, as I read through the generating keypair
section, "under what circumstances would these defaults be inappropriate?"
The notion of using the same key with different user IDs "as an employee at
work and a political activist on the side" is interesting. Knowing one,
could you be traced to the other? (Are they separate numeric ids, and is
that enough?) (seems someone could just match the public keys)
It's a very nice touch that you don't cover every single prompt that the
system throws at you, but instead treat them functionally. For example,
I can imagine other books going through the "Comment:" and "Email Address:"
prompts.
-->
<!--
"Key verification is a weak point in public-key cryptography ..."
Saying "weak point" makes it sound like a slam on public key stuff.
Although we've talked about weaknesses of the trust model, I'm guessing
the point here is that communication is only secure if you verify the
identity of the key's owner.
Key verification can be done through any means "as long as you can
guarantee that you are communicating with the key's true owner".
I suspect we'd also like to prevent leaking information that an
interceptor could use to pose as us in a key verification step with
another party. I suppose the notion of bootstrapping may not be widely
appreciated as an analogy.
I'm almost inclined to want to see a section in the Getting Started
guide called "Why you should read the rest of this book". Failing
that, or perhaps better yet, maybe it would work to have some margin
notes that point to other sections of the book for more information
("a discussion of trust models begins on p. 95").
-->

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<chapter id="concepts" xreflabel="2">
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Concepts
</title>
<para>
&Gnupg; makes uses of several cryptographic concepts including
<firstterm>symmetric ciphers</firstterm>,
<firstterm>public-key ciphers</firstterm>, and
<firstterm>one-way hashing</firstterm>.
You can make basic use &gnupg; without fully understanding these concepts,
but in order to use it wisely some understanding of them is necessary.
</para>
<para>
This chapter introduces the basic cryptographic concepts used in GnuPG.
Other books cover these topics in much more detail.
A good book with which to pursue further study is
<ulink url="http://www.counterpane.com/schneier.html">Bruce
Schneier</ulink>'s
<ulink url="http://www.counterpane.com/applied.html">"Applied
Cryptography"</ulink>.
</para>
<sect1>
<title>
Symmetric ciphers
</title>
<para>
A symmetric cipher is a cipher that uses the same key for both encryption
and decryption.
Two parties communicating using a symmetric cipher must agree on the
key beforehand.
Once they agree, the sender encrypts a message using the key, sends it
to the receiver, and the receiver decrypts the message using the key.
As an example, the German Enigma is a symmetric cipher, and daily keys
were distributed as code books.
Each day, a sending or receiving radio operator would consult his copy
of the code book to find the day's key.
Radio traffic for that day was then encrypted and decrypted using the
day's key.
Modern examples of symmetric ciphers include 3DES, Blowfish, and IDEA.
</para>
<para>
A good cipher puts all the security in the key and none in the algorithm.
In other words, it should be no help to an attacker if he knows which
cipher is being used.
Only if he obtains the key would knowledge of the algorithm be needed.
The ciphers used in &gnupg; have this property.
</para>
<para>
Since all the security is in the key, then it is important that it be
very difficult to guess the key.
In other words, the set of possible keys, &ie;, the <emphasis>key
space</emphasis>, needs
to be large.
While at Los Alamos, Richard Feynman was famous for his ability to
crack safes.
To encourage the mystique he even carried around a set of tools
including an old stethoscope.
In reality, he used a variety of tricks to reduce the number of
combinations he had to try to a small number and then simply guessed
until he found the right combination.
In other words, he reduced the size of the key space.
</para>
<para>
Britain used machines to guess keys during World War 2.
The German Enigma had a very large key space, but the British built
speciailzed computing engines, the Bombes, to mechanically try
keys until the day's key was found.
This meant that sometimes they found the day's key within hours of
the new key's use, but it also meant that on some days they never
did find the right key.
The Bombes were not general-purpose computers but were precursors
to modern-day computers.
</para>
<para>
Today, computers can guess keys very quickly, and this is why key
size is important in modern cryptosystems.
The cipher DES uses a 56-bit key, which means that there are
<!-- inlineequation -->
2<superscript>56</superscript> possible keys.
<!-- inlineequation -->
2<superscript>56</superscript> is 72,057,594,037,927,936 keys.
This is a lot of keys, but a general-purpose computer can check the
entire key space in a matter of days.
A specialized computer can check it in hours.
On the other hand, more recently designed ciphers such as 3DES,
Blowfish, and IDEA
<!-- inlineequation -->
all use 128-bit keys, which means there are 2<superscript>128</superscript>
possible keys.
This is many, many more keys, and even if all the computers on the
planet cooperated, it could still take more time than the age of
the universe to find the key.
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Public-key ciphers
</title>
<para>
The primary problem with symmetric ciphers is not their security but
with key exchange.
Once the sender and receiver have exchanged keys, that key can be
used to securely communicate, but what secure communication channel
was used to communicate the key itself?
In particular, it would probably be much easier for an attacker to work
to intercept the key than it is to try all the keys in the key space.
Another problem is the number of keys needed.
<!-- inlineequation -->
If there are <emphasis>n</emphasis> people who need to communicate, then
<!-- inlineequation -->
<emphasis>n(n-1)/2</emphasis> keys
are needed for each pair of people to communicate privately.
This may be ok for a small number of people but quickly becomes unwieldly
for large groups of people.
</para>
<para>
Public-key ciphers were invented to avoid the key-exchange problem
entirely.
A public-key cipher uses a pair of keys for sending messages.
The two keys belong to the person receiving the message.
One key is a <emphasis>public key</emphasis> and may be given to anybody.
The other key is a <emphasis>private key</emphasis> and is kept
secret by the owner.
A sender encrypts a message using the public key and once encrypted,
only the private key may be used to decrypt it.
</para>
<para>
This protocol solves the key-exchange problem inherent with symmetric
ciphers.
There is no need for the sender and receiver to agree
upon a key.
All that is required is that some time before secret communication the
sender gets a copy of the receiver's public key.
Furthermore, the one public key can be used by anybody wishing to
communicate with the receiver.
<!-- inlineequation -->
So only <emphasis>n</emphasis> keypairs are needed for <emphasis>n</emphasis>
people to communicate secretly
with one another,
</para>
<para>
Public-key ciphers are based on one-way trapdoor functions.
A one-way function is a function that is easy to compute,
but the inverse is hard to compute.
For example, it is easy to multiply two prime numbers together to get
a composite, but it is difficult to factor a composite into its prime
components.a
A one-way trapdoor function is similar, but it has a trapdoor.
That is, if some piece of information is known, it becomes easy
to compute the inverse.
For example, if you have a number made of two prime factors, then knowing
one of the factors makes it easy to compute the second.
Given a public-key cipher based on prime factorization, the public
key contains a composite number made from two large prime factors, and
the encryption algorithm uses that composite to encrypt the
message.
The algorithm to decrypt the message requires knowing the prime factors,
so decryption is easy if you have the private key containing one of the
factors but extremely difficult if you do not have it.
</para>
<para>
As with good symmetric ciphers, with a good public-key cipher all of the
security rests with the key.
Therefore, key size is a measure of the system's security, but
one cannot compare the size of a symmetric cipher key and a public-key
cipher key as a measure of their relative security.
In a brute-force attack on a symmetric cipher with a key size of 80 bits,
<!-- inlineequation -->
the attacker must enumerate up to 2<superscript>81</superscript>-1 keys to
find the right key.
In a brute-force attack on a public-key cipher with a key size of 512 bits,
the attacker must factor a composite number encoded in 512 bits (up to
155 decimal digits).
The workload for the attacker is fundamentally different depending on
the cipher he is attacking.
While 128 bits is sufficient for symmetric ciphers, given today's factoring
technology public keys with 1024 bits are recommended for most purposes.
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Hybrid ciphers
</title>
<para>
Public-key ciphers are no panacea.
Many symmetric ciphers are stronger from a security standpoint,
and public-key encryption and decryption are more expensive than the
corresponding operations in symmetric systems.
Public-key ciphers are nevertheless an effective tool for distributing
symmetric cipher keys, and that is how they are used in hybrid cipher
systems.
</para>
<para>
A hybrid cipher uses both a symmetric cipher and a public-key cipher.
It works by using a public-key cipher to share a key for the symmetric
cipher.
The actual message being sent is then encrypted using the key and sent
to the recipient.
Since symmetric key sharing is secure, the symmetric key used is different
for each message sent.
Hence it is sometimes called a session key.
</para>
<para>
Both PGP and &gnupg; use hybrid ciphers.
The session key, encrypted using the public-key cipher, and the message
being sent, encrypted with the symmetric cipher, are automatically
combined in one package.
The recipient uses his private-key to decrypt the session key and the
session key is then used to decrypt the message.
</para>
<para>
A hybrid cipher is no stronger than the public-key cipher or symmetric
cipher it uses, whichever is weaker.
In PGP and &gnupg;, the public-key cipher is probably the weaker of
the pair.
Fortunately, however, if an attacker could decrypt a session key it
would only be useful for reading the one message encrypted with that
session key.
The attacker would have to start over and decrypt another session
key in order to read any other message.
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Digital signatures
</title>
<para>
A hash function is a many-to-one function that maps its input to a
value in a finite set.
Typically this set is a range of natural numbers.
<!-- inlineequation -->
A simple ehash function is <emphasis>f</emphasis>(<emphasis>x</emphasis>) = 0
for all integers <emphasis>x</emphasis>.
A more interesting hash function is
<emphasis>f</emphasis>(<emphasis>x</emphasis>) = <emphasis>x</emphasis>
<emphasis>mod</emphasis> 37, which
maps <emphasis>x</emphasis> to the remainder of dividing <emphasis>x</emphasis> by 37.
</para>
<para>
A document's digital signature is the result of applying a hash
function to the document.
To be useful, however, the hash function needs to satisfy two
important properties.
First, it should be hard to find two documents that hash to the
same value.
Second, given a hash value it should be hard to recover the document
that produced that value.
</para>
<para>
Some public-key ciphers<footnote><para>
The cipher must have the property that the actual public key or private
key could be used by the encryption algorithm as the public key.
RSA is an example of such an algorithm while ElGamal is not an example.
</para>
</footnote> could be used to sign documents.
The signer encrypts the document with his <emphasis>private</emphasis> key.
Anybody wishing to check the signature and see the document simply
uses the signer's public key to decrypt the document.
This algorithm does satisfy the two properties needed from a good hash
function, but in practice, this algorithm is too slow to be useful.
</para>
<para>
An alternative is to use hash functions designed to satisfy these
two important properties.
SHA and MD5 are examples of such algorithms.
Using such an algorithm, a document is signed by hashing it, and
the hash value is the signature.
Another person can check the signature by also hashing their copy of the
document and comparing the hash value they get with the hash value of
the original document.
If they match, it is almost certain that the documents are identical.
</para>
<para>
Of course, the problem now is using a hash function for digital
signatures without permitting an attacker to interfere with signature
checking.
If the document and signature are sent unencrypted, an attacker could
modify the document and generate a corresponding signature without the
recipient's knowledge.
If only the document is encrypted, an attacker could tamper with the
signature and cause a signature check to fail.
A third option is to use a hybrid public-key encryption to encrypt both
the signature and document.
The signer uses his private key, and anybody can use his public key
to check the signature and document.
This sounds good but is actually nonsense.
If this algorithm truly secured the document it would also
secure it from tampering and there would be no need for the signature.
The more serious problem, however, is that this does not protect either
the signature or document from tampering.
With this algorithm, only the session key for the symmetric cipher
is encrypted using the signer's private key.
Anybody can use the public key to recover the session key.
Therefore, it is straightforward for an attacker to recover the session
key and use it to encrypt substitute documents and signatures to send
to others in the sender's name.
</para>
<para>
An algorithm that does work is to use a public key algorithm to
encrypt only the signature.
In particular, the hash value is encrypted using the signer's private
key, and anbody can check the signature using the public key.
The signed document can be sent using any other encryption algorithm
including none if it is a public document.
If the document is modified the signature check will fail, but this
is precisely what the signature check is supposed to catch.
The Digital Signature Standard (DSA) is a public key signature
algorithm that works as just described.
DSA is the primary signing algorithm used in &Gnupg;.
</para>
</sect1>
</chapter>

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<chapter id="management" xreflabel="3">
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Key Management
</title>
<para>
Key tampering is a major security weakness with public-key cryptography.
An eavesdropper may tamper with a user's keyrings or forge a
user's public key and post it for others to download and use.
For example, suppose Chloe wants to monitor the messages that Alice
sends to Blake.
She could mount what is called a <firstterm>man in the
middle</firstterm> attack.
In this attack, Chloe creates a new public/private keypair.
She replaces Alice's copy of Blake's public key with the new public key.
She then intercepts the messages that Alice sends to Blake.
For each intercept, she decrypts it using the new private key, reencrypts
it using Blake's true public key, and forwards the reencrypted
message to Blake.
All messages sent from Alice to Blake can now be read by Chloe.
</para>
<para>
Good key management is crucial in order to ensure not just the integrity
of your keyrings but the integrity of other users' keyrings as well.
The core of key management in &gnupg; is the notion of signing keys.
Key signing has two main purposes: it permits you to detect tampering
on your keyring, and it allows you to certify that a key truly belongs
to the person named by a user ID on the key.
Key signatures are also used in a scheme known as the <firstterm>web of
trust</firstterm> to extend certification to keys not directly signed by you
but signed by others you trust.
Responsible users who practice good key management can defeat key
tampering as a practical attack on secure communication with &gnupg;.
</para>
<sect1>
<title>
Managing your own keypair
</title>
<para>
A keypair has a public key and a private key.
A public key consists of
the public portion of the master signing key,
the public portions of the subordinate signing and encryption subkeys, and
a set of user IDs used to associate the public key with a real person.
Each piece has data about itself.
For a key, this data includes its ID, when it was created, when it
will expire, etc.
For a user ID, this data includes the name of the real person it identifies,
an optional comment, and an email address.
The structure of the private key is similar, except that it contains only
the private portions of the keys, and there is no user ID information.
</para>
<para>
The command-line option
<link linkend="edit-key"><option>--edit-key</option></link>
may be used to view a keypair.
For example,
<screen width="80">
<prompt>chloe%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --edit-key chloe@cyb.org</userinput>
Secret key is available.
pub 1024D/26B6AAE1 created: 1999-06-15 expires: never trust: -/u
sub 2048g/0CF8CB7A created: 1999-06-15 expires: never
sub 1792G/08224617 created: 1999-06-15 expires: 2002-06-14
sub 960D/B1F423E7 created: 1999-06-15 expires: 2002-06-14
(1) Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
(2) Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
<prompt>Command></prompt>
</screen>
The public key is displayed along with an indication of whether
or not the private key is available.
Information about each component of the public key is then listed.
The first column indicates the type of the key.
The keyword <literal>pub</literal> identifies the public master signing key,
and the keyword <literal>sub</literal> identifies a public subordinate key.
The second column indicates the key's bit length, type, and ID.
The type is <literal>D</literal> for a DSA key, <literal>g</literal> for an
encryption-only
ElGamal key, and <literal>G</literal> for an ElGamal key that may be used for
both encryption and signing.
The creation date and expiration date are given in columns three and four.
The user IDs are listed following the keys.
</para>
<para>
More information about the key can be obtained with interactive commands.
The command <link linkend="toggle"><command>toggle</command></link>
switches between the public and private
components of a keypair if indeed both components are available.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>toggle</userinput>
sec 1024D/26B6AAE1 created: 1999-06-15 expires: never
sbb 2048g/0CF8CB7A created: 1999-06-15 expires: never
sbb 1792G/08224617 created: 1999-06-15 expires: 2002-06-14
sbb 960D/B1F423E7 created: 1999-06-15 expires: 2002-06-14
(1) Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
(2) Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
</screen>
The information provided is similar to the listing for the public-key
component.
The keyword <literal>sec</literal> identifies the private master signing key,
and the keyword <literal>sbb</literal> identifies the private subordinates keys.
The user IDs from the public key are also listed for convenience.
</para>
<sect2>
<title id="integrity">
Key integrity
</title>
<para>
When you distribute your public key, you are distributing the public
components of your master and subordinate keys as well as the user IDs.
Distributing this material alone, however, is a security risk since
it is possible for an attacker to tamper with the key.
The public key can be modified by adding or substituting keys, or by
adding or changing user IDs.
By tampering with a user ID, the attacker could change the user ID's email
address to have email redirected to himself.
By changing one of the encryption keys, the attacker would
also be able to decrypt the messages redirected to him.
</para>
<para>
Using digital signatures is a solution to this problem.
When data is signed by a private key, the corresponding public key
is bound to the signed data.
In other words, only the corresponding public key can be used to
verify the signature and ensure that the data has not been modified.
A public key can be protected from tampering by using its corresponding
private master key to sign the public key components and user IDs, thus
binding the components to the public master key.
Signing public key components with the corresponding private master
signing key is called <firstterm>self-signing</firstterm>, and a public key that has
self-signed user IDs bound to it is called a <firstterm>certificate</firstterm>.
</para>
<!--
%\begin{figure}
%Blank
%\caption{This should depict how self-signatures bind information to
%a public key.}\label{fig:selfsignedkey}
%\end{figure}
%
%As an example, Figure~\ref{fig:selfsignedkey} illustrates Chloe's public
%key, which has been self-signed to bind the user IDs and public subkeys
%to the public master key.
%The signatures on the user IDs can be checked with the \texttt{check}
%command from the key edit menu.
-->
<para>
As an example, Chloe has two user IDs and three subkeys.
The signatures on the user IDs can be checked with the command
<link linkend="check"><command>check</command></link> from the key edit menu.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>chloe%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --edit-key chloe</userinput>
Secret key is available.
pub 1024D/26B6AAE1 created: 1999-06-15 expires: never trust: -/u
sub 2048g/0CF8CB7A created: 1999-06-15 expires: never
sub 1792G/08224617 created: 1999-06-15 expires: 2002-06-14
sub 960D/B1F423E7 created: 1999-06-15 expires: 2002-06-14
(1) Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
(2) Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>check</userinput>
uid Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
sig! 26B6AAE1 1999-06-15 [self-signature]
uid Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
sig! 26B6AAE1 1999-06-15 [self-signature]
</screen>
As expected, the signing key for each signature is the master signing
key with key ID <literal>0x26B6AAE1</literal>.
The self-signatures on the subkeys are present in the public key, but
they are not shown by the &gnupg; interface.
</para>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Adding and deleting key components
</title>
<para>
Both new subkeys and new user IDs may be added to your keypair after
it has been created.
A user ID is added using the command
<link linkend="adduid"><command>adduid</command></link>.
You are prompted for a real name, email address, and comment just
as when you create an initial keypair.
A subkey is added using the command
<link linkend="addkey"><command>addkey</command></link>.
The interface is similar to the interface used when creating an initial
keypair.
The subkey may be a DSA signing key, and encrypt-only ElGamal
key, or a sign-and-encrypt ElGamal key.
When a subkey or user ID is generated it is self-signed using your
master signing key, which is why you must supply your passphrase
when the key is generated.
</para>
<para>
Additional user IDs are useful when you need multiple identities.
For example, you may have an identity for your job and an identity
for your work as a political activist.
Coworkers will know you by your work user ID.
Coactivists will know you by your activist user ID.
Since those groups of people may not overlap, though, each group
may not trust the other user ID.
Both user IDs are therefore necessary.
</para>
<para>
Additional subkeys are also useful.
The user IDs associated with your public master key are validated by
the people with whom you
communicate, and changing the master key therefore requires recertification.
This may be difficult and time consuming if you communicate with
many people.
On the other hand, it is good to periodically change encryption subkeys.
If a key is broken, all the data encrypted with that key will be
vulnerable.
By changing keys, however, only the data encrypted with the one broken
key will be revealed.
</para>
<para>
Subkeys and user IDs may also be deleted.
To delete a subkey or user ID you must first select it using the
<link linkend="key"><command>key</command></link> or
<link linkend="uid"><command>uid</command></link> commands respectively.
These commands are toggles.
For example, the command <command>key <parameter>2</parameter></command>
selects the second subkey,
and invoking <command>key <parameter>2</parameter></command> again
deselects it.
If no extra argument is given, all subkeys or user IDs are deselected.
Once the user IDs to be deleted are selected, the command
<link linkend="deluid"><command>deluid</command></link>
actually deletes the user IDs from your key.
Similarly, the command <link linkend="delkey"><command>delkey</command></link>
deletes all selected subkeys from both your public and private keys.
</para>
<para>
For local keyring management, deleting key components is a good way
to trim other people's public keys of unnecessary material.
Deleting user IDs and subkeys on your own key, however, is not always
wise since it complicates key distribution.
By default, when a user imports your updated public key it will be merged
with the old copy of your public key on his ring if it exists.
The components from both keys are combined in the merge, and this
effectively restores any components you deleted.
To properly update the key, the user must first delete the old version
of your key and then import the new version.
This puts an extra burden on the people with whom you communicate.
Furthermore, if you send your key to a keyserver, the merge will
happen regardless, and anybody who downloads your key from a keyserver
will never see your key with components deleted.
Consequently, for updating your own key it is better to revoke key
components instead of deleting them.
</para>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Revoking key components
</title>
<para>
To revoke a subkey it must be selected.
Once selected it may be revoked with the
<link linkend="revkey"><command>revkey</command></link> command.
The key is revoked by adding a revocation self-signature to the key.
Unlike the command-line option <option>--gen-revoke</option>, the effect of
revoking a subkey is immediate.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>revkey</userinput>
Do you really want to revoke this key? y
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>"
1024-bit DSA key, ID B87DBA93, created 1999-06-28
pub 1024D/B87DBA93 created: 1999-06-28 expires: never trust: -/u
sub 2048g/B7934539 created: 1999-06-28 expires: never
sub 1792G/4E3160AD created: 1999-06-29 expires: 2000-06-28
rev! subkey has been revoked: 1999-06-29
sub 960D/E1F56448 created: 1999-06-29 expires: 2000-06-28
(1) Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
(2) Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
</screen>
<para>
A user ID is revoked differently.
Normally, a user ID collects signatures that attest that the user ID
describes the person who actually owns the associated key.
In theory, a user ID describes a person forever, since that person will
never change.
In practice, though, elements of the user ID such as the email address
and comment may change over time, thus invalidating the user ID.
</para>
<para>
The OpenPGP
<comment>First reference to OpenPGP</comment>
specification does not support user ID revocation, but
a user ID can effectively be revoked by revoking the self-signature
on the user ID.
For the security reasons described
<link linkend="integrity">previously</link>,
correspondents will not trust a user ID with no valid self-signature.
</para>
<para>
A signature is revoked by using the command
<link linkend="revsig"><command>revsig</command></link>.
Since you may have signed any number of user IDs, the user interface
prompts you to decide for each signature whether or not to revoke it.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>revsig</userinput>
You have signed these user IDs:
Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
signed by B87DBA93 at 1999-06-28
Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
signed by B87DBA93 at 1999-06-28
user ID: "Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>"
signed with your key B87DBA93 at 1999-06-28
Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N)n
user ID: "Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>"
signed with your key B87DBA93 at 1999-06-28
Create a revocation certificate for this signature? (y/N)y
You are about to revoke these signatures:
Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
signed by B87DBA93 at 1999-06-28
Really create the revocation certificates? (y/N)y
You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for
user: "Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>"
1024-bit DSA key, ID B87DBA93, created 1999-06-28
pub 1024D/B87DBA93 created: 1999-06-28 expires: never trust: -/u
sub 2048g/B7934539 created: 1999-06-28 expires: never
sub 1792G/4E3160AD created: 1999-06-29 expires: 2000-06-28
rev! subkey has been revoked: 1999-06-29
sub 960D/E1F56448 created: 1999-06-29 expires: 2000-06-28
(1) Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
(2) Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
</screen>
<para>
A revoked user ID is indicated by the revocation signature on
the ID when the signatures on the key's user IDs are listed.
</para>
<screen width="80">
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>check</userinput>
uid Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
sig! B87DBA93 1999-06-28 [self-signature]
uid Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
rev! B87DBA93 1999-06-29 [revocation]
sig! B87DBA93 1999-06-28 [self-signature]
</screen>
<para>
Revoking both subkeys and self-signatures on user IDs adds revocation
self-signatures to the key.
Since signatures are being added and no material is deleted, a
revocation will always be visible to others when your updated public
key is distributed and merged with older copies of it.
Revocation therefore guarantees that everybody has a consistent
copy of your public key.
</para>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Updating a key's expiration time
</title>
<para>
The expiration time of a key may be updated with the command
<link linkend="expire"><command>expire</command></link> from the key edit menu.
If no key is selected the expiration time of the primary key
is updated.
Otherwise the expiration time of the selected subordinate key
is updated.
</para>
<para>
A key's expiration time is associated with the key's self-signature.
The expiration time is updated by deleting the old self-signature
and adding a new self-signature.
Since correspondents will not have deleted the old self-signature, they
will see an additional self-signature on the key when they update
their copy of your key.
The latest self-signature takes precedence, however, so all correspondents
will unambiguously know the expiration times of your keys.
</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Validating other keys on your public keyring
</title>
<para>
In Chapter <xref linkend="intro"> a procedure was given to validate your
correspondents' public keys: a correspondent's key is validated by
personally checking his key's fingerprint and then signing his public
key with your private key.
By personally checking the fingerprint you can be sure that the
key really does belong to him, and since you have signed they key, you
can be sure to detect any tampering with it in the future.
Unfortunately, this procedure is awkward when either you must validate
a large number of keys or communicate with people whom you do not
know personally.
</para>
<para>
&Gnupg; addresses this problem with a mechanism popularly known
as the <firstterm>web of trust</firstterm>.
In the web of trust model, responsibility for validating public
keys is delegated to people you trust.
For example, suppose
<itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para>
Alice has signed Blake's key, and
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
Blake has signed Chloe's key and Dharma's key.
</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
If Alice trusts Blake to properly validate keys that he signs, then
Alice can infer that Chloe's and Dharma's keys are valid without
having to personally check them.
She simply uses her validated copy of Blake's public key to
check that Blake's signatures on Chloe's and Dharma's are good.
In general, assuming that Alice fully trusts everybody to properly
validate keys they sign, then any key signed by a valid key is also
considered valid.
The root is Alice's key, which is axiomatically assumed to be valid.
</para>
<sect2>
<title>
Trust in a key's owner
</title>
<para>
In practice trust is subjective.
For example, Blake's key is valid to Alice since she signed it, but she
may not trust Blake to properly validate keys that he signs.
In that case, she would not take Chloe's and Dharma's key as valid
based on Blake's signatures alone.
The web of trust model accounts for this by associating with each
public key on your keyring an indication of how much you trust the
key's owner.
There are four trust levels.
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
<term>
unknown
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Nothing is known about the owner's judgement in key signing.
Keys on your public keyring that you do not own initially have
this trust level.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
none
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
The owner is known to improperly sign other keys.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
marginal
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
The owner understands the implications of key signing and
properly validates keys before signing them.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
full
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
The owner has an excellent understanding of key signing,
and his signature on a key would be as good as your own.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
A key's trust level is something that you alone assign to the
key, and it is considered private information.
It is not packaged with the key when it is exported; it is even
stored separately from your keyrings in a separate database.
</para>
<para>
The &gnupg; key editor may be used to adjust your trust in a key's owner.
The command is <link linkend="trust"><command>trust</command></link>.
In this example Alice edits her trust in Blake and then updates
the trust database to recompute which keys are valid based on her new
trust in Blake.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --edit-key blake</userinput>
pub 1024D/8B927C8A created: 1999-07-02 expires: never trust: q/f
sub 1024g/C19EA233 created: 1999-07-02 expires: never
(1) Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>trust</userinput>
pub 1024D/8B927C8A created: 1999-07-02 expires: never trust: q/f
sub 1024g/C19EA233 created: 1999-07-02 expires: never
(1) Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly
verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,
checking fingerprints from different sources...)?
1 = Don't know
2 = I do NOT trust
3 = I trust marginally
4 = I trust fully
s = please show me more information
m = back to the main menu
<prompt>Your decision?</prompt> <userinput>3</userinput>
pub 1024D/8B927C8A created: 1999-07-02 expires: never trust: m/f
sub 1024g/C19EA233 created: 1999-07-02 expires: never
(1) Blake (Executioner) &lt;blake@cyb.org>
<prompt>Command></prompt> <userinput>quit</userinput>
[...]
</screen>
Trust in the key's owner and the key's validity are indicated to the
right when the key is displayed.
Trust in the owner is displayed first and the key's validity is
<!-- HERE, need to fix quotation marks -->
second<footnote>
<para>
&Gnupg; overloads the word "trust" by using it to mean
trust in an owner and trust in a key.
This can be confusing.
Sometimes trust in an owner is referred to as
<firstterm>owner-trust</firstterm> to
distinguish it from trust in a key.
<!-- HERE, need to fix quotation marks -->
Throughout this manual, however, "trust" is used to
mean trust in a key's
<!-- HERE, need to fix quotation marks -->
owner, and "validity" is used to mean trust that a key
belongs to the human associated with the key ID.
</para>
</footnote>.
The four trust/validity levels are abbreviated: unknown (<literal>q</literal>),
none (<literal>n</literal>), marginal (<literal>m</literal>), and
full (<literal>f</literal>).
In this case, Blake's key is fully valid since Alice signed it herself.
She initially has an unknown trust in Blake to properly sign other keys
but decides to trust him marginally.
</para>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Using trust to validate keys
</title>
<para>
The web of trust allows a more elaborate algorithm to be used to
validate a key.
Formerly, a key was considered valid only if you signed it personally.
<!-- HERE, math -->
A more flexible algorithm can now be used: a key <emphasis>K</emphasis> is considered valid
if it meets two conditions:
<orderedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para>
it is signed by enough valid keys, meaning
<itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para>
you have signed it personally,
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
it has been signed by one fully trusted key, or
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
it has been signed by three marginally trusted keys; and
</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
<!-- HERE, math -->
the path of signed keys leading from <emphasis>K</emphasis> back
to your own key is five steps or shorter.
</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist>
The path length, number of marginally trusted keys required, and number
of fully trusted keys required may be adjusted.
The numbers given above are the default values used by &gnupg;.
</para>
<para>
<xref linkend="wot-examples"> shows a web of trust rooted at Alice.
The graph illustrates who has signed who's keys.
The table shows which keys Alice considers valid based on her
trust in the other members of the web.
<comment>Potential bug: <option>--completes-needed</option> on command
line seems to be ignored when combined with <option>--update-trustdb</option>.
Value is taken correctly if put in options file, however.</comment>
This example assumes that two marginally-trusted keys or one
fully-trusted key is needed to validate another key.
The maximum path length is three.
</para>
<para>
When computing valid keys in the example, Blake and Dharma's are
always considered fully valid since they were signed directly
by Alice.
The validity of the other keys depends on trust.
In the first case, Dharma is trusted fully, which implies
that Chloe's and Francis's keys will be considered valid.
In the second example, Blake and Dharma are trusted marginally.
Since two marginally trusted keys are needed to fully validate a
key, Chloe's key will be considered fully valid, but Francis's
key will be considered only marginally valid.
In the case where Chloe and Dharma are marginally trusted,
Chloe's key will be marginally valid since Dharma's key is
fully valid.
Francis's key, however, will also be considered marginally
valid since only a fully valid key can be used to validate
other keys, and Dharma's key is the only fully valid key
that has been used to sign Francis's key.
When marginal trust in Blake is added, Chloe's key becomes
fully valid and can then be used to fully validate Francis's
key and marginally validate Elena's key.
Lastly, when Blake, Chloe, and Elena are fully trusted, this is
still insufficient to validate Geoff's key since the maximum
certification path is three, but the path length from Geoff
back to Alice is four.
</para>
<para>
The web of trust model is a flexible approach to the problem of safe
public key exchange.
It permits you to tune &gnupg; to reflect how you use it.
At one extreme you may insist on multiple, short paths from your
<!-- HERE, math -->
key to another key <emphasis>K</emphasis> in order to trust it.
On the other hand, you may be satisfied with longer paths and
<!-- HERE, math -->
perhaps as little as one path from your key to the other
key <emphasis>K</emphasis>.
<!-- HERE, math -->
Requiring multiple, short paths is a strong guarantee
that <emphasis>K</emphasis> belongs to whom your think it does.
The price, of course, is that it is more difficult to validate keys
since you must personally sign more keys than if you accepted fewer
and longer paths.
</para>
<figure id="wot-examples" float=1>
<title>
A hypothetical web of trust
</title>
<!--
The graph indicates who has signed who's keys.
The table, in which names have been abbreviated, shows which keys are
valid depending on how Alice trusts other members in the web.
Alice considers different keys valid depending on how she trusts
the members of the web.
-->
<graphic fileref="signatures.jpg"></graphic>
<informaltable frame="all">
<tgroup cols="4" rowsep="1" colsep="1">
<colspec colname="one" colnum="1">
<colspec colname="two" colnum="2">
<colspec colname="three" colnum="3">
<colspec colname="four" colnum="4">
<spanspec spanname="lefthalf" namest="one" nameend="two" align="center">
<spanspec spanname="righthalf" namest="three" nameend="four" align="center">
<thead>
<colspec
<row>
<entry spanname="lefthalf">trust</entry>
<entry spanname="righthalf">validity</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry align="center">marginal</entry>
<entry align="center">full</entry>
<entry align="center">marginal</entry>
<entry align="center">full</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Dharma</entry>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Blake, Chloe, Dharma, Francis</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blake, Dharma</entry>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Francis</entry>
<entry>Blake, Chloe, Dharma</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Chloe, Dharma</entry>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Chloe, Francis</entry>
<entry>Blake, Dharma</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>Blake, Chloe, Dharma</entry>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Elena</entry>
<entry>Blake, Chloe, Dharma, Francis</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Blake, Chloe, Elena</entry>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Blake, Chloe, Elena, Francis</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</informaltable>
</figure>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Distributing keys
</title>
<para>
Ideally, you distribute your key by personally giving it to your
correspondents.
In practice, however, keys are often distributed by email or some
other electronic communication medium.
Distribution by email is good practice when you have only a few
correspondents, and even if you have many correspondents, you can use
an alternative means such as posting your public key on your World Wide
Web homepage.
This is unacceptable, however, if people who need your public key do
not know where to find it on the Web.
</para>
<para>
To solve this problem public key servers are used to collect
and distribute public keys.
A public key received by the server is either added to the server's
database or merged with the existing key if already present.
When a key request comes to the server, the server consults its
database and returns the requested public key if found.
</para>
<para>
A keyserver is also valuable when many people are frequently signing other
people's keys.
Without a keyserver, when Blake sign's Alice's key then Blake would send
Alice a copy of her public key signed by him so that Alice could
add the updated key to her ring as well as distribute it to all of her
correspondents.
Going through this effort fulfills Alice's and Blake's responsibility
to the community at large in building tight webs of trust and thus
improving the security of PGP.
It is nevertheless a nuisance if key signing is frequent.
</para>
<para>
Using a keyserver makes the process somewhat easier.
When Blake signs Alice's key he sends the signed key to the key server.
The key server adds Blake's signature to its copy of Alice's key.
Individuals interested in updating their copy of Alice's key then consult
the keyserver on their own initiative to retrieve the updated key.
Alice need never be involved with distribution and can retrieve signatures
on her key simply by querying a keyserver.
<comment><option>--keyserver</option> must come before
<option>--send-key</option> or <option>--recv-key</option>.
This appears to be a bug.</comment>
</para>
<para>
One or more keys may be sent to a keyserver using the command-line
option <link linkend="send-keys"><option>--send-keys</option></link>.
The option takes one or more key specifiers and sends the specified
keys to the key server.
The key server to which to send the keys is specified with the
command-line option <link linkend="keyserver"><option>--keyserver</option></link>.
Similarly, the option
<link linkend="recv-keys"><option>--recv-keys</option></link> is used
to retrieve keys from a keyserver, but the option <option>--recv-keys</option>
requires a key ID be used to specify the key.
In the following example Alice sends her public key to the keyserver
<parameter>certserver.pgp.com</parameter> and then updates her copy
of Blake's key from the same keyserver.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --keyserver certserver.pgp.com --recv-key 0xBB7576AC</userinput>
gpg: requesting key BB7576AC from certserver.pgp.com ...
gpg: key BB7576AC: 1 new signature
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: new signatures: 1
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --keyserver certserver.pgp.com --send-key blake@cyb.org</userinput>
gpg: success sending to 'certserver.pgp.com' (status=200)
</screen>
There are several popular keyservers in use around the world.
The major keyservers synchronize themselves, so it is fine to
pick a keyserver close to you on the Internet and then use it
regularly for sending and receiving keys.
</para>
</sect1>
</chapter>

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<chapter id="wise" xreflabel="4">
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Daily use of &Gnupg;
</title>
<para>
&Gnupg; is a complex tool with technical, social, and legal issues
surrounding it.
Technically, it has been designed to be used in situations having
drastically different security needs.
This complicates key management.
Socially, using &gnupg; is not strictly a personal decision.
To use &gnupg effectively both parties communicating must use it.
Finally, as of 1999, laws regarding digital encryption, and in particular
whether or not using &gnupg; is legal, vary from country to country and
is currently being debated by many national governments.
</para>
<para>
This chapter addresses these issues.
It gives practical advice on how to use &gnupg; to meet your security needs.
It also suggests ways to promote the use of &gnupg; for secure
communication between yourself and your colleagues when your colleagues
are not currently using &gnupg;.
Finally, the legal status of &gnupg; is outlined given the current status
of encryption laws in the world.
</para>
<sect1>
<title>
Defining your security needs
</title>
<para>
&Gnupg; is a tool you use to protect your privacy.
Your privacy is protected if you can correspond with others without
eavesdroppers reading those messages.
</para>
<para>
How you should use &gnupg; depends on the determination and resourcefulness
of those who might want to read your encrypted messages.
An eavesdropper may be an unscrupulous system administrator casually
scanning your mail, it might be an industrial spy trying to collect
your company's secrets, or it might be a law enforcement agency trying
to prosecute you.
Using &gnupg; to protect against casual eavesdropping is going to be
different than using &gnupg; to protect against a determined adversary.
Your goal, ultimately, is to make it more expensive to recover the
unencrypted data than that data is worth.
</para>
<para>
Customizing your use of &gnupg; revolves around three issues:
<itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para>
the key size of your public/private keypair,
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
protecting your private key, and
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>
managing your web of trust.
</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
A well-chosen key size protects you against brute-force attacks on
encrypted messages.
Protecting your private key prevents an attacker from simply using your
private key to decrypt encrypted messages and sign messages in your name.
Correctly managing your web of trust prevents attackers from masquarading
as people with whom you communicate.
Ultimately, addressing these issues with respect to your own security
needs is how you balance the extra work required to use &gnupg; with
the privacy it gives you.
</para>
<sect2>
<title>
Choosing a key size
</title>
<para>
Selecting a key size depends on the key.
In OpenPGP, a public/private keypair usually has multiple keys.
At the least it has a master signing key, and it probably has one or
more additional subkeys for encryption.
Using default key generation parameters with &gnupg;, the master
key will be a DSA key, and the subkeys will be ElGamal keys.
</para>
<para>
DSA allows a key size up to 1024 bits.
This is not especially good given today's factoring technology, but
that is what the standard specifies.
Without question, you should use 1024 bit DSA keys.
</para>
<para>
ElGamal keys, on the other hand, may be of any size.
Since &gnupg; is a hybrid public-key system, the public key is used
to encrypt a 128-bit session key, and the private key is used to
decrypt it.
Key size nevertheless affects encryption and decryption speed
since the cost of these algorithms is exponential in the size of
the key.
Larger keys also take more time to generate and take more space
to store.
Ultimately, there are diminishing returns on the extra security
a large key provides you.
After all, if the key is large enough to resist a brute-force
attack, an eavesdropper will merely switch to some other method for
obtaining your plaintext data.
Examples of other methods include robbing your home or office
and mugging you.
1024 bits is thus the recommended key size.
If you genuinely need a larger key size then you probably already
know this and should be consulting an expert in data security.
</para>
</sect2>
<sect2>
<title>
Protecting your private key
</title>
<para>
Protecting your private key is the most important job you have to
use &gnupg; correctly.
If someone obtains your private key, then all data encrypted to
the private key can be decrypted and signatures can be made in your name.
If you lose your private key, then you will no longer be able to
decrypt documents encrypted to you in the future or in the past,
and you will not be able to make signatures.
Losing sole possession of your private key is catastrophic.
</para>
<para>
Regardless of how you use &gnupg; you should store the public
key's <link linkend="revocation">revocation certificate</link>
and a backup of your private key on write-protected media in a safe place.
For example, you could burn them on a CD-ROM and store them in your
safe deposit box at the bank in a sealed envelope.
Alternatively, you could store them on a floppy and hide it in your
house.
Whatever you do, they should be put on media that is safe to store
for as long as you expect to keep the key, and you should store
them more carefully than the copy of your private key you use daily.
</para>
<para>
To help safeguard your key, &Gnupg; does not store your raw
private key on disk.
Instead it encrypts it using a symmetric encryption algorithm.
That is why you need a passphrase to access the key.
Thus there are two barriers an attacker must cross to access your private
key: (1) he must actually acquire the key, and (2) he must get past
the encryption.
</para>
<para>
Safely storing your private key is important, but there is a cost.
Ideally, you would keep the private key on a removable, write-protected disk
such as a floppy disk, and you would use it on a single-user machine
not connected to a network.
This may be inconvenient or impossible for you to do.
For example, you may not own your own machine and must use a computer
at work or school, or it may mean you have to physically disconnect
your computer from your cable modem every time you want to use &gnupg;
</para>
<para>
This does not mean you cannot or should not use &gnupg;.
It means only that you have decided that the data you are protecting is
important enough to encrypt but not so important as to take extra
steps to make the first barrier stronger.
It is your choice.
</para>
<para>
A good passphrase is absolutely critical when using &gnupg;.
Any attacker who gains access to your private key must bypass the
encryption on the private key.
Instead of brute-force guessing the key, an attacker will almost
certainly instead try to guess the passphrase.
</para>
<para>
The motivation for trying passphrases is that most people choose
a passphrase that is easier to guess than a random 128-bit key.
If the passphrase is a word, it is much cheaper to try all the
words in the dictionaries of the world's languages.
Even if the word is permuted, &eg, k3wldood, it is still easier
to try dictionary words with a catalog of permutations.
The same problem applies to quotations.
In general, passphrases based on natural-language utterances
are poor passphrases since there is little randomness and lots
of redundancy in natural language.
You should avoid natural language passphrases if you can.
</para>
<para>
A good passphrase is one that you can remember but is hard for
someone to guess.
It should include characters from the whole range of printable characters
on your keyboard.
This includes uppercase alphabetics characters, numbers, and special
characters such as <literal>}</literal> and <literal>|</literal>.
Be creative and spend a little time considering your passphrase; a
good choice is important to ensure your privacy.
</para>
</sect2>
<!--
<sect2>
<title>
Reacting to a compromised private key
</title>
<para>
Despite your precautions you may lose sole access to your private key.
For example, you may forget the passphrase, or someone who you think
can bypass the encryption gets access to it.
In that case then you need to spread the word that your key is no
longer valid.
To do that you use the key revocation certificate you should have generated
when you created the key.
Importing it onto your public keyring will revoke the public key
of the keypair you no longer wish to use.
It is then up to you to distribute the revoked public key to all
those who may encrypt documents to you.
</para>
<para>
A revoked public key only prevents future use of the private key.
Others will neither be able to encrypt documents to the key nor will
they be able to check signatures made with the private key.
Documents signed in the past can still be checked, however, and
documents encrypted in the past can still be decrypted.
</para>
<para>
It is important that you protect the revocation certificate carefully.
Anybody can add the certificate to your public key and distribute it,
and there is no way to revoke a revocation certificate.
Therefore, you should store the revocation certificate in a safe
place such as with the backup of your private key.
</para>
</sect2>
-->
<sect2>
<title>
Managing your web of trust
</title>
<para>
As with protecting your private key, managing your web of trust is
another aspect of using &gnupg; that requires balancing security against
ease of use.
If you are using &gnupg; to protect against casual eavesdropping and
forgeries then you can afford to be relatively trusting of other
people's signatures.
On the other hand, if you are concerned that there may be a determined
attacker interested in invading your privacy, then
you should be much less trusting of other signatures and spend more time
personally verifying signatures.
</para>
<para>
Regardless of your own security needs, through, you should
<emphasis>always be careful</emphasis> when signing other keys.
It is selfish to sign a key with just enough confidence in the key's
validity to satisfy your own security needs.
Others, with more stringent security needs, may want to depend on
your signature.
If they cannot depend on you then that weakens the web of trust
and makes it more difficult for all &gnupg; users to communicate.
Use the same care in signing keys that you would like others to use when
you depend on their signatures.
</para>
<para>
In practice, managing your web of trust reduces to assigning trust to
others and tuning the options
<link linkend="marginals-needed"><option>--marginals-needed</option></link>
and
<link linkend="completes-needed"><option>--completes-needed</option></link>.
Any key you personally sign will be considered valid, but except for small
groups, it will not be practical to personally sign the key of every person
with whom you communicate.
You will therefore have to assign trust to others.
</para>
<para>
It is probably wise to be accurate when assigning trust and then
use the options to tune how careful &gnupg; is with key validation.
As a concrete example, you may fully trust a few close friends that
you know are careful with key signing and then marginally
trust all others on your keyring.
From there, you may set <option>--completes-needed</option> to
<literal>1</literal> and <option>--marginals-needed</option> to
<literal>2</literal>.
If you are more concerned with security you might choose values of
<literal>1</literal> and <literal>3</literal> or <literal>2</literal>
and <literal>3</literal> respectively.
If you are less concerned with privacy attacks and just want some
reasonable confidence about validity, set the values to <literal>1</literal>
and <literal>1</literal>.
In general, higher numbers for these options imply that more people
would be needed to conspire against you in order to have a key validated
that does not actually belong to the person whom you think it does.
</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Building your web of trust
</title>
<para>
Wanting to use &gnupg; yourself is not enough.
In order to use to communicate securely with others you must have
a web of trust.
At first glance, however, building a web of trust is a daunting task.
The people with whom you communicate need to use
&gnupg;<footnote><para>In this section, &gnupg; refers to the
&gnupg; implementation of OpenPGP as well as other implementations
such as NAI's PGP product.</para></footnote>, and there needs to be enough
key signing so that keys can be considered valid.
These are not technical problems; they are social problems.
Nevertheless, you must overcome these problems if you want to
use &gnupg;.
</para>
<para>
When getting started using &gnupg; it is important to realize that you
need not securely communicate with every one of your correspondents.
Start with a small circle of people, perhaps just yourself and
one or two others who also want to exercise their right
to privacy.
Generate your keys and sign each other's public keys.
This is your initial web of trust.
By doing this you will appreciate the value of a small, robust
web of trust and will be more cautious as you grow your web
in the future.
</para>
<para>
In addition to those in your initial web of trust, you may want to
communicate securely with others who are also using &gnupg;.
Doing so, however, can be awkward for two reasons:
(1) you do not always know when someone uses or is willing to use
&gnupg;, and (2) if you do know of someone who uses it, you may still have
trouble validating their key.
The first reason occurs because people do not always advertise that
they use &gnupg;.
The way to change this behavior is to set the example and advertise
that you use &gnupg;.
There are at least three ways to do this: you can sign messages you mail
to others or post to message boards, you can put your public key on your
web page, or, if you put your key on a keyserver, you can put your key
ID in your email signature.
If you advertise your key then you make it that much more acceptable
for others to advertise their keys.
Furthermore, you make it easier for others to start communicating
with you securely since you have taken the initiative and made it clear
that you use &gnupg;.
</para>
<para>
Key validation is more difficult.
If you do not personally know the person whose key you want to sign,
then it is not possible to sign the key yourself.
You must rely on the signatures of others and hope to find a chain
of signatures leading from the key in question back to your own.
To have any chance of finding a chain, you must take the intitive
and get your key signed by others outside of your intitial web of trust.
An effective way to accomplish this is to participate in key
signing parties.
If you are going to a conference look ahead of time for a key
signing party, and if you do not see one being held, offer to
<ulink url="http://www.herrons.com/kb2nsx/keysign.html">hold one</ulink>.
You can also be more passive and carry your fingerprint with you
for impromptu key exchanges.
In such a situation the person to whom you gave the fingerprint
would verify it and sign your public key once he returned home.
</para>
<para>
Keep in mind, though, that this is optional.
You have no obligation to either publically advertise your key or
sign other people's keys.
The power of &gnupg; is that it is flexible enough to adapt to your
security needs whatever they may be.
The social reality, however, is that you will need to take the initiative
if you want to grow your web of trust and use &gnupg; for as much of
your communication as possible.
</para>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Using &Gnupg; legally
</title>
<para>
The legal status of encryption software varies from country to country,
and law regarding encryption software is rapidly evolving.
<ulink url="http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm">Bert-Japp
Koops</ulink> has an excellent
<ulink url="http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm">Crypto
Law Survey</ulink> to which you should refer for the legal status of
encryption software in your country.
</para>
</sect1>
</chapter>

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<chapter id="Modules" xreflabel="5">
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Programming with &Gnupg;
</title>
<para>...</para>
<sect1>
<title>
Using &gpg in batch mode
</title>
<para>...</para>
<sect2>
<title>
Invoking &gpg from mail clients
</title>
<para>...</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1>
<title>
Writing extension modules
</title>
<para>...</para>
</sect1>
</chapter>

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<reference>
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Command Reference
</title>
<partintro>
<sect1>
<title>
Key specifiers
</title>
<para>
Many commands and options require a <firstterm>key specifier</firstterm>.
A key specifier is the key ID or any portion of ther user ID of
a key.
Consider the following example.
<screen width="80">
<prompt>alice%</prompt> <userinput>gpg --list-keys chloe</userinput>
pub 1024D/B87DBA93 1999-06-28 Chloe (Jester) &lt;chloe@cyb.org>
uid Chloe (Plebian) &lt;chloe@tel.net>
sub 2048g/B7934539 1999-06-28
</screen>
For this key, <literal>0xB87DBA93</literal>,
<literal>Chloe</literal>,
<literal>Plebian</literal>, and
<literal>oe@tel</literal>
are all examples of key specifiers that match the above key.
</para>
</sect1>
</partintro>
<refentry id="send-keys">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
send-keys
</refname>
<refpurpose>
send keys to a key server
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
send-keys <replaceable class="parameter">key</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command sends a public key to a keyserver.
The parameter <replaceable class="parameter">key</replaceable> specifies
the public key that should be uploaded.
The command requires the option
<link linkend="keyserver"><option>keyserver</option></link> to specify
to which keyserver &gpg; should send the keys.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="recv-keys">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
recv-keys
</refname>
<refpurpose>
retrieve keys from a key server
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>recv-keys</option> <replaceable class="parameter">key-id key-id ...</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command downloads one or more public keys from a keyserver.
Each <replaceable class="parameter">key-id</replaceable> is a key ID.
The command requires the option
<link linkend="keyserver"><option>keyserver</option></link> to
specify from which keyserver &gpg; should download the keys.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="encrypt">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
encrypt
</refname>
<refpurpose>
encrypt a document
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>encrypt</option> <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command encrypts the document
<replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable> to
recipients specified using the
option <link linkend="recipient"><option>recipient</option></link>.
If the parameter <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
is omitted, then the document to encrypt is taken from standard input.
If the option <option>recipient</option> is omitted,
&gpg; will prompt for a recipient.
If the option <link linkend="output"><option>output</option></link> is used,
&gpg; will output the encrypted information to the specified file.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="decrypt">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
decrypt
</refname>
<refpurpose>
decrypt an encrypted document
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>decrypt</option> <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command decrypts <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
and puts the result on standard output.
If the parameter <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
is omitted, then the document to decrypt is taken from standard input.
Use the option <link linkend="output"><option>output</option></link>
to output the decrypted message to a file instead.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="clearsign">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
clearsign
</refname>
<refpurpose>
make a cleartext signature
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>clearsign</option> <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command signs a message that can be verified to ensure that the
original message has not been changed.
Verification of the signed message is done using the command
<link linkend="verify"><option>verify</option></link>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="fingerprint">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
fingerprint
</refname>
<refpurpose>
display key fingerprints
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>fingerprint</option> <replaceable class="parameter">name ...</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command prints the fingerprints of the specified public keys.
The parameter <replaceable class="parameter">name</replaceable> is a
key specifier.
If no parameter <replaceable class="parameter">name</replaceable> is
provided, &gpg; will print the fingerprints of all the keys on
your public keyring.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="detach-sig">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
detach-sig
</refname>
<refpurpose>
make a detached signature
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>detach-sig</option> <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command creates a signature file that can be used
to verify that the orginal file
<replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable> has not
been changed.
Verification of the file using a detached signature is done using the
command <link linkend="verify"><option>verify</option></link>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="gen-key">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
gen-key
</refname>
<refpurpose>
generate a new keypair
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>gen-key</option>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command generates a private/public key pair for use in encrypting,
decrypting, and signing of messages.
You will br prompted for the kind of key you wish to create, the key
size, and the key's expiration date.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="symmetric">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
symmetric
</refname>
<refpurpose>
encrypt a document using only a symmetric encryption algorithm
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>symmetric</option> <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command encrypts a document using a symmetric algorithm with
a key derived from a passphrase supplied by you during execution.
The key should be selected to make it difficult to randomly guess the key.
To decrypt a document encrypted in this manner use the command.
<link linkend="decrypt"><option>decrypt</option></link>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="list-keys">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
list-keys
</refname>
<refpurpose>
list information about the specified keys
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>list-keys</option> <replaceable class="parameter">key ...</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command lists the public key specified by the key specifiers on the
command line.
If no key specifier is given, &gpg; will print all of the keys on the
public keyring.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="import">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
import
</refname>
<refpurpose>
import keys to a local keyring
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>import</option> <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command imports one or more public keys onto the user's public
keyring from the file <replaceable class="parameter">filename</replaceable>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="verify">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
verify
</refname>
<refpurpose>
verify a signed document
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>verify</option> <replaceable class="parameter">signature document</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command verifies a document against a signature
to ensure that the document has not been altered since the signature
was created.
If <replaceable class="parameter">signature</replaceable> is omitted,
&gpg; will look in <replaceable class="parameter">document</replaceable>
for a clearsign signature.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="gen-revoke">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
gen-revoke
</refname>
<refpurpose>
generate a revocation certificate for a public/private keypair
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>gen-revoke</option> <replaceable class="parameter">key</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command generates a revocation certificate for a public/private
key pair.
The parameter <replaceable class="parameter">key</replaceable> is
a key specifier.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="export">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
export
</refname>
<refpurpose>
export keys from a local keyring
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>export</option> <replaceable class="parameter">key key ...</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command exports the public keys components of the keys specified
by the key specifiers <replaceable class="parameter">key key ...</replaceable>.
The export command by default sends its output to standard output.
This key file can later be imported into another keyring using the command
<link linkend="import"><option>import</option></link>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="edit-key">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
edit-key
</refname>
<refpurpose>
presents a menu for operating on keys
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>edit-key</option> <replaceable class="parameter">key</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This command presents a menu which enables you to perform
key-related taskes.
The key specifier <replaceable class="parameter">key</replaceable>
specifies the key pair to be edited.
If the specifier matches more than one key pair, &gpg; issues
an error and exits.
</para>
<para>
Key listings displayed during key editing show the key with its
secondary keys and all user ids.
Selected keys or user ids are indicated by an asterisk.
The trust and validity values are displayed with the primary key:
the first is the assigned trust and the second is the
calculated validity.
Letters are used for the values:
<informaltable>
<tgroup cols="2" rowsep="1" colsep="1">
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Letter</entry>
<entry>Meaning</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
<row>
<entry>
-
</entry>
<entry>
No ownertrust assigned / not yet calculated.
</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>
e
</entry>
<entry>
Trust calculation has failed.
</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>
q
</entry>
<entry>
Not enough information for calculation.
</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>
n
</entry>
<entry>
Never trust this key.
</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>
m
</entry>
<entry>
Marginally trusted.
</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>
f
</entry>
<entry>
Fully trusted.
</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry>
u
</entry>
<entry>
Ultimately trusted.
</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</informaltable>
</para>
<para>
The following lists each key editing command and a description
of its behavior.
</para>
<refsect2 id="sign">
<title>
sign
</title>
<para>
Makes a signature on the current key.
If th key is not yet signed by the default user or the user
given with the option
<link linkend="local-user"><option>local-user</option></link>,
the program displays the information of the key again, together with
its fingerprint and asks whether it should be signed.
This question is repeated for all users specified with the option
<option>local-user</option>.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="lsign">
<title>
lsign
</title>
<para>
Same as <link linkend="sign">sign</link>, but the signature is
marked as non-exportable and will therefore never be used by others.
This may be used to make keys valid only in the local environment.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="revsig">
<title>
revsig
</title>
<para>
Revoke a signature.
Asks for each signature makde by a one of the private keys whether
a revocation certificate should be generated.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="trust">
<title>
trust
</title>
<para>
Change the owner trust value.
This updates the trust database immediately and no save is required.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="disable">
<title>
disable
</title>
<para>
Disable the key.
A disabled key cannot normally be used for encryption.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="enable">
<title>
enable
</title>
<para>
Enable a key that has been previously
<link linkend="disable">disabled</link>.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="adduid">
<title>
adduid
</title>
<para>
Add a new user id to the current key.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="deluid">
<title>
deluid
</title>
<para>
Delete a user id from the current key.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="addkey">
<title>
addkey
</title>
<para>
Add a new subkey to the current key.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="delkey">
<title>
delkey
</title>
<para>
Delete a subkey from the current key.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="revkey">
<title>
revkey
</title>
<para>
Revoke a subkey of the current key.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="expire">
<title>
expire
</title>
<para>
Change a key expiration time.
If a subkey is selected, the time of that key will be changed.
With no selection the expiration time of the current primary key is changed.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="key">
<title>
key n
</title>
<para>
Toggle selection of subkey with index n.
Use 0 to deselect all.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="uid">
<title>
uid n
</title>
<para>
Toggle selection of user id with index n.
Use 0 to deselect all.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="passwd">
<title>
toggle
</title>
<para>
Change the passphrase of the private key of the selected key pair.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="toggle">
<title>
toggle
</title>
<para>
Toggle between public and private key listings.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="check">
<title>
check
</title>
<para>
Check all selected user ids.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="pref">
<title>
pref
</title>
<para>
List preferences.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="save">
<title>
save
</title>
<para>
Save all changes to the current key and quit.
</para>
</refsect2>
<refsect2 id="quit">
<title>
save
</title>
<para>
Quit without updating the current key.
</para>
</refsect2>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
</reference>

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<reference>
<docinfo>
<date>
$Id$
</date>
</docinfo>
<title>
Options Reference
</title>
<partintro>
<sect1 id="optionsfile">
<title>
Setting options
</title>
<para>
Options may be specified on the command line or in an options file.
The default location of the options file is
<literal>~/.gnupg/options</literal>.
When specifying options in the options file, omit the leading two
dashes and instead use simply the option name followed by any
arguments.
Lines in the file with a hash (<literal>#</literal>) as the
first non-white-space character are ignored.
</para>
</sect1>
</partintro>
<refentry id="keyserver">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
keyserver
</refname>
<refpurpose>
specify the keyserver to use to locate keys
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>keyserver</option> <replaceable class="parameter">server-name</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This option is used in conjunction with either
<link linkend="recv-keys"><option>recv-keys</option></link> or
<link linkend="send-keys"><option>send-keys</option></link> to specify a
keyserver to manage public key distribution.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="output">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
output
</refname>
<refpurpose>
specify the file in which to place output
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>output</option> <replaceable class="parameter">file-name</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This is a description.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="recipient">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
recipient
</refname>
<refpurpose>
specify the recipient of a public-key encrypted document
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This is a description.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="armor">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
armor
</refname>
<refpurpose>
ASCII-armor encrypted or signed output
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This is a description.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="no-greeting">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
no-greeting
</refname>
<refpurpose>
suppress the opening copyright notice but do not enter batch mode
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
This is a description.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="local-user">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
local-user
</refname>
<refpurpose>
specifies a user id to use for signing
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>localuser</option> <replaceable class="parameter">name</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
Use <replaceable class="parameter">name</replaceable> as the user ID to sign.
This option is silently ignored for the list commands, so that it can be
used in an options file.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="completes-needed">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
completes-needed
</refname>
<refpurpose>
specifies the number of fully-trusted people needed to validate a new key.
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>completes-needed</option> <replaceable class="parameter">n</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
A public key on your keyring is validated using those signatures on
the key that were made by other valid keys on your keyring.
The option specifies the number of signatures needed if you fully
trust the owners of the keys that made the signatures.
Your trust in a key's owner is set with the command
<link linkend="edit-key"><option>edit-key</option></link>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<refentry id="marginals-needed">
<refnamediv>
<refname>
marginals-needed
</refname>
<refpurpose>
specifies the number of marginally-trusted people needed to validate
a new key.
</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<synopsis>
<option>marginals-needed</option> <replaceable class="parameter">n</replaceable>
</synopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1>
<title>
Description
</title>
<para>
A public key on your keyring is validated using those signatures on
the key that were made by other valid keys on your keyring.
The option specifies the number of signatures needed if you marginally
trust the owners of the keys that made the signatures.
Your trust in a key's owner is set with the command
<link linkend="edit-key"><option>edit-key</option></link>.
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
</reference>

71
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<!--
ToDo
- acknowledge Joergen Grahn for his xfig version of Figure 3.1
- 'inlineequation' marks places where formatting is ok now but not
semantically correct.
- need some story for formatting math
From Tom Goulet (tomg@iaw.on.ca):
> and the <SUP> tag doesn't seem to do much under Lynx, consider just
> using a ^ to show powers.
-->
<!DOCTYPE BOOK PUBLIC "-//Davenport//DTD DocBook V3.0//EN" [
<!--ArborText, Inc., 1988-1995, v.4001-->
<!NOTATION drw SYSTEM "DRW">
<!ENTITY gpg "<application>gpg</application>">
<!ENTITY gnupg "GnuPG">
<!ENTITY Gnupg "GnuPG">
<!ENTITY eg "e.g.">
<!ENTITY ie "i.e.">
<!ENTITY chapter1 SYSTEM "c1.sgml">
<!ENTITY chapter2 SYSTEM "c2.sgml">
<!ENTITY chapter3 SYSTEM "c3.sgml">
<!ENTITY chapter4 SYSTEM "c4.sgml">
<!ENTITY chapter5 SYSTEM "c5.sgml">
<!ENTITY chapter6 SYSTEM "c6.sgml">
<!ENTITY chapter7 SYSTEM "c7.sgml">
]>
<book>
<bookinfo>
<title>The GNU Privacy Handbook</title>
<date>
August 25, 1999
</date>
<copyright>
<year>1999</year>
<holder>Free Software Foundation</holder>
</copyright>
<abstract>
<para>
Please direct questions, bug reports, or suggesstions concerning
this manual to the maintainer, Mike Ashley (<email>jashley@acm.org</email>).
Contributors to this manual also include Matthew Copeland and
Joergen Grahn.
</para>
<para>
This manual may be redistributed under the terms of the
<ulink url="http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html">GNU General Public
License</ulink>.
</para>
<para> <!-- I have added this note (wk 06.09.99) -->
PLEASE NOTE, THAT THIS IS A DRAFT VERSION OF THE MANUAL AND NOT A COMPLETE
AND CORRECT MANUAL. CONSIDER IT AS WORK IN PROGRESS. The latest draft of
the manual should be available online;
<ulink url="http://www.gnupg.org/docs.html">www.gnupg.org</ulink> has a link
to it.
</para>
</abstract>
</bookinfo>
<toc></toc>
&chapter1
&chapter2
&chapter3
&chapter4
&chapter5
&chapter6
&chapter7
</book>

44
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#FIG 3.2
Landscape
Center
Inches
Letter
100.00
Single
-2
1200 2
6 600 300 9450 2625
6 1500 300 9450 2625
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
1575 1050 2475 1950
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
3675 1950 4575 1050
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
5775 1050 6675 1050
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
7875 1050 8475 1050
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
3600 525 4500 1050
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
3675 1950 5100 2550
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
5175 1200 5625 2325
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 825 6825 1125 Elena\001
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 825 8625 1125 Geoff\001
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 825 4725 1125 Chloe\001
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 825 2625 525 Blake\001
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 990 2550 2025 Dharma\001
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 1155 5175 2625 Francis\001
-6
2 1 0 3 0 7 100 0 -1 0.000 0 0 -1 1 0 2
1 1 3.00 90.00 180.00
1575 1050 2475 450
4 0 0 100 0 14 18 0.0000 4 180 825 600 1125 Alice\001
-6