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Sample ECC keys and message do now work.

Browse Source 
Import and export of secret keys does now work.  Encryption has been
fixed to be compatible with the sample messages.

This version tests for new Libgcrypt function and thus needs to be
build with a new Libgcrypt installed.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-02-02 15:48:54 +01:00
parent e0d4139e19
commit 4659c923a0
19 changed files with 692 additions and 356 deletions
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4
ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
2011-02-01 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* configure.ac (HAVE_GCRY_PK_GET_CURVE): Define if availabale.
2011-01-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* configure.ac (AC_CONFIG_FILES): Remove keyserver/.

101
agent/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
2011-02-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* cvt-openpgp.c (convert_secret_key): Remove algo mapping.
2011-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* cvt-openpgp.c (convert_to_openpgp): Adjust to reverted Libgcrypt
ABI.
* protect.c (protect_info): Adjust ECDSA and ECDH parameter names.
Add "ecc".
* findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Ditto.
@ -522,7 +529,7 @@
* genkey.c (agent_protect_and_store): Return RC and not 0.
* protect.c (do_encryption): Fix ignored error code from malloc.
Reported by Fabian Keil.
2009-06-17 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* call-pinentry.c (agent_get_confirmation): Add arg WITH_CANCEL.
@ -546,7 +553,7 @@
* trustlist.c: Include estream.h.
(agent_marktrusted): Replace stdio stream by estream functions.
* protect-tool.c (store_private_key): Use bin2hex.
* protect-tool.c (store_private_key): Use bin2hex.
2009-06-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
@ -560,7 +567,7 @@
2009-05-15 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
Fix bug #1053.
* agent.h (lookup_ttl_t): New.
* findkey.c (unprotect): Add arg LOOKUP_TTL.
(agent_key_from_file): Ditto.
@ -638,7 +645,7 @@
(agent_istrusted): Add arg R_DISABLED. Change all callers.
(agent_marktrusted): Do not ask if flagged as disabled. Reverse
the order of the questions. Store the disabled flag.
* gpg-agent.c (main): Save signal mask and open fds. Restore mask
and close all fds prior to the exec. Fixes bug#1013.
@ -749,11 +756,11 @@
* command.c (cmd_geteventcounter): Mark unused arg.
(cmd_listtrusted, cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt, cmd_genkey): Ditto.
(cmd_updatestartuptty, post_cmd_notify): Ditto.
* command-ssh.c (add_control_entry)
(ssh_handler_request_identities, ssh_handler_remove_identity)
(ssh_handler_remove_all_identities, ssh_handler_lock)
* command-ssh.c (add_control_entry)
(ssh_handler_request_identities, ssh_handler_remove_identity)
(ssh_handler_remove_all_identities, ssh_handler_lock)
(ssh_handler_unlock): Ditto.
* call-pinentry.c (pinentry_active_p, popup_message_thread)
* call-pinentry.c (pinentry_active_p, popup_message_thread)
(agent_popup_message_stop): Ditto.
* findkey.c (agent_public_key_from_file): Ditto.
* genkey.c (check_passphrase_pattern): Ditto.
@ -872,7 +879,7 @@
* agent.h (struct server_control_s): Add XAUTHORITY and
PINENTRY_USER_DATA.
* gpg-agent.c: New option --xauthority.
(main, agent_init_default_ctrl)
(main, agent_init_default_ctrl)
(agent_deinit_default_ctrl): Implemented
* command.c (cmd_updatestartuptty): Ditto.
* command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Ditto.
@ -1032,7 +1039,7 @@
2007-06-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* agent.h (ctrl_t): Remove. It is now declared in ../common/util.h.
* agent.h (ctrl_t): Remove. It is now declared in ../common/util.h.
* gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): New arg SILENT. Changed
all callers.
@ -1065,7 +1072,7 @@
* preset-passphrase.c (main): Setup default socket name for
simple-pwquery.
(map_spwq_error): Remove.
(MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL): New.
(MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL): New.
* call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Use gnupg_module_name.
* call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto.
@ -1127,7 +1134,7 @@
(main): Call the setup_libgcrypt_logging helper.
* protect-tool.c (my_gcry_logger): Removed.
(main): Call the setup_libgcrypt_logging helper.
2007-04-03 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* trustlist.c (read_trustfiles): Take a missing trustlist as an
@ -1135,7 +1142,7 @@
2007-03-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* protect-tool.c: New option --p12-charset.
* protect-tool.c: New option --p12-charset.
* minip12.c (p12_build): Implement it.
2007-03-19 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
@ -1170,7 +1177,7 @@
2007-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh):
* command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh):
* Makefile.am (t_common_ldadd): Add LIBICONV.
@ -1298,7 +1305,7 @@
(agent_pksign_do): Use it here for the TLS algo.
* agent.h (GCRY_MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1): New.
* divert-scd.c (pksign): Add case for tls-md5sha1.
* divert-scd.c (encode_md_for_card): Check that the algo is valid.
2006-10-04 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
@ -1368,7 +1375,7 @@
Replaced all Assuan error codes by libgpg-error codes. Removed
all map_to_assuan_status and map_assuan_err.
* gpg-agent.c (main): Call assuan_set_assuan_err_source to have Assuan
switch to gpg-error codes.
* command.c (set_error): Adjusted.
@ -1412,7 +1419,7 @@
* minip12.c (oid_pkcs_12_keyBag): New.
(parse_bag_encrypted_data): New arg R_RESULT. Support keybags and
return the key object.
return the key object.
(p12_parse): Take new arg into account. Free RESULT on error.
2006-06-26 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
@ -1480,7 +1487,7 @@
* call-scd.c (inq_needpin): Reworked to support the new KEYPADINFO.
* query.c (start_pinentry): Keep track of the owner.
(popup_message_thread, agent_popup_message_start)
(popup_message_thread, agent_popup_message_start)
(agent_popup_message_stop, agent_reset_query): New.
* command.c (start_command_handler): Make sure a popup window gets
closed.
@ -1531,7 +1538,7 @@
2005-06-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* minip12.c (create_final): Cast size_t to ulong for printf.
* minip12.c (create_final): Cast size_t to ulong for printf.
(build_key_bag, build_cert_bag, build_cert_sequence): Ditto.
2005-06-16 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
@ -1546,7 +1553,7 @@
* protect.c (do_encryption): Ditto.
(do_encryption): Made arg PROTBEGIN unsigned. Initialize RESULT
and RESULTLEN even on error.
(merge_lists): Need to cast unsigned char * for strcpy. Initialize
(merge_lists): Need to cast unsigned char * for strcpy. Initialize
RESULTand RESULTLEN even on error.
(agent_unprotect): Likewise for strtoul.
(make_shadow_info): Made P and INFO plain char.
@ -1606,7 +1613,7 @@
* command.c (cmd_updatestartuptty): New.
* gpg-agent.c: New option --write-env-file.
* gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Make sure that the signals we
are handling are not blocked.Block signals while creating new
threads.
@ -1876,8 +1883,8 @@
(make_cstring): Ditto.
(data_sign): Don't use a variable for the passphrase prompt, make
it translatable.
(ssh_request_process):
(ssh_request_process):
* findkey.c (modify_description): Renamed arguments for clarity,
polished documentation. Make comment a C-string. Fixed case of
@ -2003,7 +2010,7 @@
2004-12-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* gpg-agent.c (main): Use default_homedir().
* protect-tool.c (main): Ditto.
* protect-tool.c (main): Ditto.
2004-12-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
@ -2029,7 +2036,7 @@
* query.c (initialize_module_query): New.
* call-scd.c (initialize_module_call_scd): New.
* gpg-agent.c (main): Call them.
2004-12-18 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* gpg-agent.c (main): Remove special Pth initialize.
@ -2081,10 +2088,10 @@
to Moritz for pointing this out.
2004-09-25 Moritz Schulte <moritz@g10code.com>
* agent.h: Declare: agent_pksign_do.
(struct server_control_s): New member: raw_value.
* pksign.c (do_encode_md): New argument: raw_value; support
generation of raw (non-pkcs1) data objects; adjust callers.
(agent_pksign_do): New function, based on code ripped
@ -2092,7 +2099,7 @@
(agent_pksign): Use agent_pksign_do.
* command.c (start_command_handler): Set ctrl.digest.raw_value.
2004-09-09 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.de>
* gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): New.
@ -2133,14 +2140,14 @@
* gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Reload the trustlist on SIGHUP.
(start_connection_thread): Hack to simulate a ticker.
* trustlist.c (agent_trustlist_housekeeping)
* trustlist.c (agent_trustlist_housekeeping)
(agent_reload_trustlist): New. Protected all global functions
here with a simple counter which is sufficient for Pth.
2004-05-03 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* gpg-agent.c: Remove help texts for options lile --lc-ctype.
(main): New option --allow-mark-trusted.
(main): New option --allow-mark-trusted.
* trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Use it here.
2004-04-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
@ -2213,7 +2220,7 @@
string. Changed all callers.
* minip12.c: Revamped the build part.
(p12_build): New args CERT and CERTLEN.
(p12_build): New args CERT and CERTLEN.
2004-02-18 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
@ -2307,7 +2314,7 @@
* findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Now return an error code so
that we have more detailed error messages in the upper layers.
This fixes the handling of pinentry's cancel button.
This fixes the handling of pinentry's cancel button.
* pksign.c (agent_pksign): Changed accordingly.
* pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Ditto.
* command.c (cmd_passwd): Ditto.
@ -2334,12 +2341,12 @@
* pksign.c (do_encode_md): Allocate enough space. Cast md
byte to unsigned char to prevent sign extension.
2003-08-14 Timo Schulz <twoaday@freakmail.de>
* pksign.c (do_encode_md): Due to the fact pkcs#1 padding
is now in Libgcrypt, use the new interface.
2003-07-31 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* Makefile.am (gpg_agent_LDADD): Added INTLLIBS.
@ -2389,7 +2396,7 @@
* gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Adjusted for Pth 2.0
Adjusted for changes in the libgcrypt API. Some more fixes for the
libgpg-error stuff.
libgpg-error stuff.
2003-06-04 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
@ -2468,11 +2475,11 @@
(agent_askpin,agent_get_passphrase,agent_get_confirmation): Add
CTRL arg and pass it ot start_pinentry.
* command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Pass CTRL argument.
* trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Add CTRL argument
* trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Add CTRL argument
* command.c (cmd_marktrusted): Pass CTRL argument
* divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Add CTRL arg.
* divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Add CTRL arg.
(divert_pksign,divert_pkdecrypt): Ditto. Changed caller.
(getpin_cb): Use OPAQUE to pass the CTRL variable. Changed both
(getpin_cb): Use OPAQUE to pass the CTRL variable. Changed both
users.
* findkey.c (unprotect): Add CTRL arg.
(agent_key_from_file): Ditto.
@ -2707,7 +2714,7 @@
convert it to hex here.
* findkey.c (agent_write_private_key): New.
* genkey.c (store_key): And use it here.
* pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Changed the way the diversion is done.
* divert-scd.c (divert_pkdecrypt): Changed interface and
implemented it.
@ -2737,7 +2744,7 @@
* protect.c (snext,sskip,smatch): Moved to
* sexp-parse.h: New file.
* divert-scd.c: New.
2002-02-27 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* protect.c (agent_shadow_key): New.
@ -2765,7 +2772,7 @@
* gpg-agent.c: New option --default-cache-ttl.
* cache.c (agent_put_cache): Use it.
* cache.c: Add a few debug outputs.
* protect.c (agent_private_key_type): New.
@ -2773,10 +2780,10 @@
* findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Use it to decide whether we
have to unprotect a key.
(unprotect): Cache the passphrase.
* findkey.c (agent_key_from_file,agent_key_available): The key
files do now require a ".key" suffix to make a script's life
easier.
easier.
* genkey.c (store_key): Ditto.
2002-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
@ -2784,11 +2791,11 @@
* genkey.c (store_key): Protect the key.
(agent_genkey): Ask for the passphrase.
* findkey.c (unprotect): Actually unprotect the key.
* query.c (agent_askpin): Add an optional start_err_text.
* query.c (agent_askpin): Add an optional start_err_text.
2002-01-30 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* protect.c: New.
* protect.c: New.
(hash_passphrase): Based on the GnuPG 1.0.6 version.
* protect-tool.c: New
@ -2842,10 +2849,10 @@
* command.c (rc_to_assuan_status): Removed and changed all callers
to use map_to_assuan_status.
2001-12-19 Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
* keyformat.txt: New.
* keyformat.txt: New.
2001-12-19 Marcus Brinkmann <marcus@g10code.de>

86
agent/cvt-openpgp.c
View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
/* Helper to pass data via the callback to do_unprotect. */
struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s
struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s
{
int is_v4;
int is_protected;
@ -87,10 +87,12 @@ get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip)
"(public-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)))", pkey[0], pkey[1]);
break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:
case GCRY_PK_ECDH:
case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:
case GCRY_PK_ECDH:
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL,
"(public-key(ecc(c%m)(q%m)))", pkey[0], pkey[1]);
"(public-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)))",
pkey[0], pkey[1], pkey[2], pkey[3], pkey[4],
pkey[5]);
break;
default:
@ -108,8 +110,7 @@ get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip)
/* Convert a secret key given as algorithm id and an array of key
parameters into our s-expression based format. Note that
PUBKEY_ALGO is a standard id and not an OpenPGP id.
*/
PUBKEY_ALGO has an gcrypt algorithm number. */
static gpg_error_t
convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
{
@ -118,9 +119,6 @@ convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
*r_key = NULL;
/* FIXME: This is not consistent with the above comment. */
pubkey_algo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (pubkey_algo);
switch (pubkey_algo)
{
case GCRY_PK_DSA:
@ -147,15 +145,15 @@ convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDSA:
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_skey, NULL,
"(private-key(ecdsa(c%m)(q%m)(d%m)))",
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2]);
break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDH:
/* Although our code would work with "ecc" we explicitly use
"ecdh" or "ecdsa" to implicitly set the key capabilities. */
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_skey, NULL,
"(private-key(ecdh(c%m)(q%m)(p%m)(d%m)))",
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3]);
"(private-key(%s(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)"
"(d%m)))",
pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA?"ecdsa":"ecdh",
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4],
skey[5], skey[6]);
break;
default:
@ -184,7 +182,7 @@ hash_passphrase_and_set_key (const char *passphrase,
keylen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (protect_algo);
if (!keylen)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
key = xtrymalloc_secure (keylen);
if (!key)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
@ -204,7 +202,7 @@ static u16
checksum (const unsigned char *p, unsigned int n)
{
u16 a;
for (a=0; n; n-- )
a += *p++;
return a;
@ -272,7 +270,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
if (nskey+1 >= skeysize)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUFFER_TOO_SHORT);
/* Check whether SKEY is at all protected. If it is not protected
merely verify the checksum. */
if (!is_protected)
@ -284,7 +282,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
{
if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, skey[i]);
if (!err)
{
@ -301,7 +299,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
if (err)
return err;
}
if (actual_csum != desired_csum)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM);
return 0;
@ -324,7 +322,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
s2k_algo, gcry_md_algo_name (s2k_algo));
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO);
}
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, protect_algo,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
(GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
@ -343,10 +341,10 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
{
gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
return err;
}
}
gcry_cipher_setiv (cipher_hd, protect_iv, protect_ivlen);
actual_csum = 0;
if (pkt_version >= 4)
{
@ -379,15 +377,15 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
{
/* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect tampering
with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa attack. */
desired_csum = 0;
desired_csum = 0;
actual_csum = 1; /* Default to bad checksum. */
if (ndata < 20)
if (ndata < 20)
log_error ("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
else
else
{
gcry_md_hd_t h;
if (gcry_md_open (&h, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 1))
BUG(); /* Algo not available. */
gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
@ -397,13 +395,13 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
gcry_md_close (h);
}
}
else
else
{
/* Old 16 bit checksum method. */
if (ndata < 2)
{
log_error ("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
desired_csum = 0;
desired_csum = 0;
actual_csum = 1; /* Mark checksum bad. */
}
else
@ -417,7 +415,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
}
}
}
/* Better check it here. Otherwise the gcry_mpi_scan would fail
because the length may have an arbitrary value. */
if (desired_csum == actual_csum)
@ -468,7 +466,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
}
buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (ndata);
if (!buffer)
{
@ -476,7 +474,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
return err;
}
gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
buffer[0] = p[0];
buffer[1] = p[1];
@ -557,7 +555,7 @@ try_do_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
pointed to by GRIP. On error NULL is stored at all return
arguments. */
gpg_error_t
convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
unsigned char *grip, const char *prompt,
const char *cache_nonce,
unsigned char **r_key, char **r_passphrase)
@ -625,7 +623,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
if (!protect_algo && !!strcmp (string, "IDEA"))
protect_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_IDEA;
xfree (string);
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 3, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen || valuelen > sizeof iv)
goto bad_seckey;
@ -848,7 +846,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
bad_seckey:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
goto leave;
outofmem:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
goto leave;
@ -874,13 +872,13 @@ key_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *array)
}
array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
gcry_sexp_release (l2);
if (!array[idx])
if (!array[idx])
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Required parameter invalid. */
goto leave;
}
}
leave:
if (err)
{
@ -1028,7 +1026,7 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase,
gcry_sexp_release (list);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Invalid structure of object. */
}
algo = gcry_pk_map_name (name);
xfree (name);
@ -1038,8 +1036,8 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase,
case GCRY_PK_ELG: algoname = "elg"; npkey = 3; elems = "pgyx"; break;
case GCRY_PK_ELG_E: algoname = "elg"; npkey = 3; elems = "pgyx"; break;
case GCRY_PK_DSA: algoname = "dsa"; npkey = 4; elems = "pqgyx"; break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDSA: algoname = "ecdsa"; npkey = 2; elems = "cqd"; break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDH: algoname = "ecdh"; npkey = 3; elems = "cqpd"; break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDSA: algoname = "ecdsa"; npkey = 6; elems = "pabgnqd"; break;
case GCRY_PK_ECDH: algoname = "ecdh"; npkey = 6; elems = "pabgnqd"; break;
default: algoname = ""; npkey = 0; elems = NULL; break;
}
assert (!elems || strlen (elems) < DIM (array) );
@ -1070,9 +1068,9 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase,
void *format_args[10+2];
size_t n;
gcry_sexp_t tmpkey, tmpsexp = NULL;
snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu", s2k_count);
init_membuf (&mbuf, 50);
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey");
for (i=j=0; i < npkey; i++)
@ -1105,7 +1103,7 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase,
" %S\n"
" (protection sha1 aes %b 1:3 sha1 %b %s))\n",
algoname,
tmpkey,
tmpkey,
(int)sizeof protect_iv, protect_iv,
(int)sizeof salt, salt,
countbuf);

24
common/util.h
View File

@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
#ifndef GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED
#define GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED 198
#endif
#ifndef GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE
#define GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE 187
#endif
#ifndef GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE
#define GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE 188
#endif
/* Hash function used with libksba. */
@ -75,10 +81,10 @@
/* GCC attributes. */
#if __GNUC__ >= 4
#if __GNUC__ >= 4
# define GNUPG_GCC_A_SENTINEL(a) __attribute__ ((sentinel(a)))
#else
# define GNUPG_GCC_A_SENTINEL(a)
# define GNUPG_GCC_A_SENTINEL(a)
#endif
@ -132,14 +138,14 @@ int answer_is_yes_no_quit (const char *s);
int answer_is_okay_cancel (const char *s, int def_answer);
/*-- xreadline.c --*/
ssize_t read_line (FILE *fp,
ssize_t read_line (FILE *fp,
char **addr_of_buffer, size_t *length_of_buffer,
size_t *max_length);
/*-- b64enc.c and b64dec.c --*/
struct b64state
{
struct b64state
{
unsigned int flags;
int idx;
int quad_count;
@ -184,9 +190,9 @@ unsigned char *make_canon_sexp_from_rsa_pk (const void *m, size_t mlen,
size_t *r_len);
gpg_error_t get_rsa_pk_from_canon_sexp (const unsigned char *keydata,
size_t keydatalen,
unsigned char const **r_n,
unsigned char const **r_n,
size_t *r_nlen,
unsigned char const **r_e,
unsigned char const **r_e,
size_t *r_elen);
gpg_error_t get_pk_algo_from_canon_sexp (const unsigned char *keydata,
size_t keydatalen,
@ -231,7 +237,7 @@ const char *dirmngr_socket_name (void);
gpgconf. */
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_AGENT 1
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_PINENTRY 2
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_SCDAEMON 3
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_SCDAEMON 3
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_DIRMNGR 4
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_PROTECT_TOOL 5
#define GNUPG_MODULE_NAME_CHECK_PATTERN 6
@ -286,7 +292,7 @@ int gnupg_compare_version (const char *a, const char *b);
#ifndef HAVE_TTYNAME
/* Systems without ttyname (W32) will merely return NULL. */
static inline char *
ttyname (int fd)
ttyname (int fd)
{
(void)fd;
return NULL;

16
configure.ac
View File

@ -742,6 +742,7 @@ AM_PATH_GPG_ERROR("$NEED_GPG_ERROR_VERSION",
AM_PATH_LIBGCRYPT("$NEED_LIBGCRYPT_API:$NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION",
have_libgcrypt=yes,have_libgcrypt=no)
# fixme: We can remove the next two checks if we require libgcrypt 1.5.
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether Libgcrypt support ECDH], gnupg_cv_gcry_pk_ecdh,
[ _gnupg_gcry_save_cflags=$CFLAGS
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS"
@ -756,6 +757,21 @@ if test "$gnupg_cv_gcry_pk_ecdh" = yes; then
[Define if gcrypt.h has the enum value for ECDH.])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether Libgcrypt has gcry_pk_get_curve],
gnupg_cv_gcry_pk_get_curve,
[ _gnupg_gcry_save_cflags=$CFLAGS
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS"
AC_TRY_COMPILE(
[#include <gcrypt.h>],
[ return gcry_pk_get_curve (NULL, 0, NULL); ],
gnupg_cv_gcry_pk_get_curve=yes,
gnupg_cv_gcry_pk_get_curve=no)
CFLAGS=$_gnupg_gcry_save_cflags])
if test "$gnupg_cv_gcry_pk_get_curve" = yes; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GCRY_PK_GET_CURVE], 1,
[Define if gcrypt.h has gcry_pk_get_curve.])
fi
#
# libassuan is used for IPC

15
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
2011-02-02 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Make sure keyids are available.
* keyid.c (hash_public_key): Adjust for the ECC case.
2011-02-01 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* import.c (transfer_secret_keys): Implement ECC case.
* gpg.c (main): Call setup_libgcrypt_logging.
* keygen.c (gpg_curve_to_oid): New.
(ecckey_from_sexp): Factor curve name mapping out to new function.
2011-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* misc.c (make_flagged_int, openpgp_oid_from_str)

81
g10/ecdh.c
View File

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static const struct
unsigned int qbits;
int openpgp_hash_id; /* KEK digest algorithm. */
int openpgp_cipher_id; /* KEK cipher algorithm. */
} kek_params_table[] =
} kek_params_table[] =
/* Note: Must be sorted by ascending values for QBITS. */
{
{ 256, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256, CIPHER_ALGO_AES },
@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ pk_ecdh_default_params (unsigned int qbits)
if (!kek_params)
return NULL;
kek_params[0] = 3; /* Number of bytes to follow. */
kek_params[1] = 1; /* Version for KDF+AESWRAP. */
kek_params[1] = 1; /* Version for KDF+AESWRAP. */
/* Search for matching KEK parameter. Defaults to the strongest
possible choices. Performance is not an issue here, only
interoperability. */
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ pk_ecdh_default_params (unsigned int qbits)
assert (i < DIM (kek_params_table));
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ECDH KEK params are", kek_params, sizeof(kek_params) );
return gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, kek_params, 4 * 8);
}
@ -88,16 +88,16 @@ pk_ecdh_default_params (unsigned int qbits)
key_derivation+key_wrapping. If IS_ENCRYPT is true the function
encrypts; if false, it decrypts. On success the result is stored
at R_RESULT; on failure NULL is stored at R_RESULT and an error
code returned.
code returned.
FIXME: explain PKEY and PK_FP.
*/
/*
TODO: memory leaks (x_secret).
*/
gpg_error_t
pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
const byte pk_fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],
gcry_mpi_t data, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
gcry_mpi_t *r_result)
@ -106,8 +106,8 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
byte *secret_x;
int secret_x_size;
unsigned int nbits;
const unsigned char *kdf_params;
size_t kdf_params_size;
const unsigned char *kek_params;
size_t kek_params_size;
int kdf_hash_algo;
int kdf_encr_algo;
unsigned char message[256];
@ -139,11 +139,11 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
return err;
}
secret_x_size = (nbits+7)/8;
secret_x_size = (nbits+7)/8;
assert (nbytes > secret_x_size);
memmove (secret_x, secret_x+1, secret_x_size);
memset (secret_x+secret_x_size, 0, nbytes-secret_x_size);
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ECDH shared secret X is:", secret_x, secret_x_size );
}
@ -158,24 +158,24 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
*/
if (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (pkey[2], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
return GPG_ERR_BUG;
kdf_params = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pkey[2], &nbits);
kdf_params_size = (nbits+7)/8;
kek_params = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pkey[2], &nbits);
kek_params_size = (nbits+7)/8;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ecdh KDF params:", kdf_params, kdf_params_size);
log_printhex ("ecdh KDF params:", kek_params, kek_params_size);
/* Expect 4 bytes 03 01 hash_alg symm_alg. */
if (kdf_params_size != 4 || kdf_params[0] != 3 || kdf_params[1] != 1)
if (kek_params_size != 4 || kek_params[0] != 3 || kek_params[1] != 1)
return GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY;
kdf_hash_algo = kdf_params[2];
kdf_encr_algo = kdf_params[3];
kdf_hash_algo = kek_params[2];
kdf_encr_algo = kek_params[3];
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_debug ("ecdh KDF algorithms %s+%s with aeswrap\n",
openpgp_md_algo_name (kdf_hash_algo),
openpgp_cipher_algo_name (kdf_encr_algo));
if (kdf_hash_algo != GCRY_MD_SHA256
&& kdf_hash_algo != GCRY_MD_SHA384
&& kdf_hash_algo != GCRY_MD_SHA512)
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
/* fixed-length field 4 */
iobuf_write (obuf, "Anonymous Sender ", 20);
/* fixed-length field 5, recipient fp */
iobuf_write (obuf, pk_fp, 20);
iobuf_write (obuf, pk_fp, 20);
message_size = iobuf_temp_to_buffer (obuf, message, sizeof message);
iobuf_close (obuf);
@ -207,11 +207,10 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
return err;
if(DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ecdh KDF message params are:",
kdf_params, kdf_params_size );
log_printhex ("ecdh KDF message params are:", message, message_size);
}
/* Derive a KEK (key wrapping key) using kdf_params and secret_x. */
/* Derive a KEK (key wrapping key) using MESSAGE and SECRET_X. */
{
gcry_md_hd_t h;
int old_size;
@ -222,7 +221,7 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
kdf_hash_algo, gpg_strerror (err));
gcry_md_write(h, "\x00\x00\x00\x01", 4); /* counter = 1 */
gcry_md_write(h, secret_x, secret_x_size); /* x of the point X */
gcry_md_write(h, kdf_params, kdf_params_size);/* KDF parameters */
gcry_md_write(h, message, message_size);/* KDF parameters */
gcry_md_final (h);
@ -242,7 +241,7 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ecdh KEK is:", secret_x, secret_x_size );
}
/* And, finally, aeswrap with key secret_x. */
{
gcry_cipher_hd_t hd;
@ -284,7 +283,7 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
if (is_encrypt)
{
byte *in = data_buf+1+data_buf_size+8;
/* Write data MPI into the end of data_buf. data_buf is size
aeswrap data. */
err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, in,
@ -296,7 +295,7 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
xfree (data_buf);
return err;
}
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ecdh encrypting :", in, data_buf_size );
@ -325,14 +324,14 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
*r_result = result;
}
else
{
byte *in;
const void *p;
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (data, &nbits);
nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
if (!p || nbytes > data_buf_size || !nbytes)
@ -349,10 +348,10 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
}
in = data_buf+data_buf_size;
data_buf_size = data_buf[0];
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ecdh decrypting :", data_buf+1, data_buf_size);
err = gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, in, data_buf_size, data_buf+1,
data_buf_size);
gcry_cipher_close (hd);
@ -363,12 +362,12 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
xfree (data_buf);
return err;
}
data_buf_size -= 8;
if (DBG_CIPHER)
log_printhex ("ecdh decrypted to :", in, data_buf_size);
/* Padding is removed later. */
/* if (in[data_buf_size-1] > 8 ) */
/* { */
@ -376,7 +375,7 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
/* in[data_buf_size-1] ); */
/* return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY; */
/* } */
err = gcry_mpi_scan (&result, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, in, data_buf_size, NULL);
xfree (data_buf);
if (err)
@ -385,11 +384,11 @@ pk_ecdh_encrypt_with_shared_point (int is_encrypt, gcry_mpi_t shared_mpi,
gpg_strerror (err));
return err;
}
*r_result = result;
}
}
return err;
}
@ -453,5 +452,3 @@ pk_ecdh_decrypt (gcry_mpi_t * result, const byte sk_fp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN],
sk_fp, data/*encr data as an MPI*/,
skey, result);
}

148
g10/export.c
View File

@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ export_pubkeys_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users,
kbnode_t *keyblock_out, unsigned int options )
{
int any, rc;
rc = do_export_stream (ctrl, out, users, 0, keyblock_out, options, &any);
if (!rc && !any)
rc = -1;
@ -197,9 +197,9 @@ do_export (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t users, int secret, unsigned int options )
int any, rc;
armor_filter_context_t *afx = NULL;
compress_filter_context_t zfx;
memset( &zfx, 0, sizeof zfx);
rc = open_outfile (GNUPG_INVALID_FD, NULL, 0, &out );
if (rc)
return rc;
@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list_t list, KBNODE node)
u32 kid[2];
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
for (; list; list = list->next)
if (list->kid[0] == kid[0] && list->kid[1] == kid[1])
return 1;
@ -293,17 +293,17 @@ exact_subkey_match_p (KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc, KBNODE node)
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID:
keyid_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, kid);
break;
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20:
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR:
fingerprint_from_pk (node->pkt->pkt.public_key, fpr,&fprlen);
break;
default:
break;
}
switch(desc->mode)
{
case KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID:
@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ canon_pubkey_algo (int algo)
case GCRY_PK_RSA:
case GCRY_PK_RSA_E:
case GCRY_PK_RSA_S: return GCRY_PK_RSA;
case GCRY_PK_ELG:
case GCRY_PK_ELG:
case GCRY_PK_ELG_E: return GCRY_PK_ELG;
default: return algo;
}
@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ canon_pubkey_algo (int algo)
/* Use the key transfer format given in S_PGP to create the secinfo
structure in PK and chnage the parameter array in PK to include the
structure in PK and change the parameter array in PK to include the
secret parameters. */
static gpg_error_t
transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
goto bad_seckey;
protect_algo = gcry_cipher_map_name (string);
xfree (string);
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 3, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen || valuelen > sizeof iv)
goto bad_seckey;
@ -460,6 +460,7 @@ transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
|| gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSKEY, NULL, &nskey)
|| !npkey || npkey >= nskey || nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY)
goto bad_seckey;
pubkey_algo = map_pk_gcry_to_openpgp (pubkey_algo);
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "skey", 0);
@ -557,6 +558,77 @@ transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
goto leave;
}
/* We need to change the received parameters for ECC algorithms.
The transfer format has all parameters but OpenPGP defines that
only the OID of the curve is to be used. */
if (pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
{
gcry_sexp_t s_pubkey;
const char *curvename, *curveoidstr;
gcry_mpi_t mpi;
/* We build an S-expression with the public key parameters and
ask Libgcrypt to return the matching curve name. */
if (npkey != 6 || !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2]
|| !skey[3] || !skey[4] || !skey[5]
|| !skey[6] || skey[7])
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
goto leave;
}
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pubkey, NULL,
"(public-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)))",
skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4]);
if (err)
goto leave;
#ifdef HAVE_GCRY_PK_GET_CURVE
curvename = gcry_pk_get_curve (s_pubkey, 0, NULL);
#else
curvename = "?";
#endif
gcry_sexp_release (s_pubkey);
curveoidstr = gpg_curve_to_oid (curvename, NULL);
if (!curveoidstr)
{
log_error ("no OID known for curve `%s'\n", curvename);
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_NAME);
goto leave;
}
err = openpgp_oid_from_str (curveoidstr, &mpi);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Now replace the curve parameters by the OID and shift the
rest of the parameters. */
gcry_mpi_release (skey[0]);
skey[0] = mpi;
for (idx=1; idx <= 4; idx++)
gcry_mpi_release (skey[idx]);
skey[1] = skey[5];
skey[2] = skey[6];
for (idx=3; idx <= 6; idx++)
skey[idx] = NULL;
/* Fixup the NPKEY and NSKEY to match OpenPGP reality. */
npkey = 2;
nskey = 3;
/* for (idx=0; skey[idx]; idx++) */
/* { */
/* log_info ("YYY skey[%d]:", idx); */
/* if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) */
/* { */
/* void *p; */
/* unsigned int nbits; */
/* p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (skey[idx], &nbits); */
/* log_printhex (NULL, p, (nbits+7)/8); */
/* } */
/* else */
/* gcry_mpi_dump (skey[idx]); */
/* log_printf ("\n"); */
/* } */
}
/* Do some sanity checks. */
if (s2k_count <= 1024)
{
@ -576,11 +648,17 @@ transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
err = openpgp_md_test_algo (s2k_algo);
if (err)
goto leave;
/* Check that the public key parameters match. */
/* Check that the public key parameters match. Since Libgcrypt 1.5
and the gcry_pk_get_curve function, gcry_mpi_cmp handles opaque
MPI correctly and thus we don't need to to do the extra
opaqueness checks. */
for (idx=0; idx < npkey; idx++)
if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)
if (0
#ifndef HAVE_GCRY_PK_GET_CURVE
gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)
|| gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)
#endif
|| gcry_mpi_cmp (pk->pkey[idx], skey[idx]))
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PUBKEY);
@ -607,7 +685,7 @@ transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
ski->is_protected = 1;
ski->sha1chk = 1;
ski->algo = protect_algo;
@ -636,7 +714,7 @@ transfer_format_to_openpgp (gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, PKT_public_key *pk)
bad_seckey:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
goto leave;
outofmem:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);
goto leave;
@ -671,7 +749,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
init_packet (&pkt);
kdbhd = keydb_new ();
if (!users)
if (!users)
{
ndesc = 1;
desc = xcalloc (ndesc, sizeof *desc);
@ -679,10 +757,10 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
}
else
{
for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next, ndesc++)
;
desc = xmalloc ( ndesc * sizeof *desc);
for (ndesc=0, sl=users; sl; sl = sl->next)
{
if (!(err=classify_user_id (sl->d, desc+ndesc)))
@ -708,7 +786,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
goto leave;
}
#endif
/* For secret key export we need to setup a decryption context. */
if (secret)
{
@ -721,7 +799,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
}
/* Prepare a cipher context. */
err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
@ -737,20 +815,20 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
kek = NULL;
}
while (!(err = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex)))
while (!(err = keydb_search2 (kdbhd, desc, ndesc, &descindex)))
{
int skip_until_subkey = 0;
u32 keyid[2];
PKT_public_key *pk;
if (!users)
if (!users)
desc[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
/* Read the keyblock. */
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keyblock = NULL;
err = keydb_get_keyblock (kdbhd, &keyblock);
if (err)
if (err)
{
log_error (_("error reading keyblock: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
goto leave;
@ -802,7 +880,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
clean_key (keyblock, opt.verbose, (options&EXPORT_MINIMAL), NULL, NULL);
/* And write it. */
for (kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0)); )
for (kbctx=NULL; (node = walk_kbnode (keyblock, &kbctx, 0)); )
{
if (skip_until_subkey)
{
@ -835,7 +913,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
subkey and include that subkey into the output
too. Need to add this subkey to a list so that
it won't get processed a second time.
So the first step here is to check that list and
skip in any case if the key is in that list.
@ -843,7 +921,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
function of GnuPG < 2.1 is not able to merge
secret keys and thus it is useless to output them
as two separate keys and have import merge them. */
if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node))
if (subkey_in_list_p (subkey_list, node))
skip_until_subkey = 1; /* Already processed this one. */
else
{
@ -854,7 +932,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
&& exact_subkey_match_p (desc+j, node))
break;
if (!(j < ndesc))
skip_until_subkey = 1; /* No other one matching. */
skip_until_subkey = 1; /* No other one matching. */
}
}
@ -885,7 +963,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
{
int i;
for (i=0;i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;i++)
if ( (node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[i]->class & 0x40))
break;
@ -904,7 +982,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
or a signature on an attrib */
while (kbctx->next && kbctx->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
kbctx = kbctx->next;
continue;
}
@ -913,7 +991,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
{
u32 subkidbuf[2], *subkid;
char *hexgrip, *serialno;
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
subkid = NULL;
@ -930,7 +1008,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
skip_until_subkey = 1;
continue;
}
err = hexkeygrip_from_pk (pk, &hexgrip);
if (err)
{
@ -970,7 +1048,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
/* Create a key stub. */
struct seckey_info *ski;
const char *s;
pk->seckey_info = ski = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ski);
if (!ski)
{
@ -989,7 +1067,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
ski->ivlen++, s += 2)
ski->iv[ski->ivlen] = xtoi_2 (s);
}
if ((options&EXPORT_SEXP_FORMAT))
err = build_sexp (out, node->pkt, &indent);
else
@ -1032,7 +1110,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
realkeylen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (key, keylen, NULL, &err);
if (!realkeylen)
goto unwraperror; /* Invalid csexp. */
err = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, NULL, key, realkeylen);
xfree (key);
key = NULL;
@ -1252,7 +1330,7 @@ build_sexp_seckey (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent)
/* For some packet types we write them in a S-expression format. This
is still EXPERIMENTAL and subject to change. */
static int
static int
build_sexp (iobuf_t out, PACKET *pkt, int *indent)
{
int rc;

3
g10/gpg.c
View File

@ -1959,6 +1959,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
NEED_LIBGCRYPT_VERSION, gcry_check_version (NULL) );
}
/* Use our own logging handler for Libcgrypt. */
setup_libgcrypt_logging ();
/* Put random number into secure memory */
gcry_control (GCRYCTL_USE_SECURE_RNDPOOL);

252
g10/import.c
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2007, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
* 2007, 2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ import_keys_internal (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
rc = import (ctrl, inp2, fname, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options);
iobuf_close(inp2);
/* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */
iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE,
iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE,
0, (char*)fname);
if( rc )
log_error("import from `%s' failed: %s\n", fname,
@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ import (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
rc = import_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock,
stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0);
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
rc = import_secret_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock, stats, options);
else if( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
kbnode_t node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
int problem=0;
merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
@ -672,9 +672,9 @@ check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value))
{
const char *algo =
const char *algo =
(openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value)
? num
? num
: openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs->value));
if(!problem)
check_prefs_warning(pk);
@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
{
const char *algo =
(gcry_md_test_algo (prefs->value)
? num
? num
: gcry_md_algo_name (prefs->value));
if(!problem)
check_prefs_warning(pk);
@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
return 0;
}
if (opt.interactive) {
if(is_status_enabled())
print_import_check (pk, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id);
@ -938,7 +938,7 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk_orig, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
}
@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
n_sigs_cleaned = fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (keyblock_orig, keyid);
if (n_sigs_cleaned)
commit_kbnode (&keyblock_orig);
/* and try to merge the block */
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
@ -1032,13 +1032,13 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
stats->n_sigs_cleaned +=n_sigs_cleaned;
stats->n_uids_cleaned +=n_uids_cleaned;
if (is_status_enabled ())
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, ((n_uids?2:0)|(n_sigs?4:0)|(n_subk?8:0)));
}
else
{
same_key = 1;
if (is_status_enabled ())
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, 0);
if( !opt.quiet )
@ -1107,6 +1107,37 @@ import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
}
/* Extract one MPI value from the S-expression PKEY which is expected
to hold a "public-key". Returns NULL on error. */
static gcry_mpi_t
one_mpi_from_pkey (gcry_sexp_t pkey, const char *name, size_t namelen)
{
gcry_sexp_t list, l2;
gcry_mpi_t a;
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (pkey, "public-key", 0);
if (!list)
return NULL;
l2 = gcry_sexp_cadr (list);
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = l2;
if (!list)
return NULL;
l2 = gcry_sexp_find_token (list, name, namelen);
if (!l2)
{
gcry_sexp_release (list);
return NULL;
}
a = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG);
gcry_sexp_release (l2);
gcry_sexp_release (list);
return a;
}
/* Transfer all the secret keys in SEC_KEYBLOCK to the gpg-agent. The
function prints diagnostics and returns an error code. */
static gpg_error_t
@ -1133,6 +1164,7 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
size_t wrappedkeylen;
char *cache_nonce = NULL;
gcry_mpi_t ecc_params[5] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
/* Get the current KEK. */
err = agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 0, &kek, &keklen);
@ -1148,7 +1180,8 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
if (!err)
err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen);
if (err)
goto leave; xfree (kek);
goto leave;
xfree (kek);
kek = NULL;
main_pk = NULL;
@ -1161,6 +1194,20 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
if (!main_pk)
main_pk = pk;
/* Make sure the keyids are available. */
keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
pk->main_keyid[0] = pk->keyid[0];
pk->main_keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1];
}
else
{
pk->main_keyid[0] = main_pk->keyid[0];
pk->main_keyid[1] = main_pk->keyid[1];
}
ski = pk->seckey_info;
if (!ski)
BUG ();
@ -1191,34 +1238,109 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
init_membuf (&mbuf, 50);
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey");
for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++)
if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
{
if (!pk->pkey[i])
; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */
else if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %b");
format_args_buf_ptr[i] = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &n);
format_args_buf_int[i] = (n+7)/8;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_int + i;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_ptr + i;
}
/* We need special treatment for ECC algorithms. OpenPGP
stores only the curve name but the agent expects a full
key. This is so that we can keep all curve name
validation code out of gpg-agent. */
#if PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY < 7
#error PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY too low for ECC
#endif
char *curve = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
if (!curve)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
#ifdef HAVE_GCRY_PK_GET_CURVE /* Also ensures availability of get_param. */
gcry_sexp_t cparam = gcry_pk_get_param (GCRY_PK_ECDSA, curve);
#else
gcry_sexp_t cparam = NULL;
#endif
xfree (curve);
if (!cparam)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_CURVE);
else
{
const char *s;
/* Append the curve parameters P, A, B, G and N. */
for (i=j=0; !err && *(s = "pabgn"+i); i++)
{
ecc_params[i] = one_mpi_from_pkey (cparam, s, 1);
if (!ecc_params[i])
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CURVE);
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = ecc_params+i;
}
}
gcry_sexp_release (cparam);
if (!err)
{
/* Append the public key element Q. */
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + 1;
/* Append the secret key element D. Note that
for ECDH we need to skip PKEY[2] because this
holds the KEK which is not needed. */
i = pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH? 3 : 2;
if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %b");
format_args_buf_ptr[i]
= gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i],&n);
format_args_buf_int[i] = (n+7)/8;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_int + i;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_ptr + i;
}
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
/* Standard case for the old (non-ECC) algorithms. */
for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++)
{
if (!pk->pkey[i])
; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */
else if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %b");
format_args_buf_ptr[i] = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i],&n);
format_args_buf_int[i] = (n+7)/8;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_int + i;
format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_ptr + i;
}
else
{
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
}
}
}
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")\n");
put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1);
{
char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL);
if (!format)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&skey, NULL, format, format_args);
xfree (format);
}
if (err)
xfree (get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL));
else
{
char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL);
if (!format)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&skey, NULL, format, format_args);
xfree (format);
}
if (err)
{
log_error ("error building skey array: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
@ -1228,7 +1350,7 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
if (ski->is_protected)
{
char countbuf[35];
/* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a
dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and
thus we send dummy data for the IV. */
@ -1289,9 +1411,9 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
transferkey = NULL;
/* Send the wrapped key to the agent. */
{
{
char *desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, 1, 1);
err = agent_import_key (ctrl, desc, &cache_nonce,
err = agent_import_key (ctrl, desc, &cache_nonce,
wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen);
xfree (desc);
}
@ -1328,6 +1450,8 @@ transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
}
leave:
for (i=0; i < DIM (ecc_params); i++)
gcry_mpi_release (ecc_params[i]);
xfree (cache_nonce);
xfree (wrappedkey);
xfree (transferkey);
@ -1392,7 +1516,7 @@ sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
* with the trust calculation.
*/
static int
import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
struct stats_s *stats, unsigned int options)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
@ -1400,17 +1524,17 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
KBNODE node, uidnode;
u32 keyid[2];
int rc = 0;
/* Get the key and print some info about it */
node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY);
if (!node)
BUG ();
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
uidnode = find_next_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_USER_ID);
if (opt.verbose)
{
log_info ("sec %4u%c/%s %s ",
@ -1423,7 +1547,7 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
log_printf ("\n");
}
stats->secret_read++;
if (!uidnode)
{
log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
@ -1456,10 +1580,10 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
return 0;
}
#endif
#endif
clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
if (!(options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) || !have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid) )
{
/* We don't have this key, insert as a new key. */
@ -1477,7 +1601,7 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
/* Fixme: We should check for an invalid keyblock and
cancel the secret key import in this case. */
release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
/* Read the keyblock again to get the effects of a merge. */
/* Fixme: we should do this based on the fingerprint or
even better let import_one return the merged
@ -1493,7 +1617,7 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
if (!opt.quiet)
log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"),
keystr_from_pk (pk));
if (is_status_enabled ())
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, 1|16);
check_prefs (ctrl, node);
}
@ -1502,11 +1626,11 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock,
}
}
else
{
{
/* We don't want to merge the secret keys. */
log_error (_("key %s: secret key part already available\n"),
keystr_from_pk (pk));
if (is_status_enabled ())
if (is_status_enabled ())
print_import_ok (pk, 16);
}
@ -1556,9 +1680,9 @@ import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node, struct stats_s *stats )
{
byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
size_t an;
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
afp[an++] = 0;
rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
}
@ -1654,11 +1778,11 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
int rc;
u32 bsdate=0, rsdate=0;
kbnode_t bsnode = NULL, rsnode = NULL;
(void)fname;
(void)pk;
for (n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode (n, 0)); )
for (n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode (n, 0)); )
{
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
{
@ -1672,7 +1796,7 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
if ( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
continue;
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
if ( keyid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || keyid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
{
@ -1684,7 +1808,7 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
import a fully-cached key which speeds things up. */
if (!opt.no_sig_cache)
check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( IS_UID_SIG(sig) || IS_UID_REV(sig) )
{
KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
@ -1694,16 +1818,16 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
keystr(keyid));
return -1; /* The complete keyblock is invalid. */
}
/* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying. */
if (!(unode->flag&1))
if (!(unode->flag&1))
{
rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
if ( rc )
{
if ( opt.verbose )
{
char *p = utf8_to_native
char *p = utf8_to_native
(unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
strlen (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
log_info (gpg_err_code(rc) == G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
@ -1732,7 +1856,7 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
n->flag |= 4;
}
}
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) )
else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) )
{
/* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps like
the rest of gpg. If the standard gets revocation
@ -1761,19 +1885,19 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
else
{
/* It's valid, so is it newer? */
if (sig->timestamp >= bsdate)
if (sig->timestamp >= bsdate)
{
knode->flag |= 1; /* The subkey is valid. */
if (bsnode)
{
/* Delete the last binding sig since this
one is newer */
bsnode->flag |= 4;
bsnode->flag |= 4;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
" binding\n"),keystr(keyid));
}
bsnode = n;
bsdate = sig->timestamp;
}
@ -1818,12 +1942,12 @@ chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
{
/* Delete the last revocation sig since
this one is newer. */
rsnode->flag |= 4;
rsnode->flag |= 4;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
" revocation\n"),keystr(keyid));
}
rsnode = n;
rsdate = sig->timestamp;
}

57
g10/keygen.c
View File

@ -1080,6 +1080,40 @@ write_keybinding (KBNODE root, PKT_public_key *pri_psk, PKT_public_key *sub_psk,
return err;
}
/* Map the Libgcrypt ECC curve NAME to an OID. If R_NBITS is not NULL
store the bit size of the curve there. Returns NULL for unknown
curve names. */
const char *
gpg_curve_to_oid (const char *name, unsigned int *r_nbits)
{
unsigned int nbits = 0;
const char *oidstr;
if (!name)
oidstr = NULL;
else if (!strcmp (name, "NIST P-256"))
{
oidstr = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7";
nbits = 256;
}
else if (!strcmp (name, "NIST P-384"))
{
oidstr = "1.3.132.0.34";
nbits = 384;
}
else if (!strcmp (name, "NIST P-521"))
{
oidstr = "1.3.132.0.35";
nbits = 521;
}
else
oidstr = NULL;
if (r_nbits)
*r_nbits = nbits;
return oidstr;
}
static gpg_error_t
ecckey_from_sexp (gcry_mpi_t *array, gcry_sexp_t sexp, int algo)
@ -1117,23 +1151,11 @@ ecckey_from_sexp (gcry_mpi_t *array, gcry_sexp_t sexp, int algo)
goto leave;
}
gcry_sexp_release (l2);
if (!strcmp (curve, "NIST P-256"))
{
oidstr = "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7";
nbits = 256;
}
else if (!strcmp (curve, "NIST P-384"))
{
oidstr = "1.3.132.0.34";
nbits = 384;
}
else if (!strcmp (curve, "NIST P-521"))
{
oidstr = "1.3.132.0.35";
nbits = 521;
}
else
oidstr = gpg_curve_to_oid (curve, &nbits);
if (!oidstr)
{
/* That can't happen because we used one of the curves
gpg_curve_to_oid knows about. */
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ);
goto leave;
}
@ -1445,7 +1467,8 @@ gen_ecc (int algo, unsigned int nbits, kbnode_t pub_root,
assert (algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA || algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH);
/* For now we may only use one of the 3 NISY curves. */
/* For now we may only use one of the 3 NIST curves. See also
gpg_curve_to_oid. */
if (nbits <= 256)
curve = "NIST P-256";
else if (nbits <= 384)

97
g10/keyid.c
View File

@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_UNSIGNED_TIME_T
# define IS_INVALID_TIME_T(a) ((a) == (time_t)(-1))
#else
#else
/* Error or 32 bit time_t and value after 2038-01-19. */
# define IS_INVALID_TIME_T(a) ((a) < 0)
#endif
@ -81,6 +81,11 @@ hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk)
if(pk->version<4)
n+=2;
/* FIXME: We can avoid the extra malloc by calling only the first
mpi_print here which computes the required length and calling the
real mpi_print only at the end. The speed advantage would only be
for ECC (opaque MPIs) or if we could implement an mpi_print
variant with a callback handler to do the hashing. */
if (npkey==0 && pk->pkey[0]
&& gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[0], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
@ -92,25 +97,32 @@ hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
for (i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
{
enum gcry_mpi_format fmt;
if ((pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
&& (i == 0 || i == 2))
fmt = GCRYMPI_FMT_USG; /* Name of OID or KEK parms. */
if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
{
size_t nbits;
const void *p;
p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (pk->pkey[i], &nbits);
pp[i] = xmalloc ((nbits+7)/8);
memcpy (pp[i], p, (nbits+7)/8);
nn[i] = (nbits+7)/8;
n += nn[i];
}
else
fmt = GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP;
if (gcry_mpi_print (fmt, NULL, 0, &nbytes, pk->pkey[i]))
BUG ();
pp[i] = xmalloc (nbytes);
if (gcry_mpi_print (fmt, pp[i], nbytes, &nbytes, pk->pkey[i]))
BUG ();
nn[i] = nbytes;
n += nn[i];
{
if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0,
&nbytes, pk->pkey[i]))
BUG ();
pp[i] = xmalloc (nbytes);
if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, pp[i], nbytes,
&nbytes, pk->pkey[i]))
BUG ();
nn[i] = nbytes;
n += nn[i];
}
}
}
gcry_md_putc ( md, 0x99 ); /* ctb */
/* What does it mean if n is greater than than 0xFFFF ? */
gcry_md_putc ( md, n >> 8 ); /* 2 byte length header */
@ -127,7 +139,7 @@ hash_public_key (gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk)
u16 days=0;
if(pk->expiredate)
days=(u16)((pk->expiredate - pk->timestamp) / 86400L);
gcry_md_putc ( md, days >> 8 );
gcry_md_putc ( md, days );
}
@ -178,7 +190,7 @@ v3_keyid (gcry_mpi_t a, u32 *ki)
BUG ();
if (nbytes < 8) /* oops */
ki[0] = ki[1] = 0;
else
else
{
p = buffer + nbytes - 8;
ki[0] = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] <<16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
@ -215,7 +227,7 @@ keystrlen(void)
const char *
keystr (u32 *keyid)
{
{
static char keyid_str[KEYID_STR_SIZE];
switch (opt.keyid_format)
@ -226,7 +238,7 @@ keystr (u32 *keyid)
case KF_LONG:
if (keyid[0])
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX",
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX",
(ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1]);
else
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX", (ulong)keyid[1]);
@ -238,12 +250,12 @@ keystr (u32 *keyid)
case KF_0xLONG:
if(keyid[0])
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "0x%08lX%08lX",
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "0x%08lX%08lX",
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1]);
else
snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "0x%08lX", (ulong)keyid[1]);
break;
default:
BUG();
}
@ -254,7 +266,7 @@ keystr (u32 *keyid)
const char *
keystr_with_sub (u32 *main_kid, u32 *sub_kid)
{
{
static char buffer[KEYID_STR_SIZE+1+KEYID_STR_SIZE];
char *p;
@ -408,7 +420,7 @@ keyid_from_fingerprint( const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, u32 *keyid )
else
keyid_from_pk (&pk, keyid);
}
else
else
{
const byte *dp = fprint;
keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
@ -422,7 +434,7 @@ keyid_from_fingerprint( const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len, u32 *keyid )
u32
keyid_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig, u32 *keyid)
{
if( keyid )
if( keyid )
{
keyid[0] = sig->keyid[0];
keyid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
@ -437,13 +449,13 @@ namehash_from_uid (PKT_user_id *uid)
if (!uid->namehash)
{
uid->namehash = xmalloc (20);
if (uid->attrib_data)
rmd160_hash_buffer (uid->namehash, uid->attrib_data, uid->attrib_len);
else
rmd160_hash_buffer (uid->namehash, uid->name, uid->len);
}
return uid->namehash;
}
@ -465,7 +477,7 @@ mk_datestr (char *buffer, time_t atime)
if (IS_INVALID_TIME_T (atime))
strcpy (buffer, "????" "-??" "-??"); /* Mark this as invalid. */
else
else
{
tp = gmtime (&atime);
sprintf (buffer,"%04d-%02d-%02d",
@ -485,7 +497,7 @@ datestr_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk)
{
static char buffer[11+5];
time_t atime = pk->timestamp;
return mk_datestr (buffer, atime);
}
@ -518,7 +530,7 @@ expirestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
{
static char buffer[11+5];
time_t atime;
if (!sig->expiredate)
return _("never ");
atime=sig->expiredate;
@ -591,7 +603,7 @@ const char *
colon_datestr_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
{
static char buf[20];
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%lu", (ulong)sig->timestamp);
return buf;
}
@ -621,21 +633,21 @@ fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len)
const byte *dp;
size_t len, nbytes;
int i;
if ( pk->version < 4 )
{
if ( is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) )
{
/* RSA in version 3 packets is special. */
gcry_md_hd_t md;
if (gcry_md_open (&md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0))
BUG ();
if ( pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo) > 1 )
if ( pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo) > 1 )
{
for (i=0; i < 2; i++)
{
if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0,
if (gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, NULL, 0,
&nbytes, pk->pkey[i]))
BUG ();
/* fixme: Better allocate BUF on the stack */
@ -662,10 +674,10 @@ fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len)
memset (array,0,16);
}
}
else
else
{
gcry_md_hd_t md;
md = do_fingerprint_md(pk);
dp = gcry_md_read( md, 0 );
len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (gcry_md_get_algo (md));
@ -677,7 +689,7 @@ fingerprint_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, byte *array, size_t *ret_len)
pk->keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
gcry_md_close( md);
}
*ret_len = len;
return array;
}
@ -694,7 +706,7 @@ keygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned char *array)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t s_pkey;
if (DBG_PACKET)
log_debug ("get_keygrip for public key\n");
@ -742,7 +754,7 @@ keygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned char *array)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO);
break;
}
if (err)
return err;
@ -758,7 +770,7 @@ keygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned char *array)
/* FIXME: Save the keygrip in PK. */
}
gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
return 0;
}
@ -786,4 +798,3 @@ hexkeygrip_from_pk (PKT_public_key *pk, char **r_grip)
}
return err;
}

1
g10/main.h
View File

@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ void keyedit_passwd (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username);
void show_basic_key_info (KBNODE keyblock);
/*-- keygen.c --*/
const char *gpg_curve_to_oid (const char *name, unsigned int *r_nbits);
u32 parse_expire_string(const char *string);
u32 ask_expire_interval(int object,const char *def_expire);
u32 ask_expiredate(void);

104
g10/passphrase.c
View File

@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER)
log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (err));
/* Default to 65536 which we used up to 2.0.13. */
return 96;
return 96;
}
else if (mycnt >= 65011712)
return 255; /* Largest possible value. */
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
if (iterations >= 65011712)
return 255;
/* Need count to be in the range 16-31 */
for (count=iterations>>6; count>=32; count>>=1)
c++;
@ -96,13 +96,13 @@ encode_s2k_iterations (int iterations)
if (S2K_DECODE_COUNT(result) < iterations)
result++;
return result;
}
/* Hash a passphrase using the supplied s2k.
/* Hash a passphrase using the supplied s2k.
Always needs: dek->algo, s2k->mode, s2k->hash_algo. */
static void
hash_passphrase ( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k)
@ -119,20 +119,20 @@ hash_passphrase ( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k)
if (gcry_md_open (&md, s2k->hash_algo, 1))
BUG ();
for (pass=0; used < dek->keylen ; pass++ )
for (pass=0; used < dek->keylen ; pass++ )
{
if ( pass )
if ( pass )
{
gcry_md_reset (md);
for (i=0; i < pass; i++ ) /* Preset the hash context. */
gcry_md_putc (md, 0 );
}
if ( s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3 )
if ( s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3 )
{
int len2 = pwlen + 8;
ulong count = len2;
if ( s2k->mode == 3 )
{
count = S2K_DECODE_COUNT(s2k->count);
@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ hash_passphrase ( DEK *dek, char *pw, STRING2KEY *s2k)
/* A little bit complicated because we need a ulong for count. */
while ( count > len2 ) /* maybe iterated+salted */
{
{
gcry_md_write ( md, s2k->salt, 8 );
gcry_md_write ( md, pw, pwlen );
count -= len2;
@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd )
int i, len;
char *pw;
if ( !opt.batch )
if ( !opt.batch )
{ /* Not used but we have to do a dummy read, so that it won't end
up at the begin of the message if the quite usual trick to
prepend the passphtrase to the message is used. */
@ -240,12 +240,12 @@ read_passphrase_from_fd( int fd )
while (!(read (fd, buf, 1) != 1 || *buf == '\n' ))
;
*buf = 0;
return;
return;
}
for (pw = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
for (pw = NULL, i = len = 100; ; i++ )
{
if (i >= len-1 )
if (i >= len-1 )
{
char *pw2 = pw;
len += 100;
@ -311,35 +311,35 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
if( keyid && get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
{
if (pk)
free_public_key( pk );
free_public_key( pk );
pk = NULL; /* oops: no key for some reason */
}
orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
if (custom_description)
atext = native_to_utf8 (custom_description);
else if ( !mode && pk && keyid )
{
{
char *uid;
size_t uidlen;
const char *algo_name = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( pk->pubkey_algo );
const char *timestr;
char *maink;
if ( !algo_name )
algo_name = "?";
#define KEYIDSTRING _(" (main key ID %s)")
maink = xmalloc ( strlen (KEYIDSTRING) + keystrlen() + 20 );
if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] && keyid[0] != keyid[2]
if( keyid[2] && keyid[3] && keyid[0] != keyid[2]
&& keyid[1] != keyid[3] )
sprintf( maink, KEYIDSTRING, keystr(&keyid[2]) );
else
*maink = 0;
uid = get_user_id ( keyid, &uidlen );
uid = get_user_id ( keyid, &uidlen );
timestr = strtimestamp (pk->timestamp);
#undef KEYIDSTRING
@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
"%u-bit %s key, ID %s,\n" \
"created %s%s.\n" )
atext = xmalloc ( 100 + strlen (PROMPTSTRING)
atext = xmalloc ( 100 + strlen (PROMPTSTRING)
+ uidlen + 15 + strlen(algo_name) + keystrlen()
+ strlen (timestr) + strlen (maink) );
sprintf (atext, PROMPTSTRING,
@ -362,16 +362,16 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
#undef PROMPTSTRING
{
{
size_t dummy;
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fpr, &dummy );
have_fpr = 1;
}
}
else
atext = xstrdup ( _("Enter passphrase\n") );
if (!mode && cacheid)
my_cacheid = cacheid;
@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
rc = agent_get_passphrase (my_cacheid, tryagain_text, my_prompt, atext,
repeat, check, &pw);
xfree (my_prompt);
xfree (atext); atext = NULL;
@ -396,14 +396,14 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
if (!rc)
;
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
|| gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
{
log_info (_("cancelled by user\n") );
if (canceled)
*canceled = 1;
}
else
else
{
log_error (_("problem with the agent: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
/* Due to limitations in the API of the upper layers they
@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ passphrase_get ( u32 *keyid, int mode, const char *cacheid, int repeat,
definitely not happen and let it continue without requiring a
passphrase. Given that now all the upper layers handle a
cancel correctly, we simply set the cancel flag now for all
errors from the agent. */
errors from the agent. */
if (canceled)
*canceled = 1;
@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
int rc;
(void)algo;
if (!cacheid)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
char hexfprbuf[2*20+1];
size_t dummy;
pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk);
if ( !keyid || get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
{
@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
NULL, sets it to true.
MODE 0: Allow cached passphrase
1: Ignore cached passphrase
1: Ignore cached passphrase
2: Ditto, but create a new key
3: Allow cached passphrase; use the S2K salt as the cache ID
4: Ditto, but create a new key
@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ passphrase_clear_cache ( u32 *keyid, const char *cacheid, int algo )
DEK *
passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode,
const char *tryagain_text,
const char *tryagain_text,
const char *custdesc, const char *custprompt,
int *canceled)
{
@ -499,11 +499,11 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
if (!canceled)
canceled = &dummy_canceled;
*canceled = 0;
if ( !s2k )
{
assert (mode != 3 && mode != 4);
/* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
/* This is used for the old rfc1991 mode
* Note: This must match the code in encode.c with opt.rfc1991 set */
s2k = &help_s2k;
s2k->mode = 0;
@ -529,16 +529,16 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
/* If we do not have a passphrase available in NEXT_PW and status
information are request, we print them now. */
if ( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() )
if ( !next_pw && is_status_enabled() )
{
char buf[50];
if ( keyid )
{
u32 used_kid[2];
char *us;
if ( keyid[2] && keyid[3] )
if ( keyid[2] && keyid[3] )
{
used_kid[0] = keyid[2];
used_kid[1] = keyid[3];
@ -548,16 +548,16 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
used_kid[0] = keyid[0];
used_kid[1] = keyid[1];
}
us = get_long_user_id_string ( keyid );
write_status_text ( STATUS_USERID_HINT, us );
xfree(us);
snprintf (buf, sizeof buf -1, "%08lX%08lX %08lX%08lX %d 0",
(ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
(ulong)used_kid[0], (ulong)used_kid[1],
pubkey_algo );
write_status_text ( STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE, buf );
}
else
@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
{
PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
char *p;
p = get_user_id_native(keyid);
tty_printf ("\n");
tty_printf (_("You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for\n"
@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
if ( !get_pubkey( pk, keyid ) )
{
const char *s = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( pk->pubkey_algo );
tty_printf (_("%u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s"),
nbits_from_pk( pk ), s?s:"?", keystr(keyid),
strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
@ -610,19 +610,19 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
free_public_key( pk );
}
if ( next_pw )
if ( next_pw )
{
/* Simply return the passphrase we already have in NEXT_PW. */
pw = next_pw;
next_pw = NULL;
}
else if ( have_static_passphrase () )
else if ( have_static_passphrase () )
{
/* Return the passphrase we have stored in FD_PASSWD. */
pw = xmalloc_secure ( strlen(fd_passwd)+1 );
strcpy ( pw, fd_passwd );
}
else
else
{
if ((mode == 3 || mode == 4) && (s2k->mode == 1 || s2k->mode == 3))
{
@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ passphrase_to_dek_ext (u32 *keyid, int pubkey_algo,
return NULL;
}
}
if ( !pw || !*pw )
write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
@ -689,15 +689,15 @@ gpg_format_keydesc (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
char *maink;
char *desc;
const char *prompt;
algo_name = openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo);
timestr = strtimestamp (pk->timestamp);
uid = get_user_id (pk->keyid, &uidlen);
uid = get_user_id (pk->keyid, &uidlen);
orig_codeset = i18n_switchto_utf8 ();
if (pk->main_keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]
&& pk->keyid[0] != pk->main_keyid[0]
&& pk->keyid[0] != pk->main_keyid[0]
&& pk->keyid[1] != pk->main_keyid[1])
maink = xtryasprintf (_(" (main key ID %s)"), keystr (pk->main_keyid));
else
@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ gpg_format_keydesc (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
"created %s%s.\n"),
prompt,
(int)uidlen, uid,
nbits_from_pk (pk), algo_name,
nbits_from_pk (pk), algo_name,
keystr (pk->keyid), timestr,
maink?maink:"" );
xfree (maink);
@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ gpg_format_keydesc (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, int escaped)
if (escaped)
{
char *tmp = percent_plus_escape (desc);
xfree (desc);
xfree (desc);
desc = tmp;
}

5
include/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
2011-02-01 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* cipher.h (PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY, PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY): Bump up to
accommodate gcrypt ECC keys.
2011-01-21 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* cipher.h (GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT): Remove compatibility macros

4
include/cipher.h
View File

@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ typedef struct
/* Constants to allocate static MPI arrays. */
#define PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY 4
#define PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY 6
#define PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY 5
#define PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY 7
#define PUBKEY_MAX_NSIG 2
#define PUBKEY_MAX_NENC 2

3
tests/openpgp/samplekeys/README
View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
no-creation-time.gpg A key with a zero creation time.
ecc-sample-1-pub.asc The first ECC sample key.
ecc-sample-1-sec.asc The first ECC sample key (secret).

22
tests/openpgp/samplekeys/ecc-sample-1-pub.asc Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
The key has been generated by the first GnuPG ECC version at
http://code.google.com/p/gnupg-ecc.
The sample key has ECDSA top key 0xBAA59D9C and a single ECDH
encryption subkey 0x4089AB73. ECDH subkey uses SHA-256 and AES-128
with KDF.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v2.1.0-ecc (GNU/Linux)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=hMzp
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

25
tests/openpgp/samplekeys/ecc-sample-1-sec.asc Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
The key has been generated by the first GnuPG ECC version at
http://code.google.com/p/gnupg-ecc.
The sample key has ECDSA top key 0xBAA59D9C and a single ECDH
encryption subkey 0x4089AB73. ECDH subkey uses SHA-256 and AES-128
with KDF. The password for the key is "ecc".
-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
Version: GnuPG v2.1.0-ecc (GNU/Linux)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=O8Dg
-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----