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agent: Support the use case of composite PQC for prompting.

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* agent/findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Take care of the case
where GRIP==CTRL->keygrip1.
* agent/pkdecrypt.c (composite_pgp_kem_decrypt): Use NULL for the
GRIP, it's for crypto operation where prompt is expected.

--

GnuPG-bug-id: 7648
Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <gniibe@fsij.org>
This commit is contained in:
NIIBE Yutaka 2025-05-14 11:41:31 +09:00
parent d5a4a2dc89
commit 45a11327f3
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 640114AF89DE6054
2 changed files with 35 additions and 27 deletions
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60
agent/findkey.c
View File

@ -1345,22 +1345,23 @@ prompt_for_card (ctrl_t ctrl, const unsigned char *grip,
/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp in RESULT after locating it using
the GRIP. Caller should set GRIP=NULL, when a key in a file is
intended to be used for cryptographic operation. In this case,
CTRL->keygrip is used to locate the file, and it may ask a user for
confirmation. If the operation shall be diverted to a token, an
allocated S-expression with the shadow_info part from the file is
stored at SHADOW_INFO; if not NULL will be stored at SHADOW_INFO.
CACHE_MODE defines now the cache shall be used. DESC_TEXT may be
set to present a custom description for the pinentry. LOOKUP_TTL
is an optional function to convey a TTL to the cache manager; we do
not simply pass the TTL value because the value is only needed if
an unprotect action was needed and looking up the TTL may have some
overhead (e.g. scanning the sshcontrol file). If a CACHE_NONCE is
given that cache item is first tried to get a passphrase. If
R_PASSPHRASE is not NULL, the function succeeded and the key was
protected the used passphrase (entered or from the cache) is stored
there; if not NULL will be stored. The caller needs to free the
returned passphrase. */
intended to be used for cryptographic operation (except the case of
GRIP==CTRL->keygrip1 for PQC). When GRIP==NULL, CTRL->keygrip is
used to locate the file. When GRIP==NULL or GRIP==CTRL->keygrip1,
it may ask a user for confirmation. If the operation shall be
diverted to a token, an allocated S-expression with the shadow_info
part from the file is stored at SHADOW_INFO; if not NULL will be
stored at SHADOW_INFO. CACHE_MODE defines now the cache shall be
used. DESC_TEXT may be set to present a custom description for the
pinentry. LOOKUP_TTL is an optional function to convey a TTL to
the cache manager; we do not simply pass the TTL value because the
value is only needed if an unprotect action was needed and looking
up the TTL may have some overhead (e.g. scanning the sshcontrol
file). If a CACHE_NONCE is given that cache item is first tried to
get a passphrase. If R_PASSPHRASE is not NULL, the function
succeeded and the key was protected the used passphrase (entered or
from the cache) is stored there; if not NULL will be stored. The
caller needs to free the returned passphrase. */
gpg_error_t
agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
const char *desc_text,
@ -1375,6 +1376,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
nvc_t keymeta = NULL;
char *desc_text_buffer = NULL; /* Used in case we extend DESC_TEXT. */
int for_crypto_operation = 0;
*result = NULL;
if (shadow_info)
@ -1384,11 +1386,18 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
if (r_timestamp)
*r_timestamp = (time_t)(-1);
if (!grip && !ctrl->have_keygrip)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
if (!grip)
{
if (!ctrl->have_keygrip)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY);
for_crypto_operation = 1;
grip = ctrl->keygrip;
}
else if (grip == ctrl->keygrip1)
/* This is the use case for composite PQC, */
for_crypto_operation = 1;
err = read_key_file (ctrl, grip? grip : ctrl->keygrip,
&s_skey, &keymeta, NULL);
err = read_key_file (ctrl, grip, &s_skey, &keymeta, NULL);
if (err)
{
if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ENOENT)
@ -1418,7 +1427,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
*r_timestamp = isotime2epoch (created);
}
if (!grip && keymeta)
if (for_crypto_operation && keymeta)
{
const char *ask_confirmation = nvc_get_string (keymeta, "Confirm:");
@ -1520,8 +1529,7 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
if (!err)
{
err = unprotect (ctrl, cache_nonce, desc_text_final, &buf,
grip? grip : ctrl->keygrip,
err = unprotect (ctrl, cache_nonce, desc_text_final, &buf, grip,
cache_mode, lookup_ttl, r_passphrase);
if (err)
log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n",
@ -1556,9 +1564,9 @@ agent_key_from_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce,
* When it's a key on card (not on tpm2), make sure
* it's available.
*/
if (strcmp (shadow_type, "t1-v1") == 0 && !grip)
err = prompt_for_card (ctrl, ctrl->keygrip,
keymeta, *shadow_info);
if (strcmp (shadow_type, "t1-v1") == 0
&& for_crypto_operation)
err = prompt_for_card (ctrl, grip, keymeta, *shadow_info);
}
}
else

2
agent/pkdecrypt.c
View File

@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ composite_pgp_kem_decrypt (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *desc_text,
gcry_buffer_t fixed_info = { 0, 0, 0, NULL };
err = agent_key_from_file (ctrl, NULL, desc_text,
ctrl->keygrip, &shadow_info0,
NULL, &shadow_info0,
CACHE_MODE_NORMAL, NULL, &s_skey0, NULL, NULL);
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
{