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Code Activity

gpg: Improve passphrase caching.

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* agent/cache.c (last_stored_cache_key): New.
(agent_get_cache): Allow NULL for KEY.
(agent_store_cache_hit): New.
* agent/findkey.c (unprotect): Call new function and try to use the
last stored key.

* g10/revoke.c (create_revocation): Add arg CACHE_NONCE and pass to
make_keysig_packet.
(gen_standard_revoke): Add arg CACHE_NONCE and pass to
create_revocation.
* g10/keygen.c (do_generate_keypair): Call gen_standard_revoke with
cache nonce.
--

This patch adds two features:

1. The key for the last passphrase successfully used for unprotecting
a key is stored away.  On a cache miss the stored away passphrase is
tried as well.  This helps for the common GPG use case of having a
signing and encryption (sub)key with the same passphrase.  See the
code for more comments.

2. The now auto-generated revocation certificate does not anymore
popup a passphrase prompt.  Thus for standard key generation the
passphrase needs to be given only once (well, two with the
confirmation).
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2014-09-17 15:12:08 +02:00
parent 83c2d2396c
commit 457bce5cd3
6 changed files with 81 additions and 9 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
agent/agent.h
View File

@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ void agent_flush_cache (void);
int agent_put_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode,
const char *data, int ttl);
char *agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode);
void agent_store_cache_hit (const char *key);
/*-- pksign.c --*/

29
agent/cache.c
View File

@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ struct cache_item_s {
/* The cache himself. */
static ITEM thecache;
/* NULL or the last cache key stored by agent_store_cache_hit. */
static char *last_stored_cache_key;
/* This function must be called once to initialize this module. It
has to be done before a second thread is spawned. */
@ -388,12 +391,24 @@ agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
ITEM r;
char *value = NULL;
int res;
int last_stored = 0;
if (cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_IGNORE)
return NULL;
if (!key)
{
key = last_stored_cache_key;
if (!key)
return NULL;
last_stored = 1;
}
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug ("agent_get_cache '%s' (mode %d) ...\n", key, cache_mode);
log_debug ("agent_get_cache '%s' (mode %d)%s ...\n",
key, cache_mode,
last_stored? " (stored cache key)":"");
housekeeping ();
for (r=thecache; r; r = r->next)
@ -404,6 +419,7 @@ agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
|| r->cache_mode == cache_mode)
&& !strcmp (r->key, key))
{
/* Note: To avoid races KEY may not be accessed anymore below. */
r->accessed = gnupg_get_time ();
if (DBG_CACHE)
log_debug ("... hit\n");
@ -442,3 +458,14 @@ agent_get_cache (const char *key, cache_mode_t cache_mode)
return NULL;
}
/* Store the key for the last successful cache hit. That value is
used by agent_get_cache if the requested KEY is given as NULL.
NULL may be used to remove that key. */
void
agent_store_cache_hit (const char *key)
{
xfree (last_stored_cache_key);
last_stored_cache_key = key? xtrystrdup (key) : NULL;
}

42
agent/findkey.c
View File

@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
rc = agent_unprotect (ctrl, *keybuf, pw, NULL, &result, &resultlen);
if (!rc)
{
if (cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_NORMAL)
agent_store_cache_hit (hexgrip);
if (r_passphrase)
*r_passphrase = pw;
else
@ -383,6 +385,45 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
xfree (pw);
rc = 0;
}
else if (cache_mode == CACHE_MODE_NORMAL)
{
/* The standard use of GPG keys is to have a signing and an
encryption subkey. Commonly both use the same
passphrase. We try to help the user to enter the
passphrase only once by silently trying the last
correctly entered passphrase. Checking one additional
passphrase should be acceptable; despite the S2K
introduced delays. The assumed workflow is:
1. Read encrypted message in a MUA and thus enter a
passphrase for the encryption subkey.
2. Reply to that mail with an encrypted and signed
mail, thus entering the passphrase for the signing
subkey.
We can often avoid the passphrase entry in the second
step. We do this only in normal mode, so not to
interfere with unrelated cache entries. */
pw = agent_get_cache (NULL, cache_mode);
if (pw)
{
rc = agent_unprotect (ctrl, *keybuf, pw, NULL,
&result, &resultlen);
if (!rc)
{
if (r_passphrase)
*r_passphrase = pw;
else
xfree (pw);
xfree (*keybuf);
*keybuf = result;
return 0;
}
xfree (pw);
rc = 0;
}
}
/* If the pinentry is currently in use, we wait up to 60 seconds
for it to close and check the cache again. This solves a common
@ -460,6 +501,7 @@ unprotect (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *cache_nonce, const char *desc_text,
{
agent_put_cache (hexgrip, cache_mode, pi->pin,
lookup_ttl? lookup_ttl (hexgrip) : 0);
agent_store_cache_hit (hexgrip);
if (r_passphrase && *pi->pin)
*r_passphrase = xtrystrdup (pi->pin);
}

2
g10/keygen.c
View File

@ -4115,7 +4115,7 @@ do_generate_keypair (struct para_data_s *para,
update_ownertrust (pk, ((get_ownertrust (pk) & ~TRUST_MASK)
| TRUST_ULTIMATE ));
gen_standard_revoke (pk);
gen_standard_revoke (pk, cache_nonce);
if (!opt.batch)
{

2
g10/main.h
View File

@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ int enarmor_file( const char *fname );
/*-- revoke.c --*/
struct revocation_reason_info;
int gen_standard_revoke (PKT_public_key *psk);
int gen_standard_revoke (PKT_public_key *psk, const char *cache_nonce);
int gen_revoke( const char *uname );
int gen_desig_revoke( const char *uname, strlist_t locusr);
int revocation_reason_build_cb( PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque );

14
g10/revoke.c
View File

@ -443,7 +443,8 @@ create_revocation (const char *filename,
struct revocation_reason_info *reason,
PKT_public_key *psk,
kbnode_t keyblock,
const char *leadintext, int suffix)
const char *leadintext, int suffix,
const char *cache_nonce)
{
int rc;
iobuf_t out = NULL;
@ -466,7 +467,7 @@ create_revocation (const char *filename,
rc = make_keysig_packet (&sig, psk, NULL, NULL, psk, 0x20, 0,
opt.force_v4_certs? 4:0,
0, 0,
revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, NULL);
revocation_reason_build_cb, reason, cache_nonce);
if (rc)
{
log_error (_("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr (rc));
@ -511,9 +512,10 @@ create_revocation (const char *filename,
by gpg's interactive key generation function. The certificate is
stored at a dedicated place in a slightly modified form to avoid an
accidental import. PSK is the primary key; a corresponding secret
key must be available. */
key must be available. CACHE_NONCE is optional but can be used to
help gpg-agent to avoid an extra passphrase prompt. */
int
gen_standard_revoke (PKT_public_key *psk)
gen_standard_revoke (PKT_public_key *psk, const char *cache_nonce)
{
int rc;
estream_t memfp;
@ -573,7 +575,7 @@ gen_standard_revoke (PKT_public_key *psk)
reason.code = 0x00; /* No particular reason. */
reason.desc = NULL;
rc = create_revocation (fname, &reason, psk, NULL, leadin, 3);
rc = create_revocation (fname, &reason, psk, NULL, leadin, 3, cache_nonce);
xfree (leadin);
xfree (fname);
@ -662,7 +664,7 @@ gen_revoke (const char *uname)
if (!opt.armor)
tty_printf (_("ASCII armored output forced.\n"));
rc = create_revocation (NULL, reason, psk, keyblock, NULL, 0);
rc = create_revocation (NULL, reason, psk, keyblock, NULL, 0, NULL);
if (rc)
goto leave;