diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index d4dcdc070..6d40bb91f 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -1,14 +1,17 @@
-Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.??
+Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.17
 ------------------------------------
 
     * Comment packets are now of private type 61.
 
-    * passphrase code still used a 160 bit blowfish key, add a
+    * Passphrase code still used a 160 bit blowfish key, added a
       silly workaround. Please change your passphrase again - sorry.
 
     * Conventional encryption now uses a type 3 packet to describe the
       used algorithms.
 
+    * The new algorithm number for Blowfish is 20, 16 is still used for
+      encryption only; for signing it is only used when it is in a v3 packet,
+      so that GNUPG keys are still valid.
 
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 0.2.16
diff --git a/README b/README
index a13192c70..ebfa2c1a4 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 		  GNUPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
 		 -------------------------------
 
-    THIS IS ALPHA SOFTWARE, YOU MAY ENCOUNTER SOOME BUGS.
+    THIS IS ALPHA SOFTWARE, YOU MAY ENCOUNTER SOME BUGS.
 
     On a Linux box (version 2.x.x, alpha or x86 CPU) it should
     work reliably.  You may create your key on such a machine and
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 3e39c0886..bc817672f 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -47,5 +47,3 @@
 
     * add readline support (but how can we allcoate it in secure memory?)
 
-    * add multi-user-id-sigs handling to import.c
-
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 8459e5aa5..0fcb3bba7 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-0.2.16a
+0.2.17
diff --git a/checks/Makefile.am b/checks/Makefile.am
index b4a830b42..8de908cca 100644
--- a/checks/Makefile.am
+++ b/checks/Makefile.am
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ TESTS = version.test \
 	armsigs.test armencrypt.test armencryptp.test \
 	signencrypt.test signencrypt-dsa.test \
 	armsignencrypt.test armdetach.test \
-	armdetachm.test detachm.test genkey1024.test
+	armdetachm.test detachm.test genkey1024.test \
+	conventional.test
 
 
 TEST_FILES = pubring.asc secring.asc gnupg.asc plain-1 plain-2 plain-3o.asc \
diff --git a/checks/conventional.test b/checks/conventional.test
new file mode 100755
index 000000000..295db822b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/checks/conventional.test
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. defs.inc || exit 3
+
+#info Checking conventional encryption
+for i in plain-2 data-32000 ; do
+    echo "Hier spricht HAL" | ./run-gpg --passphrase-fd 0 -c -o x --yes $i
+    echo "Hier spricht HAL" | ./run-gpg --passphrase-fd 0    -o y --yes x
+    cmp $i y || error "$i: mismatch"
+done
+for i in plain-1 data-80000 ; do
+    echo "Hier spricht HAL" | ./run-gpg --passphrase-fd 0 \
+					--cipher-algo cast -c -o x --yes $i
+    echo "Hier spricht HAL" | ./run-gpg --passphrase-fd 0    -o y --yes x
+    cmp $i y || error "$i: mismatch"
+done
+
diff --git a/checks/sigs.test b/checks/sigs.test
index 15c464f1e..4b3894c28 100755
--- a/checks/sigs.test
+++ b/checks/sigs.test
@@ -9,3 +9,13 @@ for i in $plain_files $data_files; do
     cmp $i y || error "$i: mismatch"
 done
 
+for da in rmd160 sha1 md5 tiger; do
+    for i in $plain_files; do
+	echo "$usrpass1" | ./run-gpg --passphrase-fd 0 --digest-algo $da \
+				-s -o x --yes $i
+	./run-gpg -o y --yes x
+	cmp $i y || error "$i: mismatch"
+	# process only the first one
+	break
+    done
+done
diff --git a/cipher/misc.c b/cipher/misc.c
index 339b3bc52..cadaad563 100644
--- a/cipher/misc.c
+++ b/cipher/misc.c
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ check_pubkey_algo2( int algo, unsigned usage )
 	return 0;
 
       case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
 	return 0;
 
     #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 3ddb311e3..b61ea5cda 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
+Mon May  4 19:01:25 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* compress.c: doubled buffer sizes
+	* parse-packet.c (do_plaintext): now uses iobuf_read/write.
+
+Mon May  4 09:35:53 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* seskey.c (encode_md_value): Add optional argument hash_algo,
+	changed all callers.
+
+	* passphrase.c (make_dek_from_passphrase): Removed
+	* (get_passhrase_hash): Changed name to passphrase_to_dek, add arg,
+	changed all callers.
+
+	* all: Introduced the new ELG identifier and added support for the
+	encryption only one (which is okay to use by GNUPG for signatures).
+
 Sun May  3 17:50:26 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
 
 	* packet.h (PKT_OLD_COMMENT): New name for type 16.
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index eff3314a5..07aaf0676 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ do_public_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_cert *pkc )
     if( pkc->version < 4 )
 	write_16(a, pkc->valid_days );
     iobuf_put(a, pkc->pubkey_algo );
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.elg.p );
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.elg.g );
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.elg.y );
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ do_public_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_public_cert *pkc )
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.dsa.g );
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.dsa.y );
     }
-    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.rsa.n );
 	mpi_write(a, pkc->d.rsa.e );
     }
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ do_secret_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
     if( skc->version < 4 )
 	write_16(a, skc->valid_days );
     iobuf_put(a, skc->pubkey_algo );
-    if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(skc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.p );
 	mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.g );
 	mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.y );
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ do_secret_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
 	mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.x );
 	write_16(a, skc->csum );
     }
-    else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(skc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.n );
 	mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.e );
 	if( skc->is_protected ) {
@@ -362,11 +362,11 @@ do_pubkey_enc( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc )
     write_32(a, enc->keyid[0] );
     write_32(a, enc->keyid[1] );
     iobuf_put(a,enc->pubkey_algo );
-    if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, enc->d.elg.a );
 	mpi_write(a, enc->d.elg.b );
     }
-    else if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer );
     }
     else {
@@ -395,8 +395,10 @@ calc_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt )
 static int
 do_plaintext( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_plaintext *pt )
 {
-    int c, i, rc = 0;
+    int i, rc = 0;
     u32 n;
+    byte buf[1000]; /* FIXME: this buffer has the plaintext! */
+    int nbytes;
 
     write_header(out, ctb, calc_plaintext( pt ) );
     iobuf_put(out, pt->mode );
@@ -407,13 +409,14 @@ do_plaintext( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_plaintext *pt )
 	rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
 
     n = 0;
-    while( (c=iobuf_get(pt->buf)) != -1 ) {
-	if( iobuf_put(out, c) ) {
+    while( (nbytes=iobuf_read(pt->buf, buf, 1000)) != -1 ) {
+	if( iobuf_write(out, buf, nbytes) == -1 ) {
 	    rc = G10ERR_WRITE_FILE;
 	    break;
 	}
-	n++;
+	n += nbytes;
     }
+    memset(buf,0,1000); /* at least burn the buffer */
     if( !pt->len )
 	iobuf_set_block_mode(out, 0 ); /* write end marker */
     else if( n != pt->len )
@@ -480,7 +483,7 @@ do_signature( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_signature *sig )
     }
     iobuf_put(a, sig->digest_start[0] );
     iobuf_put(a, sig->digest_start[1] );
-    if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, sig->d.elg.a );
 	mpi_write(a, sig->d.elg.b );
     }
@@ -488,7 +491,7 @@ do_signature( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_signature *sig )
 	mpi_write(a, sig->d.dsa.r );
 	mpi_write(a, sig->d.dsa.s );
     }
-    else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_write(a, sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer );
     }
     else {
diff --git a/g10/compress.c b/g10/compress.c
index 8f547dffa..4bf1a87f8 100644
--- a/g10/compress.c
+++ b/g10/compress.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ init_compress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs )
 						       "unknown error" );
     }
 
-    zfx->outbufsize = 4096;
+    zfx->outbufsize = 8192;
     zfx->outbuf = m_alloc( zfx->outbufsize );
 }
 
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ init_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs )
 						       "unknown error" );
     }
 
-    zfx->inbufsize = 1024;
+    zfx->inbufsize = 2048;
     zfx->inbuf = m_alloc( zfx->inbufsize );
     zs->avail_in = 0;
 }
diff --git a/g10/elg.c b/g10/elg.c
index bf6bf4361..2ced92723 100644
--- a/g10/elg.c
+++ b/g10/elg.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ g10_elg_encrypt( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek )
 {
     MPI frame;
 
-    assert( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL );
+    assert( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) );
 
     enc->d.elg.a = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkc->d.elg.p) );
     enc->d.elg.b = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkc->d.elg.p) );
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ g10_elg_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
     MPI frame;
     byte *dp;
 
-    assert( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL );
+    assert( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) );
     if( !digest_algo )
 	digest_algo = md_get_algo(md);
 
@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ g10_elg_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
     sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
     sig->d.elg.a = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.elg.p) );
     sig->d.elg.b = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.elg.p) );
-    frame = encode_md_value( md, mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.elg.p));
+    frame = encode_md_value( md, digest_algo,  mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.elg.p));
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_mpidump("calc sig frame (elg): ", frame);
     elg_sign( sig->d.elg.a, sig->d.elg.b, frame, &skc->d.elg );
     mpi_free(frame);
     if( opt.verbose ) {
diff --git a/g10/encode.c b/g10/encode.c
index 4852f6e60..1871c3476 100644
--- a/g10/encode.c
+++ b/g10/encode.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode )
     IOBUF inp, out;
     PACKET pkt;
     PKT_plaintext *pt;
+    STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
     int rc = 0;
     u32 filesize;
     cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
@@ -87,10 +88,14 @@ encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode )
 
     cfx.dek = NULL;
     if( mode ) {
-	cfx.dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *cfx.dek );
-	cfx.dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
-	if( (rc = make_dek_from_passphrase( cfx.dek , 2, NULL )) ) {
+	s2k = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *s2k );
+	s2k->mode = 1;
+	s2k->hash_algo = opt.def_digest_algo;
+	cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, opt.def_cipher_algo, s2k, 2 );
+	if( !cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen ) {
+	    rc = G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
 	    m_free(cfx.dek);
+	    m_free(s2k);
 	    iobuf_close(inp);
 	    log_error("error creating passphrase: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
 	    return rc;
@@ -100,6 +105,7 @@ encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode )
     if( !(out = open_outfile( filename, opt.armor? 1:0 )) ) {
 	iobuf_close(inp);
 	m_free(cfx.dek);
+	m_free(s2k);
 	return G10ERR_CREATE_FILE;  /* or user said: do not overwrite */
     }
 
@@ -112,6 +118,17 @@ encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode )
     if( opt.compress )
 	iobuf_push_filter( out, compress_filter, &zfx );
 
+    if( s2k ) {
+	PKT_symkey_enc *enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
+	enc->version = 4;
+	enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
+	enc->s2k = *s2k;
+	pkt.pkttype = PKT_SYMKEY_ENC;
+	pkt.pkt.symkey_enc = enc;
+	if( (rc = build_packet( out, &pkt )) )
+	    log_error("build symkey packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+	m_free(enc);
+    }
 
     /* setup the inner packet */
     if( filename ) {
@@ -148,6 +165,7 @@ encode_simple( const char *filename, int mode )
     pt->buf = NULL;
     free_packet(&pkt);
     m_free(cfx.dek);
+    m_free(s2k);
     return rc;
 }
 
@@ -314,9 +332,9 @@ write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PKC_LIST pkc_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out )
 	pkc = pkc_list->pkc;
 	enc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
 	enc->pubkey_algo = pkc->pubkey_algo;
-	if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+	if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) )
 	    g10_elg_encrypt( pkc, enc, dek );
-	else if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+	else if( is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) )
 	    g10_rsa_encrypt( pkc, enc, dek );
 	else
 	    BUG();
diff --git a/g10/free-packet.c b/g10/free-packet.c
index d998ce29d..3cf82c8ac 100644
--- a/g10/free-packet.c
+++ b/g10/free-packet.c
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ free_symkey_enc( PKT_symkey_enc *enc )
 void
 free_pubkey_enc( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc )
 {
-    if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_free( enc->d.elg.a );
 	mpi_free( enc->d.elg.b );
     }
-    else if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+    else if( is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) )
 	mpi_free( enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer );
     m_free(enc);
 }
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ free_pubkey_enc( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc )
 void
 free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *sig )
 {
-    if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_free( sig->d.elg.a );
 	mpi_free( sig->d.elg.b );
     }
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *sig )
 	mpi_free( sig->d.dsa.r );
 	mpi_free( sig->d.dsa.s );
     }
-    else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+    else if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	mpi_free( sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer );
     m_free(sig->hashed_data);
     m_free(sig->unhashed_data);
@@ -68,32 +68,11 @@ free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *sig )
 }
 
 
-/****************
- * Return the digest algorithm from the signature packet.
- * We need this function because the digest algo depends on the
- * used pubkey algorithm.
- */
-int
-digest_algo_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig )
-{
-  #if 0 /* not used anymore */
-    switch( sig->pubkey_algo ) {
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL: return sig->d.elg.digest_algo;
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:	return sig->d.dsa.digest_algo;
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:	return sig->d.rsa.digest_algo;
-      default: return 0;
-    }
-  #endif
-    return sig->digest_algo;
-}
-
-
-
 
 void
 release_public_cert_parts( PKT_public_cert *cert )
 {
-    if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(cert->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_free( cert->d.elg.p ); cert->d.elg.p = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.elg.g ); cert->d.elg.g = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.elg.y ); cert->d.elg.y = NULL;
@@ -104,7 +83,7 @@ release_public_cert_parts( PKT_public_cert *cert )
 	mpi_free( cert->d.dsa.g ); cert->d.dsa.g = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.dsa.y ); cert->d.dsa.y = NULL;
     }
-    else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(cert->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.n ); cert->d.rsa.n = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.e ); cert->d.rsa.e = NULL;
     }
@@ -123,7 +102,7 @@ copy_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *d, PKT_public_cert *s )
     if( !d )
 	d = m_alloc(sizeof *d);
     memcpy( d, s, sizeof *d );
-    if( s->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(s->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	d->d.elg.p = mpi_copy( s->d.elg.p );
 	d->d.elg.g = mpi_copy( s->d.elg.g );
 	d->d.elg.y = mpi_copy( s->d.elg.y );
@@ -134,7 +113,7 @@ copy_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *d, PKT_public_cert *s )
 	d->d.dsa.g = mpi_copy( s->d.dsa.g );
 	d->d.dsa.y = mpi_copy( s->d.dsa.y );
     }
-    else if( s->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(s->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	d->d.rsa.n = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.n );
 	d->d.rsa.e = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.e );
     }
@@ -144,7 +123,7 @@ copy_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *d, PKT_public_cert *s )
 void
 release_secret_cert_parts( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 {
-    if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(cert->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_free( cert->d.elg.p ); cert->d.elg.p = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.elg.g ); cert->d.elg.g = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.elg.y ); cert->d.elg.y = NULL;
@@ -157,7 +136,7 @@ release_secret_cert_parts( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	mpi_free( cert->d.dsa.y ); cert->d.dsa.y = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.dsa.x ); cert->d.dsa.x = NULL;
     }
-    else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(cert->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.n ); cert->d.rsa.n = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.e ); cert->d.rsa.e = NULL;
 	mpi_free( cert->d.rsa.d ); cert->d.rsa.d = NULL;
@@ -180,7 +159,7 @@ copy_secret_cert( PKT_secret_cert *d, PKT_secret_cert *s )
     if( !d )
 	d = m_alloc(sizeof *d);
     memcpy( d, s, sizeof *d );
-    if( s->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(s->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	d->d.elg.p = mpi_copy( s->d.elg.p );
 	d->d.elg.g = mpi_copy( s->d.elg.g );
 	d->d.elg.y = mpi_copy( s->d.elg.y );
@@ -193,7 +172,7 @@ copy_secret_cert( PKT_secret_cert *d, PKT_secret_cert *s )
 	d->d.dsa.y = mpi_copy( s->d.dsa.y );
 	d->d.dsa.x = mpi_copy( s->d.dsa.x );
     }
-    else if( s->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(s->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	d->d.rsa.n = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.n );
 	d->d.rsa.e = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.e );
 	d->d.rsa.d = mpi_copy( s->d.rsa.d );
@@ -326,7 +305,7 @@ cmp_public_certs( PKT_public_cert *a, PKT_public_cert *b )
     if( a->pubkey_algo != b->pubkey_algo )
 	return -1;
 
-    if( a->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(a->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( mpi_cmp( a->d.elg.p , b->d.elg.p ) )
 	    return -1;
 	if( mpi_cmp( a->d.elg.g , b->d.elg.g ) )
@@ -344,7 +323,7 @@ cmp_public_certs( PKT_public_cert *a, PKT_public_cert *b )
 	if( mpi_cmp( a->d.dsa.y , b->d.dsa.y ) )
 	    return -1;
     }
-    else if( a->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(a->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( mpi_cmp( a->d.rsa.n , b->d.rsa.n ) )
 	    return -1;
 	if( mpi_cmp( a->d.rsa.e , b->d.rsa.e ) )
@@ -367,7 +346,7 @@ cmp_public_secret_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
     if( pkc->pubkey_algo != skc->pubkey_algo )
 	return -1;
 
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.elg.p , skc->d.elg.p ) )
 	    return -1;
 	if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.elg.g , skc->d.elg.g ) )
@@ -385,7 +364,7 @@ cmp_public_secret_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
 	if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.dsa.y , skc->d.dsa.y ) )
 	    return -1;
     }
-    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.rsa.n , skc->d.rsa.n ) )
 	    return -1;
 	if( mpi_cmp( pkc->d.rsa.e , skc->d.rsa.e ) )
diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
index 3edadfe92..9591502e3 100644
--- a/g10/getkey.c
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -164,9 +164,9 @@ cache_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
     pkc_cache_entry_t ce;
     u32 keyid[2];
 
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo)
 	|| pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
-	|| pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+	|| is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	keyid_from_pkc( pkc, keyid );
     }
     else
diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h
index d2b64ea19..968ee692a 100644
--- a/g10/keydb.h
+++ b/g10/keydb.h
@@ -97,8 +97,7 @@ int  build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list,
 /*-- passphrase.h --*/
 void set_passphrase_fd( int fd );
 int  get_passphrase_fd(void);
-DEK *get_passphrase_hash( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k );
-int make_dek_from_passphrase( DEK *dek, int mode, STRING2KEY *s2k );
+DEK *passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode);
 
 /*-- getkey.c --*/
 void add_keyring( const char *name );
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 37824d84d..0a4afbf43 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -624,35 +624,29 @@ change_passphrase( const char *username )
     if( rc )
 	tty_printf("Can't edit this key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
     else {
-	DEK *dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
+	DEK *dek = NULL;
 	STRING2KEY *s2k = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
 
-	tty_printf( "Enter the new passphrase for this secret key.\n\n" );
+	tty_printf(_("Enter the new passphrase for this secret key.\n\n") );
 
 	for(;;) {
-	    dek->algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
 	    s2k->mode = 1;
 	    s2k->hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
-	    rc = make_dek_from_passphrase( dek , 2, s2k );
-	    if( rc == -1 ) {
+	    dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH, s2k, 2 );
+	    if( !dek ) {
+		tty_printf(_("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again.\n"));
+	    }
+	    else if( !dek->keylen ) {
 		rc = 0;
-		tty_printf( "You don't want a passphrase -"
-			    " this is probably a *bad* idea!\n\n");
-		answer = tty_get("Do you really want to do this? ");
+		tty_printf(_( "You don't want a passphrase -"
+			    " this is probably a *bad* idea!\n\n"));
+		answer = tty_get(_("Do you really want to do this? "));
 		tty_kill_prompt();
 		if( answer_is_yes(answer) )
 		    changed++;
 		m_free(answer);
 		break;
 	    }
-	    else if( rc == G10ERR_PASSPHRASE ) {
-		tty_printf("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again.\n");
-	    }
-	    else if( rc ) {
-		m_free(dek); dek = NULL;
-		log_error("Error getting the passphrase: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
-		break;
-	    }
 	    else { /* okay */
 		skc->protect.algo = dek->algo;
 		skc->protect.s2k = *s2k;
diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
index bcef7528a..e714c1605 100644
--- a/g10/keygen.c
+++ b/g10/keygen.c
@@ -527,14 +527,15 @@ generate_keypair()
 
     tty_printf(_("You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key.\n\n") );
 
-    dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
     s2k = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *s2k );
     for(;;) {
-	dek->algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
 	s2k->mode = 1;
 	s2k->hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
-	rc = make_dek_from_passphrase( dek , 2, s2k );
-	if( rc == -1 ) {
+	dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH, s2k, 2 );
+	if( !dek ) {
+	    tty_printf(_("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again.\n"));
+	}
+	else if( !dek->keylen ) {
 	    m_free(dek); dek = NULL;
 	    m_free(s2k); s2k = NULL;
 	    tty_printf(_(
@@ -543,16 +544,6 @@ generate_keypair()
 	    "using this program with the option \"--change-passphrase\"\n\n"));
 	    break;
 	}
-	else if( rc == G10ERR_PASSPHRASE ) {
-	    tty_printf(_("passphrase not correctly repeated; try again.\n"));
-	}
-	else if( rc ) {
-	    m_free(dek); dek = NULL;
-	    m_free(s2k); s2k = NULL;
-	    m_free(uid);
-	    log_error("Error getting the passphrase: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
-	    return;
-	}
 	else
 	    break; /* okay */
     }
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
index 5bbf6477a..55c0c49ae 100644
--- a/g10/keyid.c
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ pubkey_letter( int algo )
       case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:	return 'R' ;
       case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:	return 'r' ;
       case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:	return 's' ;
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
       case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL: return 'G' ;
       case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:	return 'D' ;
       default: return '?';
@@ -238,7 +239,7 @@ keyid_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
     if( !keyid )
 	keyid = dummy_keyid;
 
-    if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(skc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	const byte *dp;
 	MD_HANDLE md;
 	md = elg_fingerprint_md_skc(skc);
@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ keyid_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
 	lowbits = keyid[1];
 	md_close(md);
     }
-    else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(skc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	lowbits = mpi_get_keyid( skc->d.rsa.n, keyid );
     }
     else {
@@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ keyid_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
     if( !keyid )
 	keyid = dummy_keyid;
 
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	const byte *dp;
 	MD_HANDLE md;
 	if( pkc->version < 4 ) {
@@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ keyid_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
 	lowbits = keyid[1];
 	md_close(md);
     }
-    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	lowbits = mpi_get_keyid( pkc->d.rsa.n, keyid );
     }
     else {
@@ -337,13 +338,13 @@ keyid_from_sig( PKT_signature *sig, u32 *keyid )
 unsigned
 nbits_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
 {
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	return mpi_get_nbits( pkc->d.elg.p );
     }
     else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA ) {
 	return mpi_get_nbits( pkc->d.dsa.p );
     }
-    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	return mpi_get_nbits( pkc->d.rsa.n );
     }
     else
@@ -356,13 +357,13 @@ nbits_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
 unsigned
 nbits_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc )
 {
-    if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(skc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	return mpi_get_nbits( skc->d.elg.p );
     }
     else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA ) {
 	return mpi_get_nbits( skc->d.dsa.p );
     }
-    else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(skc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	return mpi_get_nbits( skc->d.rsa.n );
     }
     else
@@ -424,7 +425,7 @@ fingerprint_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, size_t *ret_len )
 
     pkc.pubkey_algo = skc->pubkey_algo;
     pkc.version     = skc->version;
-    if( pkc.pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc.pubkey_algo) ) {
 	pkc.timestamp = skc->timestamp;
 	pkc.valid_days = skc->valid_days;
 	pkc.pubkey_algo = skc->pubkey_algo;
@@ -441,7 +442,7 @@ fingerprint_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, size_t *ret_len )
 	pkc.d.dsa.g = skc->d.dsa.g;
 	pkc.d.dsa.y = skc->d.dsa.y;
     }
-    else if( pkc.pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(pkc.pubkey_algo) ) {
 	pkc.d.rsa.n = skc->d.rsa.n;
 	pkc.d.rsa.e = skc->d.rsa.e;
     }
@@ -461,7 +462,7 @@ fingerprint_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, size_t *ret_len )
     size_t len;
     unsigned n;
 
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	MD_HANDLE md;
 	if( pkc->version < 4 ) {
 	    md = v3_elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
@@ -485,7 +486,7 @@ fingerprint_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, size_t *ret_len )
 	memcpy(array, dp, 20 );
 	md_close(md);
     }
-    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	MD_HANDLE md;
 
 	md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
diff --git a/g10/main.h b/g10/main.h
index 4450849d6..9a1ae4ddb 100644
--- a/g10/main.h
+++ b/g10/main.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ IOBUF open_sigfile( const char *iname );
 /*-- seskey.c --*/
 void make_session_key( DEK *dek );
 MPI encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits );
-MPI encode_md_value( MD_HANDLE md, unsigned nbits );
+MPI encode_md_value( MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo, unsigned nbits );
 
 /*-- comment.c --*/
 KBNODE make_comment_node( const char *s );
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 7e0ba18b7..fa2291bc0 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -148,36 +148,16 @@ add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 static void
 proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 {
-   /* FIXME:   NOT READY */
-   #if 0
     PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
-    int result = 0;
 
-    c->last_was_session_key = 1;
     enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
-    if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
-	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
-	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA	) {
-	m_free(c->dek ); /* paranoid: delete a pending DEK */
-	c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
-	if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
-	    /* error: delete the DEK */
-	    m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
-	}
+    if( enc->seskeylen )
+	log_error( "symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n");
+    else {
+	c->last_was_session_key = 2;
+	c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, enc->cipher_algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
     }
-    else
-	result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-
-    if( result == -1 )
-	;
-    else if( !result ) {
-	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
-	    log_info( "pubkey_enc packet: Good DEK\n" );
-    }
-    else
-	log_error( "pubkey_enc packet: %s\n", g10_errstr(result));
     free_packet(pkt);
-  #endif
 }
 
 static void
@@ -189,9 +169,9 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     c->last_was_session_key = 1;
     enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
     /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
-    if( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
 	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
-	|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA	) {
+	|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)  ) {
 	m_free(c->dek ); /* paranoid: delete a pending DEK */
 	c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
 	if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
@@ -222,9 +202,7 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     /*printf("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
     if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
 	/* assume this is old conventional encrypted data */
-	c->dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
-	c->dek->algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
-	result = make_dek_from_passphrase( c->dek, 0, NULL );
+	c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, opt.def_cipher_algo, NULL, 0 );
     }
     else if( !c->dek )
 	result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
@@ -254,7 +232,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     if( opt.verbose )
 	log_info("original file name='%.*s'\n", pt->namelen, pt->name);
     free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
-    /* fixme: take the digest algo(s) to use from the
+    /* FIXME: take the digest algo(s) to use from the
      * onepass_sig packet (if we have these)
      * And look at the sigclass to check whether we should use the
      * textmode filter (sigclass 0x01)
@@ -262,6 +240,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     c->mfx.md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0);
     md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
     md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
+    md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_TIGER );
     rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx );
     if( rc )
 	log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
@@ -318,7 +297,7 @@ do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node )
     assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
     sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
 
-    algo = digest_algo_from_sig( sig );
+    algo = sig->digest_algo;
     if( !algo )
 	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
     if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
@@ -790,8 +769,7 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 	    c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
 	    /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/
 	    for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) {
-		md_enable( c->mfx.md,
-			   digest_algo_from_sig(n1->pkt->pkt.signature));
+		md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
 	    }
 	    /* ask for file and hash it */
 	    if( c->sigs_only )
@@ -814,7 +792,7 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 
 	if( !c->have_data ) {
 	    free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
-	    c->mfx.md = md_open(digest_algo_from_sig(sig), 0);
+	    c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
 	    if( c->sigs_only )
 		rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->signed_data,
 				     sig->sig_class == 0x01 );
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index 0f54d3a86..76e1a7a35 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
 	goto leave;
     }
     version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
-    if( k->version != 4 ) {
+    if( version != 4 ) {
 	log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
 	goto leave;
     }
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ parse_symkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
 		printf("%02x", k->s2k.salt[i]);
 	    if( s2kmode == 4 )
 		printf(", count %lu\n", (ulong)k->s2k.count );
+	    printf("\n");
 	}
     }
 
@@ -508,9 +509,9 @@ parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
     k->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
     k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
     if( list_mode )
-	printf(":pubkey enc packet: version %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
-			    k->version, (ulong)k->keyid[0], (ulong)k->keyid[1]);
-    if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+	printf(":pubkey enc packet: version %d, algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
+	  k->version, k->pubkey_algo, (ulong)k->keyid[0], (ulong)k->keyid[1]);
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(k->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	n = pktlen;
 	k->d.elg.a = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0); pktlen -=n;
 	n = pktlen;
@@ -523,7 +524,7 @@ parse_pubkeyenc( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
 	    putchar('\n');
 	}
     }
-    else if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(k->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	n = pktlen;
 	k->d.rsa.rsa_integer = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
 	if( list_mode ) {
@@ -732,9 +733,10 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
     }
 
     if( list_mode ) {
-	printf(":signature packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
+	printf(":signature packet: algo %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n"
 	       "\tversion %d, created %lu, md5len %d, sigclass %02x\n"
 	       "\tdigest algo %d, begin of digest %02x %02x\n",
+		sig->pubkey_algo,
 		(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
 		sig->version, (ulong)sig->timestamp, md5_len, sig->sig_class,
 		sig->digest_algo,
@@ -744,7 +746,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	    parse_subpkt( sig->unhashed_data, -2 );
 	}
     }
-    if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	n = pktlen;
 	sig->d.elg.a = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
 	n = pktlen;
@@ -770,7 +772,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	    putchar('\n');
 	}
     }
-    else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	n = pktlen;
 	sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
 	if( list_mode ) {
@@ -877,12 +879,12 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
     algorithm = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
     if( list_mode )
 	printf(":%s key packet:\n"
-	       "\tversion %d, created %lu, valid for %hu days\n",
+	       "\tversion %d, algo %d, created %lu, valid for %hu days\n",
 		pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT? "public" :
 		pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT? "secret" :
 		pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT? "public sub" :
 		pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT? "secret sub" : "??",
-		version, timestamp, valid_period );
+		version, algorithm, timestamp, valid_period );
     if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT || pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT )  {
 	pkt->pkt.secret_cert->timestamp = timestamp;
 	pkt->pkt.secret_cert->valid_days = valid_period;
@@ -898,7 +900,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	pkt->pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo = algorithm;
     }
 
-    if( algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(algorithm) ) {
 	MPI elg_p, elg_g, elg_y;
 	n = pktlen; elg_p = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
 	n = pktlen; elg_g = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
@@ -1159,7 +1161,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	    log_mpidump("dsa x=", cert->d.dsa.x ); */
 	}
     }
-    else if( algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_RSA(algorithm) ) {
 	MPI rsa_pub_mod, rsa_pub_exp;
 
 	n = pktlen; rsa_pub_mod = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0); pktlen -=n;
diff --git a/g10/passphrase.c b/g10/passphrase.c
index 9711f5aff..5bd3eacbd 100644
--- a/g10/passphrase.c
+++ b/g10/passphrase.c
@@ -51,13 +51,29 @@ get_passphrase_fd()
 /****************
  * Get a passphrase for the secret key with KEYID, display TEXT
  * if the user needs to enter the passphrase.
- * Returns: m_alloced md5 passphrase hash; caller must free
+ * mode 0 = standard, 2 = create new passphrase
+ * Returns: a DEK with a session key; caller must free
+ *	    or NULL if the passphrase was not correctly repeated.
+ *	    (only for mode 2)
+ *	    a dek->keylen of 0 means: no passphrase entered.
+ *	    (only for mode 2)
  */
 DEK *
-get_passphrase_hash( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k )
+passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode )
 {
     char *pw;
     DEK *dek;
+    STRING2KEY help_s2k;
+
+    if( !s2k ) {
+	s2k = &help_s2k;
+	s2k->mode = 0;
+	/* this should be MD5 if cipher is IDEA, but because we do
+	 * not have IDEA, we use the default one, the the user
+	 * can select it from the commandline
+	 */
+	s2k->hash_algo = opt.def_digest_algo;
+    }
 
     if( keyid && !opt.batch ) {
 	char *ustr;
@@ -95,44 +111,25 @@ get_passphrase_hash( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k )
     else {
 	pw = tty_get_hidden("Enter pass phrase: " );
 	tty_kill_prompt();
+	if( mode == 2 ) {
+	    char *pw2 = tty_get_hidden("Repeat pass phrase: " );
+	    tty_kill_prompt();
+	    if( strcmp(pw, pw2) ) {
+		m_free(pw2);
+		m_free(pw);
+		return NULL;
+	    }
+	    m_free(pw2);
+	}
     }
     dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
     dek->algo = cipher_algo;
-    hash_passphrase( dek, pw, s2k, 0 );
-    m_free(pw); /* is allocated in secure memory, so it will be burned */
-    return dek;
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * This function is used to construct a DEK from a user input.
- * It uses the default CIPHER.
- * Returns: 0 = okay, -1 No passphrase entered, > 0 error
- */
-int
-make_dek_from_passphrase( DEK *dek, int mode, STRING2KEY *s2k )
-{
-    char *pw, *pw2;
-    int rc=0;
-
-    pw = tty_get_hidden("Enter pass phrase: " );
-    tty_kill_prompt();
-    if( mode == 2 ) {
-	pw2 = tty_get_hidden("Repeat pass phrase: " );
-	tty_kill_prompt();
-	if( strcmp(pw, pw2) ) {
-	    m_free(pw2);
-	    m_free(pw);
-	    return G10ERR_PASSPHRASE;
-	}
-	m_free(pw2);
-    }
-    if( !*pw )
-	rc = -1;
+    if( !*pw && mode == 2 )
+	dek->keylen = 0;
     else
 	hash_passphrase( dek, pw, s2k, mode==2 );
-    m_free(pw);
-    return rc;
+    m_free(pw); /* is allocated in secure memory, so it will be burned */
+    return dek;
 }
 
 
diff --git a/g10/pubkey-enc.c b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
index b0d82bf68..5cdf9f484 100644
--- a/g10/pubkey-enc.c
+++ b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
     if( (rc = get_seckey( skc, k->keyid )) )
 	goto leave;
 
-    if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(k->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
 	    log_mpidump("Encr DEK a:", k->d.elg.a );
 	    log_mpidump("     DEK b:", k->d.elg.b );
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ get_session_key( PKT_pubkey_enc *k, DEK *dek )
 	elg_decrypt( plain_dek, k->d.elg.a, k->d.elg.b, &skc->d.elg );
     }
   #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
-    else if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( is_ELGAMAL(k->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( DBG_CIPHER )
 	    log_mpidump("Encr DEK frame:", k->d.rsa.rsa_integer );
 
diff --git a/g10/ringedit.c b/g10/ringedit.c
index def4a4306..28faeddc1 100644
--- a/g10/ringedit.c
+++ b/g10/ringedit.c
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
 	    if(   req_skc->timestamp == skc->timestamp
 	       && req_skc->valid_days == skc->valid_days
 	       && req_skc->pubkey_algo == skc->pubkey_algo
-	       && (   ( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
+	       && (   ( is_ELGAMAL(skc->pubkey_algo)
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.elg.p, skc->d.elg.p )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.elg.g, skc->d.elg.g )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.elg.y, skc->d.elg.y )
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.dsa.y, skc->d.dsa.y )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.dsa.x, skc->d.dsa.x )
 		      )
-		   || ( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+		   || ( is_RSA(skc->pubkey_algo)
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.n, skc->d.rsa.n )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.e, skc->d.rsa.e )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_skc->d.rsa.d, skc->d.rsa.d )
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
 	    if(   req_pkc->timestamp == pkc->timestamp
 	       && req_pkc->valid_days == pkc->valid_days
 	       && req_pkc->pubkey_algo == pkc->pubkey_algo
-	       && (   ( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
+	       && (   ( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo)
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.elg.p, pkc->d.elg.p )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.elg.g, pkc->d.elg.g )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.elg.y, pkc->d.elg.y )
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ keyring_search( PACKET *req, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf, const char *fname )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.dsa.g, pkc->d.dsa.g )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.dsa.y, pkc->d.dsa.y )
 		      )
-		   || ( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+		   || ( is_RSA(pkc->pubkey_algo)
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.rsa.n, pkc->d.rsa.n )
 			&& !mpi_cmp( req_pkc->d.rsa.e, pkc->d.rsa.e )
 		      )
diff --git a/g10/rsa.c b/g10/rsa.c
index edecdfb1c..251f6198c 100644
--- a/g10/rsa.c
+++ b/g10/rsa.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void
 g10_rsa_encrypt( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek )
 {
   #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
-    assert( enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA );
+    assert( is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) );
 
     keyid_from_pkc( pkc, enc->keyid );
     enc->d.rsa.rsa_integer = encode_session_key( dek,
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ g10_rsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
  #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
     byte *dp;
 
-    assert( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA );
+    assert( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) );
     if( !digest_algo )
 	digest_algo = md_get_algo(md);
 
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ g10_rsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
     sig->digest_start[0] = dp[0];
     sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
     sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer =
-		   encode_md_value( md, mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.rsa.rsa_n));
+	   encode_md_value( md, digest_algo, mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.rsa.rsa_n));
     rsa_secret( sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, sig->d.rsa.rsa_integer, &skc->d.rsa );
     if( opt.verbose ) {
 	char *ustr = get_user_id_string( sig->keyid );
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index 23ba0314b..a265a3713 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	  case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
 	  case CIPHER_ALGO_CAST:
 	    keyid_from_skc( cert, keyid );
-	    dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, cert->protect.algo,
-					      &cert->protect.s2k );
+	    dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, cert->protect.algo,
+					      &cert->protect.s2k, 0 );
 	    cipher_hd = cipher_open( cert->protect.algo,
 				     CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1);
 	    cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	    cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, cert->protect.iv, cert->protect.iv, 8 );
 	    switch( cert->pubkey_algo ) {
 	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
+	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
 		buffer = mpi_get_secure_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, &nbytes, NULL );
 		cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
 		mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 );
@@ -81,6 +82,8 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 		break;
 	    #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
 	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
+	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:
+	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
 		csum = 0;
 		#define X(a) do { \
 		    buffer = mpi_get_secure_buffer( cert->d.rsa.##a,	 \
@@ -104,7 +107,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	    cipher_close( cipher_hd );
 	    /* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
 	    if( csum != cert->csum ) {
-		if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+		if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) {
 		    /* very bad kludge to work around an early bug */
 		    csum -= checksum_u16( mpi_get_nbits(cert->d.elg.x) );
 		    nbytes = mpi_get_nlimbs(cert->d.elg.x) * 4;
@@ -122,6 +125,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	    }
 
 	    switch( cert->pubkey_algo ) {
+	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
 	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
 		res = elg_check_secret_key( &cert->d.elg );
 		break;
@@ -130,6 +134,8 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 		break;
 	    #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
 	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
+	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:
+	      case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
 		res = rsa_check_secret_key( &cert->d.rsa );
 		break;
 	    #endif
@@ -151,6 +157,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
     }
     else { /* not protected */
 	switch( cert->pubkey_algo ) {
+	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
 	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
 	    csum = checksum_mpi( cert->d.elg.x );
 	    break;
@@ -158,6 +165,8 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	    csum = checksum_mpi( cert->d.dsa.x );
 	    break;
 	#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
+	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:
+	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
 	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
 	    csum =0;
 	    buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.rsa.rsa_d, &nbytes, NULL );
@@ -181,7 +190,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	  default: BUG();
 	}
 	if( csum != cert->csum ) {
-	    if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+	    if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) {
 		/* very bad kludge to work around an early bug */
 		csum -= checksum_u16( mpi_get_nbits(cert->d.elg.x) );
 		nbytes = mpi_get_nlimbs(cert->d.elg.x) * 4;
@@ -214,20 +223,25 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
 	if( i )
 	    log_error("Invalid passphrase; please try again ...\n\n");
 	switch( cert->pubkey_algo ) {
+	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
 	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
 	  case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
 	    rc = do_check( cert );
+	  #if 1 /* set to 0 to disable the workaround */
 	    if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && cert->is_protected
-		&& cert->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH ) {
+		&& cert->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH
+		&& cert->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
 		/* Workaround for a bug in 0.2.16 which still used
 		 * a 160 bit key for BLOWFISH. */
-		log_info("trying workaround for 0.2.16 passphrase bug ...\n");
+     log_info("trying workaround for 0.2.16 passphrase bug ...\n");
+     log_info("If you don't need this, uncomment it in g10/seckey-cert.c\n\n");
 		cert->protect.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160;
 		rc = do_check( cert );
 		if( rc )
 		    rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
 		cert->protect.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
 	    }
+	  #endif
 	    break;
 	  default: rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
 	}
@@ -256,13 +270,14 @@ do_protect( void (*fnc)(CIPHER_HANDLE, byte *, byte *, unsigned),
     unsigned nbytes;
 
     switch( cert->pubkey_algo ) {
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
 	/* recalculate the checksum, so that --change-passphrase
 	 * can be used to convert from the faulty to the correct one
 	 * wk 06.04.98:
 	 * fixme: remove this some time in the future.
 	 */
 	cert->csum = checksum_mpi( cert->d.elg.x );
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
 	buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, &nbytes, NULL );
 	(*fnc)( fnc_hd, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
 	mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 );
diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c
index 500dc8457..25819909c 100644
--- a/g10/seskey.c
+++ b/g10/seskey.c
@@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
 
 
 MPI
-encode_md_value( MD_HANDLE md, unsigned nbits )
+encode_md_value( MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo, unsigned nbits )
 {
-    int algo = md_get_algo(md);
+    int algo = hash_algo? hash_algo : md_get_algo(md);
     const byte *asn;
     size_t asnlen, mdlen;
 
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
index 7051b3be4..1af891d44 100644
--- a/g10/sig-check.c
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -63,14 +63,16 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
     MPI result = NULL;
     int rc=0;
 
-    if( pkc->version == 4 && pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
-	log_info("WARNING: This is probably a PGP generated "
+    if( pkc->version == 4 && pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) {
+	log_info("this is a PGP generated "
 		 "ElGamal key which is NOT secure for signatures!\n");
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    }
 
     if( pkc->timestamp > sig->timestamp )
 	return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT; /* pubkey newer that signature */
 
-    if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pkc->pubkey_algo) ) {
 	if( (rc=check_digest_algo(sig->digest_algo)) )
 	    goto leave;
 	/* make sure the digest algo is enabled (in case of a detached
@@ -85,7 +87,10 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
 	    md_putc( digest,  a        & 0xff );
 	}
 	md_final( digest );
-	result = encode_md_value( digest, mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.p));
+	result = encode_md_value( digest, sig->digest_algo,
+					  mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.p));
+	if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	    log_mpidump("calc sig frame (elg): ", result);
 	if( !elg_verify( sig->d.elg.a, sig->d.elg.b, result, &pkc->d.elg ) )
 	    rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
     }
@@ -139,7 +144,8 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
 	    rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
     }
  #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
-    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
+    else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
+	     || pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S ) {
 	int i, j, c, old_enc;
 	byte *dp;
 	const byte *asn;
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index ddcded7f1..4dbb8aee1 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -46,11 +46,11 @@ complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_cert *skc, MD_HANDLE md )
 
     if( (rc=check_secret_key( skc )) )
 	;
-    else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+    else if( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, 0 );
     else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
 	g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, 0 );
-    else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+    else if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, 0 );
     else
 	BUG();
@@ -281,11 +281,11 @@ sign_file( STRLIST filenames, int detached, STRLIST locusr,
 	}
 	md_final( md );
 
-	if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+	if( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	    g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
 	else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
 	    g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
-	else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+	else if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	    g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
 	else
 	    BUG();
@@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
 	}
 	md_final( md );
 
-	if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
+	if( is_ELGAMAL(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	    g10_elg_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
 	else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
 	    g10_dsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
-	else if( sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+	else if( is_RSA(sig->pubkey_algo) )
 	    g10_rsa_sign( skc, sig, md, opt.def_digest_algo );
 	else
 	    BUG();
diff --git a/g10/skclist.c b/g10/skclist.c
index 6d34b05bf..53fd2e985 100644
--- a/g10/skclist.c
+++ b/g10/skclist.c
@@ -63,14 +63,18 @@ build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock,
 	else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(skc->pubkey_algo, usage)) ) {
 	    SKC_LIST r;
 	    if( skc->version == 4 && (usage & 1)
-		&& skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
-		log_info("WARNING: This is probably a PGP generated "
+		&& skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) {
+		log_error("this is a PGP generated "
 		    "ElGamal key which is NOT secure for signatures!\n");
-	    r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-	    r->skc = skc; skc = NULL;
-	    r->next = skc_list;
-	    r->mark = 0;
-	    skc_list = r;
+		free_secret_cert( skc ); skc = NULL;
+	    }
+	    else {
+		r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+		r->skc = skc; skc = NULL;
+		r->next = skc_list;
+		r->mark = 0;
+		skc_list = r;
+	    }
 	}
 	else {
 	    free_secret_cert( skc ); skc = NULL;
@@ -89,14 +93,19 @@ build_skc_list( STRLIST locusr, SKC_LIST *ret_skc_list, int unlock,
 	    else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(skc->pubkey_algo, usage)) ) {
 		SKC_LIST r;
 		if( skc->version == 4 && (usage & 1)
-		    && skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
-		    log_info("WARNING: This is probably a PGP generated "
-			"ElGamal key which is NOT secure for signatures!\n");
-		r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-		r->skc = skc; skc = NULL;
-		r->next = skc_list;
-		r->mark = 0;
-		skc_list = r;
+		    && skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) {
+		    log_info("skipped '%s': this is a PGP generated "
+			"ElGamal key which is not secure for signatures!\n",
+			locusr->d );
+		    free_secret_cert( skc ); skc = NULL;
+		}
+		else {
+		    r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+		    r->skc = skc; skc = NULL;
+		    r->next = skc_list;
+		    r->mark = 0;
+		    skc_list = r;
+		}
 	    }
 	    else {
 		free_secret_cert( skc ); skc = NULL;
diff --git a/include/ChangeLog b/include/ChangeLog
index 94d967df3..9470baee4 100644
--- a/include/ChangeLog
+++ b/include/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+Mon May  4 16:37:17 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* cipher.h (PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E): New, with value of the
+	old one.
+	* (is_ELGAMAL, is_RSA): New macros
+
 Sun Apr 26 14:35:24 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
 
 	* types.h: New type u64
diff --git a/include/cipher.h b/include/cipher.h
index c82d35140..b64d234db 100644
--- a/include/cipher.h
+++ b/include/cipher.h
@@ -50,9 +50,9 @@
 #define PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA        1
 #define PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E      2     /* RSA encrypt only */
 #define PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S      3     /* RSA sign only */
-#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL   16
+#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E 16     /* encrypt only ElGamal (but not vor v3)*/
 #define PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA       17
-/*#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL	20  sign and encrypt elgamal */
+#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL   20     /* sign and encrypt elgamal */
 
 #define DIGEST_ALGO_MD5       1
 #define DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1      2
@@ -61,6 +61,10 @@
 #define DIGEST_ALGO_TIGER     101
 #endif
 
+#define is_RSA(a)     ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E \
+		       || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S )
+#define is_ELGAMAL(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E)
+
 typedef struct {
     int algo;
     int keylen;
diff --git a/scripts/mkdiff b/scripts/mkdiff
index 659768374..6bf79ca72 100755
--- a/scripts/mkdiff
+++ b/scripts/mkdiff
@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ echo "Removing old directories"
 
 echo "Unpacking previous and current tar"
 tar xzf "gnupg-$curr_ver.tar.gz"
+rm -f gnupg-${curr_ver}/po/*.gmo
 tar xzf "gnupg-$prev_ver.tar.gz"
+rm -f gnupg-${prev_ver}/po/*.gmo
 
 
 echo "Diffing"
diff --git a/tools/bftest.c b/tools/bftest.c
index a6816e19f..551e8e55d 100644
--- a/tools/bftest.c
+++ b/tools/bftest.c
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
     int encode=0;
     CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
-    char buf[100];
-    int n, size=8;
+    char buf[4096];
+    int n, size=4096;
     int algo;
 
   #ifdef __MINGW32__
diff --git a/util/ChangeLog b/util/ChangeLog
index 89eedb0c1..31312c7eb 100644
--- a/util/ChangeLog
+++ b/util/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Mon May  4 19:48:03 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
+
+	* iobuf.c (iobuf_read): Code is now faster.
+	* (iobuf_write): ditto.
+
 Mon Apr 27 11:01:32 1998  Werner Koch  (wk@isil.d.shuttle.de)
 
 	* strgutil.c (memicmp): New.
diff --git a/util/iobuf.c b/util/iobuf.c
index 3940f1034..1578d565b 100644
--- a/util/iobuf.c
+++ b/util/iobuf.c
@@ -728,15 +728,38 @@ iobuf_read(IOBUF a, byte *buf, unsigned buflen )
 {
     int c, n;
 
-    for(n=0 ; n < buflen; n++, buf++ ) {
-	if( (c = iobuf_readbyte(a)) == -1 ) {
-	    if( !n )
-		return -1; /* eof */
-	    break;
+    if( a->unget.buf || a->nlimit ) {
+	/* handle special cases */
+	for(n=0 ; n < buflen; n++, buf++ ) {
+	    if( (c = iobuf_readbyte(a)) == -1 ) {
+		if( !n )
+		    return -1; /* eof */
+		break;
+	    }
+	    else
+		*buf = c;
 	}
-	else
-	    *buf = c;
+	return n;
     }
+
+    if( a->filter_eof ) {
+	if( DBG_IOBUF )
+	    log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: filter eof in iobuf_read\n", a->no, a->subno );
+	return -1;
+    }
+    n = 0;
+    do {
+	for( ; n < buflen && a->d.start < a->d.len; n++ )
+	    *buf++ = a->d.buf[a->d.start++];
+	if( n < buflen ) {
+	    if( (c=underflow(a)) == -1 ) {
+		a->nbytes += n;
+		return n? n : -1/*EOF*/;
+	    }
+	    *buf++ = c; n++;
+	}
+    } while( n < buflen );
+    a->nbytes += n;
     return n;
 }
 
@@ -782,12 +805,18 @@ iobuf_writebyte(IOBUF a, unsigned c)
 int
 iobuf_write(IOBUF a, byte *buf, unsigned buflen )
 {
-    for( ; buflen; buflen--, buf++ )
-	if( iobuf_writebyte(a, *buf) )
-	    return -1;
+    do {
+	for( ; buflen && a->d.len < a->d.size; buflen--, buf++ )
+	    a->d.buf[a->d.len++] = *buf;
+	if( buflen ) {
+	    if( iobuf_flush(a) )
+		return -1;
+	}
+    } while( buflen );
     return 0;
 }
 
+
 int
 iobuf_writestr(IOBUF a, const char *buf )
 {
diff --git a/zlib/Makefile b/zlib/Makefile
index a060f7842..8ae5caf9d 100644
--- a/zlib/Makefile
+++ b/zlib/Makefile
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ POSUB = po
 RANLIB = ranlib
 USE_INCLUDED_LIBINTL = yes
 USE_NLS = yes
-VERSION = 0.2.16a
+VERSION = 0.2.17
 ZLIBS = 
 l =