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gpg: Move key cleaning functions to a separate file.
* g10/trust.c (mark_usable_uid_certs, clean_sigs_from_uid) (clean_uid_from_key, clean_one_uid, clean_key): Move to ... * g10/key-clean.c: new file. * g10/key-clean.h: New. * g10/Makefile.am (gpg_sources): Add new files. * g10/export.c, g10/import.c, g10/keyedit.c, g10/trustdb.c: Include new header. * g10/trustdb.h (struct key_item, is_in_klist): Move to ... * g10/keydb.h: here. -- Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> (cherry picked from commit 135e46ea480d749b8a9692f71d4d0bfdadd8ee2f)
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch
parent
b4599a0449
commit
40bf383f72
@ -151,6 +151,7 @@ gpg_sources = server.c \
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trust.c $(trust_source) $(tofu_source) \
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$(card_source) \
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exec.c exec.h \
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key-clean.c key-clean.h \
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key-check.c key-check.h
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gpg_SOURCES = gpg.c \
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@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
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#include "../common/init.h"
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#include "trustdb.h"
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#include "call-agent.h"
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#include "key-clean.h"
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/* An object to keep track of subkeys. */
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struct subkey_list_s
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@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
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#include "../common/init.h"
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#include "../common/mbox-util.h"
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#include "key-check.h"
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#include "key-clean.h"
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struct import_stats_s
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422
g10/key-clean.c
Normal file
422
g10/key-clean.c
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
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/* key-clean.c - Functions to clean a keyblock
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2008, 2010-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2014, 2016-2018 Werner Koch
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include "gpg.h"
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "../common/util.h"
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#include "../common/host2net.h"
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#include "../common/i18n.h"
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#include "options.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "key-clean.h"
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/*
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* Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
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* To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and
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* from the remain ones we look for the latest one. If this is not a
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* certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
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* node flag bit 8. Revocations are marked with flag 11, and sigs
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* from unavailable keys are marked with flag 12. Note that flag bits
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* 9 and 10 are used for internal purposes.
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*/
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void
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mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
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u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
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u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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PKT_signature *sig;
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/* First check all signatures. */
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for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
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{
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int rc;
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node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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break; /* ready */
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if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
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continue;
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sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (main_kid
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&& sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
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continue; /* ignore self-signatures if we pass in a main_kid */
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if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
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continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
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if(sig->sig_class>=0x11 && sig->sig_class<=0x13 &&
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sig->sig_class-0x10<opt.min_cert_level)
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continue; /* treat anything under our min_cert_level as an
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invalid signature */
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if (klist && !is_in_klist (klist, sig))
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continue; /* no need to check it then */
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if ((rc=check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL)))
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{
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/* we ignore anything that won't verify, but tag the
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no_pubkey case */
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if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
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node->flag |= 1<<12;
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continue;
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}
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node->flag |= 1<<9;
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}
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/* Reset the remaining flags. */
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for (; node; node = node->next)
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node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
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/* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
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* bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
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* processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures, and bit
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* 11 will be set for usable revocations. */
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/* For each cert figure out the latest valid one. */
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for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
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{
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KBNODE n, signode;
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u32 kid[2];
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u32 sigdate;
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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break;
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if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
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continue; /* not a node to look at */
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if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
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continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
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node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
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sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
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signode = node;
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sigdate = sig->timestamp;
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kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
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/* Now find the latest and greatest signature */
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for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
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{
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if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
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break;
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if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
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continue;
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if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
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continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
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sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
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continue;
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n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
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/* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
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then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is
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older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
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as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're
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automatically fine. */
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if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
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(!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
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continue;
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/* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
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then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
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n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
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nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're
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automatically fine. */
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if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
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((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
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!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
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(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
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n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
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{
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signode = n;
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sigdate = sig->timestamp;
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continue;
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}
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/* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
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remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
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revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
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If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
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packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
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their original order. */
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if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
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{
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signode = n;
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sigdate = sig->timestamp;
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}
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}
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sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
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if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
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{ /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked.
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* Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
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* We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
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* certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
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* want that after the expiration of his certificate the
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* system falls back to an older certification which has a
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* different expiration time */
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const byte *p;
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u32 expire;
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p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
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expire = p? sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32(p) : 0;
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if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
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{
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signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
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if (next_expire && expire && expire < *next_expire)
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*next_expire = expire;
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}
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}
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else
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signode->flag |= (1<<11);
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}
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}
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static int
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clean_sigs_from_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
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int noisy, int self_only)
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{
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int deleted = 0;
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kbnode_t node;
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u32 keyid[2];
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log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
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|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
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keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
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/* Passing in a 0 for current time here means that we'll never weed
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out an expired sig. This is correct behavior since we want to
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keep the most recent expired sig in a series. */
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mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
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/* What we want to do here is remove signatures that are not
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considered as part of the trust calculations. Thus, all invalid
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signatures are out, as are any signatures that aren't the last of
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a series of uid sigs or revocations It breaks down like this:
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coming out of mark_usable_uid_certs, if a sig is unflagged, it is
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not even a candidate. If a sig has flag 9 or 10, that means it
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was selected as a candidate and vetted. If a sig has flag 8 it
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is a usable signature. If a sig has flag 11 it is a usable
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revocation. If a sig has flag 12 it was issued by an unavailable
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key. "Usable" here means the most recent valid
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signature/revocation in a series from a particular signer.
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Delete everything that isn't a usable uid sig (which might be
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expired), a usable revocation, or a sig from an unavailable
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key. */
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for (node=uidnode->next;
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node && node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
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node=node->next)
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{
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int keep;
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keep = self_only? (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] == keyid[0]
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&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] == keyid[1]) : 1;
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/* Keep usable uid sigs ... */
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if ((node->flag & (1<<8)) && keep)
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continue;
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/* ... and usable revocations... */
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if ((node->flag & (1<<11)) && keep)
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continue;
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/* ... and sigs from unavailable keys. */
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/* disabled for now since more people seem to want sigs from
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unavailable keys removed altogether. */
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/*
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if(node->flag & (1<<12))
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continue;
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*/
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/* Everything else we delete */
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/* At this point, if 12 is set, the signing key was unavailable.
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If 9 or 10 is set, it's superseded. Otherwise, it's
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invalid. */
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if (noisy)
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log_info ("removing signature from key %s on user ID \"%s\": %s\n",
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keystr (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid),
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uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
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node->flag&(1<<12)? "key unavailable":
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node->flag&(1<<9)? "signature superseded"
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/* */ :"invalid signature" );
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delete_kbnode (node);
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deleted++;
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}
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return deleted;
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}
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/* This is substantially easier than clean_sigs_from_uid since we just
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have to establish if the uid has a valid self-sig, is not revoked,
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and is not expired. Note that this does not take into account
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whether the uid has a trust path to it - just whether the keyholder
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themselves has certified the uid. Returns true if the uid was
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compacted. To "compact" a user ID, we simply remove ALL signatures
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except the self-sig that caused the user ID to be remove-worthy.
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We don't actually remove the user ID packet itself since it might
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be resurrected in a later merge. Note that this function requires
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that the caller has already done a merge_keys_and_selfsig().
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TODO: change the import code to allow importing a uid with only a
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revocation if the uid already exists on the keyring. */
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static int
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clean_uid_from_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode, int noisy)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
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int deleted = 0;
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log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
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|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
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log_assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
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/* Skip valid user IDs, compacted user IDs, and non-self-signed user
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IDs if --allow-non-selfsigned-uid is set. */
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if (uid->created
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|| uid->flags.compacted
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|| (!uid->flags.expired && !uid->flags.revoked && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid))
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return 0;
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for (node=uidnode->next;
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node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
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node=node->next)
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{
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if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
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{
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delete_kbnode (node);
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deleted = 1;
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uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted = 1;
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}
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}
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if (noisy)
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{
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const char *reason;
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char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
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if (uid->flags.revoked)
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reason = _("revoked");
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else if (uid->flags.expired)
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reason = _("expired");
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else
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reason = _("invalid");
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log_info ("compacting user ID \"%s\" on key %s: %s\n",
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user, keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key),
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reason);
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xfree (user);
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}
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return deleted;
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}
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/* Needs to be called after a merge_keys_and_selfsig() */
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void
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clean_one_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
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int noisy, int self_only, int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
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{
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int dummy = 0;
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log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
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|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
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log_assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
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if (!uids_cleaned)
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uids_cleaned = &dummy;
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if (!sigs_cleaned)
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sigs_cleaned = &dummy;
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/* Do clean_uid_from_key first since if it fires off, we don't have
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to bother with the other. */
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*uids_cleaned += clean_uid_from_key (keyblock, uidnode, noisy);
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if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted)
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*sigs_cleaned += clean_sigs_from_uid (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode,
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noisy, self_only);
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}
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/* NB: This function marks the deleted nodes only and the caller is
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* responsible to skip or remove them. */
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void
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clean_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
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int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
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{
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kbnode_t node;
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merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
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for (node = keyblock->next;
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node && !(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
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node = node->next)
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{
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if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
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clean_one_uid (ctrl, keyblock, node, noisy, self_only,
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uids_cleaned, sigs_cleaned);
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}
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|
||||
/* Remove bogus subkey binding signatures: The only signatures
|
||||
* allowed are of class 0x18 and 0x28. */
|
||||
log_assert (!node || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
||||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY));
|
||||
for (; node; node = node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
||||
&& !(IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
|
||||
|| IS_SUBKEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
delete_kbnode (node);
|
||||
if (sigs_cleaned)
|
||||
++*sigs_cleaned;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
37
g10/key-clean.h
Normal file
37
g10/key-clean.h
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
|
||||
/* key-clean.h - Functions to clean a keyblock
|
||||
* Copyright (C) 2018 Werner Koch
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This file is part of GnuPG.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
|
||||
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
|
||||
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
|
||||
* (at your option) any later version.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
|
||||
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
|
||||
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
|
||||
* GNU General Public License for more details.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
|
||||
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
|
||||
* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef GNUPG_G10_KEY_CLEAN_H
|
||||
#define GNUPG_G10_KEY_CLEAN_H
|
||||
|
||||
#include "gpg.h"
|
||||
|
||||
void mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
|
||||
u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire);
|
||||
|
||||
void clean_one_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
int noisy, int self_only,
|
||||
int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned);
|
||||
void clean_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
|
||||
int *uids_cleaned,int *sigs_cleaned);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /*GNUPG_G10_KEY_CLEAN_H*/
|
||||
30
g10/keydb.h
30
g10/keydb.h
@ -64,6 +64,20 @@ struct kbnode_struct {
|
||||
#define is_cloned_kbnode(a) ((a)->private_flag & 2)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff
|
||||
* needed for key validation.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct key_item {
|
||||
struct key_item *next;
|
||||
unsigned int ownertrust,min_ownertrust;
|
||||
byte trust_depth;
|
||||
byte trust_value;
|
||||
char *trust_regexp;
|
||||
u32 kid[2];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Bit flags used with build_pk_list. */
|
||||
enum
|
||||
{
|
||||
@ -133,6 +147,22 @@ enum
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check whether the signature SIG is in the klist K.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static inline struct key_item *
|
||||
is_in_klist (struct key_item *k, PKT_signature *sig)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (; k; k = k->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
|
||||
return k;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*-- keydb.c --*/
|
||||
|
||||
#define KEYDB_RESOURCE_FLAG_PRIMARY 2 /* The primary resource. */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
|
||||
#include "../common/host2net.h"
|
||||
#include "tofu.h"
|
||||
#include "key-check.h"
|
||||
#include "key-clean.h"
|
||||
#include "keyedit.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static void show_prefs (PKT_user_id * uid, PKT_signature * selfsig,
|
||||
|
||||
388
g10/trust.c
388
g10/trust.c
@ -437,391 +437,3 @@ get_validity_string (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
|
||||
return _("revoked");
|
||||
return trust_value_to_string (trustlevel);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Mark the signature of the given UID which are used to certify it.
|
||||
* To do this, we first revmove all signatures which are not valid and
|
||||
* from the remain ones we look for the latest one. If this is not a
|
||||
* certification revocation signature we mark the signature by setting
|
||||
* node flag bit 8. Revocations are marked with flag 11, and sigs
|
||||
* from unavailable keys are marked with flag 12. Note that flag bits
|
||||
* 9 and 10 are used for internal purposes.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void
|
||||
mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
|
||||
u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire)
|
||||
{
|
||||
kbnode_t node;
|
||||
PKT_signature *sig;
|
||||
|
||||
/* First check all signatures. */
|
||||
for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
|
||||
node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
|
||||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|
||||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
||||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
|
||||
break; /* ready */
|
||||
if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
||||
if (main_kid
|
||||
&& sig->keyid[0] == main_kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == main_kid[1])
|
||||
continue; /* ignore self-signatures if we pass in a main_kid */
|
||||
if (!IS_UID_SIG(sig) && !IS_UID_REV(sig))
|
||||
continue; /* we only look at these signature classes */
|
||||
if(sig->sig_class>=0x11 && sig->sig_class<=0x13 &&
|
||||
sig->sig_class-0x10<opt.min_cert_level)
|
||||
continue; /* treat anything under our min_cert_level as an
|
||||
invalid signature */
|
||||
if (klist && !is_in_klist (klist, sig))
|
||||
continue; /* no need to check it then */
|
||||
if ((rc=check_key_signature (ctrl, keyblock, node, NULL)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* we ignore anything that won't verify, but tag the
|
||||
no_pubkey case */
|
||||
if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
|
||||
node->flag |= 1<<12;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
node->flag |= 1<<9;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Reset the remaining flags. */
|
||||
for (; node; node = node->next)
|
||||
node->flag &= ~(1<<8 | 1<<9 | 1<<10 | 1<<11 | 1<<12);
|
||||
|
||||
/* kbnode flag usage: bit 9 is here set for signatures to consider,
|
||||
* bit 10 will be set by the loop to keep track of keyIDs already
|
||||
* processed, bit 8 will be set for the usable signatures, and bit
|
||||
* 11 will be set for usable revocations. */
|
||||
|
||||
/* For each cert figure out the latest valid one. */
|
||||
for (node=uidnode->next; node; node = node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KBNODE n, signode;
|
||||
u32 kid[2];
|
||||
u32 sigdate;
|
||||
|
||||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
||||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
if ( !(node->flag & (1<<9)) )
|
||||
continue; /* not a node to look at */
|
||||
if ( (node->flag & (1<<10)) )
|
||||
continue; /* signature with a keyID already processed */
|
||||
node->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
|
||||
sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
||||
signode = node;
|
||||
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
||||
kid[0] = sig->keyid[0]; kid[1] = sig->keyid[1];
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now find the latest and greatest signature */
|
||||
for (n=uidnode->next; n; n = n->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
||||
|| n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
if ( !(n->flag & (1<<9)) )
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if ( (n->flag & (1<<10)) )
|
||||
continue; /* shortcut already processed signatures */
|
||||
sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
||||
if (kid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || kid[1] != sig->keyid[1])
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
n->flag |= (1<<10); /* mark this node as processed */
|
||||
|
||||
/* If signode is nonrevocable and unexpired and n isn't,
|
||||
then take signode (skip). It doesn't matter which is
|
||||
older: if signode was older then we don't want to take n
|
||||
as signode is nonrevocable. If n was older then we're
|
||||
automatically fine. */
|
||||
|
||||
if(((IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
|
||||
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
|
||||
(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
|
||||
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
|
||||
(!(IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
|
||||
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
|
||||
(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
|
||||
n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If n is nonrevocable and unexpired and signode isn't,
|
||||
then take n. Again, it doesn't matter which is older: if
|
||||
n was older then we don't want to take signode as n is
|
||||
nonrevocable. If signode was older then we're
|
||||
automatically fine. */
|
||||
|
||||
if((!(IS_UID_SIG(signode->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
|
||||
!signode->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
|
||||
(signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
|
||||
signode->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))) &&
|
||||
((IS_UID_SIG(n->pkt->pkt.signature) &&
|
||||
!n->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.revocable &&
|
||||
(n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate==0 ||
|
||||
n->pkt->pkt.signature->expiredate>curtime))))
|
||||
{
|
||||
signode = n;
|
||||
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* At this point, if it's newer, it goes in as the only
|
||||
remaining possibilities are signode and n are both either
|
||||
revocable or expired or both nonrevocable and unexpired.
|
||||
If the timestamps are equal take the later ordered
|
||||
packet, presuming that the key packets are hopefully in
|
||||
their original order. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
|
||||
{
|
||||
signode = n;
|
||||
sigdate = sig->timestamp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
|
||||
if (IS_UID_SIG (sig))
|
||||
{ /* this seems to be a usable one which is not revoked.
|
||||
* Just need to check whether there is an expiration time,
|
||||
* We do the expired certification after finding a suitable
|
||||
* certification, the assumption is that a signator does not
|
||||
* want that after the expiration of his certificate the
|
||||
* system falls back to an older certification which has a
|
||||
* different expiration time */
|
||||
const byte *p;
|
||||
u32 expire;
|
||||
|
||||
p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_SIG_EXPIRE, NULL );
|
||||
expire = p? sig->timestamp + buf32_to_u32(p) : 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (expire==0 || expire > curtime )
|
||||
{
|
||||
signode->flag |= (1<<8); /* yeah, found a good cert */
|
||||
if (next_expire && expire && expire < *next_expire)
|
||||
*next_expire = expire;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
signode->flag |= (1<<11);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
clean_sigs_from_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
int noisy, int self_only)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int deleted = 0;
|
||||
kbnode_t node;
|
||||
u32 keyid[2];
|
||||
|
||||
log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
||||
|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
|
||||
|
||||
keyid_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Passing in a 0 for current time here means that we'll never weed
|
||||
out an expired sig. This is correct behavior since we want to
|
||||
keep the most recent expired sig in a series. */
|
||||
mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* What we want to do here is remove signatures that are not
|
||||
considered as part of the trust calculations. Thus, all invalid
|
||||
signatures are out, as are any signatures that aren't the last of
|
||||
a series of uid sigs or revocations It breaks down like this:
|
||||
coming out of mark_usable_uid_certs, if a sig is unflagged, it is
|
||||
not even a candidate. If a sig has flag 9 or 10, that means it
|
||||
was selected as a candidate and vetted. If a sig has flag 8 it
|
||||
is a usable signature. If a sig has flag 11 it is a usable
|
||||
revocation. If a sig has flag 12 it was issued by an unavailable
|
||||
key. "Usable" here means the most recent valid
|
||||
signature/revocation in a series from a particular signer.
|
||||
|
||||
Delete everything that isn't a usable uid sig (which might be
|
||||
expired), a usable revocation, or a sig from an unavailable
|
||||
key. */
|
||||
|
||||
for (node=uidnode->next;
|
||||
node && node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE;
|
||||
node=node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int keep;
|
||||
|
||||
keep = self_only? (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0] == keyid[0]
|
||||
&& node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1] == keyid[1]) : 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Keep usable uid sigs ... */
|
||||
if ((node->flag & (1<<8)) && keep)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/* ... and usable revocations... */
|
||||
if ((node->flag & (1<<11)) && keep)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
/* ... and sigs from unavailable keys. */
|
||||
/* disabled for now since more people seem to want sigs from
|
||||
unavailable keys removed altogether. */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
if(node->flag & (1<<12))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* Everything else we delete */
|
||||
|
||||
/* At this point, if 12 is set, the signing key was unavailable.
|
||||
If 9 or 10 is set, it's superseded. Otherwise, it's
|
||||
invalid. */
|
||||
|
||||
if (noisy)
|
||||
log_info ("removing signature from key %s on user ID \"%s\": %s\n",
|
||||
keystr (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid),
|
||||
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
|
||||
node->flag&(1<<12)? "key unavailable":
|
||||
node->flag&(1<<9)? "signature superseded"
|
||||
/* */ :"invalid signature" );
|
||||
|
||||
delete_kbnode (node);
|
||||
deleted++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return deleted;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* This is substantially easier than clean_sigs_from_uid since we just
|
||||
have to establish if the uid has a valid self-sig, is not revoked,
|
||||
and is not expired. Note that this does not take into account
|
||||
whether the uid has a trust path to it - just whether the keyholder
|
||||
themselves has certified the uid. Returns true if the uid was
|
||||
compacted. To "compact" a user ID, we simply remove ALL signatures
|
||||
except the self-sig that caused the user ID to be remove-worthy.
|
||||
We don't actually remove the user ID packet itself since it might
|
||||
be resurrected in a later merge. Note that this function requires
|
||||
that the caller has already done a merge_keys_and_selfsig().
|
||||
|
||||
TODO: change the import code to allow importing a uid with only a
|
||||
revocation if the uid already exists on the keyring. */
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
clean_uid_from_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode, int noisy)
|
||||
{
|
||||
kbnode_t node;
|
||||
PKT_user_id *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
|
||||
int deleted = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
||||
|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
|
||||
log_assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Skip valid user IDs, compacted user IDs, and non-self-signed user
|
||||
IDs if --allow-non-selfsigned-uid is set. */
|
||||
if (uid->created
|
||||
|| uid->flags.compacted
|
||||
|| (!uid->flags.expired && !uid->flags.revoked && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (node=uidnode->next;
|
||||
node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE;
|
||||
node=node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.chosen_selfsig)
|
||||
{
|
||||
delete_kbnode (node);
|
||||
deleted = 1;
|
||||
uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (noisy)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const char *reason;
|
||||
char *user = utf8_to_native (uid->name, uid->len, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
if (uid->flags.revoked)
|
||||
reason = _("revoked");
|
||||
else if (uid->flags.expired)
|
||||
reason = _("expired");
|
||||
else
|
||||
reason = _("invalid");
|
||||
|
||||
log_info ("compacting user ID \"%s\" on key %s: %s\n",
|
||||
user, keystr_from_pk (keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key),
|
||||
reason);
|
||||
|
||||
xfree (user);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return deleted;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Needs to be called after a merge_keys_and_selfsig() */
|
||||
void
|
||||
clean_one_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
int noisy, int self_only, int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int dummy = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
log_assert (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|
||||
|| keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY);
|
||||
log_assert (uidnode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!uids_cleaned)
|
||||
uids_cleaned = &dummy;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!sigs_cleaned)
|
||||
sigs_cleaned = &dummy;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Do clean_uid_from_key first since if it fires off, we don't have
|
||||
to bother with the other. */
|
||||
*uids_cleaned += clean_uid_from_key (keyblock, uidnode, noisy);
|
||||
if (!uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.compacted)
|
||||
*sigs_cleaned += clean_sigs_from_uid (ctrl, keyblock, uidnode,
|
||||
noisy, self_only);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* NB: This function marks the deleted nodes only and the caller is
|
||||
* responsible to skip or remove them. */
|
||||
void
|
||||
clean_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
|
||||
int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned)
|
||||
{
|
||||
kbnode_t node;
|
||||
|
||||
merge_keys_and_selfsig (ctrl, keyblock);
|
||||
|
||||
for (node = keyblock->next;
|
||||
node && !(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
||||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
|
||||
node = node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
|
||||
clean_one_uid (ctrl, keyblock, node, noisy, self_only,
|
||||
uids_cleaned, sigs_cleaned);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Remove bogus subkey binding signatures: The only signatures
|
||||
* allowed are of class 0x18 and 0x28. */
|
||||
log_assert (!node || (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|
||||
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY));
|
||||
for (; node; node = node->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (is_deleted_kbnode (node))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
|
||||
&& !(IS_SUBKEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature)
|
||||
|| IS_SUBKEY_REV (node->pkt->pkt.signature)))
|
||||
{
|
||||
delete_kbnode (node);
|
||||
if (sigs_cleaned)
|
||||
++*sigs_cleaned;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
|
||||
#include "tdbio.h"
|
||||
#include "trustdb.h"
|
||||
#include "tofu.h"
|
||||
#include "key-clean.h"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct key_item **KeyHashTable; /* see new_key_hash_table() */
|
||||
|
||||
@ -46,36 +46,6 @@
|
||||
#define NAMEHASH_LEN 20
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* A structure to store key identification as well as some stuff needed
|
||||
* for validation
|
||||
*/
|
||||
struct key_item {
|
||||
struct key_item *next;
|
||||
unsigned int ownertrust,min_ownertrust;
|
||||
byte trust_depth;
|
||||
byte trust_value;
|
||||
char *trust_regexp;
|
||||
u32 kid[2];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check whether the signature SIG is in the klist K.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static inline struct key_item *
|
||||
is_in_klist (struct key_item *k, PKT_signature *sig)
|
||||
{
|
||||
for (; k; k = k->next)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (k->kid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && k->kid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
|
||||
return k;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*-- trust.c --*/
|
||||
int cache_disabled_value (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk);
|
||||
void register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid);
|
||||
@ -103,17 +73,6 @@ int get_validity_info (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t kb, PKT_public_key *pk,
|
||||
const char *get_validity_string (ctrl_t ctrl,
|
||||
PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid);
|
||||
|
||||
void mark_usable_uid_certs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
u32 *main_kid, struct key_item *klist,
|
||||
u32 curtime, u32 *next_expire);
|
||||
|
||||
void clean_one_uid (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t uidnode,
|
||||
int noisy, int self_only,
|
||||
int *uids_cleaned, int *sigs_cleaned);
|
||||
void clean_key (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock, int noisy, int self_only,
|
||||
int *uids_cleaned,int *sigs_cleaned);
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*-- trustdb.c --*/
|
||||
void tdb_register_trusted_keyid (u32 *keyid);
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user