mirror of
git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git
synced 2025-07-02 22:46:30 +02:00
Update head to match stable 1.0
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw
parent
151ee2f47b
commit
3f51f7db3d
155 changed files with 83872 additions and 37585 deletions
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/* seckey-cert.c - secret key certificate packet handling
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
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@ -23,58 +23,22 @@
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <gcrypt.h>
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#include "util.h"
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#include "memory.h"
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#include "packet.h"
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#include "mpi.h"
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#include "keydb.h"
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#include "cipher.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "options.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "status.h"
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/****************
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* Emulate our old PK interface here - sometime in the future we might
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* change the internal design to directly fit to libgcrypt.
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*/
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static int
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pk_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
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{
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GCRY_SEXP s_skey;
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int rc;
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/* make a sexp from skey */
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if( algo == GCRY_PK_DSA ) {
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rc = gcry_sexp_build ( &s_skey, NULL,
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"(private-key(dsa(p%m)(q%m)(g%m)(y%m)(x%m)))",
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skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4] );
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}
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else if( algo == GCRY_PK_ELG || algo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E ) {
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rc = gcry_sexp_build ( &s_skey, NULL,
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"(private-key(elg(p%m)(g%m)(y%m)(x%m)))",
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skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3] );
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}
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else if( algo == GCRY_PK_RSA ) {
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rc = gcry_sexp_build ( &s_skey, NULL,
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"(private-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)(d%m)(p%m)(q%m)(u%m)))",
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skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4], skey[5] );
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}
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else
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return GPGERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
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if ( rc )
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BUG ();
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rc = gcry_pk_testkey( s_skey );
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gcry_sexp_release( s_skey );
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return rc;
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}
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static int
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do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
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do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text )
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{
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byte *buffer;
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u16 csum=0;
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int i, res;
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unsigned nbytes;
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@ -82,19 +46,20 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
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if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
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DEK *dek = NULL;
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u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
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GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
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CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
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PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
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if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
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log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
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return GPGERR_GENERAL;
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return G10ERR_GENERAL;
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}
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if( sk->protect.algo == GCRY_CIPHER_NONE )
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if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
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BUG();
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if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
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log_info(_("protection algorithm %d is not supported\n"),
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sk->protect.algo );
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return GPGERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
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if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
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log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
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sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
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idea_cipher_warn(0);
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return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
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}
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keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
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keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
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@ -103,110 +68,115 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
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keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
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}
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dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
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&sk->protect.s2k, 0 );
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/* Hmmm: Do we use sync mode here even for Twofish? */
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if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
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GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
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GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
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| (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
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0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) ) )
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) {
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BUG();
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}
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if( gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
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log_fatal("set key failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror(-1) );
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gcry_free(dek);
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&sk->protect.s2k, 0, tryagain_text );
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cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
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CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1);
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cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
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m_free(dek);
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save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
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if( gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ))
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log_fatal("set IV failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror(-1) );
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cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
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csum = 0;
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if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
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size_t ndata;
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unsigned int ndatabits;
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int ndata;
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byte *p, *data;
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u16 csumc = 0;
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i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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assert( gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
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p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
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ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
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assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
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p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
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if ( ndata > 1 )
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csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
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data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
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gcry_cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
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mpi_release( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
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data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
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cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, p, ndata );
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mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
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p = data;
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if( ndata < 2 ) {
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log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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}
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else {
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csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
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sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
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if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
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/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
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sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
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if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
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/* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
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tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
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attack */
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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if( ndata < 20 )
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log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
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else {
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MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
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if (!h)
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BUG(); /* algo not available */
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md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
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md_final (h);
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if (!memcmp (md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
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data + ndata - 20, 20) ) {
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/* digest does match. We have to keep the old
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style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
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test used for unprotected keys does work.
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This test gets used when we are adding new
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keys. */
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sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
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}
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md_close (h);
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}
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}
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/* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
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* because the length may have an arbitrary value */
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if( sk->csum == csum ) {
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for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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nbytes = ndata;
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assert( gcry_is_secure( p ) );
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res = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
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p, &nbytes);
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if( res )
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log_bug("gcry_mpi_scan failed in do_check: rc=%d\n", res);
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ndata -= nbytes;
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p += nbytes;
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}
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}
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gcry_free(data);
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}
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else {
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if( ndata < 2 ) {
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log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
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sk->csum = 0;
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csum = 1;
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}
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else {
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csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
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sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
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if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
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/* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
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sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
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}
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}
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}
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/* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
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because the length may have an arbitrary value */
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if( sk->csum == csum ) {
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for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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nbytes = ndata;
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sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 );
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ndata -= nbytes;
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p += nbytes;
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}
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/* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
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checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
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}
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m_free(data);
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}
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else {
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for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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size_t ndata;
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unsigned int ndatabits;
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byte *p, *data;
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assert( gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
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p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
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ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
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data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
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gcry_cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
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gcry_cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
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mpi_release( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
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res = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
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data, &ndata );
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if( res )
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log_bug("gcry_mpi_scan failed in do_check: rc=%d\n", res);
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buffer = mpi_get_secure_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
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cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
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assert( mpi_is_protected(sk->skey[i]) );
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cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
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mpi_set_buffer( sk->skey[i], buffer, nbytes, 0 );
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mpi_clear_protect_flag( sk->skey[i] );
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csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
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gcry_free( data );
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m_free( buffer );
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}
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if( opt.emulate_bugs & EMUBUG_GPGCHKSUM ) {
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csum = sk->csum;
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}
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}
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gcry_cipher_close( cipher_hd );
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cipher_close( cipher_hd );
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/* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
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if( csum != sk->csum ) {
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copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
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passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
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free_secret_key( save_sk );
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return GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
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return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
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}
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/* the checksum may be correct in some cases,
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* so we also check the key itself */
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res = pk_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
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/* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */
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res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
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if( res ) {
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copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
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passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
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free_secret_key( save_sk );
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return GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
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return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
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}
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free_secret_key( save_sk );
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sk->is_protected = 0;
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@ -215,11 +185,10 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
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csum = 0;
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for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
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assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
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csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
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}
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if( csum != sk->csum )
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return GPGERR_CHECKSUM;
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return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
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}
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return 0;
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@ -234,17 +203,20 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
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int
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check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
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{
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int rc = GPGERR_BAD_PASS;
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int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
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int i;
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if( n < 1 )
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n = opt.batch? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
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n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
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for(i=0; i < n && rc == GPGERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
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if( i )
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log_info(_("Invalid passphrase; please try again ...\n"));
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rc = do_check( sk );
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if( rc == GPGERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
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for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
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const char *tryagain = NULL;
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if (i) {
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tryagain = _("Invalid passphrase; please try again");
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log_info (_("%s ...\n"), tryagain);
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}
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rc = do_check( sk, tryagain );
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if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
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u32 kid[2];
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char buf[50];
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@ -289,114 +261,103 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
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return 0;
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if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
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GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
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CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
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if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
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rc = GPGERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
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if( check_cipher_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
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rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
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else {
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print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo );
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if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
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GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
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GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
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| (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
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0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) ))
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) {
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BUG();
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}
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rc = gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
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if( rc == GCRYERR_WEAK_KEY ) {
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cipher_hd = cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
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CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB, 1 );
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if( cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
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log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
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" - please change passphrase again.\n"));
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rc = 0;
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}
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else if( rc )
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BUG();
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/* set the IV length */
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{ int blocksize = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen( sk->protect.algo );
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if( blocksize != 8 && blocksize != 16 )
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log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %d\n", blocksize );
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sk->protect.ivlen = blocksize;
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assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
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}
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gcry_randomize(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen,
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GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM);
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gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
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/* FIXME: replace set/get buffer */
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sk->protect.ivlen = cipher_get_blocksize( sk->protect.algo );
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assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
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if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 )
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BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */
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randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
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cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
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if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
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byte *bufarr[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned narr[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned nbits[GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY];
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byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
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int ndata=0;
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byte *p, *data;
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for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
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i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) {
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assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
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if( gcry_mpi_aprint( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, (void**)bufarr+j,
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narr+j, sk->skey[i]))
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BUG();
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nbits[j] = gcry_mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
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||||
assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
|
||||
bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL );
|
||||
nbits[j] = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
ndata += narr[j] + 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for( ; j < GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
|
||||
for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
|
||||
bufarr[j] = NULL;
|
||||
ndata += 2; /* for checksum */
|
||||
ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */
|
||||
|
||||
data = gcry_xmalloc_secure( ndata );
|
||||
data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
|
||||
p = data;
|
||||
for(j=0; j < GNUPG_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
|
||||
for(j=0; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
|
||||
p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
|
||||
p[1] = nbits[j];
|
||||
p += 2;
|
||||
memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] );
|
||||
p += narr[j];
|
||||
gcry_free(bufarr[j]);
|
||||
m_free(bufarr[j]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
|
||||
sk->csum = csum;
|
||||
*p++ = csum >> 8;
|
||||
*p++ = csum;
|
||||
assert( p == data+ndata );
|
||||
gcry_cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, NULL, 0 );
|
||||
|
||||
if (opt.simple_sk_checksum) {
|
||||
log_info (_("generating the deprecated 16-bit checksum"
|
||||
" for secret key protection\n"));
|
||||
csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
|
||||
sk->csum = csum;
|
||||
*p++ = csum >> 8;
|
||||
*p++ = csum;
|
||||
sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
MD_HANDLE h = md_open (DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1);
|
||||
if (!h)
|
||||
BUG(); /* algo not available */
|
||||
md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
|
||||
md_final (h);
|
||||
memcpy (p, md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20);
|
||||
p += 20;
|
||||
md_close (h);
|
||||
sk->csum = csum = 0;
|
||||
sk->protect.sha1chk = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert( p == data+ndata );
|
||||
|
||||
cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, data, ndata );
|
||||
for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
||||
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
||||
mpi_release( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
mpi_free( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
sk->skey[i] = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
||||
sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata*8 );
|
||||
sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else {
|
||||
/* NOTE: we always recalculate the checksum because there
|
||||
* are some test releases which calculated it wrong */
|
||||
/* FIXME: Replace this code -- Hmmm: why */
|
||||
csum = 0;
|
||||
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
|
||||
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
|
||||
csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
|
||||
if( gcry_mpi_aprint( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
|
||||
&buffer, &nbytes, sk->skey[i] ) )
|
||||
BUG();
|
||||
|
||||
gcry_cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
|
||||
assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ) );
|
||||
gcry_cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, nbytes, NULL, 0 );
|
||||
gcry_mpi_release( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
if( gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
|
||||
buffer,&nbytes ) )
|
||||
BUG();
|
||||
|
||||
gcry_free( buffer );
|
||||
csum += checksum_mpi_counted_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
|
||||
cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
|
||||
assert( !mpi_is_protected(sk->skey[i]) );
|
||||
cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
|
||||
mpi_set_buffer( sk->skey[i], buffer, nbytes, 0 );
|
||||
mpi_set_protect_flag( sk->skey[i] );
|
||||
m_free( buffer );
|
||||
}
|
||||
sk->csum = csum;
|
||||
}
|
||||
sk->is_protected = 1;
|
||||
gcry_cipher_close( cipher_hd );
|
||||
cipher_close( cipher_hd );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue