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gpg: First take on PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD.
* common/openpgpdefs.h (PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD): New const.
* g10/dek.h (DEK): Increase size of use_aead to 4 bits.
* g10/filter.h (cipher_filter_context_t): Add new fields for AEAD.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_encrypted): Add fields aead_algo, cipher_algo, and
chunkbyte.
* g10/build-packet.c (do_encrypted_aead): New.
(build_packet): Call it.
* g10/parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Handle SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD.
(parse_one_sig_subpkt, can_handle_critical): Ditto.
(parse_encrypted): Clear new PKT_ENCRYPTED fields.
(parse_encrypted_aead): New.
(parse): Call it.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Take care of --rfc4880bis option when checking
compliance.
* g10/cipher-aead.c: Replace the stub by real code.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (decode_filter_ctx_t): Add fields for use with
AEAD.
(aead_set_nonce): New.
(aead_set_ad): New.
(decrypt_data): Support AEAD.
(aead_underflow): New.
(aead_decode_filter): New.
* g10/encrypt.c (use_aead): Make that new fucntion work.
(encrypt_simple): Use default_aead_algo() instead of EAX.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Support AEAD.
(do_proc_packets): Support PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD.
--
This code has seen only a very few manual tests. Encrypting always
uses a 64k chunks and decryption has not been tested with larger
chunks. Those small chunks make debugging much faster.
Tests can be done using:
gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback --passphrase abc \
--force-aead --aead-algo ocb --s2k-mode 0 --cipher AES \
-v -z 0 --status-fd 2 -c <INFILE >OUTFILE
and
gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback --passphrase=abc \
--status-fd 2 -v -d <INFILE >OUTFILE
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch
parent
81d71818d0
commit
3f4ca85cb0
12 changed files with 1235 additions and 138 deletions
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@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
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/* parse-packet.c - read packets
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* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
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* 2007, 2009, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch
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* Copyright (C) 1998-2007, 2009-2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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* Copyright (C) 2014, 2018 Werner Koch
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* Copyright (C) 2015 g10 Code GmbH
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*
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* This file is part of GnuPG.
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@ -18,6 +17,7 @@
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0+
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*/
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#include <config.h>
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@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ static int parse_compressed (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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PACKET * packet, int new_ctb);
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static int parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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PACKET * packet, int new_ctb, int partial);
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static gpg_error_t parse_encrypted_aead (IOBUF inp, int pkttype,
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unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet,
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int partial);
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static int parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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PACKET * packet, int new_ctb);
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static int parse_gpg_control (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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@ -636,6 +639,7 @@ parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t * retpos,
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case PKT_PLAINTEXT:
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case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
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case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
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case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
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case PKT_COMPRESSED:
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iobuf_set_partial_body_length_mode (inp, c & 0xff);
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pktlen = 0; /* To indicate partial length. */
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@ -823,6 +827,9 @@ parse (parse_packet_ctx_t ctx, PACKET *pkt, int onlykeypkts, off_t * retpos,
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case PKT_MDC:
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rc = parse_mdc (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, new_ctb);
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break;
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case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:
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rc = parse_encrypted_aead (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial);
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break;
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case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
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rc = parse_gpg_control (inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt, partial);
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break;
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@ -1392,6 +1399,11 @@ dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical,
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for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
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es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
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break;
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD:
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es_fputs ("pref-aead-algos:", listfp);
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for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
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es_fprintf (listfp, " %d", buffer[i]);
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break;
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case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
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es_fputs ("revocation key: ", listfp);
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if (length < 22)
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@ -1554,6 +1566,7 @@ parse_one_sig_subpkt (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
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case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
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case SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
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case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
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@ -1636,6 +1649,7 @@ can_handle_critical (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
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case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER: /* issuer key ID */
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case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR: /* issuer fingerprint */
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH:
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case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR:
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case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
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@ -3161,6 +3175,9 @@ parse_encrypted (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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ed->buf = NULL;
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ed->new_ctb = new_ctb;
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ed->is_partial = partial;
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ed->aead_algo = 0;
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ed->cipher_algo = 0; /* Only used with AEAD. */
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ed->chunkbyte = 0; /* Only used with AEAD. */
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if (pkttype == PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC)
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{
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/* Fixme: add some pktlen sanity checks. */
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@ -3252,6 +3269,81 @@ parse_mdc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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}
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static gpg_error_t
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parse_encrypted_aead (iobuf_t inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
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PACKET *pkt, int partial)
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{
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int rc = 0;
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PKT_encrypted *ed;
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unsigned long orig_pktlen = pktlen;
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int version;
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ed = pkt->pkt.encrypted = xtrymalloc (sizeof *pkt->pkt.encrypted);
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if (!ed)
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return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
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ed->len = 0;
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ed->extralen = 0; /* (only used in build_packet.) */
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ed->buf = NULL;
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ed->new_ctb = 1; /* (packet number requires a new CTB anyway.) */
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ed->is_partial = partial;
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ed->mdc_method = 0;
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/* A basic sanity check. We need one version byte, one algo byte,
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* one aead algo byte, one chunkbyte, at least 15 byte IV. */
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if (orig_pktlen && pktlen < 19)
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{
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log_error ("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
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if (list_mode)
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es_fputs (":aead encrypted packet: [too short]\n", listfp);
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
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iobuf_skip_rest (inp, pktlen, partial);
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goto leave;
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}
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version = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
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if (orig_pktlen)
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pktlen--;
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if (version != 1)
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{
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log_error ("aead encrypted packet with unknown version %d\n",
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version);
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if (list_mode)
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es_fputs (":aead encrypted packet: [unknown version]\n", listfp);
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/*skip_rest(inp, pktlen); should we really do this? */
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rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
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goto leave;
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}
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ed->cipher_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
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if (orig_pktlen)
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pktlen--;
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ed->aead_algo = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
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if (orig_pktlen)
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pktlen--;
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ed->chunkbyte = iobuf_get_noeof (inp);
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if (orig_pktlen)
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pktlen--;
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/* Store the remaining length of the encrypted data. We read the
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* rest during decryption. */
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ed->len = pktlen;
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if (list_mode)
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{
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es_fprintf (listfp, ":aead encrypted packet: cipher=%u aead=%u cb=%u\n",
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ed->cipher_algo, ed->aead_algo, ed->chunkbyte);
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if (orig_pktlen)
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es_fprintf (listfp, "\tlength: %lu\n", orig_pktlen);
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else
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es_fprintf (listfp, "\tlength: unknown\n");
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}
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ed->buf = inp;
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leave:
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return rc;
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}
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/*
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* This packet is internally generated by us (in armor.c) to transfer
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* some information to the lower layer. To make sure that this packet
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