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indent: Modernize g10/sign.c

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--
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2018-10-24 16:00:20 +02:00
parent 256a280c51
commit 3b88bceb4d
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
1 changed files with 846 additions and 808 deletions
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332
g10/sign.c
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@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
static int recipient_digest_algo=0;
/****************
/*
* Create notations and other stuff. It is assumed that the stings in
* STRLIST are already checked to contain only printable data and have
* a valid NAME=VALUE format.
@ -574,7 +575,7 @@ print_status_sig_created (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, int what)
* Loop over the secret certificates in SK_LIST and build the one pass
* signature packets. OpenPGP says that the data should be bracket by
* the onepass-sig and signature-packet; so we build these onepass
* packet here in reverse order
* packet here in reverse order.
*/
static int
write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
@ -585,16 +586,16 @@ write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
for (skcount=0, sk_rover=sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
skcount++;
for (; skcount; skcount--) {
for (; skcount; skcount--)
{
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_onepass_sig *ops;
PACKET pkt;
int i, rc;
for (i=0, sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
for (i=0, sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
if (++i == skcount)
break;
}
pk = sk_rover->pk;
ops = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *ops);
@ -609,7 +610,8 @@ write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
pkt.pkt.onepass_sig = ops;
rc = build_packet (out, &pkt);
free_packet (&pkt, NULL);
if (rc) {
if (rc)
{
log_error ("build onepass_sig packet failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
return rc;
@ -619,6 +621,7 @@ write_onepass_sig_packets (SK_LIST sk_list, IOBUF out, int sigclass )
return 0;
}
/*
* Helper to write the plaintext (literal data) packet
*/
@ -632,7 +635,7 @@ write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
if (!opt.no_literal)
pt = setup_plaintext_name (fname, inp);
/* try to calculate the length of the data */
/* Try to calculate the length of the data. */
if ( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (fname) && *fname)
{
off_t tmpsize;
@ -643,9 +646,9 @@ write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
log_info (_("WARNING: '%s' is an empty file\n"), fname);
/* We can't encode the length of very large files because
OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes. So if the size of
a file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for packet
headers, we switch to partial length encoding. */
* OpenPGP uses only 32 bit for file sizes. So if the size of a
* file is larger than 2^32 minus some bytes for packet headers,
* we switch to partial length encoding. */
if (tmpsize < (IOBUF_FILELENGTH_LIMIT - 65536))
filesize = tmpsize;
else
@ -661,7 +664,8 @@ write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
else
filesize = opt.set_filesize? opt.set_filesize : 0; /* stdin */
if (!opt.no_literal) {
if (!opt.no_literal)
{
PACKET pkt;
/* Note that PT has been initialized above in no_literal mode. */
@ -680,12 +684,14 @@ write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
pt->buf = NULL;
free_packet (&pkt, NULL);
}
else {
else
{
byte copy_buffer[4096];
int bytes_copied;
while ((bytes_copied = iobuf_read (inp, copy_buffer, 4096)) != -1)
if ( (rc=iobuf_write(out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied)) ) {
if ((rc = iobuf_write (out, copy_buffer, bytes_copied)))
{
log_error ("copying input to output failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (rc));
break;
@ -697,6 +703,7 @@ write_plaintext_packet (IOBUF out, IOBUF inp, const char *fname, int ptmode)
return rc;
}
/*
* Write the signatures from the SK_LIST to OUT. HASH must be a non-finalized
* hash which will not be changes here.
@ -782,7 +789,7 @@ write_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl,
}
/****************
/*
* Sign the files whose names are in FILENAME.
* If DETACHED has the value true,
* make a detached signature. If FILENAMES->d is NULL read from stdin
@ -805,7 +812,8 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
text_filter_context_t tfx;
progress_filter_context_t *pfx;
encrypt_filter_context_t efx;
IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
iobuf_t inp = NULL;
iobuf_t out = NULL;
PACKET pkt;
int rc = 0;
PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
@ -822,7 +830,8 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
efx.ctrl = ctrl;
init_packet (&pkt);
if( filenames ) {
if (filenames)
{
fname = filenames->d;
multifile = !!filenames->next;
}
@ -842,7 +851,7 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
duration = parse_expire_string(opt.def_sig_expire);
/* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
* unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
if ((rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )))
goto leave;
@ -850,10 +859,11 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
&& (rc = build_pk_list (ctrl, remusr, &pk_list)))
goto leave;
/* prepare iobufs */
/* Prepare iobufs. */
if (multifile) /* have list of filenames */
inp = NULL; /* we do it later */
else {
else
{
inp = iobuf_open(fname);
if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
{
@ -872,8 +882,10 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname);
}
if( outfile ) {
if (is_secured_filename ( outfile )) {
if (outfile)
{
if (is_secured_filename (outfile))
{
out = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
@ -882,7 +894,7 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
if (!out)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error(_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) );
log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
else if (opt.verbose)
@ -890,9 +902,11 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
}
else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname,
opt.armor? 1 : detached? 2 : 0, 0, &out)))
{
goto leave;
}
/* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
/* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */
if (opt.textmode && !outfile && !multifile)
{
memset (&tfx, 0, sizeof tfx);
@ -905,64 +919,64 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
gcry_md_debug (mfx.md, "sign");
/* If we're encrypting and signing, it is reasonable to pick the
hash algorithm to use out of the recipient key prefs. This is
best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are
cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2
wants >160 and smartcards want =160). In the future this could
be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the
current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */
* hash algorithm to use out of the recipient key prefs. This is
* best effort only, as in a DSA2 and smartcard world there are
* cases where we cannot please everyone with a single hash (DSA2
* wants >160 and smartcards want =160). In the future this could
* be more complex with different hashes for each sk, but the
* current design requires a single hash for all SKs. */
if (pk_list)
{
if (opt.def_digest_algo)
{
if(!opt.expert &&
select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
if (!opt.expert
&& select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,
opt.def_digest_algo,
NULL) != opt.def_digest_algo)
{
log_info (_("WARNING: forcing digest algorithm %s (%d)"
" violates recipient preferences\n"),
gcry_md_algo_name (opt.def_digest_algo),
opt.def_digest_algo);
}
}
else
{
int algo, smartcard=0;
int algo;
int smartcard=0;
union pref_hint hint;
hint.digest_length = 0;
/* Of course, if the recipient asks for something
unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then
don't do it. Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live
on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we
may not be able to give the recipient what they want.
For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have. Note
that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160
key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key.
The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs
completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in
hash_for(). The override behavior here is more or less
reasonable as it is under the control of the user which
keys they sign with for a given message and the fact
that the message with multiple signatures won't be
usable on an implementation that doesn't understand
DSA2 anyway. */
* unreasonable (like the wrong hash for a DSA key) then
* don't do it. Check all sk's - if any are DSA or live
* on a smartcard, then the hash has restrictions and we
* may not be able to give the recipient what they want.
* For DSA, pass a hint for the largest q we have. Note
* that this means that a q>160 key will override a q=160
* key and force the use of truncation for the q=160 key.
* The alternative would be to ignore the recipient prefs
* completely and get a different hash for each DSA key in
* hash_for(). The override behavior here is more or less
* reasonable as it is under the control of the user which
* keys they sign with for a given message and the fact
* that the message with multiple signatures won't be
* usable on an implementation that doesn't understand
* DSA2 anyway. */
for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next )
{
if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|| sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
{
int temp_hashlen = (gcry_mpi_get_nbits
(sk_rover->pk->pkey[1]));
int temp_hashlen = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk_rover->pk->pkey[1]);
if (sk_rover->pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA)
temp_hashlen = ecdsa_qbits_from_Q (temp_hashlen);
temp_hashlen = (temp_hashlen+7)/8;
/* Pick a hash that is large enough for our
largest q */
/* Pick a hash that is large enough for our largest Q */
if (hint.digest_length < temp_hashlen)
hint.digest_length = temp_hashlen;
}
@ -973,18 +987,19 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
}
/* Current smartcards only do 160-bit hashes. If we have
to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the
recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the
same time and recipient prefs currently require a
single hash for all signatures. All this may well have
to change as the cards add algorithms. */
if (!smartcard || (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20))
if ( (algo=
select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_HASH,-1,&hint)) > 0)
* to have a >160-bit hash, then we can't use the
* recipient prefs as we'd need both =160 and >160 at the
* same time and recipient prefs currently require a
* single hash for all signatures. All this may well have
* to change as the cards add algorithms. */
if ((!smartcard || (smartcard && hint.digest_length==20))
&& ((algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_HASH,
-1, &hint)) > 0))
{
recipient_digest_algo = algo;
}
}
}
for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
gcry_md_enable (mfx.md, hash_for (sk_rover->pk));
@ -998,7 +1013,8 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
if (opt.armor && !outfile)
push_armor_filter (afx, out);
if( encryptflag ) {
if (encryptflag)
{
efx.pk_list = pk_list;
/* fixme: set efx.cfx.datalen if known */
iobuf_push_filter (out, encrypt_filter, &efx);
@ -1012,30 +1028,34 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
if (compr_algo==-1)
{
/* If we're not encrypting, then select_algo_from_prefs
will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are
encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since
there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data.
Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the
default. */
if((compr_algo=
select_algo_from_prefs(pk_list,PREFTYPE_ZIP,-1,NULL))==-1)
* will fail and we'll end up with the default. If we are
* encrypting, select_algo_from_prefs cannot fail since
* there is an assumed preference for uncompressed data.
* Still, if it did fail, we'll also end up with the
* default. */
if ((compr_algo = select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP,
-1, NULL)) == -1)
{
compr_algo = default_compress_algo();
}
}
else if (!opt.expert && pk_list
&& select_algo_from_prefs (pk_list, PREFTYPE_ZIP,
compr_algo, NULL) != compr_algo)
{
log_info (_("WARNING: forcing compression algorithm %s (%d)"
" violates recipient preferences\n"),
compress_algo_to_string (compr_algo), compr_algo);
}
/* algo 0 means no compression */
/* Algo 0 means no compression. */
if (compr_algo)
push_compress_filter (out, &zfx, compr_algo);
}
/* Write the one-pass signature packets if needed */
if (!detached) {
if (!detached)
{
rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
opt.textmode && !outfile ? 0x01:0x00);
if (rc)
@ -1045,15 +1065,19 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md);
/* Setup the inner packet. */
if( detached ) {
if( multifile ) {
if (detached)
{
if (multifile)
{
strlist_t sl;
if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("signing:") );
/* must walk reverse trough this list */
for( sl = strlist_last(filenames); sl;
sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl ) ) {
/* Must walk reverse trough this list. */
for (sl = strlist_last(filenames);
sl;
sl = strlist_prev( filenames, sl))
{
inp = iobuf_open (sl->d);
if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
{
@ -1065,7 +1089,7 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
sl->d,strerror(errno));
sl->d, gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
handle_progress (pfx, inp, sl->d);
@ -1079,28 +1103,31 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
iobuf_push_filter (inp, md_filter, &mfx);
while (iobuf_get (inp) != -1)
;
iobuf_close(inp); inp = NULL;
iobuf_close (inp);
inp = NULL;
}
if (opt.verbose)
log_printf ("\n");
}
else {
/* read, so that the filter can calculate the digest */
else
{
/* Read, so that the filter can calculate the digest. */
while (iobuf_get(inp) != -1)
;
}
}
else {
else
{
rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname,
opt.textmode && !outfile ?
(opt.textmode && !outfile) ?
(opt.mimemode? 'm' : 't') : 'b');
}
/* catch errors from above */
/* Catch errors from above. */
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* write the signatures */
/* Write the signatures. */
rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md,
opt.textmode && !outfile? 0x01 : 0x00,
0, duration, detached ? 'D':'S', NULL);
@ -1111,7 +1138,8 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
leave:
if (rc)
iobuf_cancel (out);
else {
else
{
iobuf_close (out);
if (encryptflag)
write_status (STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION);
@ -1127,9 +1155,8 @@ sign_file (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t filenames, int detached, strlist_t locusr,
}
/****************
* make a clear signature. note that opt.armor is not needed
/*
* Make a clear signature. Note that opt.armor is not needed.
*/
int
clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
@ -1138,7 +1165,8 @@ clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
armor_filter_context_t *afx;
progress_filter_context_t *pfx;
gcry_md_hd_t textmd = NULL;
IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
iobuf_t inp = NULL;
iobuf_t out = NULL;
PACKET pkt;
int rc = 0;
SK_LIST sk_list = NULL;
@ -1155,11 +1183,11 @@ clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire);
/* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
* unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
if ((rc=build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)))
goto leave;
/* prepare iobufs */
/* Prepare iobufs. */
inp = iobuf_open (fname);
if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
{
@ -1167,32 +1195,39 @@ clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
inp = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if( !inp ) {
if (!inp)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
fname? fname: "[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
fname? fname: "[stdin]", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname);
if( outfile ) {
if (is_secured_filename (outfile) ) {
if (outfile)
{
if (is_secured_filename (outfile))
{
outfile = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
else
out = iobuf_create (outfile, 0);
if (!out)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error(_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, strerror(errno) );
log_error (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), outfile, gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
else if (opt.verbose)
log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), outfile);
}
else if ((rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, 1, 0, &out)))
{
goto leave;
}
iobuf_writestr (out, "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----" LF);
@ -1203,12 +1238,15 @@ clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
memset (hashs_seen, 0, sizeof hashs_seen);
iobuf_writestr (out, "Hash: " );
for( sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next ) {
for (sk_rover = sk_list; sk_rover; sk_rover = sk_rover->next)
{
int i = hash_for (sk_rover->pk);
if( !hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] ) {
if (!hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ])
{
s = gcry_md_algo_name (i);
if( s ) {
if (s)
{
hashs_seen[ i & 0xff ] = 1;
if (any)
iobuf_put (out, ',');
@ -1235,11 +1273,10 @@ clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
if (DBG_HASHING)
gcry_md_debug (textmd, "clearsign");
copy_clearsig_text (out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped,
opt.escape_from);
copy_clearsig_text (out, inp, textmd, !opt.not_dash_escaped, opt.escape_from);
/* fixme: check for read errors */
/* now write the armor */
/* Now write the armor. */
afx->what = 2;
push_armor_filter (afx, out);
@ -1262,6 +1299,7 @@ clearsign_file (ctrl_t ctrl,
return rc;
}
/*
* Sign and conventionally encrypt the given file.
* FIXME: Far too much code is duplicated - revamp the whole file.
@ -1275,7 +1313,8 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
md_filter_context_t mfx;
text_filter_context_t tfx;
cipher_filter_context_t cfx;
IOBUF inp = NULL, out = NULL;
iobuf_t inp = NULL;
iobuf_t out = NULL;
PACKET pkt;
STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
int rc = 0;
@ -1299,12 +1338,12 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
duration = parse_expire_string (opt.def_sig_expire);
/* Note: In the old non-agent version the following call used to
unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
* unprotect the secret key. This is now done on demand by the agent. */
rc = build_sk_list (ctrl, locusr, &sk_list, PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* prepare iobufs */
/* Prepare iobufs. */
inp = iobuf_open (fname);
if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
{
@ -1312,15 +1351,16 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
inp = NULL;
gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
}
if( !inp ) {
if (!inp)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"),
fname? fname: "[stdin]", strerror(errno) );
fname? fname: "[stdin]", gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
}
handle_progress (pfx, inp, fname);
/* prepare key */
/* Prepare key. */
s2k = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *s2k);
s2k->mode = opt.s2k_mode;
s2k->hash_algo = S2K_DIGEST_ALGO;
@ -1328,7 +1368,8 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
algo = default_cipher_algo ();
cfx.dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 1, 1, NULL, &canceled);
if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen) {
if (!cfx.dek || !cfx.dek->keylen)
{
rc = gpg_error (canceled?GPG_ERR_CANCELED:GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
log_error (_("error creating passphrase: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
goto leave;
@ -1344,12 +1385,12 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
cfx.dek->use_aead? openpgp_aead_algo_name (cfx.dek->use_aead)
/**/ : "CFB");
/* now create the outfile */
/* Now create the outfile. */
rc = open_outfile (-1, fname, opt.armor? 1:0, 0, &out);
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* prepare to calculate the MD over the input */
/* Prepare to calculate the MD over the input. */
if (opt.textmode)
iobuf_push_filter (inp, text_filter, &tfx);
if (gcry_md_open (&mfx.md, 0, 0))
@ -1370,6 +1411,7 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
/* (current filters: armor)*/
{
PKT_symkey_enc *enc = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *enc );
enc->version = 4;
enc->cipher_algo = cfx.dek->algo;
enc->s2k = *s2k;
@ -1396,21 +1438,20 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
/* Write the one-pass signature packets */
/* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */
rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out,
opt.textmode? 0x01:0x00);
rc = write_onepass_sig_packets (sk_list, out, opt.textmode? 0x01:0x00);
if (rc)
goto leave;
write_status_begin_signing (mfx.md);
/* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff */
/* Pipe data through all filters; i.e. write the signed stuff. */
/* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */
rc = write_plaintext_packet (out, inp, fname,
opt.textmode ? (opt.mimemode?'m':'t'):'b');
if (rc)
goto leave;
/* Write the signatures */
/* Write the signatures. */
/* (current filters: zip - encrypt - armor) */
rc = write_signature_packets (ctrl, sk_list, out, mfx.md,
opt.textmode? 0x01 : 0x00,
@ -1422,7 +1463,8 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
leave:
if (rc)
iobuf_cancel (out);
else {
else
{
iobuf_close (out);
write_status (STATUS_END_ENCRYPTION);
}
@ -1437,7 +1479,7 @@ sign_symencrypt_file (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, strlist_t locusr)
}
/****************
/*
* Create a v4 signature in *RET_SIG.
*
* PK is the primary key to sign (required for all sigs)
@ -1488,12 +1530,11 @@ make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
if (!digest_algo)
{
/* Basically, this means use SHA1 always unless the user
specified something (use whatever they said), or it's DSA
(use the best match). They still can't pick an
inappropriate hash for DSA or the signature will fail.
Note that this still allows the caller of
make_keysig_packet to override the user setting if it
must. */
* specified something (use whatever they said), or it's DSA
* (use the best match). They still can't pick an inappropriate
* hash for DSA or the signature will fail. Note that this
* still allows the caller of make_keysig_packet to override the
* user setting if it must. */
if (opt.cert_digest_algo)
digest_algo = opt.cert_digest_algo;
@ -1520,15 +1561,15 @@ make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
if (sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19 || sigclass == 0x28)
{
/* hash the subkey binding/backsig/revocation */
/* Hash the subkey binding/backsig/revocation. */
hash_public_key (md, subpk);
}
else if (sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20)
{
/* hash the user id */
/* Hash the user id. */
hash_uid (md, sigversion, uid);
}
/* and make the signature packet */
/* Make the signature packet. */
sig = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *sig);
sig->version = sigversion;
sig->flags.exportable = 1;
@ -1536,10 +1577,7 @@ make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
keyid_from_pk (pksk, sig->keyid);
sig->pubkey_algo = pksk->pubkey_algo;
sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
if(timestamp)
sig->timestamp=timestamp;
else
sig->timestamp=make_timestamp();
sig->timestamp = timestamp? timestamp : make_timestamp ();
if (duration)
sig->expiredate = sig->timestamp + duration;
sig->sig_class = sigclass;
@ -1548,15 +1586,15 @@ make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
mk_notation_policy_etc (sig, pk, pksk);
/* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
* to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
* function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
if (mksubpkt)
rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);
if( !rc ) {
if (!rc)
{
hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
gcry_md_final (md);
rc = complete_sig (ctrl, sig, pksk, md, cache_nonce);
}
@ -1570,7 +1608,7 @@ make_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
/****************
/*
* Create a new signature packet based on an existing one.
* Only user ID signatures are supported for now.
* PK is the public key to work on.
@ -1615,17 +1653,17 @@ update_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
else
hash_uid (md, orig_sig->version, uid);
/* create a new signature packet */
/* Create a new signature packet. */
sig = copy_signature (NULL, orig_sig);
sig->digest_algo = digest_algo;
/* We need to create a new timestamp so that new sig expiration
calculations are done correctly... */
* calculations are done correctly... */
sig->timestamp = make_timestamp();
/* ... but we won't make a timestamp earlier than the existing
one. */
* one. */
{
int tmout = 0;
while (sig->timestamp <= orig_sig->timestamp)
@ -1641,22 +1679,22 @@ update_keysig_packet (ctrl_t ctrl,
}
/* Note that already expired sigs will remain expired (with a
duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
detects this case. */
* duration of 1) since build-packet.c:build_sig_subpkt_from_sig
* detects this case. */
/* Put the updated timestamp into the sig. Note that this will
automagically lower any sig expiration dates to correctly
correspond to the differences in the timestamps (i.e. the
duration will shrink). */
* automagically lower any sig expiration dates to correctly
* correspond to the differences in the timestamps (i.e. the
* duration will shrink). */
build_sig_subpkt_from_sig (sig, pksk);
if (mksubpkt)
rc = (*mksubpkt)(sig, opaque);
if (!rc) {
if (!rc)
{
hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
gcry_md_final (md);
rc = complete_sig (ctrl, sig, pksk, md, NULL);
}