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* packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt), export.c

Browse source 
(do_export_stream), import.c (remove_bad_stuff, import), parse-packet.c
(dump_sig_subpkt, parse_one_sig_subpkt): Remove vestigal code for the old
sig cache subpacket.  This wasn't completely harmless as it caused
subpacket 101 to disappear on import and export.

* options.h, armor.c, cipher.c, g10.c, keyedit.c, pkclist.c, sign.c,
encode.c, getkey.c, revoke.c: The current flags for different levels of
PGP-ness are massively complex.  This is step one in simplifying them. No
functional change yet, just use a macro to check for compliance level.

* sign.c (sign_file): Fix bug that causes spurious compression preference
warning.

* sign.c (clearsign_file): Fix bug that prevents proper warning message
from appearing when clearsigning in --pgp2 mode with a non-v3 RSA key.

* main.h, misc.c (compliance_option_string, compliance_string,
compliance_failure), pkclist.c (build_pk_list), sign.c (sign_file,
clearsign_file), encode.c (encode_crypt, write_pubkey_enc_from_list): New
functions to put the "this message may not be usable...." warning in one
place.

* options.h, g10.c (main): Part two of the simplification.  Use a single
enum to indicate what we are compliant to (1991, 2440, PGPx, etc.)

* g10.c (main): Show errors for failure in export, send-keys, recv-keys,
and refresh-keys.

* options.h, g10.c (main): Give algorithm warnings for algorithms chosen
against the --pgpX and --openpgp rules.

* keydb.h, pkclist.c (algo_available): Make TIGER192 invalid in --openpgp
mode.

* sign.c (sign_file), pkclist.c (algo_available): Allow passing a hint of
0.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2003-05-03 04:07:45 +00:00
parent 7c3aa4aea3
commit 3afe991bb8
20 changed files with 390 additions and 271 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

112
g10/pkclist.c
View file

@ -818,16 +818,13 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
{
any_recipients = 1;
if((rov->flags&2) && (opt.pgp2 || opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7))
if((rov->flags&2) && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
"--hidden-recipient",
opt.pgp2?"--pgp2":opt.pgp6?"--pgp6":"--pgp7");
compliance_option_string());
log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),
opt.pgp2?"PGP 2.x":opt.pgp6?"PGP 6.x":"PGP 7.x");
opt.pgp2=opt.pgp6=opt.pgp7=0;
compliance_failure();
}
}
else if( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to ) {
@ -857,16 +854,13 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
r->flags = (rov->flags&2)?1:0;
pk_list = r;
if(r->flags&1 && (opt.pgp2 || opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7))
if(r->flags&1 && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
{
log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
"--hidden-encrypt-to",
opt.pgp2?"--pgp2":opt.pgp6?"--pgp6":"--pgp7");
compliance_option_string());
log_info(_("this message may not be usable by %s\n"),
opt.pgp2?"PGP 2.x":opt.pgp6?"PGP 6.x":"PGP 7.x");
opt.pgp2=opt.pgp6=opt.pgp7=0;
compliance_failure();
}
}
}
@ -1131,46 +1125,60 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix such a broken
preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
static int
algo_available( int preftype, int algo, void *hint )
int
algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, void *hint )
{
if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
if( opt.pgp6 && ( algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3) )
return 0;
if( (opt.pgp7 || opt.pgp8)
&& (algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3
&& algo != 7 && algo != 8 && algo != 9 && algo != 10) )
return 0;
return algo && !check_cipher_algo( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
int bits=0;
if(hint)
bits=*(int *)hint;
if(bits && (bits != md_digest_length(algo)))
return 0;
if( (opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7) && (algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3) )
return 0;
if( opt.pgp8 && (algo != 1 && algo != 2 && algo != 3 && algo != 8))
return 0;
return algo && !check_digest_algo( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
if ( ( opt.pgp6 || opt.pgp7 || opt.pgp8 )
&& ( algo !=0 && algo != 1) )
return 0;
return !check_compress_algo( algo );
}
else
if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
{
if(PGP6 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
return 0;
if((PGP7 || PGP8) && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
&& algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
return 0;
return algo && !check_cipher_algo( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH )
{
if(hint && ((*(int *)hint) != md_digest_length(algo)))
return 0;
if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160))
return 0;
if(PGP8 && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
&& algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
return 0;
/* TIGER is not allowed any longer according to 2440bis. */
if( RFC2440 && algo == DIGEST_ALGO_TIGER )
return 0;
return algo && !check_digest_algo( algo );
}
else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
{
if((PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8) && (algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE
&& algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP))
return 0;
return !check_compress_algo( algo );
}
else
return 0;
}
@ -1197,7 +1205,7 @@ select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, int request, void *hint)
memset( mask, 0, 8 * sizeof *mask );
if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
if( opt.pgp2 &&
if( PGP2 &&
pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys
@ -1215,7 +1223,7 @@ select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, int request, void *hint)
wasn't locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in
--pgp2 mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is
used anyway. -dms */
if( opt.pgp2 &&
if( PGP2 &&
pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* MD5 is there for v3 keys with v3