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Merge branch 'STABLE-BRANCH-2-4' into master

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Werner Koch 2023-07-04 17:37:54 +02:00
commit 334f5d95c8
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89 changed files with 3260 additions and 1400 deletions
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18
g10/photoid.c
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@ -164,12 +164,11 @@ generate_photo_id (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,const char *photo_name)
{
PKT_user_id *uid;
int error=1,i;
unsigned int len;
uint64_t len;
char *filename;
byte *photo=NULL;
byte header[16];
IOBUF file;
int overflow;
header[0]=0x10; /* little side of photo header length */
header[1]=0; /* big side of photo header length */
@ -237,11 +236,18 @@ generate_photo_id (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_public_key *pk,const char *photo_name)
}
len=iobuf_get_filelength(file, &overflow);
if(len>6144 || overflow)
len = iobuf_get_filelength(file);
if(len>6144)
{
tty_printf( _("This JPEG is really large (%d bytes) !\n"),len);
if(!cpr_get_answer_is_yes("photoid.jpeg.size",
/* We silently skip JPEGs larger than 1MiB because we have a
* 2MiB limit on the user ID packets and we need some limit
* anyway because the returned u64 is larger than the u32 or
* OpenPGP. Note that the diagnostic may print a wrong
* value if the value is really large; we don't fix this to
* avoid a string change. */
tty_printf( _("This JPEG is really large (%d bytes) !\n"), (int)len);
if(len > 1024*1024
|| !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("photoid.jpeg.size",
_("Are you sure you want to use it? (y/N) ")))
{
iobuf_close(file);