1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-07-14 21:47:19 +02:00

release 0.2.14

This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1998-04-02 10:30:03 +00:00
parent 6b91e7762c
commit 303b1084d5
42 changed files with 824 additions and 518 deletions

View file

@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ static int parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
byte *hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET *packet );
static int parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static void parse_subkey( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen );
static int parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static void parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen );
@ -289,6 +288,7 @@ parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int reqtype, ulong *retpos,
rc = G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */
switch( pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_CERT:
case PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT:
pkt->pkt.public_cert = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_cert );
rc = parse_certificate(inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt );
break;
@ -311,9 +311,6 @@ parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int reqtype, ulong *retpos,
case PKT_USER_ID:
rc = parse_user_id(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT:
parse_subkey(inp, pkttype, pktlen);
break;
case PKT_COMMENT:
rc = parse_comment(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
@ -767,19 +764,37 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
int is_v4=0;
int rc=0;
if( pktlen < 12 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
goto leave;
}
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( version == 4 )
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT && version == '#' ) {
/* early versions of G10 use old comments packets; luckily all those
* comments are started by a hash */
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":old comment packet: \"" );
for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- ) {
int c;
c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( c >= ' ' && c <= 'z' )
putchar(c);
else
printf("\\x%02x", c );
}
printf("\"\n");
}
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return 0;
}
else if( version == 4 )
is_v4=1;
else if( version != 2 && version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
goto leave;
}
if( pktlen < 11 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
goto leave;
}
timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
if( is_v4 )
valid_period = 0;
@ -795,7 +810,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT? "public sub" :
pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT? "secret sub" : "??",
version, timestamp, valid_period );
if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT || pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->timestamp = timestamp;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->valid_days = valid_period;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
@ -824,7 +839,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
mpi_print(stdout, elg_y, mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.elg.p = elg_p;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.elg.g = elg_g;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.elg.y = elg_y;
@ -836,27 +851,27 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.elg.p = elg_p;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.elg.g = elg_g;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.elg.y = elg_y;
cert->d.elg.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( cert->d.elg.protect.algo ) {
cert->d.elg.is_protected = 1;
cert->d.elg.protect.count = 0;
if( cert->d.elg.protect.algo == 255 ) {
cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( cert->protect.algo ) {
cert->is_protected = 1;
cert->protect.count = 0;
if( cert->protect.algo == 255 ) {
if( pktlen < 3 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
cert->d.elg.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->d.elg.protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->d.elg.protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
switch( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k ) {
cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 1:
case 3:
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
memcpy(cert->d.elg.protect.salt, temp, 8 );
memcpy(cert->protect.salt, temp, 8 );
break;
}
switch( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k ) {
switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 0: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsimple S2K" );
break;
case 1: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsalted S2K" );
@ -866,30 +881,30 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
default:
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
cert->d.elg.protect.s2k );
cert->protect.s2k );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode ) {
printf(", algo: %d, hash: %d",
cert->d.elg.protect.algo,
cert->d.elg.protect.hash );
if( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 1
|| cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
cert->protect.algo,
cert->protect.hash );
if( cert->protect.s2k == 1
|| cert->protect.s2k == 3 ) {
printf(", salt: ");
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
printf("%02x", cert->d.elg.protect.salt[i]);
printf("%02x", cert->protect.salt[i]);
}
putchar('\n');
}
if( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
if( cert->protect.s2k == 3 ) {
if( !pktlen ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
cert->d.elg.protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
cert->protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
pktlen--;
}
@ -897,12 +912,12 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
else {
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n",
cert->d.elg.protect.algo);
cert->protect.algo);
/* old version, we don't have a S2K, so we fake one */
cert->d.elg.protect.s2k = 0;
cert->protect.s2k = 0;
/* We need this kludge to cope with old GNUPG versions */
cert->d.elg.protect.hash =
cert->d.elg.protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH?
cert->protect.hash =
cert->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH?
DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
}
if( pktlen < 8 ) {
@ -917,20 +932,20 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
memcpy(cert->d.elg.protect.iv, temp, 8 );
memcpy(cert->protect.iv, temp, 8 );
}
else
cert->d.elg.is_protected = 0;
cert->is_protected = 0;
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */
n = pktlen; cert->d.elg.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
cert->d.elg.csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret value x is not shown]\n"
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->d.elg.csum);
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
/*log_mpidump("elg p=", cert->d.elg.p );
log_mpidump("elg g=", cert->d.elg.g );
@ -955,7 +970,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
mpi_print(stdout, dsa_y, mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.dsa.p = dsa_p;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.dsa.q = dsa_q;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.dsa.g = dsa_g;
@ -969,27 +984,27 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.dsa.q = dsa_q;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.dsa.g = dsa_g;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.dsa.y = dsa_y;
cert->d.dsa.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( cert->d.dsa.protect.algo ) {
cert->d.dsa.is_protected = 1;
cert->d.dsa.protect.count = 0;
if( cert->d.dsa.protect.algo == 255 ) {
cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( cert->protect.algo ) {
cert->is_protected = 1;
cert->protect.count = 0;
if( cert->protect.algo == 255 ) {
if( pktlen < 3 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
cert->d.dsa.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->d.dsa.protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
switch( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k ) {
cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 1:
case 3:
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
memcpy(cert->d.dsa.protect.salt, temp, 8 );
memcpy(cert->protect.salt, temp, 8 );
break;
}
switch( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k ) {
switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 0: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsimple S2K" );
break;
case 1: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsalted S2K" );
@ -998,42 +1013,39 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
break;
default:
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k );
printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n", cert->protect.s2k );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode ) {
printf(", algo: %d, hash: %d",
cert->d.dsa.protect.algo,
cert->d.dsa.protect.hash );
if( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 1
|| cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
cert->protect.algo,
cert->protect.hash );
if( cert->protect.s2k == 1 || cert->protect.s2k == 3 ){
printf(", salt: ");
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
printf("%02x", cert->d.dsa.protect.salt[i]);
printf("%02x", cert->protect.salt[i]);
}
putchar('\n');
}
if( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
if( cert->protect.s2k == 3 ) {
if( !pktlen ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
cert->d.dsa.protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
cert->protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
pktlen--;
}
}
else {
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n",
cert->d.dsa.protect.algo);
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->protect.algo);
/* old version, we don't have a S2K, so we fake one */
cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k = 0;
cert->d.dsa.protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
cert->protect.s2k = 0;
cert->protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
}
if( pktlen < 8 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
@ -1047,20 +1059,20 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
memcpy(cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, temp, 8 );
memcpy(cert->protect.iv, temp, 8 );
}
else
cert->d.dsa.is_protected = 0;
cert->is_protected = 0;
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */
n = pktlen; cert->d.dsa.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
cert->d.dsa.csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret value x is not shown]\n"
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->d.dsa.csum);
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
/*log_mpidump("dsa p=", cert->d.dsa.p );
log_mpidump("dsa q=", cert->d.dsa.q );
@ -1081,7 +1093,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
mpi_print(stdout, rsa_pub_exp, mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = rsa_pub_mod;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = rsa_pub_exp;
}
@ -1091,11 +1103,11 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = rsa_pub_mod;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = rsa_pub_exp;
cert->d.rsa.protect_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->d.rsa.protect_algo);
if( cert->d.rsa.protect_algo ) {
cert->d.rsa.is_protected = 1;
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->protect.algo);
if( cert->protect.algo ) {
cert->is_protected = 1;
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( list_mode ) {
@ -1104,21 +1116,21 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
if( cert->d.rsa.protect_algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
memcpy(cert->d.rsa.protect.blowfish.iv, temp, 8 );
if( cert->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
memcpy(cert->protect.iv, temp, 8 );
}
else
cert->d.rsa.is_protected = 0;
cert->is_protected = 0;
/* (See comments at the code for elg keys) */
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_d = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_p = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_q = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_u = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
cert->d.rsa.csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret values d,p,q,u are not shown]\n"
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->d.rsa.csum);
"\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
/* log_mpidump("rsa n=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_n );
log_mpidump("rsa e=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_e );
@ -1164,37 +1176,6 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
}
static void
parse_subkey( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen )
{
int version;
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT && version == '#' ) {
/* early versions of G10 use old comments packets; luckily all those
* comments are started by a hash */
if( list_mode ) {
printf(":old comment packet: \"" );
for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- ) {
int c;
c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( c >= ' ' && c <= 'z' )
putchar(c);
else
printf("\\x%02x", c );
}
printf("\"\n");
}
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
return;
}
if( list_mode )
printf(":public subkey packet: \"" );
skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
}
static int
parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )