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See ChangeLog: Mon Jun 5 23:41:54 CEST 2000 Werner Koch

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2000-06-05 21:28:41 +00:00
parent b65f9a8b0d
commit 2f64c3538a
10 changed files with 57 additions and 12 deletions
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2
TODO
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@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
* Replace Valid/Invalid by Known/Unknown?
* Add an option to disable automatic key retrieve while verifing
signatures.
Scheduled for 1.1
-----------------

7
doc/FAQ
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@ -398,11 +398,16 @@
revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and install new
subkeys.
Q: In the edit meu the trust values is not displayed correctly after
Q: In the edit menu the trust values is not displayed correctly after
signing uids - why?
A: This happens because the some informations are stored immediately
in the trustdb, but the actual trust calculation can be done after
the save command. This is a not easy to fix design bug which will be
addressed in GnuPG 1.1
Q: An Elgamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2
A: Use the option --emulate-md-encode-bug.
Q: Old versions of GnuPG can't verify ElGamal signatures
A: Update to GnuPG 1.0.2

9
doc/gpg.sgml
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@ -1312,6 +1312,15 @@ This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.
This is not for normal use. Use the source to see for what it might be useful.
</para></listitem></varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>--emulate-md-encode-bug</term>
<listitem><para>
GnuPG versions prior to 1.0.2 had a bug in the way a signature was encode.
This options enables a workaround by checking faulty signatures again with
the encoding used in old versions. This may only happen for ElGamal signatures
which are not widely used.
</para></listitem></varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</refsect1>

7
g10/ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
Mon Jun 5 23:41:54 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* seskey.c (do_encode_md, encode_md_value): Add new arg v3compathack to work
around a bug in old versions.
* sig-check.c (do_check): use the aboved workaround when enabled.
* g10.c: New option --emulate-md-decode-bug
Mon Jun 5 12:37:43 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* build-packet.c (do_mdc): New.

3
g10/g10.c
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@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0,
oIgnoreTimeConflict,
oNoRandomSeedFile,
oEmu3DESS2KBug, /* will be removed in 1.1 */
oEmuMDEncodeBug,
aTest };
@ -367,6 +368,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
{ oIgnoreTimeConflict, "ignore-time-conflict", 0, "@" },
{ oNoRandomSeedFile, "no-random-seed-file", 0, "@" },
{ oEmu3DESS2KBug, "emulate-3des-s2k-bug", 0, "@"},
{ oEmuMDEncodeBug, "emulate-md-encode-bug", 0, "@"},
{0} };
@ -843,6 +845,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
break;
case oEmuChecksumBug: opt.emulate_bugs |= EMUBUG_GPGCHKSUM; break;
case oEmu3DESS2KBug: opt.emulate_bugs |= EMUBUG_3DESS2K; break;
case oEmuMDEncodeBug: opt.emulate_bugs |= EMUBUG_MDENCODE; break;
case oCompressSigs: opt.compress_sigs = 1; break;
case oRunAsShmCP:
#ifndef USE_SHM_COPROCESSING

2
g10/main.h
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@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ void try_make_homedir( const char *fname );
void make_session_key( DEK *dek );
MPI encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits );
MPI encode_md_value( int pubkey_algo, MD_HANDLE md,
int hash_algo, unsigned nbits );
int hash_algo, unsigned nbits, int v3compathack );
/*-- comment.c --*/
KBNODE make_comment_node( const char *s );

3
g10/options.h
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@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct {
int rfc1991;
int rfc2440;
int pgp2_workarounds;
unsigned emulate_bugs; /* bug emulation flags EMUBUG_xxxx */
unsigned int emulate_bugs; /* bug emulation flags EMUBUG_xxxx */
int shm_coprocess;
const char *set_filename;
const char *comment_string;
@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ struct {
#define EMUBUG_GPGCHKSUM 1
#define EMUBUG_3DESS2K 2
#define EMUBUG_MDENCODE 4
#define DBG_PACKET_VALUE 1 /* debug packet reading/writing */
#define DBG_MPI_VALUE 2 /* debug mpi details */

15
g10/seskey.c
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@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits )
static MPI
do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
const byte *asn, size_t asnlen )
const byte *asn, size_t asnlen, int v3compathack )
{
int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *frame;
@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
frame = md_is_secure(md)? m_alloc_secure( nframe ) : m_alloc( nframe );
n = 0;
frame[n++] = 0;
frame[n++] = algo;
frame[n++] = v3compathack? algo : 1; /* block type */
i = nframe - len - asnlen -3 ;
assert( i > 1 );
memset( frame+n, 0xff, i ); n += i;
@ -179,8 +179,15 @@ do_encode_md( MD_HANDLE md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
}
/****************
* Encode a message digest into an MPI.
* v3compathack is used to work around a bug in old GnuPG versions
* which did put the algo identifier inseatd of the block type 1 into
* the encoded value. setting this vare force the old behaviour.
*/
MPI
encode_md_value( int pubkey_algo, MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo, unsigned nbits )
encode_md_value( int pubkey_algo, MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo,
unsigned nbits, int v3compathack )
{
int algo = hash_algo? hash_algo : md_get_algo(md);
const byte *asn;
@ -197,7 +204,7 @@ encode_md_value( int pubkey_algo, MD_HANDLE md, int hash_algo, unsigned nbits )
}
else {
asn = md_asn_oid( algo, &asnlen, &mdlen );
frame = do_encode_md( md, algo, mdlen, nbits, asn, asnlen );
frame = do_encode_md( md, algo, mdlen, nbits, asn, asnlen, v3compathack);
}
return frame;
}

19
g10/sig-check.c
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@ -374,13 +374,24 @@ do_check( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest,
md_final( digest );
result = encode_md_value( pk->pubkey_algo, digest, sig->digest_algo,
mpi_get_nbits(pk->pkey[0]));
mpi_get_nbits(pk->pkey[0]), (sig->version < 4) );
ctx.sig = sig;
ctx.md = digest;
rc = pubkey_verify( pk->pubkey_algo, result, sig->data, pk->pkey,
cmp_help, &ctx );
mpi_free( result );
if( (opt.emulate_bugs & EMUBUG_MDENCODE)
&& rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && is_ELGAMAL(pk->pubkey_algo) ) {
/* In this case we try again because old GnuPG versions didn't encode
* the hash right. There is no problem with DSA here */
result = encode_md_value( pk->pubkey_algo, digest, sig->digest_algo,
mpi_get_nbits(pk->pkey[0]), (sig->version < 4) );
ctx.sig = sig;
ctx.md = digest;
rc = pubkey_verify( pk->pubkey_algo, result, sig->data, pk->pkey,
cmp_help, &ctx );
}
if( !rc && sig->flags.unknown_critical ) {
log_info(_("assuming bad signature due to an unknown critical bit\n"));
rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
@ -518,7 +529,6 @@ check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
md = md_open( algo, 0 );
md_start_debug( md, "rsa" );
hash_public_key( md, pk );
hash_uid_node( unode, md, sig );
if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) {
@ -526,8 +536,9 @@ check_key_signature2( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
*is_selfsig = 1;
rc = do_check( pk, sig, md, r_expired );
}
else
else {
rc = do_signature_check( sig, md, r_expiredate, r_expired );
}
md_close(md);
}
else {

2
g10/sign.c
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@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ do_sign( PKT_secret_key *sk, PKT_signature *sig,
sig->digest_start[0] = dp[0];
sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
frame = encode_md_value( sk->pubkey_algo, md,
digest_algo, mpi_get_nbits(sk->skey[0]));
digest_algo, mpi_get_nbits(sk->skey[0]), 0 );
rc = pubkey_sign( sk->pubkey_algo, sig->data, frame, sk->skey );
mpi_free(frame);
if( rc )