From 2c75af9f65d15653ed1bc191f1098ae316607041 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Werner Koch Date: Thu, 28 Feb 2019 14:43:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] sm: Don't mark a cert as de-vs compliant if it leads to SHA-1 sigs. * sm/keylist.c (print_compliance_flags): Also check the diges_also. -- A certificate with algorithm sha1WithRSAEncryption can be de-vs compliant (e.g. if the next in the chain used sha256WithRSAEncryption to sign it and RSA is long enough) but flagging it as such is useless because that certificate can't be used because it will create signatures using the non-compliant SHA-1 algorithm. Well, it could be used for encryption. But also evaluating the key-usage flags here would make it harder for the user to understand why certain certificates are listed as de-vs compliant and others are not. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch --- sm/keylist.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/sm/keylist.c b/sm/keylist.c index ea2a22093..420be0bd2 100644 --- a/sm/keylist.c +++ b/sm/keylist.c @@ -384,16 +384,21 @@ static void print_compliance_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo, unsigned int nbits, estream_t fp) { - int any = 0; + int indent = 0; + int hashalgo; if (gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, algo, NULL, nbits, NULL)) { - es_fputs (gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS), fp); - any++; + hashalgo = gcry_md_map_name (ksba_cert_get_digest_algo (cert)); + if (gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, hashalgo)) + { + es_fputs (gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS), fp); + indent = 1; + } } if (opt.with_key_screening) - print_pk_screening (cert, 1+any, fp); + print_pk_screening (cert, 1+indent, fp); }