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Make most of the selftests work.

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Note that there is still a problem with tests/openpgp/sigs.test while
using the option --digest-algo SHA256.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-01-21 15:22:41 +01:00
parent 90b0ff23b7
commit 27929981fc
6 changed files with 29 additions and 35 deletions
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33
agent/pksign.c
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@ -113,21 +113,21 @@ get_dsa_qbits (gcry_sexp_t key)
/* Encode a message digest for use with an DSA algorithm. */
static gpg_error_t
do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
do_encode_dsa (const byte *md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
gcry_sexp_t *r_hash)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t hash;
unsigned int qbits;
int gcry_pkalgo;
int pkalgo;
*r_hash = NULL;
gcry_pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry( dsaalgo );
pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (dsaalgo);
if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA)
qbits = gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey);
else if (gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
else if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
qbits = get_dsa_qbits (pkey);
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO);
@ -146,25 +146,28 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey,
if (qbits < 160)
{
log_error (_("%s key uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
gcry_pk_algo_name (gcry_pkalgo), qbits);
gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo), qbits);
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
}
/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
automatically left-truncate. */
/* This check would require the use of SHA512 with ECDSA 512. I think this is overkill to fail in this case.
* Therefore, relax the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it later for general case.
* ( Note that the check is really a bug for ECDSA 521 as the only hash that matches it is SHA 512, but 512 < 521 ).
* automatically left-truncate.
*
* This check would require the use of SHA512 with ECDSA 512. I
* think this is overkill to fail in this case. Therefore, relax
* the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it
* later for general case. (Note that the check is really a bug for
* ECDSA 521 as the only hash that matches it is SHA 512, but 512 <
* 521 ).
*/
if( mdlen < ((gcry_pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits>521) ? 512 : qbits) )
if (mdlen < ((pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits > 521) ? 512 : qbits)/8)
{
log_error (_("a %zu bit hash is not valid for a %u bit %s key\n"),
mdlen,
mdlen*8,
gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey),
gcry_pk_algo_name (gcry_pkalgo));
gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo));
/* FIXME: we need to check the requirements for ECDSA. */
if (mdlen < 20 || gcry_pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
if (mdlen < 20 || pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH);
}