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gpg: Avoid wrong decryption_failed for signed+OCB msg w/o pubkey.

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* g10/decrypt-data.c (struct decode_filter_context_s): Add flag
checktag_failed.
(aead_checktag): Set flag.
(decrypt_data): Initially clear that flag and check the flag after the
decryption.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Revert the log_get_errorcount based
check.
--

This fixes a bug where for an OCB encrypted and signed message with
the signing key missing during decryption the DECRYPTION_FAILED status
line was printed along with "WARNING: encrypted message has been
manipulated". This was because we use log_error to show that the
signature could not be verified due to the missing pubkey; the
original fix looked at the error counter and thus triggered the
decryption failed status.

Fixes-commit: 50e81ad38d
GnuPG-bug-id: 7042
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2024-09-19 10:00:24 +02:00
parent 6432d17385
commit 2770efa75b
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
2 changed files with 11 additions and 5 deletions
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7
g10/mainproc.c
View file

@ -798,15 +798,12 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
compliance_de_vs |= 2;
}
/* Trigger the deferred error. The second condition makes sure that a
* log_error printed in the cry_cipher_checktag never gets ignored. */
/* Trigger the deferred error. */
if (!result && early_plaintext)
result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
else if (!result && opt.show_only_session_key)
result = -1;
else if (!result && pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo
&& log_get_errorcount (0))
result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
if (result == -1)
;