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Code Activity

* command.c (cmd_checkpin): New.

Browse source 
(register_commands): Add command CHECKPIN.
* app.c (app_check_pin): New.
* app-openpgp.c (check_against_given_fingerprint): New. Factored
out that code elsewhere.
(do_check_pin): New.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2003-10-21 17:12:50 +00:00
parent 99277d21c1
commit 21be16dba9
9 changed files with 324 additions and 95 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

137
scd/app-openpgp.c
View file

@ -912,6 +912,33 @@ compare_fingerprint (APP app, int keyno, unsigned char *sha1fpr)
}
/* If a fingerprint has been specified check it against the one on
the card. This is allows for a meaningful error message in case
the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint we
assume that this is okay. */
static int
check_against_given_fingerprint (APP app, const char *fpr, int keyno)
{
unsigned char tmp[20];
const char *s;
int n;
for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 40)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* okay */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++)
tmp[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
return compare_fingerprint (app, keyno, tmp);
}
/* Compute a digital signature on INDATA which is expected to be the
raw message digest. For this application the KEYIDSTR consists of
@ -976,23 +1003,9 @@ do_sign (APP app, const char *keyidstr, int hashalgo,
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg
will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
verify-after-signing feature. */
if (fpr)
{
for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 40)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* okay */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
rc = compare_fingerprint (app, 1, tmp_sn);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 1) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
if (hashalgo == GCRY_MD_SHA1)
memcpy (data, sha1_prefix, 15);
@ -1107,23 +1120,9 @@ do_auth (APP app, const char *keyidstr,
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, gpg
will detect a bogus signature anyway due to the
verify-after-signing feature. */
if (fpr)
{
for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 40)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* okay */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
rc = compare_fingerprint (app, 3, tmp_sn);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 3) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
if (!rc)
@ -1177,23 +1176,9 @@ do_decipher (APP app, const char *keyidstr,
the key on the card has been replaced but the shadow information
known to gpg was not updated. If there is no fingerprint, the
decryption will won't produce the right plaintext anyway. */
if (fpr)
{
for (s=fpr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 40)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* okay */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=fpr, n=0; n < 20; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
rc = compare_fingerprint (app, 2, tmp_sn);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
rc = fpr? check_against_given_fingerprint (app, fpr, 2) : 0;
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
if (!rc)
@ -1202,6 +1187,55 @@ do_decipher (APP app, const char *keyidstr,
}
/* Perform a simple verify operation for CHV1 and CHV2, so that
further operations won't ask for CHV2 and it is possible to do a
cheap check on the PIN: If there is something wrong with the PIN
entry system, only the regular CHV will get blocked and not the
dangerous CHV3. KEYIDSTR is the usual card's serial number; an
optional fingerprint part will be ignored. */
static int
do_check_pin (APP app, const char *keyidstr,
int (pincb)(void*, const char *, char **),
void *pincb_arg)
{
unsigned char tmp_sn[20];
const char *s;
int n;
if (!keyidstr || !*keyidstr)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE);
/* Check whether an OpenPGP card of any version has been requested. */
if (strlen (keyidstr) < 32 || strncmp (keyidstr, "D27600012401", 12))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, n++)
;
if (n != 32)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
else if (!*s)
; /* No fingerprint given: we allow this for now. */
else if (*s == '/')
; /* We ignore a fingerprint. */
else
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ID);
for (s=keyidstr, n=0; n < 16; s += 2, n++)
tmp_sn[n] = xtoi_2 (s);
if (app->serialnolen != 16)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_CARD);
if (memcmp (app->serialno, tmp_sn, 16))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_CARD);
/* Yes, there is a race conditions: The user might pull the card
right here and we won't notice that. However this is not a
problem and the check above is merely for a graceful failure
between operations. */
return verify_chv2 (app, pincb, pincb_arg);
}
/* Select the OpenPGP application on the card in SLOT. This function
@ -1262,6 +1296,7 @@ app_select_openpgp (APP app, unsigned char **sn, size_t *snlen)
app->fnc.auth = do_auth;
app->fnc.decipher = do_decipher;
app->fnc.change_pin = do_change_pin;
app->fnc.check_pin = do_check_pin;
}
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