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gpg: Prepare parser for the new attestation certificates.

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* common/openpgpdefs.h (SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS): New.
* g10/keydb.h (IS_ATTST_SIGS): New.
(IS_CERT): Include the new one.
* g10/sign.c (mk_notation_policy_etc): Do not put notations into
attestation key signatures.
* g10/parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Add new arg digest_algo.
Print the attestation sigs.
(parse_one_sig_subpkt): Support SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS.
(can_handle_critical): Ditto.
(enum_sig_subpkt): Pass digest algo to dump_sig_subpkt.
--

This change allows to list the new subpacket with --list-packets.
Example output:

  :signature packet: algo 22, keyid C694723A1370EAB1
          version 4, created 1567097576, md5len 0, sigclass 0x16
          digest algo 8, begin of digest ff 0c
          hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2019-08-29)
          hashed subpkt 37 len 32 (attst-sigs: 1
                                   A794C6E9CCFE2F34C67E07[...])
          hashed subpkt 33 len 21 (issuer fpr v4 156A3872[...])
          subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID C694723A1370EAB1)
          data: [256 bits]
          data: [256 bits]

GnuPG-bug-id: 4694
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2019-09-05 21:27:13 +02:00
parent e1d9be730c
commit 209caaff66
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
4 changed files with 59 additions and 14 deletions
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53
g10/parse-packet.c
View file

@ -1360,17 +1360,20 @@ parse_pubkeyenc (IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
/* Dump a subpacket to LISTFP. BUFFER contains the subpacket in
question and points to the type field in the subpacket header (not
the start of the header). TYPE is the subpacket's type with the
critical bit cleared. CRITICAL is the value of the CRITICAL bit.
BUFLEN is the length of the buffer and LENGTH is the length of the
subpacket according to the subpacket's header. */
* question and points to the type field in the subpacket header (not
* the start of the header). TYPE is the subpacket's type with the
* critical bit cleared. CRITICAL is the value of the CRITICAL bit.
* BUFLEN is the length of the buffer and LENGTH is the length of the
* subpacket according to the subpacket's header. DIGEST_ALGO is the
* digest algo of the signature. */
static void
dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical,
const byte * buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length)
const byte * buffer, size_t buflen, size_t length,
int digest_algo)
{
const char *p = NULL;
int i;
int nprinted;
/* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to detect
* the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked ARR
@ -1388,9 +1391,11 @@ dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical,
buffer++;
length--;
es_fprintf (listfp, "\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*) */
critical ? "critical " : "",
hashed ? "hashed " : "", type, (unsigned) length);
nprinted = es_fprintf (listfp, "\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*) */
critical ? "critical " : "",
hashed ? "hashed " : "", type, (unsigned) length);
if (nprinted < 1)
nprinted = 1; /*(we use (nprinted-1) later.)*/
if (length > buflen)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "too short: buffer is only %u)\n", (unsigned) buflen);
@ -1585,6 +1590,32 @@ dump_sig_subpkt (int hashed, int type, int critical,
buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[15] : buffer[2],
buffer[0] == 3 ? buffer[16] : buffer[3]);
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS:
{
unsigned int hlen;
es_fputs ("attst-sigs: ", listfp);
hlen = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (digest_algo));
if (!hlen)
p = "[unknown digest algo]";
else if ((length % hlen))
p = "[invalid length]";
else
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "%d", length/hlen);
while (length)
{
es_fprintf (listfp, "\n\t%*s", nprinted-1, "");
es_write_hexstring (listfp, buffer, hlen, 0, NULL);
buffer += hlen;
length -= hlen;
}
}
}
break;
default:
if (type >= 100 && type <= 110)
p = "experimental / private subpacket";
@ -1627,6 +1658,7 @@ parse_one_sig_subpkt (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
case SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS:
return 0;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
case SIGSUBPKT_EXPORTABLE:
@ -1721,6 +1753,7 @@ can_handle_critical (const byte * buffer, size_t n, int type)
case SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES:
case SIGSUBPKT_TRUST:
case SIGSUBPKT_REGEXP:
case SIGSUBPKT_ATTST_SIGS:
/* Is it enough to show the policy or keyserver? */
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
case SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS:
@ -1812,7 +1845,7 @@ enum_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, int want_hashed, sigsubpkttype_t reqtype,
}
else if (reqtype < 0) /* List packets. */
dump_sig_subpkt (reqtype == SIGSUBPKT_LIST_HASHED,
type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n);
type, *critical, buffer, buflen, n, sig->digest_algo);
else if (type == reqtype) /* Found. */
{
buffer++;