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* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Comments.

Browse Source 
* exec.c (exec_write): Cast NULL to void* to properly terminate varargs
list.

* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Just for safety, catch an invalid
pk algorithm.

* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes
LAST before the calls to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for
the mksubpkt function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area.

* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): If an untrusted key was chosen by a
particular user ID, use that ID as the one to ask about when prompting
whether to use the key anyway. (build_pk_list): Similar change here when
adding keys to the recipient list.

* trustdb.c (update_validity): Fix bug that prevented more than one
validity record per trust record. (get_validity): When retrieving validity
for a (user) supplied user ID, return the validity for that user ID only,
and do not fall back to the general key validity. (validate_one_keyblock):
Some commentary on whether non-self-signed user IDs belong in the web of
trust (arguably, they do).
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2003-04-30 05:33:52 +00:00
parent 82334b3bdc
commit 1fc1d26083
7 changed files with 109 additions and 30 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

30
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,33 @@
2003-04-30 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Comments.
* exec.c (exec_write): Cast NULL to void* to properly terminate
varargs list.
* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Just for safety, catch an
invalid pk algorithm.
* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Crucial that the call to mksubpkt
comes LAST before the calls to finalize the sig as that makes it
possible for the mksubpkt function to get a reliable pointer to
the subpacket area.
* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): If an untrusted key was chosen by a
particular user ID, use that ID as the one to ask about when
prompting whether to use the key anyway.
(build_pk_list): Similar change here when adding keys to the
recipient list.
* trustdb.c (update_validity): Fix bug that prevented more than
one validity record per trust record.
(get_validity): When retrieving validity for a (user) supplied
user ID, return the validity for that user ID only, and do not
fall back to the general key validity.
(validate_one_keyblock): Some commentary on whether
non-self-signed user IDs belong in the web of trust (arguably,
they do).
2003-04-27 David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
* g10.c (main): Add --no-textmode.

4
g10/build-packet.c
View File

@ -794,6 +794,10 @@ build_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
case SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE: /*(obsolete)*/
BUG();
break;
/* The issuer being unhashed is a historical oddity. It
should work equally as well hashed. Of course, if even an
unhashed issuer is tampered with, it makes it awfully hard
to verify the sig... */
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
hashed = 0;
break;

5
g10/exec.c
View File

@ -417,14 +417,14 @@ int exec_write(struct exec_info **info,const char *program,
if(DBG_EXTPROG)
log_debug("execlp: %s\n",program);
execlp(program,program,NULL);
execlp(program,program,(void *)NULL);
}
else
{
if(DBG_EXTPROG)
log_debug("execlp: %s -c %s\n",shell,(*info)->command);
execlp(shell,shell,"-c",(*info)->command,NULL);
execlp(shell,shell,"-c",(*info)->command,(void *)NULL);
}
/* If we get this far the exec failed. Clean up and return. */
@ -617,4 +617,3 @@ int exec_finish(struct exec_info *info)
return ret;
}
#endif /* ! NO_EXEC */

6
g10/keyedit.c
View File

@ -1983,13 +1983,15 @@ show_key_with_all_names( KBNODE keyblock, int only_marked, int with_revoker,
for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++) {
u32 r_keyid[2];
char *user;
const char *algo=
pubkey_algo_to_string(pk->revkey[i].algid);
keyid_from_fingerprint(pk->revkey[i].fpr,
MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,r_keyid);
user=get_user_id_string (r_keyid);
tty_printf (_("This key may be revoked by %s key "),
pubkey_algo_to_string (pk->revkey[i].algid));
algo?algo:"?");
tty_print_utf8_string (user, strlen (user));
if ((pk->revkey[i].class&0x40))
tty_printf (_(" (sensitive)"));

37
g10/pkclist.c
View File

@ -542,17 +542,23 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
return 0;
if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
char *p;
u32 keyid[2];
size_t n;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
tty_printf( "%4u%c/%08lX %s \"",
nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n ),
m_free(p);
/* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, this is the
one to ask about. */
if(pk->user_id)
tty_print_utf8_string(pk->user_id->name,pk->user_id->len);
else
{
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
}
tty_printf("\"\n");
print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
tty_printf("\n");
@ -932,8 +938,8 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
}
else {
int trustlevel;
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
tty_printf(_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
}
@ -946,8 +952,6 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
}
else {
PK_LIST r;
char *p;
size_t n;
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid);
@ -956,9 +960,16 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid[1],
datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
if(pk->user_id)
tty_print_utf8_string(pk->user_id->name,
pk->user_id->len);
else
{
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
m_free(p);
}
tty_printf("\"\n");
r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
@ -1028,7 +1039,7 @@ build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
int trustlevel;
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"),

5
g10/sign.c
View File

@ -1251,12 +1251,15 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
sig->sig_class = sigclass;
if( sig->version >= 4 )
build_sig_subpkt_from_sig( sig );
mk_notation_and_policy( sig, pk, sk );
/* Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes LAST before the calls
to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for the mksubpkt
function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area. */
if( sig->version >= 4 && mksubpkt )
rc = (*mksubpkt)( sig, opaque );
if( !rc ) {
mk_notation_and_policy( sig, pk, sk );
hash_sigversion_to_magic (md, sig);
md_final(md);

52
g10/trustdb.c
View File

@ -873,13 +873,13 @@ update_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid,
vrec.rectype = RECTYPE_VALID;
memcpy (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20);
vrec.r.valid.next = trec.r.trust.validlist;
trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
}
vrec.r.valid.validity = validity;
vrec.r.valid.full_count = uid->help_full_count;
vrec.r.valid.marginal_count = uid->help_marginal_count;
write_record (&vrec);
trec.r.trust.depth = depth;
trec.r.trust.validlist = vrec.recnum;
write_record (&trec);
}
@ -985,7 +985,7 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
if(uid)
namehash_from_uid(uid);
init_trustdb ();
if (!did_nextcheck
&& (opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC || opt.trust_model==TM_OPENPGP))
@ -1043,16 +1043,30 @@ get_validity (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_user_id *uid)
while (recno)
{
read_record (recno, &vrec, RECTYPE_VALID);
if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
if ( uid && !memcmp (vrec.r.valid.namehash, uid->namehash, 20) )
break;
if(uid)
{
/* If a user ID is given we return the validity for that
user ID ONLY. If the namehash is not found, then there
is no validity at all (i.e. the user ID wasn't
signed). */
if(memcmp(vrec.r.valid.namehash,uid->namehash,20)==0)
{
validity=(vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
break;
}
}
else
{
/* If no namehash is given, we take the maximum validity
over all user IDs */
if ( validity < (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK) )
validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
}
recno = vrec.r.valid.next;
}
if (recno) /* okay, use the user ID associated one */
validity = (vrec.r.valid.validity & TRUST_MASK);
if ( (trec.r.trust.ownertrust & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) )
validity |= TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
@ -1528,6 +1542,16 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
keyid_from_pk(pk, main_kid);
for (node=kb; node; node = node->next)
{
/* A bit of discussion here: is it better for the web of trust
to be built among only self-signed uids? On the one hand, a
self-signed uid is a statement that the key owner definitely
intended that uid to be there, but on the other hand, a
signed (but not self-signed) uid does carry trust, of a sort,
even if it is a statement being made by people other than the
key owner "through" the uids on the key owner's key. I'm
going with the latter. -dshaw */
/* && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created) */
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
if (uidnode && issigned)
@ -1542,13 +1566,19 @@ validate_one_keyblock (KBNODE kb, struct key_item *klist,
}
uidnode = node;
uid=uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
#if 0
/* If the selfsig is going to expire... This is disabled as
we do count un-self-signed uids in the web of trust. */
if(uid->expiredate && uid->expiredate<*next_expire)
*next_expire = uid->expiredate;
#endif
issigned = 0;
get_validity_counts(pk,uid);
mark_usable_uid_certs (kb, uidnode, main_kid, klist,
curtime, next_expire);
}
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& (node->flag & (1<<8)) && uid)
{
/* Note that we are only seeing unrevoked sigs here */
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;