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kbx/

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* keybox.h (KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_SECRET, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL):
	New.
	* keybox-update.c (keybox_compress): Use it here instead of a
	magic constant.
sm/
	* fingerprint.c (gpgsm_get_fingerprint): Add caching.
	(gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string): Use bin2hexcolon().
	(gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring): Use bin2hex and allocate only
	as much memory as required.
	(gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring): Use bin2hex.

	* certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain): Keep track of the
	certificate chain and reset the ephemeral flags.
	* keydb.c (keydb_set_cert_flags): New args EPHEMERAL and MASK.
	Changed caller to use a mask of ~0.  Return a proper error code if
	the certificate is not available.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2007-03-20 16:57:40 +00:00
parent 75f761e6ef
commit 12cc96a176
13 changed files with 169 additions and 52 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
TODO
View File

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
(i.e. Assuan context).
* sm/certchain.c
** When a certificate chain was sucessfully verified, make ephemeral certs used in this chain permanent.
** Try to keep certificate references somewhere
This will help with some of our caching code. We also need to test
that caching; in particular "regtp_ca_chainlen".

7
kbx/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
2007-03-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* keybox.h (KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_SECRET, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL):
New.
* keybox-update.c (keybox_compress): Use it here instead of a
magic constant.
2007-01-31 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* Makefile.am (kbxutil_LDADD): Use GPG_ERROR_LIBS instead of -l.

2
kbx/keybox-blob.c
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
/* The keybox data formats
The KeyBox uses an augmented OpenPGP/X.509 key format. This makes
random access to a keyblock/Certificate easier and also gives the
random access to a keyblock/certificate easier and also gives the
opportunity to store additional information (e.g. the fingerprint)
along with the key. All integers are stored in network byte order,
offsets are counted from the beginning of the Blob.

2
kbx/keybox-search.c
View File

@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ keybox_search (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd, KEYBOX_SEARCH_DESC *desc, size_t ndesc)
blobflags = blob_get_blob_flags (blob);
if (!hd->ephemeral && (blobflags & 2))
continue; /* not in ephemeral mode but blob is flagged ephemeral */
continue; /* Not in ephemeral mode but blob is flagged ephemeral. */
for (n=0; n < ndesc; n++)
{

6
kbx/keybox-update.c
View File

@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ keybox_set_flags (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd, int what, int idx, unsigned int value)
ec = _keybox_get_flag_location (buffer, length, what, &flag_pos, &flag_size);
if (ec)
return gpg_error (ec);
off += flag_pos;
if (hd->fp)
@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ keybox_compress (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
/* Processing loop. By reading using _keybox_read_blob we
automagically skip and blobs flagged as deleted. Thus what we
automagically skip any blobs flagged as deleted. Thus what we
only have to do is to check all ephemeral flagged blocks whether
their time has come and write out all other blobs. */
cut_time = time(NULL) - 86400;
@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ keybox_compress (KEYBOX_HANDLE hd)
break;
}
blobflags = ((buffer[pos] << 8) | (buffer[pos+1]));
if ((blobflags & 2))
if ((blobflags & KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL))
{
/* This is an ephemeral blob. */
if (_keybox_get_flag_location (buffer, length,

5
kbx/keybox.h
View File

@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ typedef enum
KEYBOX_FLAG_CREATED_AT /* The date the block was created. */
} keybox_flag_t;
/* Flag values used with KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB. */
#define KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_SECRET 1
#define KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL 2
/*-- keybox-init.c --*/
void *keybox_register_file (const char *fname, int secret);

12
sm/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,5 +1,17 @@
2007-03-20 Werner Koch <wk@g10code.com>
* fingerprint.c (gpgsm_get_fingerprint): Add caching.
(gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string): Use bin2hexcolon().
(gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring): Use bin2hex and allocate only
as much memory as required.
(gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring): Use bin2hex.
* certchain.c (gpgsm_validate_chain): Keep terack of the
certificate chain and reset the ephemeral flags.
* keydb.c (keydb_set_cert_flags): New args EPHEMERAL MASK.
Changed caller to use a mask of ~0. Return a proper error code if
the certificate is not available.
* gpgsm.c: Add option --p12-charset.
* gpgsm.h (struct opt): Add p12_charset.
* export.c (popen_protect_tool): Use new option.

116
sm/certchain.c
View File

@ -50,6 +50,17 @@ struct marktrusted_info_s
static struct marktrusted_info_s *marktrusted_info;
/* While running the validation function we want to keep track of the
certificates in the chain. This type is used for that. */
struct chain_item_s
{
struct chain_item_s *next;
ksba_cert_t cert; /* The certificate. */
int is_root; /* The certificate is the root certificate. */
};
typedef struct chain_item_s *chain_item_t;
static int get_regtp_ca_info (ksba_cert_t cert, int *chainlen);
@ -222,7 +233,7 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode, estream_t fplist)
if (err)
return err;
/* STRING is a line delimited list of certifiate policies as stored
/* STRING is a line delimited list of certificate policies as stored
in the certificate. The line itself is colon delimited where the
first field is the OID of the policy and the second field either
N or C for normal or critical extension */
@ -489,7 +500,7 @@ find_up (KEYDB_HANDLE kh, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuer, int find_next)
if (rc == -1 && keyid && !find_next)
{
/* Not found by AIK.issuer_sn. Lets try the AIY.ki
/* Not found by AIK.issuer_sn. Lets try the AIK.ki
instead. Loop over all certificates with that issuer as
subject and stop for the one with a matching
subjectKeyIdentifier. */
@ -542,7 +553,7 @@ find_up (KEYDB_HANDLE kh, ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuer, int find_next)
rc = keydb_search_subject (kh, issuer);
if (rc == -1 && !find_next)
{
/* Not found, lets see whether we have one in the ephemeral key DB. */
/* Not found, let us see whether we have one in the ephemeral key DB. */
int old = keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
if (!old)
{
@ -602,8 +613,8 @@ gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next)
rc = find_up (kh, start, issuer, 0);
if (rc)
{
/* it is quite common not to have a certificate, so better don't
print an error here */
/* It is quite common not to have a certificate, so better don't
print an error here. */
if (rc != -1 && opt.verbose > 1)
log_error ("failed to find issuer's certificate: rc=%d\n", rc);
rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_CERT);
@ -669,8 +680,8 @@ is_cert_still_valid (ctrl_t ctrl, int lm, estream_t fp,
/* Store that in the keybox so that key listings are
able to return the revoked flag. We don't care
about error, though. */
keydb_set_cert_flags (subject_cert, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0,
VALIDITY_REVOKED);
keydb_set_cert_flags (subject_cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_VALIDITY, 0,
~0, VALIDITY_REVOKED);
break;
case GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN:
do_list (1, lm, fp, _("no CRL found for certificate"));
@ -722,6 +733,8 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
from a qualified root certificate.
-1 = unknown, 0 = no, 1 = yes. */
int lm = listmode;
chain_item_t chain = NULL; /* A list of all certificates in the chain. */
gnupg_get_isotime (current_time);
if (r_exptime)
@ -755,6 +768,22 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
gpg_error_t istrusted_rc = -1;
struct rootca_flags_s rootca_flags;
/* Put the certificate on our list. */
{
chain_item_t ci;
ci = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ci);
if (!ci)
{
rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
ksba_cert_ref (subject_cert);
ci->cert = subject_cert;
ci->next = chain;
chain = ci;
}
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
issuer = ksba_cert_get_issuer (subject_cert, 0);
@ -767,10 +796,12 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
goto leave;
}
/* Is this a self-issued certificate (i.e. the root certificate)? */
is_root = (subject && !strcmp (issuer, subject));
if (is_root)
{
chain->is_root = 1;
/* Check early whether the certificate is listed as trusted.
We used to do this only later but changed it to call the
check right here so that we can access special flags
@ -1157,7 +1188,7 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
}
}
/* Check for revocations etc. Note that for a root certioficate
/* Check for revocations etc. Note that for a root certificate
this test is done a second time later. This should eventually
be fixed. */
if ((flags & 1))
@ -1209,32 +1240,69 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
}
leave:
if (is_qualified != -1)
/* If we have traversed a complete chain up to the root we will
reset the ephemeral flag for all these certificates. his is done
regardless of any error because those errors may only be
transient. */
if (chain && chain->is_root)
{
/* We figured something about the qualified signature capability
of the certificate under question. Store the result as user
data in the certificate object. We do this even if the
validation itself failed. */
/* Fixme: We should set this flag for all certificates in the
chain for optimizing reasons. */
char buf[1];
gpg_error_t err;
buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "is_qualified", buf, 1);
if (err)
chain_item_t ci;
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if (!rc)
rc = err;
/* Note that it is possible for the last certificate in the
chain (i.e. our target certificate) that it has not yet
been stored in the keybox and thus the flag can't be set.
We ignore this error becuase it will later be stored
anyway. */
err = keydb_set_cert_flags (ci->cert, 1, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0,
KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL, 0);
if (!ci->next && gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
;
else if (err)
log_error ("clearing ephemeral flag failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
}
}
/* If we have figured something about the qualified signature
capability of the certificate under question, store the result as
user data in all certificates of the chain. We do this even if the
validation itself failed. */
if (is_qualified != -1)
{
gpg_error_t err;
chain_item_t ci;
char buf[1];
buf[0] = !!is_qualified;
for (ci = chain; ci; ci = ci->next)
{
err = ksba_cert_set_user_data (ci->cert, "is_qualified", buf, 1);
if (err)
{
log_error ("set_user_data(is_qualified) failed: %s\n",
gpg_strerror (err));
if (!rc)
rc = err;
}
}
}
if (r_exptime)
gnupg_copy_time (r_exptime, exptime);
xfree (issuer);
xfree (subject);
keydb_release (kh);
while (chain)
{
chain_item_t ci_next = chain->next;
ksba_cert_release (chain->cert);
xfree (chain);
chain = ci_next;
}
ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
ksba_cert_release (subject_cert);
return rc;

40
sm/fingerprint.c
View File

@ -61,6 +61,19 @@ gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo,
if (r_len)
*r_len = len;
/* Fist check whether we have cached the fingerprint. */
if (algo == GCRY_MD_SHA1)
{
size_t buflen;
assert (len >= 20);
if (!ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "sha1-fingerprint",
array, len, &buflen)
&& buflen == 20)
return array;
}
/* No, need to compute it. */
rc = gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0);
if (rc)
{
@ -80,6 +93,11 @@ gpgsm_get_fingerprint (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo,
gcry_md_final (md);
memcpy (array, gcry_md_read(md, algo), len );
gcry_md_close (md);
/* Cache an SHA-1 fingerprint. */
if ( algo == GCRY_MD_SHA1 )
ksba_cert_set_user_data (cert, "sha1-fingerprint", array, 20);
return array;
}
@ -90,7 +108,7 @@ gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo)
{
unsigned char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
char *buf;
int len, i;
int len;
if (!algo)
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
@ -99,9 +117,7 @@ gpgsm_get_fingerprint_string (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo)
assert (len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN );
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, algo, digest, NULL);
buf = xmalloc (len*3+1);
*buf = 0;
for (i=0; i < len; i++ )
sprintf (buf+strlen(buf), i? ":%02X":"%02X", digest[i]);
bin2hexcolon (digest, len, buf);
return buf;
}
@ -112,7 +128,7 @@ gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo)
{
unsigned char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
char *buf;
int len, i;
int len;
if (!algo)
algo = GCRY_MD_SHA1;
@ -120,10 +136,8 @@ gpgsm_get_fingerprint_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert, int algo)
len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (algo);
assert (len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN );
gpgsm_get_fingerprint (cert, algo, digest, NULL);
buf = xmalloc (len*3+1);
*buf = 0;
for (i=0; i < len; i++ )
sprintf (buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", digest[i]);
buf = xmalloc (len*2+1);
bin2hex (digest, len, buf);
return buf;
}
@ -190,13 +204,11 @@ char *
gpgsm_get_keygrip_hexstring (ksba_cert_t cert)
{
unsigned char grip[20];
char *buf, *p;
int i;
char *buf;
gpgsm_get_keygrip (cert, grip);
buf = p = xmalloc (20*2+1);
for (i=0; i < 20; i++, p += 2 )
sprintf (p, "%02X", grip[i]);
buf = xmalloc (20*2+1);
bin2hex (grip, 20, buf);
return buf;
}

3
sm/import.c
View File

@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ print_imported_summary (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats)
static void
check_and_store (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, ksba_cert_t cert, int depth)
check_and_store (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats,
ksba_cert_t cert, int depth)
{
int rc;

20
sm/keydb.c
View File

@ -722,7 +722,7 @@ keydb_insert_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t cert)
/* update the current keyblock with KB */
/* Update the current keyblock with KB. */
int
keydb_update_cert (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, ksba_cert_t cert)
{
@ -1366,7 +1366,9 @@ keydb_store_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, int ephemeral, int *existed)
transaction by locating the certificate in the DB and updating the
flags. */
gpg_error_t
keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int which, int idx, unsigned int value)
keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int ephemeral,
int which, int idx,
unsigned int mask, unsigned int value)
{
KEYDB_HANDLE kh;
gpg_error_t err;
@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int which, int idx, unsigned int value)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM);;
}
if (ephemeral)
keydb_set_ephemeral (kh, 1);
err = keydb_lock (kh);
if (err)
{
@ -1397,8 +1402,11 @@ keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int which, int idx, unsigned int value)
err = keydb_search_fpr (kh, fpr);
if (err)
{
log_error (_("problem re-searching certificate: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
if (err == -1)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_FOUND);
else
log_error (_("problem re-searching certificate: %s\n"),
gpg_strerror (err));
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
@ -1410,6 +1418,9 @@ keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int which, int idx, unsigned int value)
keydb_release (kh);
return err;
}
value = ((old_value & ~mask) | (value & mask));
if (value != old_value)
{
err = keydb_set_flags (kh, which, idx, value);
@ -1420,6 +1431,7 @@ keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int which, int idx, unsigned int value)
return err;
}
}
keydb_release (kh);
return 0;
}

5
sm/keydb.h
View File

@ -74,8 +74,9 @@ int keydb_search_subject (KEYDB_HANDLE hd, const char *issuer);
int keydb_classify_name (const char *name, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc);
int keydb_store_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, int ephemeral, int *existed);
gpg_error_t keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int which, int idx,
unsigned int value);
gpg_error_t keydb_set_cert_flags (ksba_cert_t cert, int ephemeral,
int which, int idx,
unsigned int mask, unsigned int value);
void keydb_clear_some_cert_flags (ctrl_t ctrl, strlist_t names);

2
sm/keylist.c
View File

@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ list_cert_raw (ctrl_t ctrl, KEYDB_HANDLE hd,
err = keydb_get_flags (hd, KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB, 0, &blobflags);
if (err)
es_fprintf (fp, " [error getting keyflags: %s]\n",gpg_strerror (err));
else if ((blobflags & 2))
else if ((blobflags & KEYBOX_FLAG_BLOB_EPHEMERAL))
es_fprintf (fp, " [stored as ephemeral]\n");
}