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See ChangeLog: Thu Sep 14 17:45:11 CEST 2000 Werner Koch

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Werner Koch 2000-09-14 15:45:03 +00:00
parent 0b9d3e2f81
commit 0f10fea8da
21 changed files with 1248 additions and 1201 deletions
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8
g10/ChangeLog
View file

@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
Thu Sep 14 17:45:11 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Dump key flags. Print special
warning in case of faked ARRs.
* getkey.c (finsih_lookup): Hack so that for v4 RSA keys the subkey
is used for encryption.
Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000 Werner Koch <wk@openit.de>
* g10.c (main): Default S2K algorithms are now SHA1 and CAST5 - this

35
g10/getkey.c
View file

@ -1598,7 +1598,40 @@ finish_lookup( KBNODE keyblock, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE k, byte *namehash,
merge_one_pk_and_selfsig( keyblock, keyblock, pk );
}
else {
if( primary && pk->pubkey_usage
if( primary && pk->pubkey_usage == PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC
&& keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->version > 3
&& keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
&& k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
/* Ugly hack to support v4 RSA keys. Here we assume that the
primary key should be used only for signing and a subkey
should be used for encryption. So now look for a subkey.
*/
KBNODE save_k = k;
u32 mainkid[2];
u32 cur_time = make_timestamp();
keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, mainkid );
for(k = save_k ; k; k = k->next ) {
if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
&& !check_pubkey_algo2(
k->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_algo,
pk->pubkey_usage )
&& !has_expired( k, mainkid, cur_time )
)
break;
}
if( !k )
k = save_k; /* not found: better use the main key instead */
else
log_info(_("using secondary key %08lX "
"instead of primary key %08lX\n"),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( k->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
(ulong)keyid_from_pk( save_k->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL)
);
}
else if( primary && pk->pubkey_usage
&& check_pubkey_algo2( k->pkt->pkt.public_key->pubkey_algo,
pk->pubkey_usage ) == G10ERR_WR_PUBKEY_ALGO ) {
/* if the usage is not correct, try to use a subkey */

16
g10/parse-packet.c
View file

@ -702,6 +702,18 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
const char *p=NULL;
int i;
/* The CERT has warning out with explains how to use GNUPG to
* detect the ARRs - we print our old message here when it is a faked
* ARR and add an additional notice */
if ( type == SIGSUBPKT_ARR && !hashed ) {
printf("\tsubpkt %d len %u (additional recipient request)\n"
"WARNING: PGP versions > 5.0 and < 6.5.8 will automagically "
"encrypt to this key and thereby reveal the plaintext to "
"the owner of this ARR key. Detailed info follows:\n",
type, (unsigned)length );
}
printf("\t%s%ssubpkt %d len %u (", /*)*/
critical ? "critical ":"",
hashed ? "hashed ":"", type, (unsigned)length );
@ -808,7 +820,9 @@ dump_sig_subpkt( int hashed, int type, int critical,
print_string( stdout, buffer, length, ')' );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS:
p = "key flags";
fputs ( "key flags:", stdout );
for( i=0; i < length; i++ )
printf(" %02X", buffer[i] );
break;
case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID:
p = "signer's user ID";