See ChangeLog: Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000 Werner Koch

ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_CHECK_FAQPROG): New.
+        * configure.in: Test for this.
+
+        * configure.in (DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS): Fix by David Champion.
+
 Wed Sep  6 17:55:47 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
 
         * configure.in: Check for fstat64 and fopen64

NEWS

@@ -19,7 +19,12 @@ Noteworthy changes in the current CVS branch STABLE-BRANCH-1-0
      
     * RSA is supported. Key generation does not yet work but will come
       soon.
-
+    
+    * CAST5 and SHA-1 are now the default algorithms to protect the key
+      and for symmetric-only encryption. This should solve a couple
+      of compatibility problems because the old algorithms are optional
+      according to RFC2440
+   
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 1.0.2 (2000-07-12)
 ----------------------------------------------

THANKS

@@ -26,11 +26,12 @@ Christian Recktenwald	   chris@citecs.de
 Daniel Eisenbud 	   eisenbud@cs.swarthmore.edu
 Daniel Koening		   dan@mail.isis.de
 Daniel Resare		   daniel@resare.com
-Detlef Lannert		   lannert@lannert.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
 Dave Dykstra		   dwd@bell-labs.com
+David Champion             dgc@uchicago.edu
 David Ellement		   ellement@sdd.hp.com
 David Hallinan		   hallinan@rtd.com
 David Mathog               MATHOG@seqaxp.bio.caltech.edu
+Detlef Lannert		   lannert@lannert.rz.uni-duesseldorf.de
 Dimitri 		   dmitri@advantrix.com
 Dirk Lattermann 	   dlatt@t-online.de
 Ed Boraas		   ecxjo@esperanto.org
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ Jeff Long		   long@kestrel.cc.ukans.edu
 Jens Bachem		   bachem@rrz.uni-koeln.de
 Jeroen C. van Gelderen     jeroen@vangelderen.org
 J Horacio MG		   homega@ciberia.es
+J. Michael Ashley          jashley@acm.org
 Joachim Backes		   backes@rhrk.uni-kl.de
 John A. Martin		   jam@jamux.com
 Johnny Teveßen		   j.tevessen@gmx.de

TODO

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 
-  * Think more whether the setting to ultimately trusted is a good idea.!!
+  * add a way to set expiration time for key signatures.
 
   * add some minor things vor VMS.
 
   * Don't get the ultimately trusted keys from the secring but store
     it permanently in the trustdb.  This way we don't need a secring at all.
+    [ Solved by re-introducing --trusted-key ]
 
   * Use DSA keys with the test suite.
 
@@ -21,6 +22,8 @@
 
   * Replace Valid/Invalid by Known/Unknown?
 
+  * Fix the bug in the mips assembler code
+
 Scheduled for 1.1
 -----------------
   * export by user-IDs does only export the first matching name which leads
@@ -42,6 +45,7 @@ Scheduled for 1.1
   * Skip RO keyrings when importing a key.
 
   * Use the newest encryption key if only the main key has been given.
+    [already in the gpg 1.1 codebase]
 
   * replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized
     utility and SOCKSify this utility.
@@ -52,6 +56,8 @@ Scheduled for 1.1
   * Delay the read of the passphrase-fd after a NEED_PASSPHRASE.  But this
     may break some scripts.
 
+  * Get new assembler stuff from gmgp 3.1
+
 
 Nice to have
 ------------

VERSION

@@ -1,3 +1 @@
 1.0.2c
-
-

acinclude.m4

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ AC_DEFUN(GNUPG_CHECK_TYPEDEF,
 dnl GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE
 dnl
 AC_DEFUN(GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE,
-  [
+  [ 
     if ${MAKE-make} --version 2>/dev/null | grep '^GNU ' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
         :
     else
@@ -45,6 +45,32 @@ AC_DEFUN(GNUPG_CHECK_GNUMAKE,
   ])
 
 
+dnl GNUPG_CHECK_FAQPROG
+dnl
+AC_DEFUN(GNUPG_CHECK_FAQPROG,
+  [ AC_MSG_CHECKING(for faqprog.pl)
+    if faqprog.pl -V 2>/dev/null | grep '^faqprog.pl ' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        working_faqprog=yes
+        FAQPROG="faqprog.pl"
+    else 
+	working_faqprog=no
+        FAQPROG=": "
+    fi
+    AC_MSG_RESULT($working_faqprog)
+    AC_SUBST(FAQPROG)
+    AM_CONDITIONAL(WORKING_FAQPROG, test "$working_faqprog" = "yes" )
+
+    if test $working_faqprog = no; then
+	AC_MSG_WARN([[
+***
+*** It seems that the faqprog.pl program is not installed.
+*** Unless you do not change the source of the FAQs it is not required.
+*** The working version of this utility should be available at:
+***   ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt/contrib/faqprog.pl
+***]])
+    fi
+  ])       
+
 
 dnl GNUPG_LINK_FILES( SRC, DEST )
 dnl same as AC_LINK_FILES, but collect the files to link in

cipher/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * random.c (fast_random_poll): Check ENOSYS for getrusage.
+        * rndunix.c:  Add 2 sources for QNX. By Sam Roberts.
+
 Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
 
         * rsa.c (secret): Speed up by using the CRT.  For a 2k keys this

cipher/random.c

@@ -594,8 +594,11 @@ fast_random_poll()
       #endif
     #else
     {	struct rusage buf;
-	if( getrusage( RUSAGE_SELF, &buf ) )
+        /* QNX/Neutrino does return ENOSYS - so we just ignore it and
+         * add whatever is in buf */
+        if( getrusage( RUSAGE_SELF, &buf ) && errno != ENOSYS )
 	    BUG();
+        
 	add_randomness( &buf, sizeof buf, 1 );
 	memset( &buf, 0, sizeof buf );
     }

cipher/rndunix.c

@@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ static struct RI {
     {	"/usr/ucb/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1       },
     {	"/usr/bin/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1       },
     {	"/bin/ps", "aux", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0          },
+    {   "/bin/ps", "-A", SC(0.3), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0           }, /*QNX*/
     {	"/usr/bin/ipcs", "-a", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1      },
     {	"/bin/ipcs", "-a", SC(0.5), NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0         },
     /* Unreliable source, depends on system usage */
@@ -290,6 +291,10 @@ static struct RI {
     /* This is a complex and screwball program.  Some systems have things
      * like rX_dmn, x = integer, for RAID systems, but the statistics are
      * pretty dodgy */
+#ifdef __QNXNTO__                                                             
+    { "/bin/pidin", "-F%A%B%c%d%E%I%J%K%m%M%n%N%p%P%S%s%T", SC(0.3),
+             NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0       },
+#endif     
 #if 0
     /* The following aren't enabled since they're somewhat slow and not very
      * unpredictable, however they give an indication of the sort of sources

configure.in

@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ AC_PROG_INSTALL
 AC_PROG_AWK
 AC_CHECK_PROG(DOCBOOK_TO_MAN, docbook-to-man, yes, no)
 AM_CONDITIONAL(HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN, test "$ac_cv_prog_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN" = yes)
-
+GNUPG_CHECK_FAQPROG
 
 MPI_OPT_FLAGS=""
 
@@ -257,13 +257,13 @@ case "${target}" in
     *-openbsd*)
         NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/srandom"
         NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
-        DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared -rdynamic -fpic -Wl,-Bshareable -Wl,-x"
+        DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared -rdynamic $CFLAGS_PIC -Wl,-Bshareable -Wl,-x"
         ;;
 
     *-netbsd*)
         NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
         NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
-        DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared -rdynamic -fpic -Wl,-Bshareable -Wl,-x"
+        DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared -rdynamic $CFLAGS_PIC -Wl,-Bshareable -Wl,-x"
         ;;
 
     *-solaris*)
@@ -275,7 +275,12 @@ case "${target}" in
     *)
         NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM="/dev/random"
         NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM="/dev/urandom"
-        DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"
+        # -shared is a gcc-ism.  Find pic flags from GNUPG_CHECK_PIC.
+        if test -n "$GCC" ; then
+           DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="-shared $CFLAGS_PIC"                            
+        else
+           DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS_PIC"
+        fi
         ;;
 esac
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM, "$NAME_OF_DEV_RANDOM")

doc/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * faq.raw: New.
+        * Makefile.am: Support to build FAQs
+
 Wed Jul 12 13:32:06 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@>
 
   * gpg.sgml: Add a note about the availability of the GPH.

doc/Makefile.am

@@ -1,9 +1,12 @@
 ## Process this file with automake to create Makefile.in
 
-EXTRA_DIST = DETAILS gpg.sgml gpg.1 FAQ HACKING OpenPGP  README.W32
+EXTRA_DIST = DETAILS gpg.sgml gpg.1 faq.raw \
+             HACKING OpenPGP README.W32
 
 man_MANS = gpg.1
 
+pkgdata_DATA = FAQ faq.html
+
 
 %.1 : %.sgml
 if HAVE_DOCBOOK_TO_MAN
@@ -15,6 +18,12 @@ else
 endif
 
 
+FAQ : faq.raw
+	$(FAQPROG) -f $<  $@ || $(FAQPROG) -f $< $@
+
+faq.html : faq.raw
+	$(FAQPROG) -h -f $< $@ 2>&1 || $(FAQPROG) -h -f $< $@
+
 %.dvi: %.sgml
 	db2dvi $<
 
@@ -29,3 +38,9 @@ dist-hook:
 	@if test `wc -c < gpg.1` -lt 200; then \
 	    echo 'ERROR: dummy man page'; false; fi
 
+
+
+
+
+
+

doc/faq.raw

@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
+[$htmltitle=GnuPG FAQ]
+[$sfaqheader=The GnuPG FAQ says:]
+[$sfaqfooter=
+The most recent version of the FAQ is available from
+<http://www.gnupg.org/>
+]
+[$usenetheader=
+]
+[$maintainer=Nils Ellmenreich <nils 'at' infosun.fmi.uni-passau.de>]
+[$WINS=.wins.uva.nl/pub/solaris]
+[$ftpWINS=ftp://ftp.wins.uva.nl/pub/solaris]
+[$hWINS=http://www.wins.uva.nl/]
+[$fhWINS=http://www.wins.uva.nl/pub/solaris/solaris2]
+[$hGPG=http://www.gnupg.org]
+
+
+[H H1]GNUPG FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS[H /H1]
+
+[H pre]
+Version: 0.1
+Last-Modified: Sep 14, 2000
+Maintained-by: [$maintainer]
+[H/pre]
+
+This is the GnuPG FAQ. The latest HTML version is available  
+[H a href=[$hGPG]] here[H/a].  
+
+The index is generated automatically, so there may be errors here.  Not
+all questions may be in the section they belong to. Suggestions about
+how to improve the structure of this FAQ are welcome.
+
+Please send additions and corrections to the maintainer. Don't send
+message like "This should be a FAQ - what's the answer?". If it hasn't
+been asked before, it isn't a FAQ. Otherwise, please provide the answer
+to be included here.
+
+[H HR]
+
+<C>
+
+[H HR]
+
+<S> GENERAL
+
+<Q> What is GnuPG?
+
+    [H a href=[$hGPG]]GnuPG[H /a] stands for GNU Privacy Guard and
+    is GNU's tool for secure communication and data storage.
+    It can be used to encrypt data and to create digital signatures.
+    It includes an advanced key management facility and is compliant
+    with the proposed OpenPGP Internet standard as described in
+    [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/rfc2440.html]RFC 2440[H/a]. As
+    such, it is aimed to be compatible with PGP from NAI Inc.
+
+<Q> Is GnuPG compatible with PGP?
+
+    In general, yes. GnuPG and newer PGP releases should be implementing
+    the OpenPGP standard. But there are some interoperability
+    problems. See questions <Rcompat>ff. for details.
+
+<S> SOURCES OF INFORMATION
+
+<Q> Where can I find more information?
+
+    Here's a list of on-line resources: [H UL] 
+
+    [H LI] [H a href=[$hGPG]/docs.html]<[$hGPG]/docs.html>[H/a] is the
+    documentation page. Have a look at the HOWTOs and the GNU Privacy
+    Handbook (GPH, available in English, Spanish and Russian). The
+    latter provides a detailed user's guide to GnuPG. You'll also find a
+    document about how to convert from PGP 2.x to GnuPG.
+
+    [H LI] On [H a href=http://lists.gnupg.org]<http://lists.gnupg.org>[H/a] 
+    you'll find a searchable online archive of the GnuPG mailing lists.
+
+    [H B]PLEASE:[H/B]
+    Before posting to a list, read this FAQ and the available
+    documentation. This way you help people focus on topics that have
+    not yet been resolved.
+    [H /UL]
+
+<Q> Where do I get GnuPG?
+
+    You can download the GNU Privacy Guard from it's primary FTP server
+    [H a href=ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt]ftp.gnupg.org[H /a] or from
+    one of the mirrors: [H a href=[$hGPG]/mirrors.html]<[$hGPG]/mirror.html>[H /a]
+
+
+
+<S> INSTALLATION 
+
+<Q> Which OSes does GnuPG run on?
+
+    It should run on most Unices as well as Windows 95 and Windows NT. A
+    list of OSes reported to be OK is presented at 
+    [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/gnupg.html#supsys]
+    http://www.gnupg.org/gnupg.html#supsys [H /a].
+
+<Q> Which random gatherer should I use?
+
+    "Good" random numbers are crucial for the security of your
+    encryption. Different operating systems provide a variety of more or
+    less quality random data. Linux and *BSD provide kernel generated
+    random data through /dev/random - this should be the preferred
+    choice on these systems. Also Solaris users with the SUNWski package
+    installed have a /dev/random. In these cases, use the configure
+    option [H pre]--enable-static-rnd=linux[H/pre].
+
+    On other systems, the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is a good
+    choice. It is a perl-daemon that monitors system activity nad hashes
+    it into random data. See the download page [H a href=http://www.gnupg.org/download.html]<http://www.gnupg.org/download.html>[H /a] 
+    how to obtain egd. Use [H pre]--enable-static-rnd=egd[H/pre] here.
+
+    If the above options do not work, you can use the random number
+    generator "unix". This is [H B]very[H /B] slow and should be
+    avoided. The random quality isn't very good so don't use it on
+    sensitive data.
+
+<Q> How do I include support for RSA and IDEA?
+
+    The official GnuPG distribution (as of 1.0.2) does not contain
+    either of them due to patents restriction. The RSA patent expires
+    Sept 20, 2000. A new GnuPG release is then scheduled to include
+    it. The IDEA patent does not expire before 2007 so don't expect
+    official support before then.
+
+    However, there are unofficial modules to include both of them even
+    in earlier version of GnuPG. They're available from [H a href=ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt/contrib/] 
+    <ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt/contrib/>[H /a]. Look for [H pre]idea.c[H /pre] 
+    and [H pre]rsa.c[H /pre]. Compilation directives are in the headers
+    of these files. Then add the following lines to your ~/.gnupg/options:
+    [H pre]
+    load-extension idea 
+    load-extension rsa
+    [H /pre]
+
+    These extensions are not available for the Windows version of GnuPG.
+
+
+<S> USAGE
+
+<Q> What is the recommended key size?
+
+    1024 bit for DSA signatures; even for plain ElGamal
+    signatures this is sufficient as the size of the hash
+    is probably the weakest link if the key size is larger
+    than 1024 bits.  Encryption keys may have greater sizes,
+    but you should than check the fingerprint of this key:
+    "gpg --fingerprint --fingerprint <user ID>".
+
+<Q> Why does it sometimes take so long to create keys?
+
+    The problem here is that we need a lot of random bytes and for that
+    we (on Linux the /dev/random device) must collect some random data.
+    It is really not easy to fill the Linux internal entropy buffer; I
+    talked to Ted Ts'o and he commented that the best way to fill the
+    buffer is to play with your keyboard.  Good security has its price.
+    What I do is to hit several times on the shift, control, alternate,
+    and capslock keys, because these keys do not produce output to the
+    screen. This way you get your keys really fast (it's the same thing
+    pgp2 does).
+
+    Another problem might be another program which eats up your random
+    bytes (a program (look at your daemons) that reads from
+    /dev/[u]random).
+
+<Q> And it really takes long when I work on a remote system. Why?
+
+    Don't do this at all! You should never create keys or even use GnuPG
+    on a remote system because you normally have no physical control
+    over your secret key ring (which is in most cases vulnerable to
+    advanced dictionary attacks) - I strongly encourage everyone to only
+    create keys on a local computer (a disconnected laptop is probably
+    the best choice) and if you need it on your connected box (I know:
+    We all do this) be sure to have a strong password for your account
+    and for your secret key and that you can trust your system
+    administrator.
+
+    When I check GnuPG on a remote system via ssh (I have no Alpha here
+    ;-) I have the same problem.  It takes a *very* long time to create
+    the keys, so I use a special option, --quick-random, to generate
+    insecure keys which are only good for some tests.
+
+<Q> What is the difference between options and commands?
+
+    If you do a 'gpg --help', you will get two separate lists. The first
+    is a list of commands. The second is a list of options. Whenever you
+    run GPG, you [H B]must[H /B] pick exactly one command (with one
+    exception, see below). You [H B]may[H /B] pick one or more options.
+    The command should, just by convention, come at the end of the
+    argument list, after all the options. If the command takes a file
+    (all the basic ones do), the filename comes at the very end. So the
+    basic way to run gpg is: 
+
+    [H pre] 
+    gpg [--option something] [--option2] [--option3 something] --command file 
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    Some options take arguments, for example the --output option (which
+    can be abbreviated -o) is an option that takes a filename. The
+    option's argument must follow immediately after the option itself,
+    otherwise gpg doesn't know which option the argument is supposed to
+    go with. As an option, --output and its filename must come before
+    the command. The --recipient (-r) option takes a name or keyid to
+    encrypt the message to, which must come right after the -r argument.
+    The --encrypt (or -e) command comes after all the options followed
+    by the file you wish to encrypt. So use 
+
+    [H pre] 
+    gpg -r alice -o secret.txt -e test.txt 
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    If you write the options out in full, it is easier to read 
+
+    [H pre]
+    gpg --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt 
+    [H/pre]
+
+    If you're saving it in a file called ".txt" then you'd probably
+    expect to see ASCII-armored text in there, so you need to add the
+    --armor (-a) option, which doesn't take any arguments.  
+
+    [H pre] 
+    gpg --armor --recipient alice --output secret.txt --encrypt test.txt
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    If you imagine square brackets around the optional parts, it becomes
+    a bit clearer: 
+
+    [H pre] 
+    gpg [--armor] [--recipient alice] [--output secret.txt] --encrypt test.txt 
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    The optional parts can be rearranged any way you want.  
+
+    [H pre] 
+    gpg --output secret.txt --recipient alice --armor --encrypt test.txt
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    If your filename begins with a hyphen (e.g. "-a.txt"), gnupg assumes
+    this is an option and may complain.  To avoid this you have either
+    to use "./-a.txt" or stop the option and command processing with two
+    hyphens: "-- -a.txt".
+  
+    [H B]The exception:[H /B] signing and encrypting at the same time. Use
+    [H pre] gpg [--options] --sign --encrypt foo.txt [H/pre]
+
+
+<Q> I can't delete an user id because it is already deleted on my public
+keying?
+
+    Because you can only select from the public key ring, there is no
+    direct way to do this.  However it is not very complicated to do it
+    anyway.  Create a new user id with exactly the same name and you
+    will see that there are now two identical user ids on the secret
+    ring.  Now select this user id and delete it.  Both user ids will be
+    removed from the secret ring.
+
+<Q> What are trust, validity and ownertrust?
+
+    "ownertrust" is used instead of "trust" to make clear that this is
+    the value you have assigned to a key to express how much you trust
+    the owner of this key to correctly sign (and so introduce) other
+    keys.  "validity", or calculated trust, is a value which says how
+    much GnuPG thinks a key is valid (that it really belongs to the one
+    who claims to be the owner of the key).  For more see the chapter
+    "The Web of Trust" in the Manual.
+
+<Q> How do I sign a patch file?
+
+    Use "gpg --clearsign --not-dash-escaped ...".  The problem with
+    --clearsign is that all lines starting with a dash are quoted with
+    "- "; obviously diff produces many of lines starting with a dash and
+    these are then quoted and that is not good for patch ;-).  To use a
+    patch file without removing the cleartext signature, the special
+    option --not-dash-escaped may be used to suppress generation of
+    these escape sequences.  You should not mail such a patch because
+    spaces and line endings are also subject to the signature and a
+    mailer may not preserve these.  If you want to mail a file you can
+    simply sign it using your MUA.
+
+<Q> Where is the "encrypt-to-self" option?
+
+    Use "--encrypt-to your_keyid".  You can use more than one of these
+    options. To temporary override the use of this additional keys, you
+    can use the option "--no-encrypt-to".
+
+<Q> How can I get rid of the Version and Comment headers in armored
+messages?
+
+    Use "--no-version --comment ''".  Note that the left over blank line
+    is required by the protocol.
+
+<Q> What does the "You are using the xxxx character set." mean?
+
+    This note is printed when UTF8 mapping has to be done.  Make sure
+    that the displayed charset is the one you have activated on your
+    system "iso-8859-1" is the most used one, so this is the default.
+    You can change the charset with the option "--charset".  It is
+    important that you active character set matches the one displayed -
+    if not, restrict yourself to plain 7 bit ASCII and no mapping has to
+    be done.
+
+<Q> How can a get list of key IDs used to encrypt a message?
+
+    [H pre] gpg --batch --decrypt --list-only --status-fd 1 2>/dev/null
+    \ | awk '/^\[GNUPG:\] ENC_TO / { print $3 }' [H /pre]
+
+<Q> I can't decrypt my symmetrical only (-c) encrypted message with
+    a new version of GnuPG.
+
+    There used to be a bug in GnuPG < 1.0.1 which happens only if 3DES
+    or Twofish has been used for symmetric only encryption (this has
+    never been the default).  The bug has been fixed but to enable you
+    to decrypt old messages, you should run gpg with the option
+    "--emulate-3des-s2k-bug", decrypt the message and encrypt it again
+    without this option.  The option will be removed in 1.1, so better
+    re-encrypt your message now.
+
+<Q> How can I used GnuPG in an automated environment?
+
+    You should use the option --batch and don't use pass phrases as
+    there is usually no way to store it more secure than the secret
+    keyring itself. The suggested way to create the keys for the
+    automated environment is:
+
+     On a secure machine:
+    [H OL] [H LI] If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing
+    subkey for your key (edit menu, choose "addkey" and the DSA).  [H
+    LI] Make sure that you use a passphrase (Needed by the current
+    implementation) [H LI] gpg --export-secret-subkeys --no-comment foo
+    >secring.auto [H LI] Copy secring.auto and the public keyring to a
+    test directory.  [H LI] Cd to this directory.  [H LI] gpg --homedir
+    . --edit foo and use "passwd" to remove the pass-phrase from the
+    subkeys.  You may also want to remove all unused subkeys.  [H LI]
+    copy secring.auto to a floppy and carry it to the target box [H /OL]
+    On the target machine: [H OL] [H LI] Install secring.auto as secret
+    keyring.  [H LI] Now you can start your new service.  It is a good
+    idea to install some intrusion detection system so that you
+    hopefully get a notice of an successful intrusion, so that you in
+    turn can revoke all the subkeys installed on that machine and
+    install new subkeys.  [H /OL]
+
+
+
+<S> COMPATIBILITY ISSUES 
+
+<Dcompat>
+
+<Q> How can I encrypt a message so that pgp 2.x is able to decrypt it?
+
+    You can't do that because pgp 2.x normally uses IDEA which is not
+    supported by GnuPG because it is patented, but if you have a
+    modified version of PGP you can try this:
+
+    [H pre] gpg --rfc1991 --cipher-algo 3des ...  [H/pre]
+
+    Please don't pipe the data to encrypt to gpg but give it as a
+    filename; otherwise, pgp 2 will not be able to handle it.
+
+<Q> How can I conventional encrypt a message, so that PGP can decrypt
+it?
+
+    You can't do this for PGP 2.  For PGP 5 you should use this: 
+
+    [H pre]
+    gpg -c --cipher-algo 3des --compress-algo 1 myfile 
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    You may replace "3des" by "cast5". "blowfish" does not work with all
+    versions of pgp5.  You may also want to put [H pre] compress-algo 1
+    [H/pre] into your ~/.gnupg/options file - this does not affect
+    normal gnupg operation.
+
+
+<Q> Why is PGP 5.x not able to encrypt messages with some keys?
+
+    PGP Inc refuses to accept ElGamal keys of type 20 even for
+    encryption.  They only support type 16 (which is identical at least
+    for decryption).  To be more inter-operable, GnuPG (starting with
+    version 0.3.3) now also uses type 16 for the ElGamal subkey which is
+    created if the default key algorithm is chosen.  You may add an type
+    16 ElGamal key to your public key which is easy as your key
+    signatures are still valid.
+
+<Q> Why is PGP 5.x not able to verify my messages?
+
+    PGP 5.x does not accept V4 signatures for data material but OpenPGP
+    requires generation of V4 signatures for all kind of data.  Use the
+    option "--force-v3-sigs" to generate V3 signatures for data.
+
+<Q> How do I transfer owner trust values from PGP to GnuPG?
+
+    There is a script in the tools directory to help you: After you have
+    imported the PGP keyring you can give this command: 
+
+    [H pre] 
+    $ lspgpot pgpkeyring | gpg --import-ownertrust 
+    [H /pre] 
+
+    where pgpkeyring is the original keyring and not the GnuPG one you
+    might have created in the first step.
+
+<Q> PGP 5.x, 6.x do not like my secret key.
+
+    PGP probably bails out on some private comment packets used by
+    GnuPG.  These packets are fully in compliance with OpenPGP; however
+    PGP is not really OpenPGP aware.  A workaround is to export the
+    secret keys with this command: 
+    [H pre] gpg --export-secret-keys --no-comment -a your-key-id [H /pre]
+
+
+
+<S> PROBLEMS and ERROR MESSAGES
+
+<Q> Why do I get "gpg: Warning: using insecure memory!"
+
+    On many systems this program should be installed as
+    setuid(root). This is necessary to lock memory pages.  Locking
+    memory pages prevents the operating system from writing memory pages
+    to disk and thereby keeping your secret keys really secret. If you
+    get no warning message about insecure memory your operating system
+    supports locking without being root. The program drops root
+    privileges as soon as locked memory is allocated.
+
+    If you can't or don't want to install GnuPG setuid(root), you can
+    use the option "--no-secmem-warning" or put [H pre]
+    no-secmem-warning [H /pre] in your ~/.gnupg/options file.
+
+<Q> In the edit menu the trust values is not displayed correctly after
+signing uids - why?
+
+    This happens because the some informations are stored immediately in
+    the trustdb, but the actual trust calculation can be done after the
+    save command.  This is a not easy to fix design bug which will be
+    addressed in some future release.
+
+<Q> An ElGamal signature does not verify anymore since version 1.0.2 ...
+
+    Use the option --emulate-md-encode-bug.
+
+<Q> Old versions of GnuPG can't verify ElGamal signatures
+
+    Update to GnuPG 1.0.2 or newer.
+
+
+<Q> When I use --clearsign, the plain text has sometimes extra dashes 
+in it - why?
+
+    This is called dash-escaped text and required by OpenPGP.
+    It always happens when a line starts with a dash ("-") and is needed
+    to distinguish those lines from the thos lines which make up such
+    a clearsigned message. 
+    
+    If you use GnuPG to process those emessage, the extra dashes are removed.
+    Good mail clients remove those extra dashes when displaying such a 
+    message.      
+
+
+
+<S> ADVANCED TOPICS
+
+<Q> How does this whole thing work?
+
+    To generate a secret/public keypair, run [H pre] gpg --gen-key
+    [H/pre] and choose the default values.
+
+    Data that is encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted by
+    the matching secret key.  The secret key is protected by a password,
+    the public key is not.
+
+    So to send your friend a message, you would encrypt your message
+    with his public key, and he would only be able to decrypt it by
+    having the secret key and putting in the password to use his secret
+    key.
+
+    GnuPG is also useful for signing things.  Things that are encrypted
+    with the secret key can be decrypted with the public key. To sign
+    something, a hash is taken of the data, and then the hash is in some
+    form encoded with the secret key. If someone has your public key, they
+    can verify that it is from you and that it hasn't changed by checking
+    the encoded form of the hash with the public key.
+  
+    A keyring is just a large file that stores keys. You have a public
+    keyring where you store yours and your friend's public keys.  You have
+    a secret keyring that you keep your secret key on, and be very careful
+    with this secret keyring: Never ever give anyone else access to it and
+    use a *good* passphrase to protect the data in it.
+  
+    You can 'conventionally' encrypt something by using the option 'gpg
+    -c'.  It is encrypted using a passphrase, and does not use public and
+    secret keys.  If the person you send the data to knows that
+    passphrase, they can decrypt it. This is usually most useful for
+    encrypting things to yourself, although you can encrypt things to your
+    own public key in the same way.  It should be used for communication
+    with partners you know and where it is easy to exchange the
+    passphrases (e.g. with your boy friend or your wife).  The advantage
+    is that you can change the passphrase from time to time and decrease
+    the risk, that many old messages may be decrypted by people who
+    accidently got your passphrase.
+  
+    You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg
+    --import' and 'gpg --export' option. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will
+    export secret keys. This is normally not useful, but you can generate
+    the key on one machine then move it to another machine.
+  
+    Keys can be signed under the 'gpg --edit-key' option.  When you sign a
+    key, you are saying that you are certain that the key belongs to the
+    person it says it comes from.  You should be very sure that is really
+    that person: You should verify the key fingerprint
+    [H pre]
+        gpg --fingerprint user-id
+    [H/pre]
+    over phone (if you really know the voice of the other person) or at a
+    key signing party (which are often held at computer conferences) or at
+    a meeting of your local GNU/Linux User Group.
+  
+    Hmm, what else.  You may use the option "-o filename" to force output
+    to this filename (use "-" to force output to stdout). "-r" just lets
+    you specify the recipient (which public key you encrypt with) on the
+    command line instead of typing it interactively.
+  
+    Oh yeah, this is important. By default all data is encrypted in some
+    weird binary format.  If you want to have things appear in ASCII text
+    that is readable, just add the '-a' option.  But the preferred method
+    is to use a MIME aware mail reader (Mutt, Pine and many more).
+  
+    There is a small security glitch in the OpenPGP (and therefore GnuPG)
+    system; to avoid this you should always sign and encrypt a message
+    instead of only encrypting it.
+
+
+<Q> Why are some signatures with an ELG-E key valid?
+
+    These are ElGamal Key generated by GnuPG in v3 (rfc1991) packets.
+    The OpenPGP draft later changed the algorithm identifier for ElGamal
+    keys which are usable for signatures and encryption from 16 to 20.
+    GnuPG now uses 20 when it generates new ElGamal keys but still
+    accept 16 (which is according to OpenPGP "encryption only") if this
+    key is in a v3 packet.  GnuPG is the only program which had used
+    these v3 ElGamal keys - so this assumption is quite safe.
+
+
+<Q> How does the whole trust thing work?
+
+    It works more or less like PGP.  The difference is that the trust is
+    computed at the time it is needed. This is one of the reasons for
+    the trustdb which holds a list of valid key signatures.  If you are
+    not running in batch mode you will be asked to assign a trust
+    parameter (ownertrust) to a key.
+
+
+
+    You can see the validity (calculated trust value) using this
+    command.
+    [H pre] gpg --list-keys --with-colons [H/pre] 
+
+    If the first field is "pub" or "uid", the second field shows you the
+    trust: 
+
+    [H pre] 
+     o = Unknown (this key is new to the system) 
+     e = The key has expired 
+     q = Undefined (no value assigned) 
+     n = Don't trust    this key at all
+     m = There is marginal trust in this key 
+     f = The key    is full trusted 
+     u = The key is ultimately trusted; this is only used
+         for keys for which the secret key is also available.  
+     r = The key    has been revoked 
+     d = The key has been disabled 
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    The value in the "pub" record is the best one of all "uid" records.
+  
+    You can get a list of the assigned trust values (how much you trust
+    the owner to correctly sign another person's key)
+  
+    [H pre] gpg --list-ownertrust [H/pre] The first field is the
+    fingerprint of the primary key, the second field is the assigned
+    value: 
+
+    [H pre] 
+     - = No Ownertrust value yet assigned.  
+     n = Never trust this keyholder to correctly verify others signatures.  
+     m = Have marginal trust in the keyholders capability to sign other
+         keys.  
+     f = Assume that the key holder really knows how to sign keys.  
+     u = No need to trust ourself because we have the secret key.  
+    [H/pre] 
+
+    Keep these values confidential because they express your opinions
+    about others.  PGP stores this information with the keyring thus it
+    is not a good idea to publish a PGP keyring instead of exporting the
+    keyring.  gnupg stores the trust in the trust-DB so it is okay to
+    give a gpg keyring away (but we have a --export command too).
+
+<Q> What kind of output is this: "key C26EE891.298, uid 09FB: ...."?
+
+    This is the internal representation of an user id in the trustdb.
+    "C26EE891" is the keyid, "298" is the local id (a record number in
+    the trustdb) and "09FB" is the last two bytes of a ripe-md-160 hash
+    of the user id for this key.
+
+<Q> How do I interpret some of the informational outputs?
+
+    While checking the validity of a key, GnuPG sometimes prints some
+    information which is prefixed with information about the checked
+    item.  [H pre] "key 12345678.3456" [H/pre] This is about the key
+    with key ID 12345678 and the internal number 3456, which is the
+    record number of the so called directory record in the trustdb.  
+    [H pre] "uid 12345678.3456/ACDE" [H/pre] This is about the user ID for
+    the same key.  To identify the user ID the last two bytes of a
+    ripe-md-160 over the user ID ring is printed.  [H pre] "sig
+    12345678.3456/ACDE/9A8B7C6D" [H/pre] This is about the signature
+    with key ID 9A8B7C6D for the above key and user ID, if it is a
+    signature which is direct on a key, the user ID part is empty
+    (..//..).
+
+<Q> Are the header lines of a cleartext signature part of the signed
+material?
+
+    No.  For example you can add or remove "Comment:" lines.  They have
+    a purpose like the mail header lines.  However a "Hash:" line is
+    needed for OpenPGP signatures to tell the parser which hash
+    algorithm to use.
+
+
+
+
+<S> ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
+
+    Many thanks to Werner Koch for the original FAQ file and to all
+    posters to gnupg-users and gnupg-devel. They all provided most of
+    the answers.
+
+    Also thanks to Casper Dik for providing me with a script to generate
+    this FAQ (he uses it for the excellent Solaris2 FAQ).
+
+[H HR]
+
+Copyright (C) 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc. , 
+59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111, USA 
+
+Verbatim copying and distribution of this entire article is permitted in
+any medium, provided this notice is preserved.

g10/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,17 @@
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * g10.c (main): Default S2K algorithms are now SHA1 and CAST5 - this
+        should solve a lot of compatibility problems with other OpenPGP
+        apps because those algorithms are SHOULD and not optional.  The old
+        way to force it was by using the --openpgp option whith the drawback 
+        that this would disable a couple of workarounds for PGP.
+
+        * g10.c (main): Don't set --quite along with --no-tty.  By Frank Tobin.
+
+        * misc.c (disable_core_dump): Don't display a warning here but a return
+        a status value and ...
+        * g10.c (main): ...print warnining here. Suggested by Sam Roberts.
+
 Wed Sep 13 18:12:34 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
 
         * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Allow to use "debug" on the secret key.

g10/g10.c

@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
     char **orig_argv;
     const char *fname;
     char *username;
+    int may_coredump;
     STRLIST sl, remusr= NULL, locusr=NULL;
     STRLIST nrings=NULL, sec_nrings=NULL;
     armor_filter_context_t afx;
@@ -613,7 +614,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
      */
     log_set_name("gpg");
     secure_random_alloc(); /* put random number into secure memory */
-    disable_core_dumps();
+    may_coredump = disable_core_dumps();
     init_signals();
     create_dotlock(NULL); /* register locking cleanup */
     i18n_init();
@@ -624,8 +625,8 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
     opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
     opt.def_compress_algo = 2;
     opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
-    opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
+    opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
-    opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
+    opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5;
     opt.completes_needed = 1;
     opt.marginals_needed = 3;
     opt.max_cert_depth = 5;
@@ -767,7 +768,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	  case oArmor: opt.armor = 1; opt.no_armor=0; break;
 	  case oOutput: opt.outfile = pargs.r.ret_str; break;
 	  case oQuiet: opt.quiet = 1; break;
-	  case oNoTTY: opt.quiet = 1; tty_no_terminal(1); break;
+	  case oNoTTY: tty_no_terminal(1); break;
 	  case oDryRun: opt.dry_run = 1; break;
 	  case oInteractive: opt.interactive = 1; break;
 	  case oVerbose: g10_opt_verbose++;
@@ -853,7 +854,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	    opt.def_cipher_algo = 0;
 	    opt.def_digest_algo = 0;
 	    opt.def_compress_algo = 1;
-	    opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
+            opt.s2k_mode = 3; /* iterated+salted */
 	    opt.s2k_digest_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
 	    opt.s2k_cipher_algo = CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5;
 	    break;
@@ -964,6 +965,11 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
 	log_info("used in a production environment or with production keys!\n");
     }
   #endif
+
+    if( may_coredump && !opt.quiet )
+	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));
+
+
     if (opt.no_literal) {
 	log_info(_("NOTE: %s is not for normal use!\n"), "--no-literal");
 	if (opt.textmode)

g10/main.h

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ char *make_radix64_string( const byte *data, size_t len );
 
 /*-- misc.c --*/
 void trap_unaligned(void);
-void disable_core_dumps(void);
+int disable_core_dumps(void);
 u16 checksum_u16( unsigned n );
 u16 checksum( byte *p, unsigned n );
 u16 checksum_mpi( MPI a );

g10/misc.c

@@ -79,22 +79,23 @@ trap_unaligned(void)
 #endif
 
 
-void
+int
 disable_core_dumps()
 {
- #ifndef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+ #ifdef HAVE_DOSISH_SYSTEM
+    return 0;
+ #else
   #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
     struct rlimit limit;
 
     limit.rlim_cur = 0;
     limit.rlim_max = 0;
     if( !setrlimit( RLIMIT_CORE, &limit ) )
-	return;
+	return 0;
-    if( errno != EINVAL )
+    if( errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOSYS )
 	log_fatal(_("can't disable core dumps: %s\n"), strerror(errno) );
   #endif
-    if( !opt.quiet )
+    return 1;
-	log_info(_("WARNING: program may create a core file!\n"));
  #endif
 }
 

tools/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * ring-a-party: Flush the last key.
+
 Wed Jul  5 13:28:45 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@>
 
   * mail-signed-keys: New.

tools/ring-a-party

@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ BEGIN { FS=":"
 	page = 0;
 	now = strftime("%b %d %H:%M %Y");
       }
+END { 
+    if (any) myflush(); 
+}
 $1 == "pub" {
 	      if( any ) myflush();
 	      uidcount = 0;

util/ChangeLog

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Thu Sep 14 14:20:38 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
+
+        * miscutil.c (answer_is_yes_no_quit): Swapped order of yes/no test
+        so that no is returned for an empty input. By David Champion.
+
 Wed Sep  6 17:55:47 CEST 2000  Werner Koch  <wk@openit.de>
 
         * iobuf.c: Use fopen64 insead of fopen when available.

util/miscutil.c

@@ -310,16 +310,16 @@ answer_is_yes_no_quit( const char *s )
     char *short_no = _("nN");
     char *short_quit = _("qQ");
 
-    if( !stricmp(s, long_yes ) )
-	return 1;
     if( !stricmp(s, long_no ) )
 	return 0;
+    if( !stricmp(s, long_yes ) )
+	return 1;
     if( !stricmp(s, long_quit ) )
 	return -1;
-    if( strchr( short_yes, *s ) && !s[1] )
-	return 1;
     if( strchr( short_no, *s ) && !s[1] )
 	return 0;
+    if( strchr( short_yes, *s ) && !s[1] )
+	return 1;
     if( strchr( short_quit, *s ) && !s[1] )
 	return -1;
     if( !stricmp(s, "yes" ) )