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Add pubkey letters e and E for ECC.

Browse source 
This does not mean we have any kind of ECC support now.  It is merely
to avoid printing a question mark for the algorithm.

Trailing white space changes as usual.
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2011-07-01 10:21:08 +02:00
parent fc1680abdf
commit 04b0b050ff
7 changed files with 216 additions and 199 deletions
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62
g10/mainproc.c
View file

@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ struct mainproc_context
int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
ulong symkeys;
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
struct
struct
{
int op;
int stop_now;
@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* New clear text signature.
* Process the last one and reset everything */
release_list(c);
}
}
else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) {
/* Pipemode control packet */
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 )
if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 )
log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n");
if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) {
/* start the whole thing */
@ -156,10 +156,10 @@ add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* and tell the outer loop to terminate */
c->pipemode.stop_now = 1;
}
else
else
log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n");
return 0; /* no need to store the packet */
}
}
if( c->list ) /* add another packet */
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
@ -264,14 +264,16 @@ symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
resulted in a garbage algorithm byte, but it's close enough since
a bogus byte here will fail later. */
if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
idea_cipher_warn(0);
{
idea_cipher_warn(0);
}
memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
return 0;
}
}
static void
proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
@ -403,7 +405,7 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
}
else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
|| enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)
|| is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)
|| (RFC2440 && enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)) {
/* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
@ -464,7 +466,7 @@ print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
const char *algstr;
if ( failed && !list->reason )
continue;
if ( !failed && list->reason )
@ -680,7 +682,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
if ( datalen < 2 )
log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
* documents */
clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
@ -764,7 +766,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
if (c->list)
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
else
else
c->list = n;
}
@ -849,7 +851,7 @@ do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
|| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
@ -1102,7 +1104,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
@ -1199,7 +1201,7 @@ proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
with an error. */
with an error. */
if (!rc && !c->any_sig_seen)
{
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
@ -1334,7 +1336,7 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
* when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
* an extra layer.
* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
* Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
*/
if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
@ -1348,8 +1350,8 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
else
free_packet(pkt);
if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) {
/* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to
* break the loop here */
/* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to
* break the loop here */
rc = -1;
break;
}
@ -1459,7 +1461,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
O = One-Pass Signature packet.
S = Signature packet.
P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
@ -1471,7 +1473,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
We reject all other messages.
Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
introduce a bug here.
@ -1485,7 +1487,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
n = c->list;
assert (n);
if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
{
/* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
"S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
@ -1504,7 +1506,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
else
goto ambiguous;
}
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
{
/* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
@ -1552,7 +1554,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if (n || !n_sig)
goto ambiguous;
}
else
else
{
ambiguous:
log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
@ -1621,19 +1623,19 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
/* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY
if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY
&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
&& opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD)
{
const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig);
if (uri)
{
/* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
int res;
struct keyserver_spec *spec;
spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0);
if (spec)
{
@ -1717,7 +1719,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
-1 );
p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
@ -1762,7 +1764,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
-1 );
if(un)
@ -1785,7 +1787,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
fputs("\n", log_stream() );
}
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
/* If we have a good signature and already printed
* the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
if ( count && !rc
&& !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY) ) {
@ -1882,7 +1884,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
if (!vpk->is_primary) {
u32 akid[2];
akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
free_public_key (vpk);
@ -2030,7 +2032,7 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
}