See ChangeLog: Wed Jun 2 14:17:19 CEST 1999 Werner Koch

This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1999-06-02 12:25:59 +00:00
parent 3dddf602dd
commit 04a0e61a7b
6 changed files with 133 additions and 99 deletions

3
NEWS
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@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
the extension stripped. To revert to the old behaviour you can
use the option --use-embedded-filename.
* Another hack to cope with pgp2 generated detached signatures.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.7
-----------------------------------

154
README
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@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
-------------------------------
Version 0.9.6
GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
-------------------------------
Version 0.9.7
GnuPG is now in Beta test and you should report all bugs to the
mailing list (see below). The 0.9.x versions are released mainly
to fix all remaining serious bugs. As soon as version 1.0 is out,
to fix all remaining serious bugs. As soon as version 1.0 is out,
development will continue with a 1.1 series and bug fixes for the
1.0 version as needed.
@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
"Key fingerprint = 6BD9 050F D8FC 941B 4341 2DCC 68B7 AB89 5754 8DCD"
You may want to add this DSA key to your GnuPG pubring and use it in
the future to verify new releases. Because you verified this README
the future to verify new releases. Because you verified this README
file and _checked_that_it_is_really_my PGP2 key 0C9857A5, you can be
quite sure that the above fingerprint is correct.
@ -60,13 +60,17 @@
Here is a quick summary:
1) "./configure"
1) "./configure"
2) "make"
3) "make install"
4) You end up with a "gpg" binray in /usr/local/bin.
Note: Because some programs rely on the existence of a
binary named "gpgm"; you should install a symbolic link
from gpgm to gpg:
$ cd /usr/local/bin; ln -s gpg gpgm
5) To avoid swapping out of sensitive data, you can install "gpg" as
suid root. If you don't do so, you may want to add the option
@ -88,7 +92,7 @@
The normal way to create a key is
gpg --gen-key
gpg --gen-key
This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create
good random numbers for the key parameters, GnuPG needs to gather
@ -115,7 +119,7 @@
Next, you should create a revocation certificate in case someone
gets knowledge of your secret key or you forgot your passphrase
gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id
gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id
Run this command and store the revocation certificate away. The output
is always ASCII armored, so that you can print it and (hopefully
@ -123,20 +127,20 @@
Now you can use your key to create digital signatures
gpg -s file
gpg -s file
This creates a file "file.gpg" which is compressed and has a
signature attached.
gpg -sa file
gpg -sa file
Same as above, but creates a file "file.asc" which is ASCII armored
and and ready for sending by mail. It is better to use your
and and ready for sending by mail. It is better to use your
mailers features to create signatures (The mailer uses GnuPG to do
this) because the mailer has the ability to MIME encode such
signatures - but this is not a security issue.
gpg -s -o out file
gpg -s -o out file
Creates a signature of "file", but writes the output to the file
"out".
@ -145,7 +149,7 @@
your key by putting it on a key server, a web page or in your .plan
file) is now able to check whether you really signed this text
gpg --verify file
gpg --verify file
GnuPG now checks whether the signature is valid and prints an
appropriate message. If the signature is good, you know at least
@ -156,29 +160,29 @@
create a new file that is identical to the original. gpg can also
run as a filter, so that you can pipe data to verify trough it
cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l
cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l
which will check the signature of signed-file and then display the
number of lines in the original file.
To send a message encrypted to someone you can use
gpg -e -r heine file
gpg -e -r heine file
This encrypts "file" with the public key of the user "heine" and
writes it to "file.gpg"
echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine
echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine
Ditto, but encrypts "hello\n" and mails it as ASCII armored message
to the user with the mail address heine.
gpg -se -r heine file
gpg -se -r heine file
This encrypts "file" with the public key of "heine" and writes it
to "file.gpg" after signing it with your user id.
gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file
gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file
Ditto, but sign the file with your alternative user id "Suttner"
@ -186,7 +190,7 @@
GnuPG has some options to help you publish public keys. This is
called "exporting" a key, thus
gpg --export >all-my-keys
gpg --export >all-my-keys
exports all the keys in the keyring and writes them (in a binary
format) to "all-my-keys". You may then mail "all-my-keys" as an
@ -197,14 +201,14 @@
To mail a public key or put it on a web page you have to create
the key in ASCII armored format
gpg --export --armor | mail panther@tiger.int
gpg --export --armor | mail panther@tiger.int
This will send all your public keys to your friend panther.
If you have received a key from someone else you can put it
into your public keyring. This is called "importing"
gpg --import [filenames]
gpg --import [filenames]
New keys are appended to your keyring and already existing
keys are updated. Note that GnuPG does not import keys that
@ -218,7 +222,7 @@
every other program used for management of cryptographic keys)
provides other solutions.
gpg --fingerprint <username>
gpg --fingerprint <username>
prints the so called "fingerprint" of the given username which
is a sequence of hex bytes (which you may have noticed in mail
@ -233,43 +237,43 @@
Suppose however that friend of yours knows someone who knows someone
who has met the owner of the public key at some computer conference.
Suppose that all the people between you and the public key holder
may now act as introducers to you. Introducers signing keys thereby
may now act as introducers to you. Introducers signing keys thereby
certify that they know the owner of the keys they sign. If you then
trust all the introducers to have correctly signed other keys, you
can be be sure that the other key really belongs to the one who
claims to own it..
There are 2 steps to validate a key:
1. First check that there is a complete chain
of signed keys from the public key you want to use
and your key and verify each signature.
2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates
of all the introduces between the public key holder and
you.
1. First check that there is a complete chain
of signed keys from the public key you want to use
and your key and verify each signature.
2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates
of all the introduces between the public key holder and
you.
Step 2 is the more complicated part because there is no easy way
for a computer to decide who is trustworthy and who is not. GnuPG
leaves this decision to you and will ask you for a trust value
(here also referenced as the owner-trust of a key) for every key
needed to check the chain of certificates. You may choose from:
needed to check the chain of certificates. You may choose from:
a) "I don't know" - then it is not possible to use any
of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used
as an introducer, to validate the target key. Use this if
you don't know the introducer.
of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used
as an introducer, to validate the target key. Use this if
you don't know the introducer.
b) "I do not trust" - Use this if you know that the introducer
does not do a good job in certifying other keys. The effect
is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to
change the value because you got new information about this
introducer.
does not do a good job in certifying other keys. The effect
is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to
change the value because you got new information about this
introducer.
c) "I trust marginally" - Use this if you assume that the
introducer knows what he is doing. Together with some
other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target
key then as good.
introducer knows what he is doing. Together with some
other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target
key then as good.
d) "I fully trust" - Use this if you really know that this
introducer does a good job when certifying other keys.
If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG
normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate
a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help
of some options).
introducer does a good job when certifying other keys.
If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG
normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate
a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help
of some options).
This information is confidential because it gives your personal
opinion on the trustworthiness of someone else. Therefore this data
is not stored in the keyring but in the "trustdb"
@ -282,7 +286,7 @@
Okay, here is how GnuPG helps you with key management. Most stuff
is done with the --edit-key command
gpg --edit-key <keyid or username>
gpg --edit-key <keyid or username>
GnuPG displays some information about the key and then prompts
for a command (enter "help" to see a list of commands and see
@ -322,37 +326,37 @@
* Only by the short keyid (prepend a zero if it begins with A..F):
"234567C4"
"0F34E556E"
"01347A56A"
"0xAB123456
"234567C4"
"0F34E556E"
"01347A56A"
"0xAB123456
* By a complete keyid:
"234AABBCC34567C4"
"0F323456784E56EAB"
"01AB3FED1347A5612"
"0x234AABBCC34567C4"
"234AABBCC34567C4"
"0F323456784E56EAB"
"01AB3FED1347A5612"
"0x234AABBCC34567C4"
* By a fingerprint:
"1234343434343434C434343434343434"
"123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434"
"0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434"
"1234343434343434C434343434343434"
"123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434"
"0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434"
The first one is MD5 the others are ripemd160 or sha1.
* By an exact string:
"=Heinrich Heine <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
"=Heinrich Heine <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
* By an email address:
"<heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
"<heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
* By word match
"+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf"
"+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf"
All words must match excatly (not case sensitive) and appear in
any order in the user ID. Words are any sequences of letters,
@ -360,15 +364,15 @@
* By the Local ID (from the trust DB):
"#34"
"#34"
This may be used by a MUA to specify an exact key after selecting
a key from GnuPG (by using a special option or an extra utility)
* Or by the usual substring:
"Heine"
"*Heine"
"Heine"
"*Heine"
The '*' indicates substring search explicitly.
@ -396,22 +400,22 @@
Esoteric commands
-----------------
gpg --list-packets datafile
gpg --list-packets datafile
Use this to list the contents of a data file. If the file is encrypted
you are asked for the passphrase, so that GnuPG is able to look at the
inner structure of a encrypted packet. This command should list all
kinds of rfc2440 messages.
gpgm --list-trustdb
gpgm --list-trustdb
List the contents of the trust DB in a human readable format
gpgm --list-trustdb <usernames>
gpgm --list-trustdb <usernames>
List the tree of certificates for the given usernames
gpgm --list-trust-path username
gpgm --list-trust-path username
List the possible trust paths for the given username. The length
of such a trust path is limited by the option --max-cert-depth
@ -429,21 +433,25 @@
See http://www.gnupg.org/mirrors.html for a list of FTP mirrors
and use them if possible.
To avoid possible legal problems we have decided, not to use
the normal www.gnu.org webserver.
Please direct bug reports to <gnupg-bugs@gnu.org> or, better,
post them to the mailing list <g10@net.lut.ac.uk> (this is a
closed list - subscribe before posting, see above (~line 33)).
Please direct questions about GnuPG to the mailing list or
one of the pgp newsgroups and give me more time to improve
GnuPG. Commercial support for GnuPG will be available soon.
GnuPG. Commercial support for GnuPG is also available; please
see the GNU service directory or search other resources.
Have fun and remember: Echelon is looking at you kid.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v0.9.5 (GNU/Linux)
Version: GnuPG v0.9.7 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org
iQB1AwUBNzFgoB0Z9MEMmFelAQG1EgL/UlmBc7X9UoSh0ge1FNSNncHQGIX8wHkG
0BHOkcHS9XNxZokgkxoUTSRDFlXxW9auWpYKYeNkkck8S9ExtOJK6FABme6Daof0
Hfe4E7TA82T73gvsMMlN6wyys3k5gTRt
=FP1e
iQB1AwUBN1UgTx0Z9MEMmFelAQH93wMAt2JYGXSkJR9+VBeLlpKdjxoIylrlDWEL
Jk5U/tuuM8H8G4ZJi7lDEhJNX77Jbh2LI18eCJJdrmWPrmDCNK2udDwcyKV4nW3k
7Fzpc/j8fKJcICP+T9YU9wa0NJrrTg1v
=dgdp
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
Wed Jun 2 14:17:19 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (proc_tree): Yet another bad hack to cope with
broken pgp2 created detached messages in textmode.
Tue Jun 1 16:01:46 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* openfile.c (make_outfile_name): New.

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@ -1080,10 +1080,23 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
/* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 );
}
#if 0
#warning md_start_debug enabled
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "det1" );
if( c->mfx.md2 )
md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "det2" );
#endif
/* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
* It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
* this will let the first signazure check (on md) fail
* but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should
* then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly
* hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
*/
if( c->sigs_only )
rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
sig->sig_class == 0x01 );
c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
else
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( &c->mfx,
iobuf_get_fname(c->iobuf));

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@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
Wed Jun 2 14:17:19 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* es_ES.po: Some patches (Urko Lusa).
Mon May 31 19:41:10 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* de.po: New version (Walter).

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@ -6,9 +6,10 @@
msgid ""
msgstr ""
"POT-Creation-Date: 1999-05-23 15:36+0200\n"
"PO-Revision-Date: 1999-05-29 13:16+0200\n"
"Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1\n"
"Date: 1998-11-13 10:49:25+0100\n"
"From: Urko Lusa <ulusa@lacueva.ddns.org>\n"
"From: Urko Lusa <ulusa@lacueva.dhis.org>\n"
"Updated: 1998-01-12\n"
"By: Luca Olivetti <luca@luca.ddns.org>\n"
"Xgettext-Options: --default-domain=gnupg --directory=.. --add-comments "
@ -21,15 +22,15 @@ msgstr ""
#: util/secmem.c:76
msgid "Warning: using insecure memory!\n"
msgstr "Aviso: ¡se está usando memoria insegura!\n"
msgstr "ATENCIÓN: ¡se está usando memoria insegura!\n"
#: util/secmem.c:249
msgid "operation is not possible without initialized secure memory\n"
msgstr ""
msgstr "operación imposible sin memoria segura inicializada\n"
#: util/secmem.c:250
msgid "(you may have used the wrong program for this task)\n"
msgstr ""
msgstr "(es posible que haya usado el programa incorrecto para esta tarea)\n"
#: util/miscutil.c:156
msgid "yes"
@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ msgstr "Ha encontrado Vd. un bug... (%s:%d)\n"
#: cipher/random.c:412
msgid "WARNING: using insecure random number generator!!\n"
msgstr "Aviso: ¡se está usando un generador de números aleatorios inseguro!\n"
msgstr "ATENCIÓN: ¡se está usando un generador de números aleatorios inseguro!\n"
#: cipher/random.c:413
msgid ""
@ -622,7 +623,7 @@ msgstr "comandos incompatibles\n"
#: g10/g10.c:580
#, c-format
msgid "NOTE: no default option file `%s'\n"
msgstr "nota: no existe fichero de opciones predefinido `%s'\n"
msgstr "NOTA: no existe fichero de opciones predefinido `%s'\n"
#: g10/g10.c:584
#, c-format
@ -666,7 +667,7 @@ msgstr "max-cert-depth debe estar en el rango 1-255\n"
#: g10/g10.c:810
msgid "NOTE: simple S2K mode (0) is strongly discouraged\n"
msgstr "nota: el modo S2K simple (0) no es nada recomendable\n"
msgstr "NOTA: el modo S2K simple (0) no es nada recomendable\n"
#: g10/g10.c:814
msgid "invalid S2K mode; must be 0, 1 or 3\n"
@ -825,7 +826,7 @@ msgstr "armadura inv
#: g10/armor.c:1009
msgid ""
"quoted printable character in armor - probably a buggy MTA has been used\n"
msgstr ""
msgstr "caracter \"quoted printable\" en la armadura - probablemente se usó un MTA defectuoso\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:137
#, c-format
@ -1013,7 +1014,7 @@ msgstr " La firma es probablemente una FALSIFICACI
msgid ""
"WARNING: This key is not certified with sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"
msgstr ""
"AVISO: ¡Esta clave no está certificada con suficientes firmas de confianza!\n"
"ATENCIÓN: ¡Esta clave no está certificada con suficientes firmas de confianza!\n"
#: g10/pkclist.c:516
msgid " It is not certain that the signature belongs to the owner.\n"
@ -1262,7 +1263,7 @@ msgstr "Caracter no v
#: g10/keygen.c:669
#, c-format
msgid "You are using the `%s' character set.\n"
msgstr ""
msgstr "Está usando el juego de caracteres `%s'.\n"
#: g10/keygen.c:675
#, c-format
@ -1396,7 +1397,7 @@ msgstr "error creando contrase
#: g10/encode.c:167 g10/encode.c:287
#, c-format
msgid "%s: WARNING: empty file\n"
msgstr "%s: atención: fichero vacío\n"
msgstr "%s: ATENCIÓN: fichero vacío\n"
#: g10/encode.c:237
#, c-format
@ -1546,7 +1547,7 @@ msgstr "escribiendo en `%s'\n"
#: g10/import.c:379 g10/import.c:435
#, fuzzy
msgid "can't lock keyring `%': %s\n"
msgstr "no puede bloquearse el anillo público: %s\n"
msgstr "no puede bloquearse el anillo público `%s': %s\n"
#: g10/import.c:382
#, fuzzy
@ -1616,7 +1617,7 @@ msgstr "clave %08lX: sin cambios\n"
#: g10/import.c:544 g10/import.c:645
#, fuzzy, c-format
msgid "can't lock keyring `%s': %s\n"
msgstr "no puede bloquearse el anillo público: %s\n"
msgstr "no puede bloquearse el anillo público `%s': %s\n"
#: g10/import.c:552
#, c-format
@ -1659,7 +1660,7 @@ msgstr "clave %08lX: no hay identificativo de usuario para la firma\n"
#: g10/import.c:693 g10/import.c:717
#, c-format
msgid "key %08lX: unsupported public key algorithm\n"
msgstr "clave %08lX: algoritmo da clave pública no soportado\n"
msgstr "clave %08lX: algoritmo de clave pública no soportado\n"
#: g10/import.c:694
#, c-format
@ -1729,7 +1730,7 @@ msgstr "%s: usuario no encontrado\n"
#: g10/keyedit.c:177
msgid "[revocation]"
msgstr ""
msgstr "[revocación]"
#: g10/keyedit.c:178
msgid "[self-signature]"
@ -1795,7 +1796,7 @@ msgstr ""
msgid ""
"The signature will be marked as non-exportable.\n"
"\n"
msgstr ""
msgstr "La firma se marcará como no exportable.\n"
#: g10/keyedit.c:321
msgid "Really sign? "
@ -2219,7 +2220,7 @@ msgstr "descifrado correcto\n"
#: g10/mainproc.c:252
msgid "WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"
msgstr ""
msgstr "ATENCIÓN: ¡el mensaje cifrado ha sido manipulado!\n"
#: g10/mainproc.c:257
#, c-format
@ -2228,7 +2229,7 @@ msgstr "descifrado fallido: %s\n"
#: g10/mainproc.c:275
msgid "NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"
msgstr "nota: el remitente solicitó \"sólo-para-tus-ojos\"\n"
msgstr "NOTA: el remitente solicitó \"sólo-para-tus-ojos\"\n"
#: g10/mainproc.c:277
#, c-format
@ -2369,7 +2370,7 @@ msgstr "la codificaci
#: g10/pubkey-enc.c:191
#, c-format
msgid "NOTE: cipher algorithm %d not found in preferences\n"
msgstr "nota: algoritmo de cifrado %d no encontrado en las preferencias\n"
msgstr "NOTA: algoritmo de cifrado %d no encontrado en las preferencias\n"
#: g10/seckey-cert.c:55
#, c-format
@ -2382,7 +2383,7 @@ msgstr "Contrase
#: g10/seckey-cert.c:227
msgid "WARNING: Weak key detected - please change passphrase again.\n"
msgstr "Aviso: detectada clave débil - por favor cambie la contraseña.\n"
msgstr "ATENCIÓN: detectada clave débil - por favor cambie la contraseña.\n"
#: g10/sig-check.c:187
#, fuzzy
@ -2409,7 +2410,7 @@ msgstr "lid %lu: identificativo de usuario sin firma\n"
#: g10/sig-check.c:308
#, c-format
msgid "NOTE: signature key expired %s\n"
msgstr "atención: clave de la firma caducada el %s\n"
msgstr "ATENCIÓN clave de la firma caducada el %s\n"
#: g10/sig-check.c:365
msgid "assuming bad signature due to an unknown critical bit\n"
@ -2432,7 +2433,7 @@ msgstr "firmando:"
#: g10/sign.c:346
#, c-format
msgid "WARNING: `%s' is an empty file\n"
msgstr "atención: '%s' es un fichero vacío\n"
msgstr "ATENCIÓN `%s' es un fichero vacío\n"
#: g10/textfilter.c:128
#, fuzzy, c-format
@ -2780,7 +2781,7 @@ msgstr "autofirma no v
#: g10/trustdb.c:1403
msgid "Valid user ID revocation skipped due to a newer self signature\n"
msgstr ""
"Revocación válida de identificativo de usuario ignorada debido auna "
"Revocación válida de identificativo de usuario ignorada debido a una "
"autofirma más reciente\n"
#: g10/trustdb.c:1410
@ -3023,7 +3024,7 @@ msgstr ""
#: g10/skclist.c:113
#, c-format
msgid "skipped `%s': %s\n"
msgstr "'%s' ignorado: %s\n"
msgstr "`%s' ignorado: %s\n"
#: g10/skclist.c:119
#, c-format
@ -3031,7 +3032,7 @@ msgid ""
"skipped `%s': this is a PGP generated ElGamal key which is not secure for "
"signatures!\n"
msgstr ""
"'%s' ignorada: ¡esta es una clave ElGamal generada por PGP\n"
"`%s' ignorada: ¡esta es una clave ElGamal generada por PGP\n"
" que NO es segura para las firmas!\n"
#. do not overwrite