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See ChangeLog: Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch

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This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1999-04-09 10:34:44 +00:00
parent 97efca04ef
commit 02d018f9c8
22 changed files with 152 additions and 139 deletions
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6
NEWS
View File

@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
* Full Twofish support. It is now statically linked by default.
----> Hmmm, still have to check the message format
The experimental 128 bit version is now disabled.
----> Hmmm, there is an internal conflict in the RFC
* Dropped support for the ancient Blowfish160 which is not OpenPGP.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.5
-----------------------------------

1
README
View File

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
Please note that this is only a bug fix release and some things
do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

7
TODO
View File

@ -21,18 +21,15 @@
* Add NO_PUBKEY and NO_SECKEY status lines.
* Add more NODATA status lines
* Solaris make as problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a
* Solaris make has problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a
gettext bug.
* Need suffix rules for .S to produce .s for some systems
* do a chmod as soon as the secring is created. Print a warning if
the directory mode is wrong.
Nice to have
------------
* use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c).
* Print a warning if the directory mode is wrong.
* replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized
utility or SOCKSify the stuff.
* Do a real fix for bug #7 or document that it is a PGP 5 error.

9
checks/genkey1024.test
View File

@ -91,14 +91,7 @@ expect {
timeout { exit 1 } }
set timeout 600
expect {
-ex "\r \rWe need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform\r
some other action (work in another window, move the mouse, utilize the\r
the disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random\r
number generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\r" {}
timeout { exit 1 } }
set timeout 600
expect {
-ex "public and secret key created and signed.\r" { exit 0 }
-re "^.*\r\npublic and secret key" { exit 0 }
eof { exit 1 }
}
exit 1

8
cipher/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* cipher.c (cipher_open): Reversed the changes for AUTO_CFB.
* blowfish.c: Dropped the Blowfish 160 mode.
* cipher.c (cipher_open): Ditto.
(setup_cipher_table): Ditto. And removed support of twofish128
Wed Apr 7 20:51:39 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* random.c (get_random_bits): Can now handle requests > POOLSIZE

5
cipher/blowfish.c
View File

@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH 4 /* blowfish 128 bit key */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 42 /* blowfish 160 bit key (not in OpenPGP)*/
#define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f) (int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f)
#define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f) (void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f)
@ -582,7 +581,7 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
void (**r_decrypt)( void *c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf )
)
{
*keylen = algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH ? 128 : 160;
*keylen = 128;
*blocksize = BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;
*contextsize = sizeof(BLOWFISH_context);
*r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(bf_setkey);
@ -591,8 +590,6 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
return "BLOWFISH";
if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 )
return "BLOWFISH160";
return NULL;
}

25
cipher/cipher.c
View File

@ -127,28 +127,6 @@ setup_cipher_table(void)
if( !cipher_table[i].name )
BUG();
i++;
cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160;
cipher_table[i].name = blowfish_get_info( cipher_table[i].algo,
&cipher_table[i].keylen,
&cipher_table[i].blocksize,
&cipher_table[i].contextsize,
&cipher_table[i].setkey,
&cipher_table[i].encrypt,
&cipher_table[i].decrypt );
if( !cipher_table[i].name )
BUG();
i++;
cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD;
cipher_table[i].name = twofish_get_info( cipher_table[i].algo,
&cipher_table[i].keylen,
&cipher_table[i].blocksize,
&cipher_table[i].contextsize,
&cipher_table[i].setkey,
&cipher_table[i].encrypt,
&cipher_table[i].decrypt );
if( !cipher_table[i].name )
BUG();
i++;
cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY;
cipher_table[i].name = "DUMMY";
cipher_table[i].blocksize = 8;
@ -362,8 +340,7 @@ cipher_open( int algo, int mode, int secure )
if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY )
hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_DUMMY;
else if( mode == CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB ) {
if( hd->blocksize > 8
|| algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 || algo >= 100 )
if( algo >= 100 )
hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
else
hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_PHILS_CFB;

3
cipher/twofish.c
View File

@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
* By Matthew Skala <mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca>, July 26, 1998
* 256-bit key length added March 20, 1999
*
* The original author has disclaimed all copyright interest in this
* code and thus putting it in the public domain.
*
* This code is a "clean room" implementation, written from the paper
* _Twofish: A 128-Bit Block Cipher_ by Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey,
* Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson, available

13
doc/DETAILS
View File

@ -111,13 +111,26 @@ more arguments in future versions.
NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
MISSING_PASSPHRASE
BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
The supplied passphrase was wrong
GOOD_PASSPHRASE
The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
is therefore usuable.
DECRYPTION_FAILED
The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
DECRYPTION_OKAY
The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase
for a conventional encrypted message was given. The program
itself may return an errorcode becuase it may not be possible to
verify a signature for some reasons.
NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
The key is not available

11
g10/ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* status.c (write_status_text): Some more status codes.
* passphrase_to_dek (passphrase_to_dek): add a status code.
* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Likewise.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Reverse the last changes
* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Dropped kludge for ancient blowfish mode.
Thu Apr 8 09:35:53 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Add a new status output

5
g10/cipher.c
View File

@ -58,10 +58,7 @@ write_header( cipher_filter_context_t *cfx, IOBUF a )
blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize( cfx->dek->algo );
if( blocksize < 8 || blocksize > 16 )
log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
/* FIXME: remove the kludge for the experimental twofish128 mode:
* we always use the 10 byte prefix and not one depending on the blocksize
*/
nprefix = cfx->dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD? blocksize : 8;
nprefix = blocksize;
randomize_buffer( temp, nprefix, 1 );
temp[nprefix] = temp[nprefix-2];
temp[nprefix+1] = temp[nprefix-1];

5
g10/encr-data.c
View File

@ -66,10 +66,7 @@ decrypt_data( PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize(dek->algo);
if( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 )
log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
/* FIXME: remove the kludge for the experimental twofish128 mode:
* we always use the 10 byte prefix and not one depending on the blocksize
*/
nprefix = dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD? blocksize : 8;
nprefix = blocksize;
if( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) )
BUG();

4
g10/import.c
View File

@ -988,6 +988,10 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
/****************
* append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
* Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
* FIXME: It may happen that two identical user ID gets imported; should we
* add another check and how can we handle the signature? Maybe
* we have to collapse both UIDs into one and then remove duplicated
* signatures.
*/
static int
append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,

1
g10/mainproc.c
View File

@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( result == -1 )
;
else if( !result ) {
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
}

6
g10/parse-packet.c
View File

@ -1305,11 +1305,7 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
}
else { /* old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5 */
sk->protect.s2k.mode = 0;
/* We need a kludge to cope with old GNUPG versions */
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo =
( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160
&& algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) ?
DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n",
sk->protect.algo, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );

4
g10/passphrase.c
View File

@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode )
m_free(pw2);
}
}
if( !pw || !*pw )
write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
dek->algo = cipher_algo;
if( !*pw && mode == 2 )

3
g10/seckey-cert.c
View File

@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
break;
}
if( !rc )
write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
return rc;
}

3
g10/status.c
View File

@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ write_status_text ( int no, const char *text)
case STATUS_NO_SECKEY : s = "NO_SECKEY\n"; break;
case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM\n"; break;
case STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED: s = "DECRYPTION_FAILED\n"; break;
case STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY: s = "DECRYPTION_OKAY\n"; break;
case STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE: s = "MISSING_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
case STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE : s = "GOOD_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
default: s = "?\n"; break;
}

3
g10/status.h
View File

@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
#define STATUS_NO_SECKEY 27
#define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM 28
#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED 29
#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY 30
#define STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE 31
#define STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE 32
/*-- status.c --*/
void set_status_fd ( int fd );

4
include/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* cipher.h (BLOWFISH160): Removed.
Tue Apr 6 19:58:12 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* cipher.h (DEK): increased max. key length to 32 bytes

1
include/cipher.h
View File

@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
#define CIPHER_ALGO_SAFER_SK128 5
#define CIPHER_ALGO_DES_SK 6
#define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH 10 /* twofish 256 bit */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 42 /* blowfish 160 bit key (not in OpenPGP)*/
#define CIPHER_ALGO_SKIPJACK 101 /* experimental: skipjack */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD 102 /* experimental: twofish 128 bit */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY 110 /* no encryption at all */

30
util/memory.c
View File

@ -123,20 +123,19 @@ static void check_allmem( const char *info );
static void
add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
{
unsigned index;
unsigned idx;
struct memtbl_entry *e;
struct info_entry *ie;
if( memtbl_len < memtbl_size )
index = memtbl_len++;
idx = memtbl_len++;
else {
struct memtbl_entry *e;
/* look for a used entry in the table. We take the first one,
* so that freed entries remain as long as possible in the table
* (free appends a new one)
*/
if( (e = memtbl_unused) ) {
index = e - memtbl;
idx = e - memtbl;
memtbl_unused = e->next;
e->next = NULL;
}
@ -145,32 +144,33 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
memtbl_size = 100;
if( !(memtbl = calloc( memtbl_size, sizeof *memtbl )) )
membug("memory debug table malloc failed\n");
index = 0;
idx = 0;
memtbl_len = 1;
atexit( dump_table_at_exit );
}
else { /* realloc */
unsigned n = memtbl_size / 4; /* enlarge by 25% */
if(!(memtbl = realloc(memtbl, (memtbl_size+n)*sizeof *memtbl)))
unsigned nn = memtbl_size / 4; /* enlarge by 25% */
if(!(memtbl = realloc(memtbl, (memtbl_size+nn)*sizeof *memtbl)))
membug("memory debug table realloc failed\n");
memset(memtbl+memtbl_size, 0, n*sizeof *memtbl );
memtbl_size += n;
index = memtbl_len++;
memtbl_size += nn;
idx = memtbl_len++;
}
}
}
e = memtbl+index;
e = memtbl+idx;
if( e->inuse )
membug("Ooops: entry %u is flagged as in use\n", index);
membug("Ooops: entry %u is flagged as in use\n", idx);
e->user_p = p + 4;
e->user_n = n;
e->count++;
if( e->next )
membug("Ooops: entry is in free entry list\n");
/* do we already have this info string */
for( ie = info_strings[info_hash(info)]; ie; ie = ie->next )
for( ie = info_strings[info_hash(info)]; ie; ie = ie->next ) {
if( ie->info == info )
break;
}
if( !ie ) { /* no: make a new entry */
if( !(ie = malloc( sizeof *ie )) )
membug("can't allocate info entry\n");
@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
e->inuse = 1;
/* put the index at the start of the memory */
p[0] = index;
p[1] = index >> 8 ;
p[2] = index >> 16 ;
p[0] = idx;
p[1] = idx >> 8 ;
p[2] = idx >> 16 ;
p[3] = mode? MAGIC_SEC_BYTE : MAGIC_NOR_BYTE ;
if( DBG_MEMORY )
log_debug( "%s allocates %u bytes using %s\n", info, e->user_n, by );