security-and-privacy/gnupg
security-and-privacy/gnupg
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.gnupg.org/gnupg.git synced 2025-01-03 12:11:33 +01:00
Code Activity

See ChangeLog: Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 1999-04-09 10:34:44 +00:00
parent 97efca04ef
commit 02d018f9c8
22 changed files with 152 additions and 139 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
NEWS
View File

@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
* Full Twofish support. It is now statically linked by default. * Full Twofish support. It is now statically linked by default.
----> Hmmm, still have to check the message format The experimental 128 bit version is now disabled.
----> Hmmm, there is an internal conflict in the RFC
* Dropped support for the ancient Blowfish160 which is not OpenPGP.
Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.5 Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.5
----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

135
README
View File

@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
Please note that this is only a bug fix release and some things Please note that this is only a bug fix release and some things
do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
------------------------------- -------------------------------
Version 0.9 Version 0.9
GnuPG is now in Beta test and you should report all bugs to the GnuPG is now in Beta test and you should report all bugs to the
mailing list (see below). The 0.9.x versions are released mainly mailing list (see below). The 0.9.x versions are released mainly
to fix all remaining serious bugs. As soon as version 1.0 is out, to fix all remaining serious bugs. As soon as version 1.0 is out,
development will continue with a 1.1 series and bug fixes for the development will continue with a 1.1 series and bug fixes for the
1.0 version as needed. 1.0 version as needed.
@ -32,7 +31,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
"Key fingerprint = ECAF 7590 EB34 43B5 C7CF 3ACB 6C7E E1B8 621C C013" "Key fingerprint = ECAF 7590 EB34 43B5 C7CF 3ACB 6C7E E1B8 621C C013"
You may want add my new DSA key to your GnuPG pubring and use it in You may want add my new DSA key to your GnuPG pubring and use it in
the future to verify new releases. Because you verified this README the future to verify new releases. Because you verified this README
file and _checked_that_it_is_really_my PGP2 key 0C9857A5, you can be file and _checked_that_it_is_really_my PGP2 key 0C9857A5, you can be
sure that the above fingerprints are correct. sure that the above fingerprints are correct.
@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
Here is a quick summary: Here is a quick summary:
1) "./configure" 1) "./configure"
2) "make" 2) "make"
@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
The normal way to create a key is The normal way to create a key is
gpg --gen-key gpg --gen-key
This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create
good random numbers for the key parameters, GnuPG needs to gather good random numbers for the key parameters, GnuPG needs to gather
@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
Next, you should create a revocation certificate in case someone Next, you should create a revocation certificate in case someone
gets knowledge of your secret key or you forgot your passphrase gets knowledge of your secret key or you forgot your passphrase
gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id
Run this command and store the revocation certificate away. The output Run this command and store the revocation certificate away. The output
is always ASCII armored, so that you can print it and (hopefully is always ASCII armored, so that you can print it and (hopefully
@ -128,20 +127,20 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
Now you can use your key to create digital signatures Now you can use your key to create digital signatures
gpg -s file gpg -s file
This creates a file "file.gpg" which is compressed and has a This creates a file "file.gpg" which is compressed and has a
signature attached. signature attached.
gpg -sa file gpg -sa file
Same as above, but creates a file "file.asc" which is ASCII armored Same as above, but creates a file "file.asc" which is ASCII armored
and and ready for sending by mail. It is better to use your and and ready for sending by mail. It is better to use your
mailers features to create signatures (The mailer uses GnuPG to do mailers features to create signatures (The mailer uses GnuPG to do
this) because the mailer has the ability to MIME encode such this) because the mailer has the ability to MIME encode such
signatures - but this is not a security issue. signatures - but this is not a security issue.
gpg -s -o out file gpg -s -o out file
Creates a signature of "file", but writes the output to the file Creates a signature of "file", but writes the output to the file
"out". "out".
@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
your key by putting it on a key server, a web page or in your .plan your key by putting it on a key server, a web page or in your .plan
file) is now able to check whether you really signed this text file) is now able to check whether you really signed this text
gpg --verify file gpg --verify file
GnuPG now checks whether the signature is valid and prints an GnuPG now checks whether the signature is valid and prints an
appropriate message. If the signature is good, you know at least appropriate message. If the signature is good, you know at least
@ -161,29 +160,29 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
create a new file that is identical to the original. gpg can also create a new file that is identical to the original. gpg can also
run as a filter, so that you can pipe data to verify trough it run as a filter, so that you can pipe data to verify trough it
cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l
which will check the signature of signed-file and then display the which will check the signature of signed-file and then display the
number of lines in the original file. number of lines in the original file.
To send a message encrypted to someone you can use To send a message encrypted to someone you can use
gpg -e -r heine file gpg -e -r heine file
This encrypts "file" with the public key of the user "heine" and This encrypts "file" with the public key of the user "heine" and
writes it to "file.gpg" writes it to "file.gpg"
echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine
Ditto, but encrypts "hello\n" and mails it as ASCII armored message Ditto, but encrypts "hello\n" and mails it as ASCII armored message
to the user with the mail address heine. to the user with the mail address heine.
gpg -se -r heine file gpg -se -r heine file
This encrypts "file" with the public key of "heine" and writes it This encrypts "file" with the public key of "heine" and writes it
to "file.gpg" after signing it with your user id. to "file.gpg" after signing it with your user id.
gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file
Ditto, but sign the file with your alternative user id "Suttner" Ditto, but sign the file with your alternative user id "Suttner"
@ -191,7 +190,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
GnuPG has some options to help you publish public keys. This is GnuPG has some options to help you publish public keys. This is
called "exporting" a key, thus called "exporting" a key, thus
gpg --export >all-my-keys gpg --export >all-my-keys
exports all the keys in the keyring and writes them (in a binary exports all the keys in the keyring and writes them (in a binary
format) to "all-my-keys". You may then mail "all-my-keys" as an format) to "all-my-keys". You may then mail "all-my-keys" as an
@ -202,14 +201,14 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
To mail a public key or put it on a web page you have to create To mail a public key or put it on a web page you have to create
the key in ASCII armored format the key in ASCII armored format
gpg --export --armor | mail panther@tiger.int gpg --export --armor | mail panther@tiger.int
This will send all your public keys to your friend panther. This will send all your public keys to your friend panther.
If you have received a key from someone else you can put it If you have received a key from someone else you can put it
into your public keyring. This is called "importing" into your public keyring. This is called "importing"
gpg --import [filenames] gpg --import [filenames]
New keys are appended to your keyring and already existing New keys are appended to your keyring and already existing
keys are updated. Note that GnuPG does not import keys that keys are updated. Note that GnuPG does not import keys that
@ -223,7 +222,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
every other program used for management of cryptographic keys) every other program used for management of cryptographic keys)
provides other solutions. provides other solutions.
gpg --fingerprint <username> gpg --fingerprint <username>
prints the so called "fingerprint" of the given username which prints the so called "fingerprint" of the given username which
is a sequence of hex bytes (which you may have noticed in mail is a sequence of hex bytes (which you may have noticed in mail
@ -237,43 +236,43 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
Suppose however that friend of yours knows someone who knows someone Suppose however that friend of yours knows someone who knows someone
who has met the owner of the public key at some computer conference. who has met the owner of the public key at some computer conference.
Suppose that all the people between you and the public key holder Suppose that all the people between you and the public key holder
may now act as introducers to you. Introducers signing keys thereby may now act as introducers to you. Introducers signing keys thereby
certify that they know the owner of the keys they sign. If you then certify that they know the owner of the keys they sign. If you then
trust all the introducers to have correctly signed other keys, you trust all the introducers to have correctly signed other keys, you
can be be sure that the other key really belongs to the one who can be be sure that the other key really belongs to the one who
claims to own it.. claims to own it..
There are 2 steps to validate a key: There are 2 steps to validate a key:
1. First check that there is a complete chain 1. First check that there is a complete chain
of signed keys from the public key you want to use of signed keys from the public key you want to use
and your key and verify each signature. and your key and verify each signature.
2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates 2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates
of all the introduces between the public key holder and of all the introduces between the public key holder and
you. you.
Step 2 is the more complicated part because there is no easy way Step 2 is the more complicated part because there is no easy way
for a computer to decide who is trustworthy and who is not. GnuPG for a computer to decide who is trustworthy and who is not. GnuPG
leaves this decision to you and will ask you for a trust value leaves this decision to you and will ask you for a trust value
(here also referenced as the owner-trust of a key) for every key (here also referenced as the owner-trust of a key) for every key
needed to check the chain of certificates. You may choose from: needed to check the chain of certificates. You may choose from:
a) "I don't know" - then it is not possible to use any a) "I don't know" - then it is not possible to use any
of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used
as an introducer, to validate the target key. Use this if as an introducer, to validate the target key. Use this if
you don't know the introducer. you don't know the introducer.
b) "I do not trust" - Use this if you know that the introducer b) "I do not trust" - Use this if you know that the introducer
does not do a good job in certifying other keys. The effect does not do a good job in certifying other keys. The effect
is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to
change the value because you got new information about this change the value because you got new information about this
introducer. introducer.
c) "I trust marginally" - Use this if you assume that the c) "I trust marginally" - Use this if you assume that the
introducer knows what he is doing. Together with some introducer knows what he is doing. Together with some
other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target
key then as good. key then as good.
d) "I fully trust" - Use this if you really know that this d) "I fully trust" - Use this if you really know that this
introducer does a good job when certifying other keys. introducer does a good job when certifying other keys.
If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG
normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate
a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help
of some options). of some options).
This information is confidential because it gives your personal This information is confidential because it gives your personal
opinion on the trustworthiness of someone else. Therefore this data opinion on the trustworthiness of someone else. Therefore this data
is not stored in the keyring but in the "trustdb" is not stored in the keyring but in the "trustdb"
@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
Okay, here is how GnuPG helps you with key management. Most stuff Okay, here is how GnuPG helps you with key management. Most stuff
is done with the --edit-key command is done with the --edit-key command
gpg --edit-key <keyid or username> gpg --edit-key <keyid or username>
GnuPG displays some information about the key and then prompts GnuPG displays some information about the key and then prompts
for a command (enter "help" to see a list of commands and see for a command (enter "help" to see a list of commands and see
@ -326,37 +325,37 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
* Only by the short keyid (prepend a zero if it begins with A..F): * Only by the short keyid (prepend a zero if it begins with A..F):
"234567C4" "234567C4"
"0F34E556E" "0F34E556E"
"01347A56A" "01347A56A"
"0xAB123456 "0xAB123456
* By a complete keyid: * By a complete keyid:
"234AABBCC34567C4" "234AABBCC34567C4"
"0F323456784E56EAB" "0F323456784E56EAB"
"01AB3FED1347A5612" "01AB3FED1347A5612"
"0x234AABBCC34567C4" "0x234AABBCC34567C4"
* By a fingerprint: * By a fingerprint:
"1234343434343434C434343434343434" "1234343434343434C434343434343434"
"123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434" "123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434"
"0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434" "0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434"
The first one is MD5 the others are ripemd160 or sha1. The first one is MD5 the others are ripemd160 or sha1.
* By an exact string: * By an exact string:
"=Heinrich Heine <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>" "=Heinrich Heine <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
* By an email address: * By an email address:
"<heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>" "<heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
* By word match * By word match
"+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf" "+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf"
All words must match excatly (not case sensitive) and appear in All words must match excatly (not case sensitive) and appear in
any order in the user ID. Words are any sequences of letters, any order in the user ID. Words are any sequences of letters,
@ -364,15 +363,15 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
* By the Local ID (from the trust DB): * By the Local ID (from the trust DB):
"#34" "#34"
This may be used by a MUA to specify an exact key after selecting This may be used by a MUA to specify an exact key after selecting
a key from GnuPG (by using a special option or an extra utility) a key from GnuPG (by using a special option or an extra utility)
* Or by the usual substring: * Or by the usual substring:
"Heine" "Heine"
"*Heine" "*Heine"
The '*' indicates substring search explicitly. The '*' indicates substring search explicitly.
@ -400,22 +399,22 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
Esoteric commands Esoteric commands
----------------- -----------------
gpg --list-packets datafile gpg --list-packets datafile
Use this to list the contents of a data file. If the file is encrypted Use this to list the contents of a data file. If the file is encrypted
you are asked for the passphrase, so that GnuPG is able to look at the you are asked for the passphrase, so that GnuPG is able to look at the
inner structure of a encrypted packet. This command should list all inner structure of a encrypted packet. This command should list all
kinds of rfc2440 messages. kinds of rfc2440 messages.
gpgm --list-trustdb gpgm --list-trustdb
List the contents of the trust DB in a human readable format List the contents of the trust DB in a human readable format
gpgm --list-trustdb <usernames> gpgm --list-trustdb <usernames>
List the tree of certificates for the given usernames List the tree of certificates for the given usernames
gpgm --list-trust-path username gpgm --list-trust-path username
List the possible trust paths for the given username. The length List the possible trust paths for the given username. The length
of such a trust path is limited by the option --max-cert-depth of such a trust path is limited by the option --max-cert-depth

7
TODO
View File

@ -21,18 +21,15 @@
* Add NO_PUBKEY and NO_SECKEY status lines. * Add NO_PUBKEY and NO_SECKEY status lines.
* Add more NODATA status lines * Add more NODATA status lines
* Solaris make as problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a * Solaris make has problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a
gettext bug. gettext bug.
* Need suffix rules for .S to produce .s for some systems
* do a chmod as soon as the secring is created. Print a warning if
the directory mode is wrong.
Nice to have Nice to have
------------ ------------
* use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c). * use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c).
* Print a warning if the directory mode is wrong.
* replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized * replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized
utility or SOCKSify the stuff. utility or SOCKSify the stuff.
* Do a real fix for bug #7 or document that it is a PGP 5 error. * Do a real fix for bug #7 or document that it is a PGP 5 error.

9
checks/genkey1024.test
View File

@ -91,14 +91,7 @@ expect {
timeout { exit 1 } } timeout { exit 1 } }
set timeout 600 set timeout 600
expect { expect {
-ex "\r \rWe need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform\r -re "^.*\r\npublic and secret key" { exit 0 }
some other action (work in another window, move the mouse, utilize the\r
the disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random\r
number generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\r" {}
timeout { exit 1 } }
set timeout 600
expect {
-ex "public and secret key created and signed.\r" { exit 0 }
eof { exit 1 } eof { exit 1 }
} }
exit 1 exit 1

8
cipher/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* cipher.c (cipher_open): Reversed the changes for AUTO_CFB.
* blowfish.c: Dropped the Blowfish 160 mode.
* cipher.c (cipher_open): Ditto.
(setup_cipher_table): Ditto. And removed support of twofish128
Wed Apr 7 20:51:39 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de> Wed Apr 7 20:51:39 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* random.c (get_random_bits): Can now handle requests > POOLSIZE * random.c (get_random_bits): Can now handle requests > POOLSIZE

5
cipher/blowfish.c
View File

@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH 4 /* blowfish 128 bit key */ #define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH 4 /* blowfish 128 bit key */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 42 /* blowfish 160 bit key (not in OpenPGP)*/
#define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f) (int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f) #define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f) (int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f)
#define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f) (void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f) #define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f) (void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f)
@ -582,7 +581,7 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
void (**r_decrypt)( void *c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf ) void (**r_decrypt)( void *c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf )
) )
{ {
*keylen = algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH ? 128 : 160; *keylen = 128;
*blocksize = BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE; *blocksize = BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;
*contextsize = sizeof(BLOWFISH_context); *contextsize = sizeof(BLOWFISH_context);
*r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(bf_setkey); *r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(bf_setkey);
@ -591,8 +590,6 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH ) if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
return "BLOWFISH"; return "BLOWFISH";
if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 )
return "BLOWFISH160";
return NULL; return NULL;
} }

25
cipher/cipher.c
View File

@ -127,28 +127,6 @@ setup_cipher_table(void)
if( !cipher_table[i].name ) if( !cipher_table[i].name )
BUG(); BUG();
i++; i++;
cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160;
cipher_table[i].name = blowfish_get_info( cipher_table[i].algo,
&cipher_table[i].keylen,
&cipher_table[i].blocksize,
&cipher_table[i].contextsize,
&cipher_table[i].setkey,
&cipher_table[i].encrypt,
&cipher_table[i].decrypt );
if( !cipher_table[i].name )
BUG();
i++;
cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD;
cipher_table[i].name = twofish_get_info( cipher_table[i].algo,
&cipher_table[i].keylen,
&cipher_table[i].blocksize,
&cipher_table[i].contextsize,
&cipher_table[i].setkey,
&cipher_table[i].encrypt,
&cipher_table[i].decrypt );
if( !cipher_table[i].name )
BUG();
i++;
cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY; cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY;
cipher_table[i].name = "DUMMY"; cipher_table[i].name = "DUMMY";
cipher_table[i].blocksize = 8; cipher_table[i].blocksize = 8;
@ -362,8 +340,7 @@ cipher_open( int algo, int mode, int secure )
if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY ) if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY )
hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_DUMMY; hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_DUMMY;
else if( mode == CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB ) { else if( mode == CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB ) {
if( hd->blocksize > 8 if( algo >= 100 )
|| algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 || algo >= 100 )
hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_CFB; hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
else else
hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_PHILS_CFB; hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_PHILS_CFB;

3
cipher/twofish.c
View File

@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
* By Matthew Skala <mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca>, July 26, 1998 * By Matthew Skala <mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca>, July 26, 1998
* 256-bit key length added March 20, 1999 * 256-bit key length added March 20, 1999
* *
* The original author has disclaimed all copyright interest in this
* code and thus putting it in the public domain.
*
* This code is a "clean room" implementation, written from the paper * This code is a "clean room" implementation, written from the paper
* _Twofish: A 128-Bit Block Cipher_ by Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey, * _Twofish: A 128-Bit Block Cipher_ by Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey,
* Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson, available * Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson, available

13
doc/DETAILS
View File

@ -111,13 +111,26 @@ more arguments in future versions.
NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash> NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed. Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
MISSING_PASSPHRASE
BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid> BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
The supplied passphrase was wrong The supplied passphrase was wrong
GOOD_PASSPHRASE
The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
is therefore usuable.
DECRYPTION_FAILED DECRYPTION_FAILED
The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message. passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
DECRYPTION_OKAY
The decryption process succeeded. This means, that either the
correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase
for a conventional encrypted message was given. The program
itself may return an errorcode becuase it may not be possible to
verify a signature for some reasons.
NO_PUBKEY <long keyid> NO_PUBKEY <long keyid>
NO_SECKEY <long keyid> NO_SECKEY <long keyid>
The key is not available The key is not available

11
g10/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* status.c (write_status_text): Some more status codes.
* passphrase_to_dek (passphrase_to_dek): add a status code.
* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Likewise.
* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Reverse the last changes
* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Dropped kludge for ancient blowfish mode.
Thu Apr 8 09:35:53 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de> Thu Apr 8 09:35:53 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Add a new status output * mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Add a new status output

5
g10/cipher.c
View File

@ -58,10 +58,7 @@ write_header( cipher_filter_context_t *cfx, IOBUF a )
blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize( cfx->dek->algo ); blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize( cfx->dek->algo );
if( blocksize < 8 || blocksize > 16 ) if( blocksize < 8 || blocksize > 16 )
log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize ); log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
/* FIXME: remove the kludge for the experimental twofish128 mode: nprefix = blocksize;
* we always use the 10 byte prefix and not one depending on the blocksize
*/
nprefix = cfx->dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD? blocksize : 8;
randomize_buffer( temp, nprefix, 1 ); randomize_buffer( temp, nprefix, 1 );
temp[nprefix] = temp[nprefix-2]; temp[nprefix] = temp[nprefix-2];
temp[nprefix+1] = temp[nprefix-1]; temp[nprefix+1] = temp[nprefix-1];

5
g10/encr-data.c
View File

@ -66,10 +66,7 @@ decrypt_data( PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize(dek->algo); blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize(dek->algo);
if( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 ) if( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 )
log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize ); log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
/* FIXME: remove the kludge for the experimental twofish128 mode: nprefix = blocksize;
* we always use the 10 byte prefix and not one depending on the blocksize
*/
nprefix = dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD? blocksize : 8;
if( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) ) if( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) )
BUG(); BUG();

4
g10/import.c
View File

@ -988,6 +988,10 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
/**************** /****************
* append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK. * append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
* Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0. * Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
* FIXME: It may happen that two identical user ID gets imported; should we
* add another check and how can we handle the signature? Maybe
* we have to collapse both UIDs into one and then remove duplicated
* signatures.
*/ */
static int static int
append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs, append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,

1
g10/mainproc.c
View File

@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( result == -1 ) if( result == -1 )
; ;
else if( !result ) { else if( !result ) {
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
if( opt.verbose > 1 ) if( opt.verbose > 1 )
log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
} }

6
g10/parse-packet.c
View File

@ -1305,11 +1305,7 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
} }
else { /* old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5 */ else { /* old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5 */
sk->protect.s2k.mode = 0; sk->protect.s2k.mode = 0;
/* We need a kludge to cope with old GNUPG versions */ sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo =
( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160
&& algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) ?
DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
if( list_mode ) if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n", printf( "\tprotect algo: %d (hash algo: %d)\n",
sk->protect.algo, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo ); sk->protect.algo, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );

4
g10/passphrase.c
View File

@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode )
m_free(pw2); m_free(pw2);
} }
} }
if( !pw || !*pw )
write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek ); dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
dek->algo = cipher_algo; dek->algo = cipher_algo;
if( !*pw && mode == 2 ) if( !*pw && mode == 2 )

3
g10/seckey-cert.c
View File

@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
break; break;
} }
if( !rc )
write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
return rc; return rc;
} }

3
g10/status.c
View File

@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ write_status_text ( int no, const char *text)
case STATUS_NO_SECKEY : s = "NO_SECKEY\n"; break; case STATUS_NO_SECKEY : s = "NO_SECKEY\n"; break;
case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM\n"; break; case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM\n"; break;
case STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED: s = "DECRYPTION_FAILED\n"; break; case STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED: s = "DECRYPTION_FAILED\n"; break;
case STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY: s = "DECRYPTION_OKAY\n"; break;
case STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE: s = "MISSING_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
case STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE : s = "GOOD_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
default: s = "?\n"; break; default: s = "?\n"; break;
} }

3
g10/status.h
View File

@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
#define STATUS_NO_SECKEY 27 #define STATUS_NO_SECKEY 27
#define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM 28 #define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM 28
#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED 29 #define STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED 29
#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY 30
#define STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE 31
#define STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE 32
/*-- status.c --*/ /*-- status.c --*/
void set_status_fd ( int fd ); void set_status_fd ( int fd );

4
include/ChangeLog
View File

@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* cipher.h (BLOWFISH160): Removed.
Tue Apr 6 19:58:12 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de> Tue Apr 6 19:58:12 CEST 1999 Werner Koch <wk@isil.d.shuttle.de>
* cipher.h (DEK): increased max. key length to 32 bytes * cipher.h (DEK): increased max. key length to 32 bytes

1
include/cipher.h
View File

@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
#define CIPHER_ALGO_SAFER_SK128 5 #define CIPHER_ALGO_SAFER_SK128 5
#define CIPHER_ALGO_DES_SK 6 #define CIPHER_ALGO_DES_SK 6
#define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH 10 /* twofish 256 bit */ #define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH 10 /* twofish 256 bit */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 42 /* blowfish 160 bit key (not in OpenPGP)*/
#define CIPHER_ALGO_SKIPJACK 101 /* experimental: skipjack */ #define CIPHER_ALGO_SKIPJACK 101 /* experimental: skipjack */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD 102 /* experimental: twofish 128 bit */ #define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD 102 /* experimental: twofish 128 bit */
#define CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY 110 /* no encryption at all */ #define CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY 110 /* no encryption at all */

30
util/memory.c
View File

@ -123,20 +123,19 @@ static void check_allmem( const char *info );
static void static void
add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by ) add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
{ {
unsigned index; unsigned idx;
struct memtbl_entry *e; struct memtbl_entry *e;
struct info_entry *ie; struct info_entry *ie;
if( memtbl_len < memtbl_size ) if( memtbl_len < memtbl_size )
index = memtbl_len++; idx = memtbl_len++;
else { else {
struct memtbl_entry *e;
/* look for a used entry in the table. We take the first one, /* look for a used entry in the table. We take the first one,
* so that freed entries remain as long as possible in the table * so that freed entries remain as long as possible in the table
* (free appends a new one) * (free appends a new one)
*/ */
if( (e = memtbl_unused) ) { if( (e = memtbl_unused) ) {
index = e - memtbl; idx = e - memtbl;
memtbl_unused = e->next; memtbl_unused = e->next;
e->next = NULL; e->next = NULL;
} }
@ -145,32 +144,33 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
memtbl_size = 100; memtbl_size = 100;
if( !(memtbl = calloc( memtbl_size, sizeof *memtbl )) ) if( !(memtbl = calloc( memtbl_size, sizeof *memtbl )) )
membug("memory debug table malloc failed\n"); membug("memory debug table malloc failed\n");
index = 0; idx = 0;
memtbl_len = 1; memtbl_len = 1;
atexit( dump_table_at_exit ); atexit( dump_table_at_exit );
} }
else { /* realloc */ else { /* realloc */
unsigned n = memtbl_size / 4; /* enlarge by 25% */ unsigned nn = memtbl_size / 4; /* enlarge by 25% */
if(!(memtbl = realloc(memtbl, (memtbl_size+n)*sizeof *memtbl))) if(!(memtbl = realloc(memtbl, (memtbl_size+nn)*sizeof *memtbl)))
membug("memory debug table realloc failed\n"); membug("memory debug table realloc failed\n");
memset(memtbl+memtbl_size, 0, n*sizeof *memtbl ); memset(memtbl+memtbl_size, 0, n*sizeof *memtbl );
memtbl_size += n; memtbl_size += nn;
index = memtbl_len++; idx = memtbl_len++;
} }
} }
} }
e = memtbl+index; e = memtbl+idx;
if( e->inuse ) if( e->inuse )
membug("Ooops: entry %u is flagged as in use\n", index); membug("Ooops: entry %u is flagged as in use\n", idx);
e->user_p = p + 4; e->user_p = p + 4;
e->user_n = n; e->user_n = n;
e->count++; e->count++;
if( e->next ) if( e->next )
membug("Ooops: entry is in free entry list\n"); membug("Ooops: entry is in free entry list\n");
/* do we already have this info string */ /* do we already have this info string */
for( ie = info_strings[info_hash(info)]; ie; ie = ie->next ) for( ie = info_strings[info_hash(info)]; ie; ie = ie->next ) {
if( ie->info == info ) if( ie->info == info )
break; break;
}
if( !ie ) { /* no: make a new entry */ if( !ie ) { /* no: make a new entry */
if( !(ie = malloc( sizeof *ie )) ) if( !(ie = malloc( sizeof *ie )) )
membug("can't allocate info entry\n"); membug("can't allocate info entry\n");
@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
e->inuse = 1; e->inuse = 1;
/* put the index at the start of the memory */ /* put the index at the start of the memory */
p[0] = index; p[0] = idx;
p[1] = index >> 8 ; p[1] = idx >> 8 ;
p[2] = index >> 16 ; p[2] = idx >> 16 ;
p[3] = mode? MAGIC_SEC_BYTE : MAGIC_NOR_BYTE ; p[3] = mode? MAGIC_SEC_BYTE : MAGIC_NOR_BYTE ;
if( DBG_MEMORY ) if( DBG_MEMORY )
log_debug( "%s allocates %u bytes using %s\n", info, e->user_n, by ); log_debug( "%s allocates %u bytes using %s\n", info, e->user_n, by );