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gpg: Pass CTRL object down to the trust functions

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Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
This commit is contained in:
Werner Koch 2016-05-21 11:41:49 +02:00
parent fd973ee1c1
commit 027c4e5552
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: E3FDFF218E45B72B
16 changed files with 180 additions and 152 deletions
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62
g10/mainproc.c
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@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
if (mainkey)
c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode?
0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL));
0 : get_validity_info (c->ctrl, pk, NULL));
es_printf ("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
if (c->trustletter)
es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
@ -1603,31 +1603,31 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
}
/* Check that the message composition is valid.
Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
S{1,n} -- detached signature.
S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
O = One-Pass Signature packet.
S = Signature packet.
P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
(Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
for a signed message but that does not work as it
introduces ambiguities.)
We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
We reject all other messages.
Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
introduce a bug here.
*/
*
* Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
*
* S{1,n} -- detached signature.
* S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
* O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
* C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
*
*
* O = One-Pass Signature packet.
* S = Signature packet.
* P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
* (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
* for a signed message but that does not work as it
* introduces ambiguities.)
* We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
* CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
* C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
*
* We reject all other messages.
*
* Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
* each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
* introduce a bug here.
*/
{
kbnode_t n;
int n_onepass, n_sig;
@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
before calling that function. */
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
else
valid = 0; /* Not used. */
@ -1950,7 +1950,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk);
if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
show_photos (c->ctrl,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
pk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
}
@ -1973,7 +1974,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
actually ask the user to update any trust
information. */
valid = (trust_value_to_string
(get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, sig, 0)));
(get_validity (c->ctrl, pk,
un->pkt->pkt.user_id, sig, 0)));
log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
}
else
@ -2061,7 +2063,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
{
if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
rc = check_signatures_trust (sig);
rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
}
/* Print extra information about the signature. */