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* misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: Use %t to indicate type of a photo

Browse source 
ID (in this version, it's always "jpeg").  Also tweak string expansion
loop to minimize reallocs.

* mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Variable type fix.

* keyedit.c (menu_set_primary_uid): Differentiate between true user IDs
and attribute user IDs when making one of them primary. That is, if we are
making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs. If we are making an attribute
packet primary, we alter attribute packets.  This matches the language in
the latest attribute packet draft.

* keyedit.c (sign_uids): No need for the empty string hack.

* getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Only accept preferences from the hashed
segment of the self-sig.
This commit is contained in:
David Shaw 2002-04-11 04:04:41 +00:00
parent f29240cc2e
commit 018f352294
6 changed files with 65 additions and 25 deletions
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15
g10/getkey.c
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@ -1109,17 +1109,14 @@ fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
* For now we only look at the hashed one.
*/
/* now build the preferences list. We try to get the preferences
* from the hashed list but if there are no such preferences, we
* try to get them from the unhashed list. There is no risk with
* that, because our implementation comes only with strong
* algorithms and it would be fruitless for an attacker to insert
* an weak algorithm. */
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
/* Now build the preferences list. These must come from the
hashed section so nobody can modify the ciphers a key is
willing to accept. */
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
sym = p; nsym = p?n:0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n );
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n );
hash = p; nhash = p?n:0;
p = parse_sig_subpkt2 ( sig, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n );
p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n );
zip = p; nzip = p?n:0;
if (uid->prefs)
m_free (uid->prefs);