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gnupg/kbx/keybox-openpgp.c

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/* keybox-openpgp.c - OpenPGP key parsing
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* Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/* This is a simple OpenPGP parser suitable for all OpenPGP key
material. It just provides the functionality required to build and
parse an KBX OpenPGP key blob. Thus it is not a complete parser.
However it is self-contained and optimized for fast in-memory
parsing. Note that we don't support old ElGamal v3 keys
anymore. */
#include <config.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "keybox-defs.h"
#include <gcrypt.h>
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#include "../common/openpgpdefs.h"
#include "../common/host2net.h"
struct keyparm_s
{
const char *mpi;
int len; /* int to avoid a cast in gcry_sexp_build. */
};
/* Assume a valid OpenPGP packet at the address pointed to by BUFBTR
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which has a maximum length as stored at BUFLEN. Return the header
information of that packet and advance the pointer stored at BUFPTR
to the next packet; also adjust the length stored at BUFLEN to
match the remaining bytes. If there are no more packets, store NULL
at BUFPTR. Return an non-zero error code on failure or the
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following data on success:
R_DATAPKT = Pointer to the begin of the packet data.
R_DATALEN = Length of this data. This has already been checked to fit
into the buffer.
R_PKTTYPE = The packet type.
R_NTOTAL = The total number of bytes of this packet
Note that these values are only updated on success.
*/
static gpg_error_t
next_packet (unsigned char const **bufptr, size_t *buflen,
unsigned char const **r_data, size_t *r_datalen, int *r_pkttype,
size_t *r_ntotal)
{
const unsigned char *buf = *bufptr;
size_t len = *buflen;
int c, ctb, pkttype;
unsigned long pktlen;
if (!len)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
ctb = *buf++; len--;
if ( !(ctb & 0x80) )
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Invalid CTB. */
if ((ctb & 0x40)) /* New style (OpenPGP) CTB. */
{
pkttype = (ctb & 0x3f);
if (!len)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* No 1st length byte. */
c = *buf++; len--;
if (pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED); /* ... packet in a keyblock. */
if ( c < 192 )
pktlen = c;
else if ( c < 224 )
{
pktlen = (c - 192) * 256;
if (!len)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* No 2nd length byte. */
c = *buf++; len--;
pktlen += c + 192;
}
else if (c == 255)
{
if (len <4 )
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* No length bytes. */
pktlen = buf32_to_ulong (buf);
buf += 4;
len -= 4;
}
else /* Partial length encoding is not allowed for key packets. */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
}
else /* Old style CTB. */
{
int lenbytes;
pktlen = 0;
pkttype = (ctb>>2)&0xf;
lenbytes = ((ctb&3)==3)? 0 : (1<<(ctb & 3));
if (!lenbytes) /* Not allowed in key packets. */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
if (len < lenbytes)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Not enough length bytes. */
for (; lenbytes; lenbytes--)
{
pktlen <<= 8;
pktlen |= *buf++; len--;
}
}
/* Do some basic sanity check. */
switch (pkttype)
{
case PKT_SIGNATURE:
case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
case PKT_MARKER:
case PKT_RING_TRUST:
case PKT_USER_ID:
case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
case PKT_OLD_COMMENT:
case PKT_ATTRIBUTE:
case PKT_COMMENT:
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL:
break; /* Okay these are allowed packets. */
default:
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
}
if (pkttype == 63 && pktlen == 0xFFFFFFFF)
/* Sometimes the decompressing layer enters an error state in
which it simply outputs 0xff for every byte read. If we have a
stream of 0xff bytes, then it will be detected as a new format
packet with type 63 and a 4-byte encoded length that is 4G-1.
Since packets with type 63 are private and we use them as a
control packet, which won't be 4 GB, we reject such packets as
invalid. */
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return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
if (pktlen > len)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Packet length header too long. */
*r_data = buf;
*r_datalen = pktlen;
*r_pkttype = pkttype;
*r_ntotal = (buf - *bufptr) + pktlen;
*bufptr = buf + pktlen;
*buflen = len - pktlen;
if (!*buflen)
*bufptr = NULL;
return 0;
}
/* Take a list of key parameters KP for the OpenPGP ALGO and compute
* the keygrip which will be stored at GRIP. GRIP needs to be a
* buffer of 20 bytes. */
static gpg_error_t
keygrip_from_keyparm (int algo, struct keyparm_s *kp, unsigned char *grip)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL;
switch (algo)
{
case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL,
"(public-key(dsa(p%b)(q%b)(g%b)(y%b)))",
kp[0].len, kp[0].mpi,
kp[1].len, kp[1].mpi,
kp[2].len, kp[2].mpi,
kp[3].len, kp[3].mpi);
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL,
"(public-key(elg(p%b)(g%b)(y%b)))",
kp[0].len, kp[0].mpi,
kp[1].len, kp[1].mpi,
kp[2].len, kp[2].mpi);
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL,
"(public-key(rsa(n%b)(e%b)))",
kp[0].len, kp[0].mpi,
kp[1].len, kp[1].mpi);
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH:
{
char *curve = openpgp_oidbuf_to_str (kp[0].mpi, kp[0].len);
if (!curve)
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
else
{
err = gcry_sexp_build
(&s_pkey, NULL,
(algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA)?
"(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags eddsa)(q%b)))":
(algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
&& openpgp_oidbuf_is_cv25519 (kp[0].mpi, kp[0].len))?
"(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(flags djb-tweak)(q%b)))":
"(public-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%b)))",
curve, kp[1].len, kp[1].mpi);
xfree (curve);
}
}
break;
default:
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO);
break;
}
if (!err && !gcry_pk_get_keygrip (s_pkey, grip))
{
log_info ("kbx: error computing keygrip\n");
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
gcry_sexp_release (s_pkey);
if (err)
memset (grip, 0, 20);
return err;
}
/* Parse a key packet and store the information in KI. */
static gpg_error_t
parse_key (const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
struct _keybox_openpgp_key_info *ki)
{
gpg_error_t err;
const unsigned char *data_start = data;
int i, version, algorithm;
size_t n;
int npkey;
unsigned char hashbuffer[768];
gcry_md_hd_t md;
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int is_ecc = 0;
struct keyparm_s keyparm[OPENPGP_MAX_NPKEY];
unsigned char *helpmpibuf[OPENPGP_MAX_NPKEY] = { NULL };
if (datalen < 5)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
version = *data++; datalen--;
if (version < 2 || version > 4 )
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); /* Invalid version. */
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/*timestamp = ((data[0]<<24)|(data[1]<<16)|(data[2]<<8)|(data[3]));*/
data +=4; datalen -=4;
if (version < 4)
{
if (datalen < 2)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
data +=2; datalen -= 2;
}
if (!datalen)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
algorithm = *data++; datalen--;
switch (algorithm)
{
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_S:
npkey = 2;
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
npkey = 3;
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
npkey = 4;
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH:
npkey = 3;
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is_ecc = 1;
break;
case PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA:
case PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA:
npkey = 2;
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is_ecc = 1;
break;
default: /* Unknown algorithm. */
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM);
}
ki->algo = algorithm;
for (i=0; i < npkey; i++ )
{
unsigned int nbits, nbytes;
if (datalen < 2)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
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if (is_ecc && (i == 0 || i == 2))
{
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nbytes = data[0];
if (nbytes < 2 || nbytes > 254)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
nbytes++; /* The size byte itself. */
if (datalen < nbytes)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
keyparm[i].mpi = data;
keyparm[i].len = nbytes;
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}
else
{
nbits = ((data[0]<<8)|(data[1]));
data += 2;
datalen -= 2;
nbytes = (nbits+7) / 8;
if (datalen < nbytes)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET);
keyparm[i].mpi = data;
keyparm[i].len = nbytes;
}
data += nbytes; datalen -= nbytes;
}
n = data - data_start;
/* Note: Starting here we need to jump to leave on error. */
/* Make sure the MPIs are unsigned. */
for (i=0; i < npkey; i++)
{
if (!keyparm[i].len || (keyparm[i].mpi[0] & 0x80))
{
helpmpibuf[i] = xtrymalloc (1+keyparm[i].len);
if (!helpmpibuf[i])
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
goto leave;
}
helpmpibuf[i][0] = 0;
memcpy (helpmpibuf[i]+1, keyparm[i].mpi, keyparm[i].len);
keyparm[i].mpi = helpmpibuf[i];
keyparm[i].len++;
}
}
err = keygrip_from_keyparm (algorithm, keyparm, ki->grip);
if (err)
goto leave;
if (version < 4)
{
/* We do not support any other algorithm than RSA in v3
packets. */
if (algorithm < 1 || algorithm > 3)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
err = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_MD5, 0);
if (err)
return err; /* Oops */
gcry_md_write (md, keyparm[0].mpi, keyparm[0].len);
gcry_md_write (md, keyparm[1].mpi, keyparm[1].len);
memcpy (ki->fpr, gcry_md_read (md, 0), 16);
gcry_md_close (md);
ki->fprlen = 16;
if (keyparm[0].len < 8)
{
/* Moduli less than 64 bit are out of the specs scope. Zero
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them out because this is what gpg does too. */
memset (ki->keyid, 0, 8);
}
else
memcpy (ki->keyid, keyparm[0].mpi + keyparm[0].len - 8, 8);
}
else
{
/* Its a pity that we need to prefix the buffer with the tag
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and a length header: We can't simply pass it to the fast
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hashing function for that reason. It might be a good idea to
have a scatter-gather enabled hash function. What we do here
is to use a static buffer if this one is large enough and
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only use the regular hash functions if this buffer is not
large enough. */
if ( 3 + n < sizeof hashbuffer )
{
hashbuffer[0] = 0x99; /* CTB */
hashbuffer[1] = (n >> 8); /* 2 byte length header. */
hashbuffer[2] = n;
memcpy (hashbuffer + 3, data_start, n);
gcry_md_hash_buffer (GCRY_MD_SHA1, ki->fpr, hashbuffer, 3 + n);
}
else
{
err = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0);
if (err)
return err; /* Oops */
gcry_md_putc (md, 0x99 ); /* CTB */
gcry_md_putc (md, (n >> 8) ); /* 2 byte length header. */
gcry_md_putc (md, n );
gcry_md_write (md, data_start, n);
memcpy (ki->fpr, gcry_md_read (md, 0), 20);
gcry_md_close (md);
}
ki->fprlen = 20;
memcpy (ki->keyid, ki->fpr+12, 8);
}
leave:
for (i=0; i < npkey; i++)
xfree (helpmpibuf[i]);
return err;
}
/* The caller must pass the address of an INFO structure which will
get filled on success with information pertaining to the OpenPGP
keyblock IMAGE of length IMAGELEN. Note that a caller does only
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need to release this INFO structure if the function returns
success. If NPARSED is not NULL the actual number of bytes parsed
will be stored at this address. */
gpg_error_t
_keybox_parse_openpgp (const unsigned char *image, size_t imagelen,
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size_t *nparsed, keybox_openpgp_info_t info)
{
gpg_error_t err = 0;
const unsigned char *image_start, *data;
size_t n, datalen;
int pkttype;
int first = 1;
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int read_error = 0;
struct _keybox_openpgp_key_info *k, **ktail = NULL;
struct _keybox_openpgp_uid_info *u, **utail = NULL;
memset (info, 0, sizeof *info);
if (nparsed)
*nparsed = 0;
image_start = image;
while (image)
{
err = next_packet (&image, &imagelen, &data, &datalen, &pkttype, &n);
if (err)
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{
read_error = 1;
break;
}
if (first)
{
if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
;
else if (pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
info->is_secret = 1;
else
{
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
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if (nparsed)
*nparsed += n;
break;
}
first = 0;
}
else if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
break; /* Next keyblock encountered - ready. */
if (nparsed)
*nparsed += n;
if (pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
{
/* For now we only count the total number of signatures. */
info->nsigs++;
}
else if (pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
{
info->nuids++;
if (info->nuids == 1)
{
info->uids.off = data - image_start;
info->uids.len = datalen;
utail = &info->uids.next;
}
else
{
u = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *u);
if (!u)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
u->off = data - image_start;
u->len = datalen;
*utail = u;
utail = &u->next;
}
}
else if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
{
err = parse_key (data, datalen, &info->primary);
if (err)
break;
}
else if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY && datalen && *data == '#' )
{
/* Early versions of GnuPG used old PGP comment packets;
* luckily all those comments are prefixed by a hash
* sign - ignore these packets. */
}
else if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
{
info->nsubkeys++;
if (info->nsubkeys == 1)
{
err = parse_key (data, datalen, &info->subkeys);
if (err)
{
info->nsubkeys--;
/* We ignore subkeys with unknown algorithms. */
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if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM)
err = 0;
if (err)
break;
}
else
ktail = &info->subkeys.next;
}
else
{
k = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *k);
if (!k)
{
err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
break;
}
err = parse_key (data, datalen, k);
if (err)
{
xfree (k);
info->nsubkeys--;
/* We ignore subkeys with unknown algorithms. */
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if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM
|| gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM)
err = 0;
if (err)
break;
}
else
{
*ktail = k;
ktail = &k->next;
}
}
}
}
if (err)
{
_keybox_destroy_openpgp_info (info);
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if (!read_error)
{
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/* Packet parsing worked, thus we should be able to skip the
rest of the keyblock. */
while (image)
{
if (next_packet (&image, &imagelen,
&data, &datalen, &pkttype, &n) )
break; /* Another error - stop here. */
if (pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY || pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
break; /* Next keyblock encountered - ready. */
if (nparsed)
*nparsed += n;
}
}
}
return err;
}
/* Release any malloced data in INFO but not INFO itself! */
void
_keybox_destroy_openpgp_info (keybox_openpgp_info_t info)
{
struct _keybox_openpgp_key_info *k, *k2;
struct _keybox_openpgp_uid_info *u, *u2;
assert (!info->primary.next);
for (k=info->subkeys.next; k; k = k2)
{
k2 = k->next;
xfree (k);
}
for (u=info->uids.next; u; u = u2)
{
u2 = u->next;
xfree (u);
}
}