gnupg/g10/keylist.c

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1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
/* keylist.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003
* Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "keydb.h"
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#include "memory.h"
#include "photoid.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "ttyio.h"
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#include "trustdb.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "status.h"
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static void list_all(int);
static void list_one( STRLIST names, int secret);
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struct sig_stats
{
int inv_sigs;
int no_key;
int oth_err;
};
static FILE *attrib_fp=NULL;
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/****************
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* List the keys
* If list is NULL, all available keys are listed
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*/
void
public_key_list( STRLIST list )
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{
if(opt.with_colons)
{
byte trust_model,marginals,completes,cert_depth;
ulong created,nextcheck;
read_trust_options(&trust_model,&created,&nextcheck,
&marginals,&completes,&cert_depth);
printf("tru:");
if(nextcheck && nextcheck <= make_timestamp())
printf("o");
if(trust_model!=opt.trust_model)
printf("t");
if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
{
if(marginals!=opt.marginals_needed)
printf("m");
if(completes!=opt.completes_needed)
printf("c");
if(cert_depth!=opt.max_cert_depth)
printf("d");
}
printf(":%d:%lu:%lu",trust_model,created,nextcheck);
/* Only show marginals, completes, and cert_depth in the classic
or PGP trust models since they are not meaningful
otherwise. */
if(trust_model==TM_PGP || trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
printf(":%d:%d:%d",marginals,completes,cert_depth);
printf("\n");
}
if( !list )
list_all(0);
else
list_one( list, 0 );
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}
void
secret_key_list( STRLIST list )
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{
if( !list )
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list_all(1);
else /* List by user id */
list_one( list, 1 );
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}
void
print_seckey_info (PKT_secret_key *sk)
{
u32 sk_keyid[2];
size_t n;
char *p;
keyid_from_sk (sk, sk_keyid);
tty_printf ("\nsec %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_sk (sk),
pubkey_letter (sk->pubkey_algo),
(ulong)sk_keyid[1], datestr_from_sk (sk));
p = get_user_id (sk_keyid, &n);
tty_print_utf8_string (p, n);
m_free (p);
tty_printf ("\n");
}
/* Print information about the public key. With FP passed as NULL,
the tty output interface is used, otherwise output is directted to
the given stream. */
void
print_pubkey_info (FILE *fp, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
u32 pk_keyid[2];
size_t n;
char *p;
keyid_from_pk (pk, pk_keyid);
if (fp)
fprintf (fp, "pub %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
(ulong)pk_keyid[1], datestr_from_pk (pk));
else
tty_printf ("\npub %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
(ulong)pk_keyid[1], datestr_from_pk (pk));
p = get_user_id (pk_keyid, &n);
if (fp)
print_utf8_string2 (fp, p, n, '\n');
else
tty_print_utf8_string (p, n);
m_free (p);
if (fp)
putc ('\n', fp);
else
tty_printf ("\n\n");
}
/*
mode=0 for stdout.
mode=1 for log_info + status messages
mode=2 for status messages only
*/
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void
show_policy_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
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{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
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while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY,&len,&seq,&crit)))
{
if(mode!=2)
{
int i;
char *str;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
if(crit)
str=_("Critical signature policy: ");
else
str=_("Signature policy: ");
if(mode)
log_info("%s",str);
else
printf("%s",str);
print_utf8_string(fp,p,len);
fprintf(fp,"\n");
}
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if(mode)
write_status_buffer ( STATUS_POLICY_URL, p, len, 0 );
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}
}
/*
mode=0 for stdout.
mode=1 for log_info + status messages
mode=2 for status messages only
*/
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
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/* TODO: use this */
void
show_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&len,&seq,&crit)))
{
if(mode!=2)
{
int i;
char *str;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
if(crit)
str=_("Critical preferred keyserver: ");
else
str=_("Preferred keyserver: ");
if(mode)
log_info("%s",str);
else
printf("%s",str);
print_utf8_string(fp,p,len);
fprintf(fp,"\n");
}
/* TODO: put in a status-fd tag for preferred keyservers */
}
}
/*
mode=0 for stdout.
mode=1 for log_info + status messages
mode=2 for status messages only
*/
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void
show_notation(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
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{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
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/* There may be multiple notations in the same sig. */
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,&len,&seq,&crit)))
if(len>=8)
{
int n1,n2;
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n1=(p[4]<<8)|p[5];
n2=(p[6]<<8)|p[7];
if(8+n1+n2!=len)
{
log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
return;
}
if(mode!=2)
{
int i;
char *str;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
/* This is UTF8 */
if(crit)
str=_("Critical signature notation: ");
else
str=_("Signature notation: ");
if(mode)
log_info("%s",str);
else
printf("%s",str);
print_utf8_string(fp,p+8,n1);
fprintf(fp,"=");
if(*p&0x80)
print_utf8_string(fp,p+8+n1,n2);
else
fprintf(fp,"[ %s ]",_("not human readable"));
fprintf(fp,"\n");
}
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if(mode)
{
write_status_buffer ( STATUS_NOTATION_NAME, p+8 , n1, 0 );
write_status_buffer ( STATUS_NOTATION_DATA, p+8+n1, n2, 50 );
}
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}
else
log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
}
static void
print_signature_stats(struct sig_stats *s)
{
if( s->inv_sigs == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 bad signature\n") );
else if( s->inv_sigs )
tty_printf(_("%d bad signatures\n"), s->inv_sigs );
if( s->no_key == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n") );
else if( s->no_key )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"),s->no_key);
if( s->oth_err == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n") );
else if( s->oth_err )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), s->oth_err );
}
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static void
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list_all( int secret )
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{
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KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
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KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
int rc=0;
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const char *lastresname, *resname;
struct sig_stats stats;
memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
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hd = keydb_new (secret);
if (!hd)
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
else
rc = keydb_search_first (hd);
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if( rc ) {
if( rc != -1 )
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log_error("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
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goto leave;
}
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lastresname = NULL;
do {
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
if (rc) {
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
if(!opt.with_colons)
{
resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
if (lastresname != resname )
{
int i;
printf("%s\n", resname );
for(i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
lastresname = resname;
}
}
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merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
list_keyblock( keyblock, secret, opt.fingerprint,
opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
keyblock = NULL;
} while (!(rc = keydb_search_next (hd)));
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if( rc && rc != -1 )
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log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
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if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
print_signature_stats(&stats);
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leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (hd);
}
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static void
list_one( STRLIST names, int secret )
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{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
GETKEY_CTX ctx;
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const char *resname;
char *keyring_str = _("Keyring");
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int i;
struct sig_stats stats;
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memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
/* fixme: using the bynames function has the disadvantage that we
* don't know wether one of the names given was not found. OTOH,
* this function has the advantage to list the names in the
* sequence as defined by the keyDB and does not duplicate
* outputs. A solution could be do test whether all given have
* been listed (this needs a way to use the keyDB search
* functions) or to have the search function return indicators for
* found names. Yet another way is to use the keydb search
* facilities directly. */
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if( secret ) {
rc = get_seckey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
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if( rc ) {
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log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
get_seckey_end( ctx );
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return;
}
do {
if ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) {
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resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
}
list_keyblock( keyblock, 1, opt.fingerprint, NULL );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
} while( !get_seckey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
get_seckey_end( ctx );
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}
else {
rc = get_pubkey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
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if( rc ) {
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log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
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get_pubkey_end( ctx );
return;
}
do {
if ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) {
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resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
}
list_keyblock( keyblock, 0, opt.fingerprint,
opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL );
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release_kbnode( keyblock );
} while( !get_pubkey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
get_pubkey_end( ctx );
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}
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if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
print_signature_stats(&stats);
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}
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static void
print_key_data( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
{
int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) : 0;
int i;
for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
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printf("pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits( pk->pkey[i] ) );
mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1 );
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
}
}
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static void
print_capabilities (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock)
{
if(pk || (sk && sk->protect.s2k.mode!=1001))
{
unsigned int use = pk? pk->pubkey_usage : sk->pubkey_usage;
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if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
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putchar ('e');
if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
{
putchar ('s');
if( pk? pk->is_primary : sk->is_primary )
putchar ('c');
}
if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
putchar ('a');
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}
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
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if ( keyblock ) { /* figure out the usable capabilities */
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KBNODE k;
int enc=0, sign=0, cert=0, auth=0, disabled=0;
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for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
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if(pk->is_primary)
disabled=pk_is_disabled(pk);
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if ( pk->is_valid && !pk->is_revoked && !pk->has_expired ) {
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
enc = 1;
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
{
sign = 1;
if(pk->is_primary)
cert = 1;
}
if ( (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
auth = 1;
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}
}
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if ( sk->is_valid && !sk->is_revoked && !sk->has_expired
&& sk->protect.s2k.mode!=1001 ) {
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if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
enc = 1;
if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
{
sign = 1;
if(sk->is_primary)
cert = 1;
}
if ( (sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
auth = 1;
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}
}
}
if (enc)
putchar ('E');
if (sign)
putchar ('S');
if (cert)
putchar ('C');
if (auth)
putchar ('A');
if (disabled)
putchar ('D');
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
}
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putchar(':');
}
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
void
dump_attribs(const PKT_user_id *uid,PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk)
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
{
int i;
if(!attrib_fp)
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
return;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
for(i=0;i<uid->numattribs;i++)
{
if(is_status_enabled())
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
char buf[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+90];
size_t j,n;
if(pk)
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
else if(sk)
fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
else
BUG();
p = array;
for(j=0; j < n ; j++, p++ )
sprintf(buf+2*j, "%02X", *p );
sprintf(buf+strlen(buf)," %lu %u %u %u %lu %lu %u",
(ulong)uid->attribs[i].len,uid->attribs[i].type,i+1,
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
uid->numattribs,(ulong)uid->created,(ulong)uid->expiredate,
((uid->is_primary?0x01:0)|
(uid->is_revoked?0x02:0)|
(uid->is_expired?0x04:0)));
write_status_text(STATUS_ATTRIBUTE,buf);
}
fwrite(uid->attribs[i].data,uid->attribs[i].len,1,attrib_fp);
}
}
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
static void
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list_keyblock_print ( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
struct sig_stats *stats=opaque;
int skip_sigs=0;
int newformat=((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY) && !secret)
|| (opt.list_options & (LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID | LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS));
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
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if( !node ) {
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log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
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return;
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
}
if( secret )
{
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pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
printf("sec%c %4u%c/",(sk->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':' ',
nbits_from_sk( sk ),pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
printf("%08lX%08lX",(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1]);
else
printf("%08lX",(ulong)keyid[1]);
printf(" %s%s",datestr_from_sk( sk ),newformat?"":" " );
if(newformat && sk->expiredate )
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_sk( sk ) );
}
else
{
#if 0
int validity;
#endif
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
#if 0
validity=get_validity(pk,NULL);
#endif
check_trustdb_stale();
printf("pub %4u%c/",
nbits_from_pk(pk),pubkey_letter(pk->pubkey_algo));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
printf("%08lX%08lX",(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1]);
else
printf("%08lX",(ulong)keyid[1]);
printf(" %s%s",datestr_from_pk( pk ),newformat?"":" " );
/* We didn't include this before in the key listing, but there
is room in the new format, so why not? */
if(newformat && pk->expiredate)
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk ) );
#if 0
/* I need to think about this some more. It's easy enough to
include, but it looks sort of confusing in the
listing... */
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY)
printf(" [%s]",trust_value_to_string(validity));
#endif
}
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
int indent;
PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if((uid->is_expired || uid->is_revoked)
&& !(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
{
skip_sigs=1;
continue;
}
else
skip_sigs=0;
if(attrib_fp && uid->attrib_data!=NULL)
dump_attribs(uid,pk,sk);
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
if(!any && newformat)
printf("\n");
if(uid->is_revoked || uid->is_expired)
printf("uid%*s[%s] ",
(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)?16:8,"",
uid->is_revoked?"revoked":"expired");
else if((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY) && pk)
{
const char *validity=
trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,uid));
/* Includes the 3 spaces for [, ], and " ". */
indent=((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)?23:15)
-strlen(validity);
if(indent<0)
indent=0;
printf("uid%*s[%s] ",indent,"",validity);
}
else if(newformat)
printf("uid%*s",
(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)?26:18,"");
else if(any)
printf("uid%*s",29,"");
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
print_utf8_string( stdout, uid->name, uid->len );
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
putchar('\n');
if( !any ) {
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
}
if((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS) && uid->attribs!=NULL)
show_photos(uid->attribs,uid->numattribs,pk,sk);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
printf("sub %4u%c/",
nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),pubkey_letter( pk2->pubkey_algo ));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
printf("%08lX%08lX",(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1]);
else
printf("%08lX",(ulong)keyid2[1]);
printf(" %s",datestr_from_pk(pk2));
if( pk2->expiredate )
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk2 ) );
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
putchar('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2, keyid2 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
u32 keyid2[2];
PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if( !any ) {
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
any = 1;
}
keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
printf("ssb %4u%c/",
nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),pubkey_letter( sk2->pubkey_algo ));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
printf("%08lX%08lX",(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1]);
else
printf("%08lX",(ulong)keyid2[1]);
printf(" %s",datestr_from_sk( sk2 ) );
if( sk2->expiredate )
printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_sk( sk2 ) );
putchar('\n');
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
}
else if( opt.list_sigs
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& !skip_sigs ) {
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
char *sigstr;
if( stats ) {
/*fflush(stdout);*/
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: stats->inv_sigs++; sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: stats->no_key++; continue;
default: stats->oth_err++; sigrc = '%'; break;
}
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has
the pk that issued it. See also
keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */
}
else {
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
/* Check if the pk is really revoked - there could be a
0x20 sig packet there even if we are not revoked
(say, if a revocation key issued the packet, but the
revocation key isn't present to verify it.) */
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 && pk->is_revoked )
puts("[revoked]");
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
puts("[key binding]");
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
puts("[subkey revoked]");
else
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
sigstr = "sig";
else {
printf("sig "
"[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",sig->sig_class );
continue;
}
fputs( sigstr, stdout );
printf("%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c ",
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
sigrc,(sig->sig_class-0x10>0 &&
sig->sig_class-0x10<4)?'0'+sig->sig_class-0x10:' ',
sig->flags.exportable?' ':'L',
sig->flags.revocable?' ':'R',
sig->flags.policy_url?'P':' ',
sig->flags.notation?'N':' ',
sig->flags.expired?'X':' ',
(sig->trust_depth>9)?'T':
(sig->trust_depth>0)?'0'+sig->trust_depth:' ');
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_LONG_KEYID)
printf("%08lX%08lX",(ulong)sig->keyid[0],(ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
else
printf("%08lX",(ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
printf(" %s", datestr_from_sig(sig));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)
printf(" %s", expirestr_from_sig(sig));
printf(" ");
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_utf8_string( stdout, p, n );
m_free(p);
}
putchar('\n');
if(sig->flags.policy_url && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_POLICY))
show_policy_url(sig,3,0);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if(sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_NOTATION))
show_notation(sig,3,0);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if(sig->flags.pref_ks && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER))
show_keyserver_url(sig,3,0);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
}
}
putchar('\n');
}
static void
list_keyblock_colon( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
int trustletter = 0;
int ulti_hack = 0;
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
if( secret ) {
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
2003-07-10 16:30:07 +02:00
printf("sec::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
nbits_from_sk( sk ),
sk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID here */ );
}
else {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
fputs( "pub:", stdout );
if ( !pk->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
trustletter = get_validity_info ( pk, NULL );
if( trustletter == 'u' )
ulti_hack = 1;
putchar(trustletter);
}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
1998-05-29 13:53:54 +02:00
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if( pk->local_id )
printf("%lu", pk->local_id );
putchar(':');
if( !opt.fast_list_mode && !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
putchar( get_ownertrust_info(pk) );
1998-05-29 13:53:54 +02:00
putchar(':');
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
}
if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
/* do not merge the first uid with the primary key */
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
any = 1;
1998-05-29 13:53:54 +02:00
}
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if(attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
dump_attribs(node->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,sk);
/*
* Fixme: We need a is_valid flag here too
*/
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
if( any ) {
int i;
char *str=uid->attrib_data?"uat":"uid";
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
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/* If we're listing a secret key, leave out the
validity values for now. This is handled better in
1.9. */
if ( sk )
printf("%s:::::",str);
else if ( uid->is_revoked )
printf("%s:r::::",str);
else if ( uid->is_expired )
printf("%s:e::::",str);
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
2003-07-10 16:30:07 +02:00
else if ( opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
printf("%s:::::",str);
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else {
int uid_validity;
if( pk && !ulti_hack )
uid_validity=get_validity_info (pk, uid);
else
uid_validity = 'u';
printf("%s:%c::::",str,uid_validity);
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}
printf("%s:",colon_strtime(uid->created));
printf("%s:",colon_strtime(uid->expiredate));
namehash_from_uid(uid);
for(i=0; i < 20; i++ )
printf("%02X",uid->namehash[i]);
printf("::");
}
if(uid->attrib_data)
printf("%u %lu",uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
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else
print_string(stdout,uid->name,uid->len, ':' );
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putchar(':');
if (any)
putchar('\n');
else {
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk, keyid );
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any = 1;
}
}
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else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
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u32 keyid2[2];
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PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
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if( !any ) {
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putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
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any = 1;
}
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keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
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fputs ("sub:", stdout );
if ( !pk2->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk2->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk2->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
/* trustletter should always be defined here */
if(trustletter)
printf("%c", trustletter );
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}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
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nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
pk2->pubkey_algo,
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(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
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colon_datestr_from_pk( pk2 ),
colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate)
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/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
);
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if( pk->local_id ) /* use the local_id of the main key??? */
printf("%lu", pk->local_id );
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk2, NULL, NULL);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2, keyid2 );
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}
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else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
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u32 keyid2[2];
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PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
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if( !any ) {
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putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
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putchar('\n');
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if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
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any = 1;
}
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keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
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printf("ssb::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
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nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
sk2->pubkey_algo,
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(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
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colon_datestr_from_sk( sk2 ),
colon_strtime (sk2->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID */ );
print_capabilities (NULL, sk2, NULL);
putchar ('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
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}
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else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc,fprokay=0;
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char *sigstr;
size_t fplen;
byte fparray[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
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if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 )
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fputs("[revoked]:", stdout);
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else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
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fputs("[key binding]:", stdout);
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
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fputs("[subkey revoked]:", stdout);
else
putchar (':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
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any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
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else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
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else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
sigstr = "sig";
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else {
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printf ("sig::::::::::%02x%c:\n",
sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
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continue;
}
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
PKT_public_key *signer_pk=NULL;
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fflush(stdout);
if(opt.no_sig_cache)
signer_pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
rc = check_key_signature2( keyblock, node, NULL, signer_pk,
NULL, NULL, NULL );
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switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
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case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
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default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
if(opt.no_sig_cache)
{
if(rc==0)
{
fingerprint_from_pk (signer_pk, fparray, &fplen);
fprokay=1;
}
free_public_key(signer_pk);
}
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}
else {
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
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fputs( sigstr, stdout );
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
printf(":");
if(sig->trust_regexp)
print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
printf(":");
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if( sigrc == '%' )
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printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
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else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
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size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
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print_string( stdout, p, n, ':' );
m_free(p);
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}
printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class,sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
if(opt.no_sig_cache && opt.check_sigs && fprokay)
{
size_t i;
printf(":");
for (i=0; i < fplen ; i++ )
printf ("%02X", fparray[i] );
printf(":");
}
printf("\n");
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/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
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}
}
if( !any ) {/* oops, no user id */
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putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
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putchar('\n');
}
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}
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
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/*
* Reorder the keyblock so that the primary user ID (and not attribute
* packet) comes first. Fixme: Replace this by a generic sort
* function. */
void
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reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE primary = NULL, primary0 = NULL, primary2 = NULL;
KBNODE last, node;
for (node=keyblock; node; primary0=node, node = node->next) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
!node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data &&
node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
primary = primary2 = node;
for (node=node->next; node; primary2=node, node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if ( !primary )
return; /* no primary key flag found (should not happen) */
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for (last=NULL, node=keyblock; node; last = node, node = node->next) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
}
assert (node);
assert (last); /* the user ID is never the first packet */
assert (primary0); /* ditto (this is the node before primary) */
if ( node == primary )
return; /* already the first one */
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last->next = primary;
primary0->next = primary2->next;
primary2->next = node;
}
void
list_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
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{
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reorder_keyblock (keyblock);
if (opt.with_colons)
list_keyblock_colon (keyblock, secret, fpr );
else
list_keyblock_print (keyblock, secret, fpr, opaque );
}
/*
* standard function to print the finperprint.
* mode 0: as used in key listings, opt.with_colons is honored
* 1: print using log_info ()
* 2: direct use of tty
* 3: direct use of tty but only primary key.
* modes 1 and 2 will try and print both subkey and primary key fingerprints
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
*/
void
print_fingerprint (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, int mode )
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
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size_t i, n;
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FILE *fp;
const char *text;
int primary=0;
if(sk)
{
if(sk->main_keyid[0]==sk->keyid[0] && sk->main_keyid[1]==sk->keyid[1])
primary=1;
}
else
{
if(pk->main_keyid[0]==pk->keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]==pk->keyid[1])
primary=1;
}
/* Just to be safe */
if(mode&0x80 && !primary)
{
log_error("primary key is not really primary!\n");
return;
}
mode&=~0x80;
if(!primary && (mode==1 || mode==2))
{
if(sk)
{
PKT_secret_key *primary_sk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_sk));
get_seckey(primary_sk,sk->main_keyid);
print_fingerprint(NULL,primary_sk,mode|0x80);
free_secret_key(primary_sk);
}
else
{
PKT_public_key *primary_pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_pk));
get_pubkey(primary_pk,pk->main_keyid);
print_fingerprint(primary_pk,NULL,mode|0x80);
free_public_key(primary_pk);
}
}
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if (mode == 1) {
fp = log_stream ();
if(primary)
text = _("Primary key fingerprint:");
else
text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
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}
else if (mode == 2) {
fp = NULL; /* use tty */
/* Translators: this should fit into 24 bytes to that the fingerprint
* data is properly aligned with the user ID */
if(primary)
text = _(" Primary key fingerprint:");
else
text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
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}
else if (mode == 3) {
fp = NULL; /* use tty */
text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
}
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else {
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fp = stdout;
text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
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}
if (sk)
fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
else
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
p = array;
if (opt.with_colons && !mode) {
fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::");
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p );
putc(':', fp);
}
else {
if (fp)
fputs (text, fp);
else
tty_printf ("%s", text);
if (n == 20) {
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, i++, p += 2 ) {
if (fp) {
if (i == 10 )
putc(' ', fp);
fprintf (fp, " %02X%02X", *p, p[1] );
}
else {
if (i == 10 )
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (" %02X%02X", *p, p[1]);
}
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}
}
else {
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for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) {
if (fp) {
if (i && !(i%8) )
putc (' ', fp);
fprintf (fp, " %02X", *p );
}
else {
if (i && !(i%8) )
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (" %02X", *p );
}
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}
}
}
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if (fp)
putc ('\n', fp);
else
tty_printf ("\n");
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}
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void set_attrib_fd(int fd)
{
static int last_fd=-1;
if ( fd != -1 && last_fd == fd )
return;
if ( attrib_fp && attrib_fp != stdout && attrib_fp != stderr )
fclose (attrib_fp);
attrib_fp = NULL;
if ( fd == -1 )
return;
if( fd == 1 )
attrib_fp = stdout;
else if( fd == 2 )
attrib_fp = stderr;
else
attrib_fp = fdopen( fd, "w" );
if( !attrib_fp ) {
log_fatal("can't open fd %d for attribute output: %s\n",
fd, strerror(errno));
}
last_fd = fd;
}