1998-12-23 17:16:57 +01:00
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
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-------------------------------
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Version 0.9
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GnuPG is now in Beta test and you should report all bugs to the
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mailing list (see below). The 0.9.x versions are mainly released
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to fix all remaining serious bugs. As soon as version 1.0 is out,
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development will continue with a 1.1 series and bug fixes for the
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1.0 version are released as needed.
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GnuPG works best on GNU/Linux or *BSD. Other Unices are
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also supported but not as good tested as those Freenix ones.
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Please verify the tar file; there is a PGP2 and a GnuPG/PGP5
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signature available. My PGP2 key is well known and published in
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1998-02-13 21:58:50 +01:00
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the "Global Trust Register for 1998", ISBN 0-9532397-0-5.
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1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
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1998-02-24 19:50:46 +01:00
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I have included my pubring as "g10/pubring.asc", which contains
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1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
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the key used to make GnuPG signatures:
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1998-07-07 16:39:45 +02:00
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"pub 1024D/57548DCD 1998-07-07 Werner Koch (gnupg sig) <dd9jn@gnu.org>"
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"Key fingerprint = 6BD9 050F D8FC 941B 4341 2DCC 68B7 AB89 5754 8DCD"
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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My new DSA key is:
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1998-07-07 16:39:45 +02:00
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"pub 1024D/621CC013 1998-07-07 Werner Koch <werner.koch@guug.de>"
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"Key fingerprint = ECAF 7590 EB34 43B5 C7CF 3ACB 6C7E E1B8 621C C013"
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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You may want add it to your GnuPG pubring and use it in the future to
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1998-07-07 16:39:45 +02:00
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verify new releases. Because you verified this README file and
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_checked_that_it_is_really_my PGP2 key 0C9857A5, you can be sure
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that the above fingerprints are correct.
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1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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Please subscribe to g10@net.lut.ac.uk by sending a mail with
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1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
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the word "subscribe" in the body to "g10-request@net.lut.ac.uk".
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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This mailing list is a closed one (only subscribers are allowed
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to post) to avoid misuse by folks who don't know the Netiquette
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and trash you mailspool with commercial junk.
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1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
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See the file COPYING for copyright and warranty information.
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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GnuPG is in compliance with RFC2440 (OpenPGP), see doc/OpenPGP for
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details.
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1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
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Due to the fact that GnuPG does not use use any patented algorithm,
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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it cannot be compatible with PGP2 versions; PGP 2.x does only use
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1998-04-14 19:51:16 +02:00
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IDEA (which is patented worldwide) and RSA (which is patented in
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1998-06-25 13:08:18 +02:00
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the United States until Sep 20, 2000).
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1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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The default algorithms are now DSA and ElGamal. ElGamal for signing
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1998-06-25 13:08:18 +02:00
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is still available, but due to the larger size of such signatures it
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1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
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is depreciated (Please note that the GnuPG implementation of ElGamal
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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signatures is *not* insecure). Symmetric algorithms are: 3DES,
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Blowfish and CAST5 (Twofish will come soon), available digest
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algorithms are MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA1 and TIGER/192.
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1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
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1998-01-05 20:13:15 +01:00
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1998-01-12 11:18:17 +01:00
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Installation
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------------
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1998-10-07 15:30:43 +02:00
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Please read the file INSTALL!
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1998-09-28 21:25:31 +02:00
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Here is a quick summary:
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1998-01-12 11:18:17 +01:00
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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1) "./configure"
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1998-01-12 11:18:17 +01:00
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2) "make"
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3) "make install"
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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4) You end up with the binaries "gpg" and "gpgm" in /usr/local/bin.
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5) Optional, but suggested: install the binary "gpg" as suid root.
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1998-02-13 21:58:50 +01:00
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1998-01-12 11:18:17 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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Intro
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-----
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This is a brief overview how to use GnuPG - it is highly suggested
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that you read the manual^H^H^H more information about the use
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of cryptography. GnuPG is only the technical tool to do it and
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the security highly depends on that YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING.
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1998-01-12 11:18:17 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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If you already have a DSA key from PGP 5 (they call them DH/ElGamal)
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you can simply copy the pgp keyrings over the GnuPG keyrings after
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running gpg once, so that it can create the correct directory.
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1998-01-12 11:18:17 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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The normal way to create a key is:
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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gpg --gen-key
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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good random numbers for the key parameters, GnuPG needs to gather
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enough noise (entropy) from your system. If you see no progress
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during key generation you should start some other activities such
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as mouse moves or hitting on the CTRL and SHIFT keys.
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Generate a key ONLY on a machine where you have direct physical
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access - don't do it over the network or on a machine used also
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by others - especially if you have no access to the root account.
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When you are asked for a passphrase; use a good one which you can easy
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remember. Don't make the passphrase too long because you have to
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type it for every decryption or signing; but - AND THIS IS VERY
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IMPORTANT - use a good one which is not easily guessable as the
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security of the whole system relies on your secret key and the
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passphrase is used to protect this secret key in case someone was
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able to get access to your secret keyring. A good way to select
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a passphrase is to figure out a short nonsense sentence which makes
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some sense for you and modify it by inserting extra spaces, non-letters
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and changing the case of some characters - this is really easy to
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remember especially if you associate some pictures with it.
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Then you should create a revocation certificate in case someone
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gets knowledge of your secret key or you forgot your passphrase:
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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Run this command and store it away; output is always ASCII armored,
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so that you can print it and (hopefully never) re-create it if
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your electronic media fails.
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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Now you can use your key to create digital signatures:
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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gpg -s file
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-02-24 19:50:46 +01:00
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This creates a file file.gpg which is compressed and has a signature
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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attached.
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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gpg -sa file
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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Same as above, but creates the file.asc which is ascii armored and
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and ready for sending by mail. Note: It is better to use your
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mailers features to create signatures (The mailer uses GnuPG to do
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this) because the mailer has the ability to MIME encode such
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signatures - but this is not a security issue.
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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gpg -s -o out file
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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Creates a signature of file, but writes the output to the file "out".
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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Everyone who knows your public key (you can and should publish
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your key by putting it on a key server, a web page or in your .plan
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file) is now able to check whether you really signed this text;
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1998-07-29 21:35:05 +02:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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gpg --verify file
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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GnuPG now checks whether the signature is valid and prints an
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appropriate message. If the signature is good, you know at least
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that the person (or machine) has access to the secret key which
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corresponds to the published public key.
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If you run gpg without an option it will verify the signature and
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create a new file which is identical to the original file. gpg
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can also run as a filter, so that you can pipe data to verify
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trough it:
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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will check the signature of signed-file and then display the
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number of lines in the original file.
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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To send a message encrypted to someone you can use this:
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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gpg -e -r heine file
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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This encrypts file with the public key of the user "heine" and
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writes it to "file.gpg"
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1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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echo "hallo" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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Ditto, but encrypts "hallo\n" and mails it as ascii armored message
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to the user with the mail address heine.
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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gpg -se -r heine file
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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This encrypts file with the public key of "heine" and writes it
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to "file.gpg" after signing it with your user id.
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
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gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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Ditto, but sign the file with your alternative user id "Suttner"
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1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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GnuPG has some options to help you publish public keys; this is
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called "exporting" a key:
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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gpg --export >all-my-keys
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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exports all the keys in the keyring and writes them (in a binary format)
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to all-my-keys. You may then mail "all-my-keys" as an MIME attachment
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to someone else or put it on an FTP server. To export only some
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user IDs, you give them as arguments on the command line.
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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To mail a public key or put it on a web page you have to create
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the key in ASCII armored format:
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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gpg --export --armor | mail panther@tiger.int
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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This will send all your public keys to your friend panther.
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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If you have received a key from someone else you can put it
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into your public keyring; is called "importing":
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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gpg --import [filenames]
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1998-02-17 21:48:52 +01:00
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1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
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New keys are appended to your keyring and already existing
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keys are updated. Note that GnuPG does not allow keys which
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are not self-signed by the user.
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Because anyone can claim that the public key belongs to her
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we must have some way to check that the public key really belongs
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to the owner. This can be achieved by comparing the key during
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a phone call. Sure, it is not very easy to compare a binary file
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by reading the complete hex dump of the file - GnuPG (and nearly
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every other program used for management of cryptographic keys)
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provides other solutions:
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gpg --fingerprint <username>
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prints the so called "fingerprint" of the given username; this
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is a sequence of hex bytes (which you may have noticed in mail
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sigs or on business cards) which uniquely identify the public
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key - two different keys will always have different fingerprints.
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It is easy to compare this fingerprint by phone and I suggest
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that you print your fingerprint on the back of your business
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card.
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If you don't know the owner of the public key you are in trouble;
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but wait: A friend of you knows someone who knows someone who
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has met the owner of the public key at some computer conference.
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So all the persons between you and the public key holder may now
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act as introducer to you; this is done by signing the keys and
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thereby certifying the other keys. If you then trust all the
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introducers to correctly sign other keys, you can be be sure that
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the other key really belongs to the one who claims so.
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There are 2 steps to validate a target key:
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1. First check that there is a complete chain
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of signed keys from the public key you want to use
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and your key and verify each signature.
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2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates
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of all the introduces between the public key holder and
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you.
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Step 2 is the more complicated part because there is no easy way
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for a computer to decide who is trustworthy and who is not. GnuPG
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leaves this decision to you and will ask you for a trust value
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(here also referenced as the owner-trust of a key) for every key
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needed to check the chain of certificates. You may choose from:
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a) "I don't know" - then it is not possible to use any
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of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used
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as an introducer, to validate the target key. Use this if
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you don't know the introducer.
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b) "I do not trust" - Use this if you know that the introducer
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does not do a good job in certifying other keys. The effect
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is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to
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change the value because you got new information about this
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introducer.
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c) "I trust marginally" - Use this if you assume that the
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introducer knows what he is doing. Together with some
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other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target
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key then as good.
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d) "I fully trust" - Use this if you really know that this
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introducer does a good job when certifying other keys.
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If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG
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normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate
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a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help
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of some options).
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These information are confidential because they give your
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personal opinion on the trustworthy of someone else. Therefore
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this data is not stored in the keyring but in the "trustdb"
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(~/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg). Do not assign a high trust value just
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because the introducer is a friend of you - decide how far she
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understands all the implications of key signatures and you may
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want to tell him more about public key cryptography so you
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can later change the trust value you assigned.
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Okay, here is how GnuPG helps you in key management: Most stuff is
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done with the --edit-key command:
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gpg --edit-key <keyid or username>
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GnuPG displays some information about the key and then prompts
|
|
|
|
for a command (enter "help" to see a list of commands and see
|
|
|
|
the man page for a more detailed explanation). To sign a key
|
|
|
|
you select the user ID you want to sign by entering the number
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|
|
|
which is displayed in the leftmost column (or do nothing if the
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|
|
|
key has only one user ID) and then enter the command "sign" and
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|
follow all the prompts. When you are ready, give the command
|
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"save" (or use "quit" to cancel your actions).
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If you want to sign the key with another user ID of yours, you
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must give an "-u" option on the command line together with the
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|
|
"--edit-key".
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Normally you want to sign only one user ID because GnuPG
|
|
|
|
does only use one and this keeps the public key certificate
|
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|
|
small. Because such key signatures are very important you
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|
should make sure that the signators of your key sign a user ID
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which is very likely to stay for a long time - choose one with an
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|
|
email address you have full control of or do not enter an email
|
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|
|
address at all. In future GnuPG will have a way to tell which
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|
|
user ID is the one with an email address you prefer - because
|
|
|
|
you have no signatures on this email address it is easy to change
|
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|
|
this address. Remember: Your signators sign your public key (the
|
|
|
|
primary one) together with one od your user IDs - so it is not possible
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|
|
to change the user ID later without voiding all the signatures.
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Tip: If you hear about a key signing party on a computer conference
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|
|
join it because this is a very convenient way to get your key
|
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|
|
certified (But remember that signatures have nothing to to with the
|
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|
|
trust you assign to a key).
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7 Ways to Specify a User ID
|
|
|
|
--------------------------
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|
There are several ways to specify a user ID, here are some examples:
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
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|
|
1998-02-26 17:56:31 +01:00
|
|
|
* Only by the short keyid (prepend a zero if it begins with A..F):
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
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|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
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|
"234567C4"
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"0F34E556E"
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"01347A56A"
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"0xAB123456
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
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|
|
* By a complete keyid:
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|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"234AABBCC34567C4"
|
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|
"0F323456784E56EAB"
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|
"01AB3FED1347A5612"
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|
"0x234AABBCC34567C4"
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
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|
1998-04-09 13:19:09 +02:00
|
|
|
* By a fingerprint:
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
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|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"1234343434343434C434343434343434"
|
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|
|
"123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434"
|
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|
|
"0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434"
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
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|
|
The first one is MD5 the others are ripemd160 or sha1.
|
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|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
* By an exact string:
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
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|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"=Heinrich Heine <heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* By an email address:
|
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|
|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"<heinrichh@uni-duesseldorf.de>"
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
* By the Local ID (from the trust DB):
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"#34"
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
This may be used by a MUA to specify an exact key after selecting
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
a key from GnuPG (by the use of a special option or an extra utility)
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* Or by the usual substring:
|
|
|
|
|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
"Heine"
|
|
|
|
"*Heine"
|
1998-01-26 23:09:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The '*' indicates substring search explicitly.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
Batch mode
|
|
|
|
----------
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
If you use the option "--batch", GnuPG runs in non-interactive mode and
|
1998-04-14 19:51:16 +02:00
|
|
|
never prompts for input data. This does not even allow entering the
|
1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
passphrase; until we have a better solution (something like ssh-agent),
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
you can use the option "--passphrase-fd n", which works like PGPs
|
1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
PGPPASSFD.
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
Batch mode also causes GnuPG to terminate as soon as a BAD signature is
|
1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Exit status
|
|
|
|
-----------
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
GnuPG returns with an exit status of 1 if in batch mode and a bad signature
|
1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
has been detected or 2 or higher for all other errors. You should parse
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
stderr or better the output of the fd specified with --status-fd to get
|
|
|
|
detailed information about the errors.
|
1998-01-02 21:40:10 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
Esoteric commands
|
|
|
|
-----------------
|
|
|
|
|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
gpg --list-packets datafile
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Use this to list the contents of a data file. If the file is encrypted
|
1998-10-16 18:00:17 +02:00
|
|
|
you are asked for the passphrase, so that GnuPG is able to look at the
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
inner structure of a encrypted packet. This command should be able
|
|
|
|
to list all kinds of rfc2440 messages.
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
gpgm --list-trustdb
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
List the contents of the trust DB in a human readable format
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-07-14 19:10:28 +02:00
|
|
|
gpgm --list-trustdb <usernames>
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
List the tree of certificates for the given usernames
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
gpgm --list-trust-path username
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
List the possible trust paths for the given username. The length
|
|
|
|
of such a trust path is limited by the option --max-cert-depth
|
|
|
|
which defaults to 5.
|
1998-01-24 17:32:27 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
For more options/commands see the man page or use "gpg --help".
|
1997-12-20 18:23:29 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Other Notes
|
|
|
|
-----------
|
|
|
|
|
1998-12-17 18:36:05 +01:00
|
|
|
The primary FTP site is "ftp://ftp.gnupg.org/pub/gcrypt/"
|
|
|
|
The primary WWW page is "http://www.gnupg.org"
|
1998-02-13 21:58:50 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
See http://www.gnugp.org/mirrors.html for a list of FTP mirrors
|
|
|
|
and use them if possible.
|
1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-06-25 13:08:18 +02:00
|
|
|
Please direct bug reports to <gnupg-bugs@gnu.org> or better
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
post them to the mailing list <g10@net.lut.ac.uk> (this is a
|
|
|
|
closed list - subscribe before posting, see above (~line 33)).
|
|
|
|
Please direct questions about GnuPG to the mailing list or
|
|
|
|
one of the pgp newsgroups; this gives me more time to improve
|
|
|
|
GnuPG. Commercial support for GnuPG will be availabe soon.
|
1997-12-16 20:15:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 13:41:40 +01:00
|
|
|
Have fun and remember: Echelon is looking at you kid.
|
1998-11-08 18:23:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
1998-12-23 17:16:57 +01:00
|
|
|
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
|
|
|
|
Version: GnuPG v0.4.5 (GNU/Linux)
|
|
|
|
Comment: For info finger gcrypt@ftp.guug.de
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
iQB1AwUBNoD99h0Z9MEMmFelAQEuQwMAgfNPPUByoNlp0qGimiHADZE+8E15rmwq
|
|
|
|
RhVhH63pEgMsPvazd01cMM9EwJyD80jjOrdZo1fyE2270NU4AjSlNsEkQ0pNZYg+
|
|
|
|
N4GL70jrOtIvclVhcsQye8J53a/fzJe7
|
|
|
|
=5+Dt
|
|
|
|
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|