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gnupg/g10/keylist.c

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1998-03-05 10:22:13 +01:00
/* keylist.c
* Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006,
* 2008, 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
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*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "errors.h"
#include "keydb.h"
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#include "memory.h"
#include "photoid.h"
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#include "util.h"
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#include "ttyio.h"
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#include "trustdb.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "i18n.h"
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#include "status.h"
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static void list_all(int);
static void list_one( STRLIST names, int secret);
static void print_card_serialno (PKT_secret_key *sk);
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struct sig_stats
{
int inv_sigs;
int no_key;
int oth_err;
};
static FILE *attrib_fp=NULL;
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/****************
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* List the keys
* If list is NULL, all available keys are listed
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*/
void
public_key_list( STRLIST list )
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{
if(opt.with_colons)
{
byte trust_model,marginals,completes,cert_depth,min_cert_level;
ulong created,nextcheck;
read_trust_options(&trust_model,&created,&nextcheck,
&marginals,&completes,&cert_depth,&min_cert_level);
printf("tru:");
if(nextcheck && nextcheck <= make_timestamp())
printf("o");
if(trust_model!=opt.trust_model)
printf("t");
if(opt.trust_model==TM_PGP || opt.trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
{
if(marginals!=opt.marginals_needed)
printf("m");
if(completes!=opt.completes_needed)
printf("c");
if(cert_depth!=opt.max_cert_depth)
printf("d");
if(min_cert_level!=opt.min_cert_level)
printf("l");
}
printf(":%d:%lu:%lu",trust_model,created,nextcheck);
/* Only show marginals, completes, and cert_depth in the classic
or PGP trust models since they are not meaningful
otherwise. */
if(trust_model==TM_PGP || trust_model==TM_CLASSIC)
printf(":%d:%d:%d",marginals,completes,cert_depth);
printf("\n");
}
/* We need to do the stale check right here because it might need to
update the keyring while we already have the keyring open. This
is very bad for W32 because of a sharing violation. For real OSes
it might lead to false results if we are later listing a keyring
which is associated with the inode of a deleted file. */
check_trustdb_stale ();
if( !list )
list_all(0);
else
list_one( list, 0 );
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}
void
secret_key_list( STRLIST list )
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{
check_trustdb_stale ();
if( !list )
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list_all(1);
else /* List by user id */
list_one( list, 1 );
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}
void
print_seckey_info (PKT_secret_key *sk)
{
u32 keyid[2];
char *p;
keyid_from_sk (sk, keyid);
p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
tty_printf ("\nsec %4u%c/%s %s %s\n",
nbits_from_sk (sk),
pubkey_letter (sk->pubkey_algo),
keystr(keyid), datestr_from_sk (sk), p);
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xfree (p);
}
/* Print information about the public key. With FP passed as NULL,
the tty output interface is used, otherwise output is directted to
the given stream. */
void
print_pubkey_info (FILE *fp, PKT_public_key *pk)
{
u32 keyid[2];
char *p;
keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
/* If the pk was chosen by a particular user ID, that is the one to
print. */
if(pk->user_id)
p=utf8_to_native(pk->user_id->name,pk->user_id->len,0);
else
p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
if (fp)
fprintf (fp, "pub %4u%c/%s %s %s\n",
nbits_from_pk (pk),
pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p);
else
tty_printf ("\npub %4u%c/%s %s %s\n",
nbits_from_pk (pk), pubkey_letter (pk->pubkey_algo),
keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk (pk), p);
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xfree (p);
}
/* Print basic information of a secret key including the card serial
number information. */
void
print_card_key_info (FILE *fp, KBNODE keyblock)
{
KBNODE node;
int i;
for (node = keyblock; node; node = node->next )
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
|| (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) )
{
PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
tty_fprintf (fp, "%s%c %4u%c/%s ",
node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY? "sec":"ssb",
(sk->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':
(sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)?'>':' ',
nbits_from_sk (sk),
pubkey_letter (sk->pubkey_algo),
keystr_from_sk(sk));
tty_fprintf (fp, _("created: %s"), datestr_from_sk (sk));
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_sk (sk));
if (sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
{
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n ");
tty_fprintf (fp, _("card-no: "));
if (sk->protect.ivlen == 16
&& !memcmp (sk->protect.iv, "\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6))
{
/* This is an OpenPGP card. */
for (i=8; i < 14; i++)
{
if (i == 10)
tty_fprintf (fp, " ");
tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
}
}
else
{ /* Something is wrong: Print all. */
for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
tty_fprintf (fp, "%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
}
}
tty_fprintf (fp, "\n");
}
}
}
/* Flags = 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical */
static void
status_one_subpacket(sigsubpkttype_t type,size_t len,int flags,const byte *buf)
{
char status[40];
/* Don't print these. */
if(len>256)
return;
sprintf(status,"%d %u %u ",type,flags,(unsigned int)len);
write_status_text_and_buffer(STATUS_SIG_SUBPACKET,status,buf,len,0);
}
/*
mode=0 for stdout.
mode=1 for log_info + status messages
mode=2 for status messages only
*/
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void
show_policy_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
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{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
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while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_POLICY,&len,&seq,&crit)))
{
if(mode!=2)
{
int i;
const char *str;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
if(crit)
str=_("Critical signature policy: ");
else
str=_("Signature policy: ");
if(mode)
log_info("%s",str);
else
printf("%s",str);
print_utf8_string(fp,p,len);
fprintf(fp,"\n");
}
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if(mode)
write_status_buffer ( STATUS_POLICY_URL, p, len, 0 );
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}
}
/*
mode=0 for stdout.
mode=1 for log_info + status messages
mode=2 for status messages only
*/
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
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/* TODO: use this */
void
show_keyserver_url(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode)
{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq=0,crit;
FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&len,&seq,&crit)))
{
if(mode!=2)
{
int i;
const char *str;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
if(crit)
str=_("Critical preferred keyserver: ");
else
str=_("Preferred keyserver: ");
if(mode)
log_info("%s",str);
else
printf("%s",str);
print_utf8_string(fp,p,len);
fprintf(fp,"\n");
}
if(mode)
status_one_subpacket(SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,len,(crit?0x02:0)|0x01,p);
}
}
/*
mode=0 for stdout.
mode=1 for log_info + status messages
mode=2 for status messages only
which bits:
1 == standard notations
2 == user notations
*/
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void
show_notation(PKT_signature *sig,int indent,int mode,int which)
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{
FILE *fp=mode?log_stream():stdout;
struct notation *nd,*notations;
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if(which==0)
which=3;
notations=sig_to_notation(sig);
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/* There may be multiple notations in the same sig. */
for(nd=notations;nd;nd=nd->next)
{
if(mode!=2)
{
int has_at=!!strchr(nd->name,'@');
if((which&1 && !has_at) || (which&2 && has_at))
{
int i;
const char *str;
for(i=0;i<indent;i++)
putchar(' ');
if(nd->flags.critical)
str=_("Critical signature notation: ");
else
str=_("Signature notation: ");
if(mode)
log_info("%s",str);
else
printf("%s",str);
/* This is all UTF8 */
print_utf8_string(fp,nd->name,strlen(nd->name));
fprintf(fp,"=");
print_utf8_string(fp,nd->value,strlen(nd->value));
fprintf(fp,"\n");
}
}
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if(mode)
{
write_status_buffer(STATUS_NOTATION_NAME,
nd->name,strlen(nd->name),0);
write_status_buffer(STATUS_NOTATION_DATA,
nd->value,strlen(nd->value),50);
}
}
free_notation(notations);
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}
static void
print_signature_stats(struct sig_stats *s)
{
if( s->inv_sigs == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 bad signature\n") );
else if( s->inv_sigs )
tty_printf(_("%d bad signatures\n"), s->inv_sigs );
if( s->no_key == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to a missing key\n") );
else if( s->no_key )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to missing keys\n"),s->no_key);
if( s->oth_err == 1 )
tty_printf(_("1 signature not checked due to an error\n") );
else if( s->oth_err )
tty_printf(_("%d signatures not checked due to errors\n"), s->oth_err );
}
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static void
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list_all( int secret )
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{
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KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
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KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
int rc=0;
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const char *lastresname, *resname;
struct sig_stats stats;
memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
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hd = keydb_new (secret);
if (!hd)
rc = G10ERR_GENERAL;
else
rc = keydb_search_first (hd);
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if( rc ) {
if( rc != -1 )
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log_error("keydb_search_first failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
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goto leave;
}
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lastresname = NULL;
do {
rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
if (rc) {
log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
goto leave;
}
if(!opt.with_colons)
{
resname = keydb_get_resource_name (hd);
if (lastresname != resname )
{
int i;
printf("%s\n", resname );
for(i=strlen(resname); i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
lastresname = resname;
}
}
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merge_keys_and_selfsig( keyblock );
list_keyblock( keyblock, secret, opt.fingerprint,
opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL);
release_kbnode( keyblock );
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keyblock = NULL;
} while (!(rc = keydb_search_next (hd)));
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if( rc && rc != -1 )
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log_error ("keydb_search_next failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
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if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
print_signature_stats(&stats);
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leave:
release_kbnode (keyblock);
keydb_release (hd);
}
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static void
list_one( STRLIST names, int secret )
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{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
GETKEY_CTX ctx;
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const char *resname;
const char *keyring_str = _("Keyring");
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int i;
struct sig_stats stats;
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memset(&stats,0,sizeof(stats));
/* fixme: using the bynames function has the disadvantage that we
* don't know wether one of the names given was not found. OTOH,
* this function has the advantage to list the names in the
* sequence as defined by the keyDB and does not duplicate
* outputs. A solution could be do test whether all given have
* been listed (this needs a way to use the keyDB search
* functions) or to have the search function return indicators for
* found names. Yet another way is to use the keydb search
* facilities directly. */
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if( secret ) {
rc = get_seckey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
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if( rc ) {
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log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
get_seckey_end( ctx );
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return;
}
do {
if ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) {
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resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
}
list_keyblock( keyblock, 1, opt.fingerprint, NULL );
release_kbnode( keyblock );
} while( !get_seckey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
get_seckey_end( ctx );
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}
else {
rc = get_pubkey_bynames( &ctx, NULL, names, &keyblock );
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if( rc ) {
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log_error("error reading key: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
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get_pubkey_end( ctx );
return;
}
do {
if ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYRING) && !opt.with_colons) {
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resname = keydb_get_resource_name (get_ctx_handle(ctx));
printf("%s: %s\n", keyring_str, resname);
for(i = strlen(resname) + strlen(keyring_str) + 2; i; i-- )
putchar('-');
putchar('\n');
}
list_keyblock( keyblock, 0, opt.fingerprint,
opt.check_sigs?&stats:NULL );
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release_kbnode( keyblock );
} while( !get_pubkey_next( ctx, NULL, &keyblock ) );
get_pubkey_end( ctx );
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}
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if(opt.check_sigs && !opt.with_colons)
print_signature_stats(&stats);
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}
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static void
print_key_data( PKT_public_key *pk )
{
int n = pk ? pubkey_get_npkey( pk->pubkey_algo ) : 0;
int i;
for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
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printf("pkd:%d:%u:", i, mpi_get_nbits( pk->pkey[i] ) );
mpi_print(stdout, pk->pkey[i], 1 );
putchar(':');
putchar('\n');
}
}
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static void
print_capabilities (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock)
{
if(pk || (sk && sk->protect.s2k.mode!=1001))
{
unsigned int use = pk? pk->pubkey_usage : sk->pubkey_usage;
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int c_printed = 0;
if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
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putchar ('e');
if ( use & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
{
putchar ('s');
if( pk? pk->is_primary : sk->is_primary )
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{
putchar ('c');
/* The PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT flag was introduced later and
we used to always print 'c' for a primary key. To
avoid any regression here we better track whether we
printed 'c' already. */
c_printed = 1;
}
}
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if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) && !c_printed )
putchar ('c');
if ( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
putchar ('a');
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}
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
if ( keyblock ) { /* figure out the usable capabilities */
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KBNODE k;
int enc=0, sign=0, cert=0, auth=0, disabled=0;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
if(pk->is_primary)
disabled=pk_is_disabled(pk);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if ( pk->is_valid && !pk->is_revoked && !pk->has_expired ) {
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
enc = 1;
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
{
sign = 1;
if(pk->is_primary)
cert = 1;
}
2009-02-09 12:14:42 +01:00
if ( pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT )
cert = 1;
if ( (pk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
auth = 1;
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}
}
else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
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|| k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
if ( sk->is_valid && !sk->is_revoked && !sk->has_expired
&& sk->protect.s2k.mode!=1001 ) {
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if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC )
enc = 1;
if ( sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG )
{
sign = 1;
if(sk->is_primary)
cert = 1;
}
2009-02-09 12:14:42 +01:00
if ( (sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) )
cert = 1;
if ( (sk->pubkey_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH) )
auth = 1;
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}
}
}
if (enc)
putchar ('E');
if (sign)
putchar ('S');
if (cert)
putchar ('C');
if (auth)
putchar ('A');
if (disabled)
putchar ('D');
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}
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putchar(':');
}
/* Flags = 0x01 hashed 0x02 critical */
static void
print_one_subpacket(sigsubpkttype_t type,size_t len,int flags,const byte *buf)
{
size_t i;
printf("spk:%d:%u:%u:",type,flags,(unsigned int)len);
for(i=0;i<len;i++)
{
/* printable ascii other than : and % */
if(buf[i]>=32 && buf[i]<=126 && buf[i]!=':' && buf[i]!='%')
printf("%c",buf[i]);
else
printf("%%%02X",buf[i]);
}
printf("\n");
}
void
print_subpackets_colon(PKT_signature *sig)
{
byte *i;
assert(opt.show_subpackets);
for(i=opt.show_subpackets;*i;i++)
{
const byte *p;
size_t len;
int seq,crit;
seq=0;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,*i,&len,&seq,&crit)))
print_one_subpacket(*i,len,0x01|(crit?0x02:0),p);
seq=0;
while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->unhashed,*i,&len,&seq,&crit)))
print_one_subpacket(*i,len,0x00|(crit?0x02:0),p);
}
}
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
void
dump_attribs(const PKT_user_id *uid,PKT_public_key *pk,PKT_secret_key *sk)
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
{
int i;
if(!attrib_fp)
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
return;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
for(i=0;i<uid->numattribs;i++)
{
if(is_status_enabled())
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
char buf[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+90];
size_t j,n;
if(pk)
fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
else if(sk)
fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
else
BUG();
p = array;
for(j=0; j < n ; j++, p++ )
sprintf(buf+2*j, "%02X", *p );
sprintf(buf+strlen(buf)," %lu %u %u %u %lu %lu %u",
(ulong)uid->attribs[i].len,uid->attribs[i].type,i+1,
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
uid->numattribs,(ulong)uid->created,(ulong)uid->expiredate,
((uid->is_primary?0x01:0)|
(uid->is_revoked?0x02:0)|
(uid->is_expired?0x04:0)));
write_status_text(STATUS_ATTRIBUTE,buf);
}
fwrite(uid->attribs[i].data,uid->attribs[i].len,1,attrib_fp);
}
}
1998-03-19 16:27:29 +01:00
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
static void
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list_keyblock_print ( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
struct sig_stats *stats=opaque;
int skip_sigs=0;
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
if( !node ) {
1998-05-29 13:53:54 +02:00
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
1998-10-21 19:34:36 +02:00
return;
1998-03-09 22:44:06 +01:00
}
if( secret )
{
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
printf("sec%c %4u%c/%s %s",(sk->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':
(sk->protect.s2k.mode==1002)?'>':' ',
nbits_from_sk( sk ),pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
keystr_from_sk(sk),datestr_from_sk( sk ));
if(sk->has_expired)
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk));
printf("]");
}
else if(sk->expiredate )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk));
printf("]");
}
printf("\n");
}
else
{
1998-06-29 14:30:57 +02:00
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
check_trustdb_stale();
printf("pub %4u%c/%s %s",
nbits_from_pk(pk),pubkey_letter(pk->pubkey_algo),
keystr_from_pk(pk),datestr_from_pk( pk ));
/* We didn't include this before in the key listing, but there
is room in the new format, so why not? */
if(pk->is_revoked)
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
printf("]");
}
else if(pk->has_expired)
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
printf("]");
}
else if(pk->expiredate)
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
printf("]");
}
#if 0
/* I need to think about this some more. It's easy enough to
include, but it looks sort of confusing in the
listing... */
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_VALIDITY)
{
int validity=get_validity(pk,NULL);
printf(" [%s]",trust_value_to_string(validity));
}
#endif
printf("\n");
}
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
print_card_serialno (sk);
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk );
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if(pk && (uid->is_expired || uid->is_revoked)
&& !(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
{
skip_sigs=1;
continue;
}
else
skip_sigs=0;
if(attrib_fp && uid->attrib_data!=NULL)
dump_attribs(uid,pk,sk);
* trustdb.h, trustdb.c (is_disabled), gpgv.c (is_disabled): Rename is_disabled to cache_disabled_value, which now takes a pk and not just the keyid. This is for speed since there is no need to re-fetch a key when we already have that key handy. Cache the result of the check so we don't need to hit the trustdb more than once. * getkey.c (skip_disabled): New function to get a pk and call is_disabled on it. (key_byname): Use it here. * packet.h, getkey.c (skip_disabled), keylist.c (print_capabilities): New "pk_is_disabled" macro to retrieve the cached disabled value if available, and fill it in via cache_disabled_value if not available. * trustdb.c (get_validity): Cache the disabled value since we have it handy and it might be useful later. * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Clear disabled flag when parsing a new key. Just in case someone forgets to clear the whole key. * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add an "if all else fails" path for setting a single user ID primary when there are multiple set primaries all at the same second, or no primaries set and the most recent user IDs are at the same second, or no signed user IDs at all. This is arbitrary, but deterministic. * exec.h, photoid.h: Add copyright message. * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): Don't dump attribs for revoked/expired/etc uids for non-colon key listings. This is for consistency with --show-photos. * main.h, keylist.c (dump_attribs), mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Dump attribs if --attrib-fd is set when verifying signatures. * g10.c (main): New --gnupg option to disable the various --openpgp, --pgpX, etc. options. This is the same as --no-XXXX for those options. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): Clear old reason if user elects to repeat question. This is bug 153. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Show keyid of the key making the signature.
2003-05-21 18:42:22 +02:00
if((uid->is_revoked || uid->is_expired)
|| ((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY) && pk))
{
const char *validity;
int indent;
validity=uid_trust_string_fixed(pk,uid);
indent=(keystrlen()+9)-atoi(uid_trust_string_fixed(NULL,NULL));
if(indent<0 || indent>40)
indent=0;
printf("uid%*s%s ",indent,"",validity);
}
else
printf("uid%*s", (int)keystrlen()+10,"");
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
print_utf8_string( stdout, uid->name, uid->len );
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
putchar('\n');
if((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_PHOTOS) && uid->attribs!=NULL)
show_photos(uid->attribs,uid->numattribs,pk,sk,uid);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
{
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
if((pk2->is_revoked || pk2->has_expired)
&& !(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_UNUSABLE_SUBKEYS))
{
skip_sigs=1;
continue;
}
else
skip_sigs=0;
printf("sub %4u%c/%s %s",
nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),pubkey_letter( pk2->pubkey_algo ),
keystr_from_pk(pk2),datestr_from_pk(pk2));
if( pk2->is_revoked )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk2));
printf("]");
}
else if( pk2->has_expired )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expired: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk2));
printf("]");
}
else if( pk2->expiredate )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk2));
printf("]");
}
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
putchar('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2 );
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
{
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
printf("ssb%c %4u%c/%s %s",
(sk2->protect.s2k.mode==1001)?'#':
(sk2->protect.s2k.mode==1002)?'>':' ',
nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),pubkey_letter( sk2->pubkey_algo ),
keystr_from_sk(sk2),datestr_from_sk( sk2 ) );
if( sk2->expiredate )
{
printf(" [");
printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_sk(sk2));
printf("]");
}
putchar('\n');
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( fpr > 1 )
{
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
print_card_serialno (sk2);
}
}
else if( opt.list_sigs
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& !skip_sigs ) {
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
char *sigstr;
if( stats ) {
/*fflush(stdout);*/
rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL );
switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: stats->inv_sigs++; sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: stats->no_key++; continue;
default: stats->oth_err++; sigrc = '%'; break;
}
/* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has
the pk that issued it. See also
keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */
}
else {
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
sigstr = "sig";
else {
printf("sig "
"[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",sig->sig_class );
continue;
}
fputs( sigstr, stdout );
printf("%c%c %c%c%c%c%c%c %s %s",
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
sigrc,(sig->sig_class-0x10>0 &&
sig->sig_class-0x10<4)?'0'+sig->sig_class-0x10:' ',
sig->flags.exportable?' ':'L',
sig->flags.revocable?' ':'R',
sig->flags.policy_url?'P':' ',
sig->flags.notation?'N':' ',
sig->flags.expired?'X':' ',
(sig->trust_depth>9)?'T':
(sig->trust_depth>0)?'0'+sig->trust_depth:' ',
keystr(sig->keyid),datestr_from_sig(sig));
if(opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_SIG_EXPIRE)
printf(" %s", expirestr_from_sig(sig));
printf(" ");
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if( sigrc == '%' )
printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
print_utf8_string( stdout, p, n );
2005-07-27 20:10:56 +02:00
xfree(p);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
}
putchar('\n');
if(sig->flags.policy_url
&& (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
show_policy_url(sig,3,0);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if(sig->flags.notation && (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
show_notation(sig,3,0,
((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
((opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
if(sig->flags.pref_ks
&& (opt.list_options&LIST_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
show_keyserver_url(sig,3,0);
2002-06-29 15:46:34 +02:00
/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
}
}
putchar('\n');
}
void
print_revokers(PKT_public_key *pk)
{
/* print the revoker record */
if( !pk->revkey && pk->numrevkeys )
BUG();
else
{
int i,j;
for (i=0; i < pk->numrevkeys; i++)
{
byte *p;
printf ("rvk:::%d::::::", pk->revkey[i].algid);
p = pk->revkey[i].fpr;
for (j=0; j < 20; j++, p++ )
printf ("%02X", *p);
printf (":%02x%s:\n", pk->revkey[i].class,
(pk->revkey[i].class&0x40)?"s":"");
}
}
}
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static void
list_keyblock_colon( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr )
{
int rc = 0;
KBNODE kbctx;
KBNODE node;
PKT_public_key *pk;
PKT_secret_key *sk;
u32 keyid[2];
int any=0;
int trustletter = 0;
int ulti_hack = 0;
int i;
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/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, secret? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node ) {
log_error("Oops; key lost!\n");
dump_kbnode( keyblock );
return;
}
if( secret ) {
pk = NULL;
sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
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printf("sec::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
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nbits_from_sk( sk ),
sk->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID here */ );
}
else {
pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
sk = NULL;
keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
fputs( "pub:", stdout );
if ( !pk->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
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;
else {
trustletter = get_validity_info ( pk, NULL );
if( trustletter == 'u' )
ulti_hack = 1;
putchar(trustletter);
}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
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nbits_from_pk( pk ),
pk->pubkey_algo,
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(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
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colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
if( !opt.fast_list_mode && !opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
putchar( get_ownertrust_info(pk) );
putchar(':');
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}
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if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
/* do not merge the first uid with the primary key */
putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
if (secret) {
putchar(':'); /* End of field 13. */
putchar(':'); /* End of field 14. */
if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
putchar('#'); /* Key is just a stub. */
else if (sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) {
/* Key is stored on an external token (card) or handled by
the gpg-agent. Print the serial number of that token
here. */
for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
}
putchar(':'); /* End of field 15. */
}
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putchar('\n');
if(pk)
print_revokers(pk);
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if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk );
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any = 1;
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}
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for( kbctx=NULL; (node=walk_kbnode( keyblock, &kbctx, 0)) ; ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
PKT_user_id *uid=node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
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if(attrib_fp && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data!=NULL)
dump_attribs(node->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,sk);
/*
* Fixme: We need a is_valid flag here too
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*/
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if( any ) {
char *str=uid->attrib_data?"uat":"uid";
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
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/* If we're listing a secret key, leave out the
validity values for now. This is handled better in
1.9. */
if ( sk )
printf("%s:::::",str);
else if ( uid->is_revoked )
printf("%s:r::::",str);
else if ( uid->is_expired )
printf("%s:e::::",str);
* parse-packet.c (parse_signature): No need to reserve 8 bytes for the unhashed signature cache any longer. * misc.c (pct_expando): Add two new expandos - signer's fingerprint (%g), and signer's primary fingerprint (%p). * Makefile.am: Include W32LIBS where appropriate. * g10.c (main): Add --rfc2440 alias for --openpgp since in a few months, they won't be the same thing. * keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_uri): Accept "http" as an alias for "hkp", since it is occasionally written that way. (keyserver_spawn): Use ascii_isspace to avoid locale issues. * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Make --allow-freeform-uid apply to the email field as well as the name field, and allow mixing fields when it is set. * options.skel: Use subkeys.pgp.net as the default keyserver. * trustdb.c (validate_one_keyblock): Certifications on revoked or expired uids do not count in the web of trust. * signal.c (init_one_signal, pause_on_sigusr, do_block): Only use sigprocmask() if we have sigset_t, and only use sigaction() if we have struct sigaction. This is for Forte c89 on Solaris which seems to define only the function call half of the two pairs by default. (pause_on_sigusr): Typo. (do_block): If we can't use sigprocmask() and sigset_t, try to get the number of signals from NSIG as well as MAXSIG, and if we can't, fail with an explanation. * signal.c, tdbio.c: Comment out the transaction code. It was not used in this version, and was causing some build problems on quasi-posix platforms (Solaris and Forte c89). * keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Don't include validity values when listing secret keys since they can be incorrect and/or misleading. This is a temporary kludge, and will be handled properly in 1.9/2.0. * mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Only show the "key available from" preferred keyserver line if the key is not currently present. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Do not sign expired uids without --expert (same behavior as revoked uids). Do not allow signing a user ID without a self-signature. --expert overrides. Add additional prompt to the signature level question. (menu_expire): When changing expiration dates, don't replace selfsigs on revoked uids since this would effectively unrevoke them. There is also no point in replacing expired selfsigs. This is bug #181 * g10.c (add_notation_data): Make sure that only ascii is passed to iscntrl. Noted by Christian Biere. * getkey.c (classify_user_id2): Replaced isspace by spacep * keygen.c (ask_user_id): Ditto. (get_parameter_algo): Ditto. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Ditto. * tdbdump.c (import_ownertrust): Ditto. s/isxdigit/hexdigitp/. * revoke.c (ask_revocation_reason): * keyserver.c (keyserver_spawn): Dito.
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else if ( opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
printf("%s:::::",str);
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else {
int uid_validity;
if( pk && !ulti_hack )
uid_validity=get_validity_info (pk, uid);
else
uid_validity = 'u';
printf("%s:%c::::",str,uid_validity);
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}
printf("%s:",colon_strtime(uid->created));
printf("%s:",colon_strtime(uid->expiredate));
namehash_from_uid(uid);
for(i=0; i < 20; i++ )
printf("%02X",uid->namehash[i]);
printf("::");
}
if(uid->attrib_data)
printf("%u %lu",uid->numattribs,uid->attrib_len);
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else
print_string(stdout,uid->name,uid->len, ':' );
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putchar(':');
if (any)
putchar('\n');
else {
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk );
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any = 1;
}
}
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else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
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u32 keyid2[2];
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PKT_public_key *pk2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
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if( !any ) {
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putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
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any = 1;
}
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keyid_from_pk( pk2, keyid2 );
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fputs ("sub:", stdout );
if ( !pk2->is_valid )
putchar ('i');
else if ( pk2->is_revoked )
putchar ('r');
else if ( pk2->has_expired )
putchar ('e');
else if ( opt.fast_list_mode || opt.no_expensive_trust_checks )
;
else {
/* trustletter should always be defined here */
if(trustletter)
printf("%c", trustletter );
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}
printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
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nbits_from_pk( pk2 ),
pk2->pubkey_algo,
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(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
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colon_datestr_from_pk( pk2 ),
colon_strtime (pk2->expiredate)
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/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
);
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print_capabilities (pk2, NULL, NULL);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( pk2, NULL, 0 );
if( opt.with_key_data )
print_key_data( pk2 );
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}
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else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
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u32 keyid2[2];
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PKT_secret_key *sk2 = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
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if( !any ) {
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putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
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putchar('\n');
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if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 ); /* of the main key */
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any = 1;
}
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keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid2 );
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printf("ssb::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::::",
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nbits_from_sk( sk2 ),
sk2->pubkey_algo,
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(ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
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colon_datestr_from_sk( sk2 ),
colon_strtime (sk2->expiredate)
/* fixme: add LID */ );
print_capabilities (NULL, sk2, NULL);
if (opt.fixed_list_mode) {
/* We print the serial number only in fixed list mode
for the primary key so, so avoid questions we print
it for subkeys also only in this mode. There is no
technical reason, though. */
putchar(':'); /* End of field 13. */
putchar(':'); /* End of field 14. */
if (sk2->protect.s2k.mode == 1001)
putchar('#'); /* Key is just a stub. */
else if (sk2->protect.s2k.mode == 1002) {
/* Key is stored on an external token (card) or handled by
the gpg-agent. Print the serial number of that token
here. */
for (i=0; i < sk2->protect.ivlen; i++)
printf ("%02X", sk2->protect.iv[i]);
}
putchar(':'); /* End of field 15. */
}
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putchar ('\n');
if( fpr > 1 )
print_fingerprint( NULL, sk2, 0 );
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}
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else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc,fprokay=0;
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char *sigstr;
size_t fplen;
byte fparray[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
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if( !any ) { /* no user id, (maybe a revocation follows)*/
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 )
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fputs("[revoked]:", stdout);
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else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
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fputs("[key binding]:", stdout);
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x28 )
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fputs("[subkey revoked]:", stdout);
else
putchar (':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
putchar('\n');
if( fpr )
print_fingerprint( pk, sk, 0 );
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any=1;
}
if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
sigstr = "rev";
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else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
sigstr = "sig";
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else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
sigstr = "sig";
else if( sig->sig_class == 0x1F )
sigstr = "sig";
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else {
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printf ("sig::::::::::%02x%c:\n",
sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
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continue;
}
if( opt.check_sigs ) {
PKT_public_key *signer_pk=NULL;
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fflush(stdout);
if(opt.no_sig_cache)
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signer_pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
rc = check_key_signature2( keyblock, node, NULL, signer_pk,
NULL, NULL, NULL );
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switch( rc ) {
case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
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case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN: sigrc = '-'; break;
case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
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case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
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default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
if(opt.no_sig_cache)
{
if(rc==0)
{
fingerprint_from_pk (signer_pk, fparray, &fplen);
fprokay=1;
}
free_public_key(signer_pk);
}
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}
else {
rc = 0;
sigrc = ' ';
}
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fputs( sigstr, stdout );
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
printf(":");
if(sig->trust_regexp)
print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
printf(":");
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if( sigrc == '%' )
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printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc) );
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else if( sigrc == '?' )
;
else if ( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
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size_t n;
char *p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
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print_string( stdout, p, n, ':' );
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xfree(p);
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}
printf(":%02x%c::", sig->sig_class,sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
if(opt.no_sig_cache && opt.check_sigs && fprokay)
{
for (i=0; i < fplen ; i++ )
printf ("%02X", fparray[i] );
}
printf(":::%d:\n", sig->digest_algo);
if(opt.show_subpackets)
print_subpackets_colon(sig);
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/* fixme: check or list other sigs here */
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}
}
if( !any ) {/* oops, no user id */
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putchar(':');
putchar(':');
print_capabilities (pk, sk, keyblock);
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putchar('\n');
}
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}
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/*
* Reorder the keyblock so that the primary user ID (and not attribute
* packet) comes first. Fixme: Replace this by a generic sort
* function. */
static void
do_reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock,int attr)
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{
KBNODE primary = NULL, primary0 = NULL, primary2 = NULL;
KBNODE last, node;
for (node=keyblock; node; primary0=node, node = node->next) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
((attr && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) ||
(!attr && !node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)) &&
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node->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
primary = primary2 = node;
for (node=node->next; node; primary2=node, node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
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|| node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if ( !primary )
return; /* no primary key flag found (should not happen) */
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for (last=NULL, node=keyblock; node; last = node, node = node->next) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
break;
}
assert (node);
assert (last); /* the user ID is never the first packet */
assert (primary0); /* ditto (this is the node before primary) */
if ( node == primary )
return; /* already the first one */
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last->next = primary;
primary0->next = primary2->next;
primary2->next = node;
}
void
reorder_keyblock (KBNODE keyblock)
{
do_reorder_keyblock(keyblock,1);
do_reorder_keyblock(keyblock,0);
}
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void
list_keyblock( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque )
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{
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reorder_keyblock (keyblock);
if (opt.with_colons)
list_keyblock_colon (keyblock, secret, fpr );
else
list_keyblock_print (keyblock, secret, fpr, opaque );
}
/*
* standard function to print the finperprint.
* mode 0: as used in key listings, opt.with_colons is honored
* 1: print using log_info ()
* 2: direct use of tty
* 3: direct use of tty but only primary key.
* modes 1 and 2 will try and print both subkey and primary key fingerprints
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*/
void
print_fingerprint (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk, int mode )
{
byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
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size_t i, n;
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FILE *fp;
const char *text;
int primary=0;
if(sk)
{
if(sk->main_keyid[0]==sk->keyid[0] && sk->main_keyid[1]==sk->keyid[1])
primary=1;
}
else
{
if(pk->main_keyid[0]==pk->keyid[0] && pk->main_keyid[1]==pk->keyid[1])
primary=1;
}
/* Just to be safe */
if(mode&0x80 && !primary)
{
log_error("primary key is not really primary!\n");
return;
}
mode&=~0x80;
if(!primary && (mode==1 || mode==2))
{
if(sk)
{
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PKT_secret_key *primary_sk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_sk));
get_seckey(primary_sk,sk->main_keyid);
print_fingerprint(NULL,primary_sk,mode|0x80);
free_secret_key(primary_sk);
}
else
{
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PKT_public_key *primary_pk=xmalloc_clear(sizeof(*primary_pk));
get_pubkey(primary_pk,pk->main_keyid);
print_fingerprint(primary_pk,NULL,mode|0x80);
free_public_key(primary_pk);
}
}
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if (mode == 1) {
fp = log_stream ();
if(primary)
text = _("Primary key fingerprint:");
else
text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
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}
else if (mode == 2) {
fp = NULL; /* use tty */
if(primary)
/* TRANSLATORS: this should fit into 24 bytes to that the
* fingerprint data is properly aligned with the user ID */
text = _(" Primary key fingerprint:");
else
text = _(" Subkey fingerprint:");
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}
else if (mode == 3) {
fp = NULL; /* use tty */
text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
}
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else {
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fp = stdout;
text = _(" Key fingerprint =");
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}
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if (sk)
fingerprint_from_sk (sk, array, &n);
else
fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
p = array;
if (opt.with_colons && !mode) {
fprintf (fp, "fpr:::::::::");
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
fprintf (fp, "%02X", *p );
putc(':', fp);
}
else {
if (fp)
fputs (text, fp);
else
tty_printf ("%s", text);
if (n == 20) {
for (i=0; i < n ; i++, i++, p += 2 ) {
if (fp) {
if (i == 10 )
putc(' ', fp);
fprintf (fp, " %02X%02X", *p, p[1] );
}
else {
if (i == 10 )
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (" %02X%02X", *p, p[1]);
}
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}
}
else {
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for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) {
if (fp) {
if (i && !(i%8) )
putc (' ', fp);
fprintf (fp, " %02X", *p );
}
else {
if (i && !(i%8) )
tty_printf (" ");
tty_printf (" %02X", *p );
}
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}
}
}
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if (fp)
putc ('\n', fp);
else
tty_printf ("\n");
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}
/* Print the serial number of an OpenPGP card if available. */
static void
print_card_serialno (PKT_secret_key *sk)
{
int i;
if (!sk)
return;
if (!sk->is_protected || sk->protect.s2k.mode != 1002)
return; /* Not a card. */
if (opt.with_colons)
return; /* Handled elsewhere. */
fputs (_(" Card serial no. ="), stdout);
putchar (' ');
if (sk->protect.ivlen == 16
&& !memcmp (sk->protect.iv, "\xD2\x76\x00\x01\x24\x01", 6) )
{ /* This is an OpenPGP card. Just print the relevant part. */
for (i=8; i < 14; i++)
{
if (i == 10)
putchar (' ');
printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
}
}
else
{ /* Something is wrong: Print all. */
for (i=0; i < sk->protect.ivlen; i++)
printf ("%02X", sk->protect.iv[i]);
}
putchar ('\n');
}
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void set_attrib_fd(int fd)
{
static int last_fd=-1;
if ( fd != -1 && last_fd == fd )
return;
if ( attrib_fp && attrib_fp != stdout && attrib_fp != stderr )
fclose (attrib_fp);
attrib_fp = NULL;
if ( fd == -1 )
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return;
if( fd == 1 )
attrib_fp = stdout;
else if( fd == 2 )
attrib_fp = stderr;
else
attrib_fp = fdopen( fd, "wb" );
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if( !attrib_fp ) {
log_fatal("can't open fd %d for attribute output: %s\n",
fd, strerror(errno));
}
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last_fd = fd;
}